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Abstract
This thesis explores and examines the determinants o f corporate hedging o f  exposure to changes 
in exchange rate. A  new finance and contingency theory model o f  currency exposure 
management decision determinants is developed and tested by conducting a two stages survey 
o f Saudi exporting and importing firms. This model suggests that the currency exposure o f  these 
firms is determined by four groups o f  forces. Finance theory is used to develop two 
explanations o f why firms hedge. The first indicates that hedging increases firm value by 
reducing expected financial distress costs, agency conflicts, corporate finance costs, and the 
problem o f  underinvestment. A second explanation is that corporate hedging is attributable to 
managerial risk aversion. Contingency theory is used to develop two further explanations o f  
why firms hedge. It suggest that the hedging decision is also dependent on the firm’s need to 
hedge, and second on the firm’s ability to hedge.
The empirical side o f  this study consists o f  two stages. In the first stage, detailed interviews 
with fifteen risk management decision makers were undertaken to help in exploring and 
building the study framework. In the second stage the research model was tested using a sample 
o f 83 responses from Saudi exporting and importing firms. This study found weak support for 
what previous studies identified as the determinants for hedging incentives and, further, 
suggests a new explanation regarding the role o f  finance theory factors in the hedging decision. 
It found strong support for the hypothesis that corporate hedging is affected, by managerial risk 
aversion. Our findings show that managers’ characteristics appear to be more associated with 
corporate risk management than other organizational and environmental factors. According to 
the managerial risk aversion argument, firms which are controlled by owners, have monetary 
and equity compensation system, and have young managers, are more likely to hedge. In 
addition, the study found that contingency theory offers another two explanations for why 
companies hedge. The first explanation is that hedging decision depends on the firm’s need to 
hedge. According to this explanation, firms with high levels o f  currency exposure, in specific 
industries, in competitive markets, and with operations highly sensitive to changes in exchange 
rates, are more likely to hedge. The second explanation is that the hedging decision depends on 
the firm’s ability to hedge. Firms with qualified staff and risk management decision makers, 
more risk experience, risk management training programme, strong relationships with banks, 
more ability to bear the hedging costs, and active internal involvement o f  operating departments 
in risk management planning, will be more likely to hedge.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The recent growth in international trading and the volatility of exchange rates has raised 
concern about the importance of hedging decisions for a firm, , affected by exchange rate 
movements. Hedging refers to all actions taken to protect a firm against the risks 
resulting from exposure to foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations. The 
international firms normally determine hedging decisions when the exact amount of 
foreign currency to be hedged is as yet unknown, and the future rate of exchange under 
floating exchange rate regimes is uncertain. In so doing, the international firm utilises 
firm specific infonnation about its international operations as well as aggregate foreign 
exchange market information and the firms’ specific hedging determinants. The result 
will be to hedge or not to hedge decisions that vary with the unique circumstances of 
each international firm.
This study considers one of the problematic aspects in the management of a business 
organization which is the determinants of the foreign exchange exposure management. 
Much of the documented evidences regarding various aspects of the determinants of 
foreign exchange exposure management decisions are limited. Due to a lack of 
academic literature regarding the determinants of foreign exchange exposure hedging 
decision, this study will contribute to the literature that deals with determinants of 
financial risk management activities. For managers it is important to understand the 
reasons that lead to a firm’s risk management strategy. Important questions remain 
regarding the determinants of the extent to which a firm hedges or not, and the 
interaction between a firm’s hedging policy and its internal and external characteristics. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section two highlights the importance of the 
study. Section three presents the objectives from managing foreign exchange exposure. 
Section four outlines the research theoretical framework. Section five introduces the 
objectives and questions of the study. Section six presents guidance to the content of the 
thesis. The final section outlines the main conclusions in this chapter.
1.2 The Importance of the Study
Mathur (1985, p. 1) stated that “Under the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, Central 
Bank interventions in foreign currency markets were frequent, with relatively minor 
changes in exchange rates. Managers then could afford to ignore foreign exchange 
exposure. However, with the demise of the Agreement in 1973, exchange rates for 
major currencies have fluctuated freely, sometimes wildly. These currency fluctuations 
constantly change the values of foreign currency assets and liabilities, thereby creating 
foreign exchange risks”. This statement by Mathur sets off the need for research in the 
area of foreign exchange risk management. Of all the winds of change that have 
buffeted international companies in recent years, none has had a more pervasive impact 
upon their risk profile than the demise of the international monetary system of quasi- 
fixed exchange rates that had prevailed until March 1973 under the Bretton Woods 
Agreement (1944-1971) and, later, under the short-lived Smithsonian accord (1971- 
1973). Exporting, importing, and investing abroad exposes a firm to foreign exchange 
risks. Managing these risks now becomes one of the most difficult and persistent 
problems for financial managers of exporting and importing firms. A number of 
arguments justify the importance of this study. From the late 1970s surveys have shown 
that companies give increasing attention to the currency exposure and its management. 
In the UK, Rosendale (1973) found that only 31% of UK engineering companies had 
any policy at senior management level on exchange rate risk prior to 1971, but Broder 
(1984) found that UK multinational companies (MNCs) were beginning to take 
currency management seriously, confirmed by 76% of respondents of his questionnaire.
Exchange rates are a major source of uncertainty for exporting and importing firms, 
being typically four times as volatile as interest rates and ten times as volatile as 
inflation (Mathur, 1985). Jorion (1990) examined the exposure of US multinationals to 
foreign currency risks and discovered a positive correlation between the value of US 
corporations and their degree of currency exposure. It is commonly believed among 
practitioners, as well as academics, that exchange rates are an important source of 
macroeconomic uncertainty that influence the performance and the value of the firm in 
an international context (Choi and Kim, 2003). Jorion (1990), Bodnar and Gentry 
(1993), Dominguez and Tesar (2001) argued that the changes in exchange rates affect 
the firm’s stock returns. During the period spanning from 1980 to 1985, U.S companies
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with overseas investment in the stock markets of such major countries as the U.K, Japan 
and Germany, had a total volatility of 50% of their dollar returns accounted by foreign 
exchange (FX) rate volatility (Eun and Rensick, 2001). One of the interviewees in this 
study stated that; “most o f our raw material imports come from the UK, and we pay the 
cost in pound sterling. The high value o f the sterling on the foreign exchange market 
affects our payments. Our operating profit was down by 24 million Saudi riyals last 
year. The reduction is more than explained by the strength o f  sterling throughout the 
year”. Many current studies have found a link between a firms’ profitability and FX 
fluctuations, (Belk and Edelshain 1997, Bodnar and Gentry 1993, Levi 1990). The 
institutional investors considered corporate hedging as way of maximizing the value of 
the firm and to minimize any possible loss of shareholders wealth (Almohaimeed, 
1999). Recent surveys found that risk management is ranked by financial managers as 
one of their most important objectives (Rawls and Smithson, 1990). Fluctuating 
exchange rates are likely to compound the problem of estimating risk. It is well known 
that managers must estimate risk return characteristics of securities in order to construct 
optimal portfolios according to the Modem Portfolio Theory (MPT). Fluctuations in 
exchange rates will make this task more difficult, possibly leading to sub-optimal 
portfolio selection. Stonehill and Moffett, (1997), argued that it is important for 
managers and investors in today’s environment of volatile foreign exchange rates to 
understand foreign exchange risk management.
It seems that the shortage in research to examine the determinants of FX risk activity 
depend on incompleteness of the existing theory and the lack of meaningful data 
relating to the corporate exchange risk hedging activity of corporations who disclose 
only minimal details of their currency risk management programs. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 4, previous studies in financial and risk management report that hedging 
decisions can be influenced by environmental factors (Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 
1993). But the studies were unable to discuss most of these environmental factors since 
the theoretical approaches adopted (finance theory) and the methods for collecting the 
data in these studies (published data) were not appropriate. Unfortunately, finance 
theory has much less clear cut guidance to offer on the logically prior question of 
foreign exposure hedging strategy; should foreign exchange exposure be managed or 
not?. It seems fair to say that is not yet a single accepted framework which can be used 
to guide hedging strategies. Partly, this gap arises precisely because previous work has
focused on how corporations hedge their foreign exchange exposure, rather than 011 
whether foreign exchange exposure should be hedged or not. Against this background, 
the study is specifically concerned with firm-specific attributes that influence the 
different corporate responses to foreign exchange exposure. Moreover, this study seeks 
to bridge the gap between business managers and business academics with the aim to 
provide rational evidence for hedging decisions and to explain its effect upon the 
business enterprise through an actual survey of hedging decision determinants. A 
further significance of this study is the potential contributions that it will make, such as 
the promotion of a better understanding of currency exposure management in 
companies in general, and in developing countries in particular. Haushalter (2000, p. 
107), stated that "Despite the prevalence of corporate risk management and the effort 
that has been developed to developing theoretical rationales for hedging, there are no 
widely accepted explanations for risk management as a corporate policy. Important 
questions remain regarding the determinants of the extent of hedged, and the 
interactions between a firm's hedging policy and its other policy decisions". This thesis 
will attempt to at least partially answer the Haushalter question by developing a 
contingency and finance framework for the determinants of hedging decisions. 
Corporate hedging literature fails completely to consider the effect of contingency 
approach in determining the hedging decision. It is not enough to say that individual 
models such as Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) should be adopted to each 
individual firm; it must be specified how such an adaptation should be effected (see 
section, 7.3.1).
This thesis aims to explore and understand the foreign exchange risk management 
policy being adopted in exporting and importing companies in Saudi Arabia, as 
perceived by Saudi firms, which may benefit other countries with similar environments, 
especially the members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)1 which have similar 
environments to that of Saudi Arabia. Carrying out a study in another country rather 
than that of a developed one, aims to obtain results comparable to the developed
1 The GCC Countries are: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and United Arab 
Emirates.
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country’s data. It was hoped that, by examining the corporate hedging behaviour in 
Saudi firms, broader and more substantial theories of perception of corporate risk 
hedging might also be formulated. The study will also contribute to the theoretical 
literature by exploring the relationship between hedging decision and the firm’s 
managerial, organizational, and specific environmental characteristics. The empirical 
tests in this study will include a set of internal and external firm’s characteristics that are 
more comprehensive than those used by previous studies. The foreign exchange risk 
management literature abounds with empirical studies which concentrate on 
“multinational companies” (MNCs). However, the focus of this study will mainly and 
largely be concentrated on “international companies”, which are simply defined here as 
importers and exporters, with fairly limited range of internal and external currency risk 
management techniques available. This study will provide new knowledge regarding the 
hedging activities in small firms and their hedging decision determinants. Furthermore, 
this study is the first to examine the factors that influence the hedging decision using a 
hybrid approach (combination of inductive and deductive approach, questionnaires and 
interviews).
1.3 Objectives of Managing Foreign Exchange Risk
The review of the literature and evidence on the previous section demonstrated that in 
general foreign exchange risk management is an important activity for many companies. 
However, each company has different number of objectives in managing this risk. In 
general, Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993, p. 267) stated that ‘finance theory indicates 
that hedging increases a firm’s value by reducing expected taxes, expected costs of 
financial distress, or other agency costs’. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993, p. 1629) 
argued that ‘corporate risk management adds value to the extent that it helps ensure that 
a corporation has sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of attractive 
investment opportunities’. Kenyon (1990) who carried out a survey study on 13 UK 
public companies found that the objectives of currency risk management are likely to be 
subordinate to the company’s main objective, they are also likely to be a heterogeneous 
collection of aims. He was unable to find a single goal, which is either in fact adopted 
by all companies or can be recommended to all. Most companies are likely to have more 
than one objective. One assumption in chapter 2 is that some currency risks are 
managed with an eye on the accounting, transaction and economic effects of exchange
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rate changes on the corporation. As can be seen further in chapter 2, currency risks is 
not a single problem for the company, but a combination of accounting and cash flow 
issues which affect the company in different ways. As a result, each company should 
have a single or set of objectives which concern these forms of currency risk.
Fatemi and Glaum (2000) surveyed the risk management practices in all non-financial 
German firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. They asked the respondents to 
rank eight different goals in terms of their importance for risk management on an 
increasing scale of 1 to 5. They found that “ensuring the survival of the firm” turns out 
to be the most important goal with an average score of 4.70 and when respondents were 
asked to choose the one goal which is the most important, the over whelming majority 
(67%) chose the survival goal. Whereas, “enhancing reported results” the objective is 
seen to be not that important for these companies with an average score of (2.58). They 
also found that “reducing earnings volatility” turns out to be a less important goal with 
an average score of (3.37). Marshall (2000) found that from managing their foreign 
exchange risk USA and Asia Pacific MNCs sought to minimize fluctuations in earning. 
For UK companies he found that achieving certainty of cash flow is the most important 
objective. Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) argued that financial managers may use risk 
management practices to build their reputation and to put themselves above the interest 
of the shareholders. Tran (1980), stated that the overall objective in foreign exchange 
risk management of many companies is defensive in an attempt to minimize foreign 
exchange losses. Other stated objectives of managing foreign exchange risk include: the 
volatility of cash flows (Copeland and Joshi, 1996, Thompson, 1996), minimizing the 
variability of accounting earnings (Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1998), minimizing any 
possible loss of shareholders’ wealth (Joseph and Hewins, 1997). However, all these 
studies concerned themselves with identifying the companies’ foreign exchange risk 
management objectives in general, without trying to explain which particular kind of 
currency risks these objectives related to.
1.4 Theoretical Framework
A combination of both finance theory (FT) and contingency theory is adopted as a 
framework for exploring and explaining the determinants of foreign exchange risk 
management in Saudi firms. Corporate hedging decision research is explained largely 
by the finance theory, indicating that the hedging increases a firm’s value. On
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determining the corporate hedging, most of the research has mainly concentrated on the 
possibility that hedging can increase a firm’s value by reducing expected taxes, 
expected costs of financial distress, expected agency conflicts, and the increasing 
investment opportunities. Most of the previous empirical work has focused on the 
predictive power of theories that view risk management as a means to maximize 
shareholder value (see Tufano, 1996; Nance et al., 1993; Geczy et al., 1997; Berkman 
and Bradbury, 1996; and Gay and Nam, 1998). Froot at al, (1993) argued that while 
finance theory provides managers with good instructions on the implementation of 
hedges, unfortunately, finance theory has had no complete clear cut guidance to offer an 
answer to the question as to hedge or not to hedge. This study points out that to allow 
for independent risk management policy choice, one would require specification of the 
determinants model of the decision. As current finance theory is not developed enough 
to describe adequately the structure of this determinants model, the field is open to 
further contribution. It seems that before attempting to build the firm’s risk management 
strategy, the manager understands empirically the determinants of that strategy decision. 
This study will attempt to contribute in this area by documenting robust empirical 
relations between foreign exchange hedging policy parameters and the determinants, 
variables before attempting to subdivide the relations into components effect.
In order to address this issue, this study presents the contingency approach to support 
the framework for the determinants of the hedging decision on the same line as finance 
theory. It argues that contingency theory offers a more useful theoretical framework for 
determining the currency exposure management policy. Contingency theorists argue 
that there is no such thing as ‘one best model’ of hedging decision and research is 
focused on identifying situational variables that could make one model more 
appropriate than others. Contingency theory would suggest that the different situational 
contexts of world and bricks and mortar organizations would dictate different sets of 
hedging decision. This study’s general assumption is that the decision to hedge or not to 
hedge the foreign exchange exposure is contingent upon environmental, organizational, 
and managerial characteristics. Many studies believe that it is becoming more important 
that the firm’s context actively affects the level of its foreign exchange exposure 
(Bradely and Moles, 2001). The underlying assumption is that the hedging decision 
requires a manager to use a model of a firm’s characteristics that match the conditions 
in which the hedging decision is taken. Thus, in order for a manager to achieve an
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effective decision, he needs to fit the decision to the contingency factors and financial 
factors of the organization and thus to the environment. The framework suggests that 
the hedging decision is determined not only by the interaction of a number of external 
contextual factors or by the extent of financial benefit from that decision, but critically 
also by factors such as the level of company ability, need, and understanding of how 
these impact on internal processes.
1.5 Objectives and Research Questions
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, nothing has been written regarding the risk 
management practice in Saudi firms, or the determinants that influence their decision to 
adopt risk management policy. This study will add to the risk management literature 
and specifically the foreign exchange exposure management behaviour in Arabic and 
developing countries. The aim o f this study is to explore and examine the determinants 
o f currency hedging decision by Saudi firms. The main question of this study is ‘why do 
some firms hedge foreign exchange exposure while others don’t? The study’s objective 
is to explore and examine the variables that improve our understanding of the rationale 
behind foreign exchange risk management. In this regard, special emphasis will be 
given to the valid reasons for corporate hedging of foreign exchange risk, and to the 
possible limitations impeding the effective operationalisation of the current practices as 
perceived by the people concerned i.e. the directors, the risk manager decision makers 
of the Saudi firms. The research is mainly concerned with firm-specific managerial, 
organizational, and environmental context factors, and the value maximization factors 
that influence the different firm responses to foreign exchange risk. In particular, the 
study will emphasise the following specific questions:
1. How serious is the problem of foreign exchange risk for Saudi firms?
2. How important is the impact of the hedging incentives on the hedging decision?
3. To what extent do management risk aversion factors influence the hedging 
decision?
4. To what extent the firm’s ‘need for hedging’ factors affect the hedging decision?
5. To what extent the firm’s ‘ability to hedge’ factors affect the hedging decision?
1.6 Guide to the Content of the Thesis
This thesis consists of eleven chapters. Chapters two, three, and four, review the 
theoretical and empirical literature which focuses on the nature and determinants of the 
foreign exchange exposure management. The aim of chapter two is to illustrate 
literature relating to the nature of foreign exchange risk problems and management and 
the context of this thesis (Saudi Arabia). The chapter’s objective is to describe how 
serious foreign exchange risk might be and to define and analyse the forms of exchange 
rate risks, and review some of the important literature regarding the management of the 
foreign exchange risk. The chapter also highlights some of the important aspects in the 
research context, Saudi Arabia. The purpose of chapter three is to explore some of the 
optimal hedging theories (against and for), which explain the factors which determine 
the extent to which a firm should or should not hedge. Chapter four reviews the 
theoretical and empirical work on the determinants of corporate hedging and derivative 
use, which helps to link the theoretical and empirical to identify areas of agreement 
regarding corporate hedging motives. The chapter highlights the previous studies which 
have modelled the role that characteristics of firms’ play as determinants of corporate 
hedging decision. The aims, methods, hypotheses, sources of data, limitations and 
findings are discussed. The aim of chapter five is to present the research design and 
methodology, and methods, which have been adopted in this study in order to describe 
the manner in which the research objectives stated in this chapter, are addressed. The 
chapter also presents the contingency and finance theory as theoretical framework for 
the study. The purpose of chapter six is to describe the responses from the interviews 
and to identify the determinants of currency exposure policy in Saudi firms. The 
objective of this chapter is to examine the role of contingency and the environmental 
context in corporate hedging decision, and to assist in building the study framework. 
The purpose of chapter seven is to set out the research theoretical framework (Model) 
and identify its use in this study. The procedures used for constructing the model, the 
dependent and independent variables are described and defined.
In chapters eight, and nine of the thesis, the findings of the surveys designed to examine 
the determinants of foreign exchange risk management policy are presented. Statistical 
analyses are undertaken in these chapters to analyse firms’ specific characteristics 
which can be used as determinants for foreign exchange risk management decision.
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These chapters aim to provide answers to the main research question as to why some 
firms hedge foreign exchange risk and others do not. The aim of chapter eight is to 
examine the relation between the determinants of hedging incentives and the foreign 
exchange risk management decision, and the relation between the determinants of 
managerial risk aversion and foreign exchange risk management decision to be 
discussed in section three. The aim of chapter nine is to analyse the effect of the firms’ 
needs to hedge on their currency exposure management policy. Also the objective of 
chapter nine is to analyse the effect of a firm’s ability to hedge in the hedging decision. 
The aim of chapter ten is to discuss the research findings. The final chapter concludes 
this thesis and identifies its contribution to knowledge. The chapter highlights the 
limitations of this study and offers suggestions for future research.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the subject of the thesis. The importance of this thesis is 
explained. The chapter has highlighted the foreign exchange risk management 
objectives. The thesis’ aim and questions are presented and the theoretical framework is 
highlighted. The guide for the content of the thesis has been set out.
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Chapter Two 
The Definition and Management of Foreign Exchange Risk
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the literature relating to the nature of the foreign 
exchange risk problem and management. This chapter’s objective is to describe how 
serious foreign exchange risk might be, to define and analyse the forms of exchange rate 
risks and review some of the important literature regarding the management of the 
foreign exchange risk. For these purposes, the chapter is divided into six sections. The 
next section provides a background to the foreign exchange risk problem and the 
volatility of the exchange rate. The third section presents the definition for the research 
subject. The fourth section illustrates foreign exchange risk management practice. 
Section five reviews some important aspects regarding the research context, Saudi 
Arabia. Section six outlines the main conclusion of this chapter.
2.2 Foreign Exchange Rate Volatility
In 1944, an international conference at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire accepted a 
US proposal for a return to a form of the Gold Standard. The Bretton Woods system 
was developed to provide some control in exchange rates between member countries, in 
that, each member set a parity value for its currency against the dollar and gold, and the 
US government undertook to buy or sell gold in exchange for dollars at the fixed value 
of $35 an ounce of gold. At that time the dollar became the principal currency for the 
settlement of international transactions and the regime of stable exchange rate was 
established. The Bretton Woods system was broadly successful until the end of the 
1960s, when some currencies like the British sterling, guilder, franc and deutschemark 
started to increase or decrease against each other and other currencies. The Bretton 
Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates collapsed when a loss of 
confidence in the dollar started. An alternative fixed rate system was needed and the 
Smithsonian Agreement (1971-1973) of fixed rates between major currencies attempted 
to provide this. However, as the US balance of payments increased, it became difficult 
to defend the fixed exchange rate system and industrialised countries were forced to a 
system of floating exchange rates. One of the main reasons causing the collapse of the
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fixed exchange rates system in the early 1970s was the dramatic increase in oil prices 
(WTRG Economics, 1999). In the early 1970s, the international economic situation 
changed dramatically. Oil exports expanded substantially, royalty payments and taxes 
on foreign oil companies increased sharply, and oil exporting governments, including 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, began setting and raising oil export prices. Saudi 
Arabia’s revenues per barrel of oil (averaged from total production and oil revenues) 
quadrupled from USS0.22 in 1948 to US$0.89 in 1970. By 1973, the price had reached 
US$10 and higher in 1974 following the Arab oil embargo introduced to pressuring 
Western supporters of Israel during the October 1973 Yam Kippur War (WTRG 
Economics, 1999). The OPEC oil price increase caused an enormous increase in the 
import costs of many Western countries. Most of them faced up to this by making 
appropriate adjustments to their economic growth rates, which dramatically affected the 
Bretton Woods system.
Since 1973, the high volatility of exchange rates has become a fact of life faced by any 
company engaged in international business. When buying or selling products in a 
foreign currency, there is always a risk that the settlement price will differ from the 
invoice price after translation into Saudi riyals, which can pose a significant obstacle to 
effective cash flow management. Between 1990 and 2003, the Saudi riyal experienced 
dramatic swings in relation to major currencies such as the British pound, and the 
Deutschmark, see Figure 2.1. The figure also shows that the US dollar is fixed against 
the Saudi riyal, one dollar is equal to 3.75 riyal.
The effect of exchange rate volatility on a company’s activities is one of the 
controversial issues in international economics. It is widely believed that exchange rate 
volatility increases risk and uncertainty in exporting and importing firms. For example, 
if a Saudi firm imports goods from UK, and the payment is in pounds, and the value of 
the pound rises against Saudi Riyal (SR), an exchange loss will be incurred. Arize and 
Shwiff (1998) examined the long-run relationship between imports and exchange rate 
volatility in G-71. The period examined is 1973 to 1995 and they found that exchange
1 G-7 or Group of Seven is seven major industrial nations whose ministers meet on a periodic basis to 
discuss and agree on economic and political issues; it comprises Germany, France, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan and United States.
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rate volatility had a significant negative effect on the volume of imports on most of G-7 
countries.
Grobar (1993), in line with international trade theory under uncertainty assumptions, 
found empirically that there is a negative relationship between the volume of exports in 
developing countries and exchange rate volatility. Uncertainty in exchange rate forces 
risk averse firms to produce fewer exports than they would in a certain environment as 
lack of forward markets for foreign currencies in most developing countries means that 
exporting firms are unable to hedge their exchange rate risk (Quirk and Schoffs, 1988). 
The scenario of export price uncertainty attributable to exchange rate uncertainty is of 
particular interest for developing countries looking to manufacturing exports as a 
stimulus to economic growth, and a foundation for developing an industrial sector as a 
means for acquiring foreign currency (Lessard, 1995).
Figure 2.1: Exchange-rate movements, Saudi riyal to British Pound (GBP), Saudi riyal to 
US dollar (USD), and Saudi riyal to Deutschmark Mark (DEM)
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Arize and Osang (2000) found that there is a negative and statistically significant long- 
run relationship between export flows and exchange rate volatility in 13 LDC’s2. Corbo 
(1989) found that there is a strong negative effect of exchange rate uncertainty on the 
exports of Chile, Colombia, Peru, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. Lassard (1995) 
argues that since volatility of exchange rates seems more likely to rise than fall in 
coming years, the demand for risk management by developing countries is large, and it 
will continue to grow.
A company’s asset, liability, profit or expected future cash flow stream, whether certain 
or not, is said to be exposed to exchange risk when a currency movement would change, 
for better or for worse, its parent or home currency value (Kenyon, 1990). Interest in 
defining and managing exposure to gains and losses caused by fluctuating exchange 
rates has increased dramatically in recent years (Copeland and Joshi, 1996). This 
concern is expected to become even more widespread if large and unpredictable 
currency movements continue to be an important part of the international business 
environment. At the same time some regard currency risk as a dispersion of outcomes 
which in the long-run must average out in gains and losses (Buckley, 1996). However, 
firms may not survive until these gains and losses are averaged out in the long run, and 
bankruptcy could result from shock movements of exchange rates. Kenyon (1990) 
found that many companies’ annual reports highlighted currency movements as a major 
factor in their performance. Nowadays, currency risk management has became a very 
complex problem as a result of (1) the increasing size and variety of exposures which 
companies incur as they develop internationally (Holland, 1993), (2) the extent of 
competitive environment that the firm face internationally (Fooladi and Rumsey, 2002), 
(3) the volatility of currencies on the foreign exchange market, (4) the increase in 
companies investing overseas has meant that the performance of the new overseas 
subsidiaries, which will fluctuate with currency movements, has a significant impact on 
overall company results, in terms of both the profit and loss account and the balance 
sheet (Kenyon, 1990), and (5) evidence that insufficient guidelines are available to 
guide managers on whether to hedge their exposure or not, how to manage their
2 These countries are: Ecuador, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Tunisia.
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exposure and those they do employ as suspect (Froot, et al, 1993). Lessard (1990) has 
observed that managers are unhappy with the ways they deal with their exposure. For 
treasurers, in order to decide whether foreign exchange risks should be managed or not, 
they should know how significant the potential currency risk is considered to be, the 
company’s attitudes to currency risk and the benefit of their hedging decision.
2.3 The Definition of the Foreign Exchange Rate Risk
The term foreign exchange exposure and foreign exchange risk are frequently used and 
are interchangeable (Buckley, 1996). Before discussing the foreign exchange risk 
management and its determinants, it would be helpful to clarify what this study means 
by risk. It is important to distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is concerned 
with situations in which probabilities can be attached to particular events occurring, 
whereas uncertainty defines situations in which probabilities cannot be attached and 
even the elements of the environment may not be predictable (Donaldson, 2001). In 
decisions associated with certainty, the decision maker has complete knowledge of the 
probability of the outcome of each alternative. In decisions associated with uncertainty, 
the decision maker has absolutely no knowledge of the probability of the outcome of 
each alternative (Donaldson, 2001). In decisions associated with risk, the decision 
maker has some probabilistic estimate of outcomes of each alternative. The risk profile 
facing firms can be assessed as; (a) unsystemic risk3, and (b) systemic risks4 which can 
be divided into, risks which the organization has very little control (e.g. political, 
economic, social and financial), and risks which the organization cannot control but can 
be influenced (e.g. competitive, interest rate and foreign exchange rate) (Williams, 
Smith, and Young, 1998). Glaum, (1990), defines risk in two ways. Firstly, the 
colloquial meaning is the “probability of the occurrence of unfavorable outcomes”. 
Secondly, the natural meaning is “the spread of possible outcomes around some
3 Unsystematic risk defined by Buckley (1996, p. 763) as ‘a part of a security’s risk associated with 
random events which do not affect the economy as a whole. Also known as specific risk, this refers to 
such things as strikes, successful and unsuccessful marketing programmes, fire and other events that are 
unique to a particular firm. Such unsystematic events can be eliminated by portfolio diversification’.
4 Systematic risk defined by Buckley (1996, p. 762) as ‘the volatility of rates of return on stocks or 
portfolios to changes in rates of return on the whole market. Also known as market risk, it stems from 
such non-diversifiable factors as war, inflation, recessions and high interest rates. These factors affect all 
firms simultaneously; hence this type of risk cannot be eliminated by diversification.
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expected value”. The latter is to be preferred in the sense that exchange rate exposure 
can result in positive as well as negative outcomes. Arnold (1998, p. 1024) defined risk 
management as ‘the selection of those risks a business should take and those which 
should be avoided or mitigated, followed by action to avoid or reduce risk’. Substantial 
attempts have been made to define FX exposure and its sources. Buckley, (1996, p. 
141), defines FX exposure as; “An asset, liability, profit or expected future cash flow 
stream (whether certain or not) is said to be exposed to exchange risk when a currency 
movement would change for better or for worse, its parent or home currency value. 
Exposure arises because currency movements may alter home currency value”. The 
general concept of exposure refers to the degree to which foreign operations are at risk 
from exchange rate changes (Demirage and Goddard, 1994). Hedging foreign exchange 
exposure (hedging foreign exchange risk or foreign exchange risk management) called 
hedging currency exposure (risk) is a practice of covering exposure designed to reduce 
the volatility of the firm’s profit and/or cash generation, and it presumably follows that 
this will reduce the volatility of the value of the firm (Buckley, 1996, p. 174-175).
As previous literature suggests, if there is broad agreement as to the general nature of 
currency exposure, little agreement exists in attempts at detailed definitions of it, (Belk 
and Edelshain, 1997; and Kenyon, 1981). It is conventional to identify three elements in 
corporate currency exposure: translation exposure, transaction exposure, and economic 
exposure (see Buckley, 1996, p. 133-140; and Holland, 1993, p. 128-130). Ankrom 
(1974) is generally cited as the first writer to use the expression “translation, 
transaction, and economic risk”. Surveys found that the amount of attention paid to the 
different exposures has changed over time to the benefit of a longer time view. At the 
beginning of the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, in 1970, when foreign 
exchange risk was seen mainly in accounting context, firms were able to deal with their 
foreign exchange rate risks using some accounting rules (Rodriguez, 1974). Moreover, 
empirical studies carried out at that period found that translation exposure was given 
primary emphasis and management by their survey respondents (Rodriguez, 1979; 
Jilling & Folks, 1977; Rodrigues, 1980; and Blin, Greenbaum and Jacobs, 1981). 
However, since 1980 the dominant objective of foreign exchange risk management has 
been to minimize transaction exposure (Khoury & Chan, 1988; Cenzairli, 1988; 
Lessard, 1990; and Soenen & Aggarwal, 1989). Economic risk also is seen to be 
important for the currency managers (Moffett and Karlsen, 1994; Kanas, 1996; Bradley,
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1998; Marshall, 2000). Belk and Glaum (1990) found that economic risk was managed 
by two-third’s of the UK companies interviewed. Whitaker (1994) found that 52 percent 
of the respondents reported that their companies try to hedge economic exposure fully 
or partially. Also Bradley (1998) found that 43% of the respondents stated that 
economic exposure was managed in their companies. One of the most controversial 
questions in foreign exchange management is the exact definition of what is at risk from 
exchange rate changes. The different types of exposure are determined using the 
corporate performance to foreign exchange rate.
2.3.1 Translation exposure
Translation (or accounting) exposure arises out of the consolidation of financial 
statements which involve foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities (balance 
sheet exposure) and gains and losses (income statement exposure). It has been defined 
by Eiteman, Stonehil & Moffet (1995, p. 183) as “the potential for accounting-derived 
changes in owners’ equity that occur because of the need to ‘translate’ foreign currency 
financial statements of foreign affiliates into a single reporting currency to prepare 
worldwide consolidated financial statements". Consolidation of foreign subsidiaries 
accounts (balance sheets & income statements) into the parent financial statements 
requires a rate or rates of exchange to translate the foreign subsidiaries’ accounts into 
the parent currency. A number of empirical studies found that firms do manage their 
translation risk (Rodrguez,1974; Mathur, 1982; Belk & Glaum, 1990; and Boyle, 1998).
However, It has been argued that the profit and loss risk should not be hedged in 
external financial markets. Firstly, consistent with the view of Coppe, Graham, and 
Koller (1996), this risk is unlikely to cause financial distress to MNCs. Even though 
actual profit figures as translated in parent currency terms may differ from those 
budgeted as a result of a movement in the rate of translation, they will never become 
negative as a result of such a movement. Secondly, consistent with the view of Dhanani 
(1998), the problem of distorted performance evaluation systems can and should be 
avoided by evaluating subsidiaries in local currency terms, and / or parent currency 
terms adjusted for the budgeted exchange rate to stop using cash flow based instruments 
to manage a paper based risk. Thirdly, arguments concerning managing accounting 
exposure, confirms that firms should not hedge the accounting exposure as the balance 
sheets and profit and loss statements being translated from one currency into another do
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not involve a cash movement, so no real gains or losses are being incurred in this 
operation (Dhanani, 1998). Buckley (1996) argued that while accounting exposure 
reflects the possibility that foreign currency denominated items which are consolidated 
into group published financial statements at current or average rates will show a 
translation loss or gain as a result, this kind of exposure does not give an indication of 
the true effects of currency fluctuations on a company’s foreign operations. He 
continues that it has little to do with true value in an economic sense. Srinivasula (1983) 
argues that if the company attempts to manage translation exposure this evidently will 
alter the cash flows of the company for the non-relevance of the gains and losses from 
translation exposure. He gave an example of a U. S. MNC, which sold forward contract 
of $600 million foreign currencies to hedge its balance sheet exposure. At that time, 
these foreign currencies appreciated against the dollar and this resulted in translation 
gains which were unrealised, but the forward contract loss involved, a cash loss in the 
order of $48 million. Finally, one may argue that a big company which has business in 
different countries does not have to hedge its translation exposure as long as losses in 
some currencies will be offset by gains in other currencies. Lessard, (1990), chose to 
measure currency risk exposure in terms of the importance corporations attached to 
managing the different exposures rather than to the perception of their impact on the 
corporation. He found that transaction exposure was given greater attention by 
management than was economic exposure, and that both these exposures were given 
more attention than translation exposure. Glaum (1988) stated that translation risk does 
not render useful information to shareholders and the attempt to manage it may lead to 
wrong and harmful decisions.
This means that the translation exposure is not an appropriate concept of foreign 
exchange exposure for currency risk management, as it is purely an accounting concept 
not directly related to cash flow. It can be concluded from these arguments that 
translation risk is no longer an important issue. The property of foreign assets and 
liabilities is largely a function of the international involvement of each company. Most 
of the Saudi companies in this study sample are international companies, defined in this 
thesis as importers or exporters (see Chapter 5, section 5.7). These companies differ 
from MNCs which have overseas operating subsidiaries, which will probably have a 
much more complicated network of foreign operations and hence translation risks. 
Consequently, the Saudi international companies would not be affected by translation
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risks, both in income as well as balance sheet risks. It can be concluded that translation 
risk is excluded from further consideration in this thesis.
2.3.2 Transaction exposure
Transaction exposure refers to the gain or loss which arises when a change in exchange 
rates affects the value of anticipated foreign currency denominated cash flows, relating 
to transactions already entered into (Kenyon, 1990). Transaction risk is a cash flow risk 
resulting from the risk that the domestic currency value of a future payment or receipt 
denominated in a foreign currency varies as a direct result of changes in exchange rates. 
Cash flow sources which can be included in this type of risk are foreign currency 
denominated trade debtors, trade creditors, dividends and loan repayments, this means 
that transaction risk consists of both trading items (foreign currency, invoiced trade 
receivables and payables) and capital items (foreign currency dividend and loan 
payments) (Levi, 1990). Therefore, any increase or decrease in expected payable or 
receivable cash flow due to the change in exchange rate is defined as a foreign currency 
transaction gain or loss and is included in the net income for the period in which the 
exchange rate changed (Madura, 1992). The loss occurred by transaction risk will affect 
the financial gearing of the company. Surveys found that managers thought they should 
manage this risk (Soenen & Aggarwal, 1989; Dhanany, 1998). If export or import 
companies make large losses on foreign currency receivables or payables, it may cause 
the company financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985). However, hedging these risks 
can avoid financial distress and can add value to the company (Froot, et al, 1993). 
Many studies about exchange rate risk management found that transaction risk is the 
most important form and the most likely to be hedged. Edelshain (1995, p. 156) 
observed that: "...Respondents rate transaction exposure as the most pervasive 
individual exposure in causing some degree of vulnerability". Belk and Glaum (1990) 
concluded that 14 of the 17 companies interviewed saw transaction exposure 
management as the centrepiece of their foreign exchange risk. Lessard (1990) surveyed 
U.S. corporations and found that respondents gave greater importance to manage 
transaction risk than to managing other forms. Marshall (2000) surveyed the foreign 
exchange practices of large UK, USA and Asia Pacific MNCs. He found that the 
majority of the respondents in each region placed transaction risk as highly important, 
particularly in the USA, where 59% of the respondents placed the most emphasis on
19
transaction risk. He suggested that the cause of the emphasis placed on transaction risk 
is understandable in view of immediate impact of transaction risk on cash flows and 
profitability. It could be suggested that Saudi export and import firms should hedge 
their foreign currency receivables or payables.
2.3.3 Economic exposure
Economic exposure refers to the possibility that the present value of future operating 
cash flows of a business, expressed in parent currency, may be affected by a change in 
foreign exchange rates (Shapiro, 1992). The economic risk concerned with impact of 
changes in exchange rates on the corporation’s competitive, and supply and demand 
positions (Edelshain, 1996; Bradley, 1998). Economic risk is not a conversion effect, 
like the other two risk forms, but a competitive, and supply and demand effect (Kenyon, 
1990). It is important to stress that for economic risk both real and nominal exchange 
rate cause risks to the company. For example, if a company's product is quoted in a 
currency other than that of competitors, and that currency rises against the currencies in 
which competitors have quoted, the price may become less competitive (competitive 
risk) and the sale may be lost (demand risk). Both of these risks are economic risks and 
caused by the real exchange rate as it affects the price instead of the cost. Belk and 
Glaum (1990) found that 9 of the 17 companies interviewed, were managing their 
expected future cash flows (economic risk). However, they pointed out that this 
management of the expected future cash flows was closely interlinked with the 
management of actual transaction risk. Some surveys found that economic risk has had 
a greater adverse impact on corporation than transaction and translation risk (Belk and 
Glaum, 1992 and Edelshain, 1995). Most of these surveys employed a multi­
dimensional definition of economic risk (e.g., economic risk, competitive risk, and 
demand risk). It could be argued that the way economic risk is divided into a number of 
separate forms is one way which increases the number of reported exposures and also if 
these surveys are divided into both transaction and translation risks and into different 
forms of economic risk this may affect the final result of the surveys. For example, 
Edelshain produced six different definitions for currency risks namely transaction risk, 
translation risk and four other different forms divided from the effect of the economic 
risks, which are: supply, value chain, revenue and competitive exposures (see
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Edelshain, p. 107). Edelshain’s results may not reflect the right picture of the 
companies’ currency risk management, as he was comparing and asking companies to 
rank four forms of economic exposure against one form to each of the transaction and 
translation exposure. Edelshain (p. 158) himself said: “..it could be argued that the 
finding is an artefact of the way economic exposure is divided up into a number of 
separate elements which increases the number of reported exposures”. However, a 
survey of foreign exchange risk management carried by Lessard (1990) which applied 
different definitions of economic risk in the questionnaire, found that transaction 
exposure is managed to a greater degree by firms than was economic exposure. Belk 
and Glaum (1992, p. 8) said: " a number of companies appeared not to be aware of the 
important longer term effects of exchange rate changes and the risk involved". 
However, no clear guidance emerges in the literature review on the importance of 
managing this kind of risk and how a company should managed it. Buckle and 
Thompson (1992) emphasise that companies experience difficulties in managing 
economic risk as it is difficult to find financial instruments which can be used to 
manage long-term risk. Furthermore, using financial hedging instruments may not be 
effective in reducing economic risk, in some cases they may even make the problem 
worse (Buckley and Thompson, 1992). Walsh (1986) argued that 70% of the treasurers 
interviewed had no understanding of the term economic risk, and saw foreign exchange 
rate management and the management of transaction exposure as synonymous terms 
without reference to the effects of exchange rate changes on prices, costs and volumes. 
He argued (p. 374) that: “The management of economic exposure was examined and it 
was posited that the management of economic exposure was less clear cut, since there 
was the added complexity of an exposure which was stochastic and difficult to 
measure”. It is difficult for a company to measure its economic risk in order to manage 
it. This is because the degree to which the changes in future cash flows of a company 
which result from the changes in foreign exchange rates are not only dependent on the 
extent of its own international operations, but also on the nature of the markets in which 
it sells its output and purchases its inputs. Shapiro (1992) states that the measurement of 
economic exposure is made especially difficult because it is impossible to assess the 
effects of an exchange rate change without simultaneously considering the impact on 
cash flows of the underlying relative rates of inflation associated with each currency. If 
the company cannot easily define and measure the economic risk, it will be very 
difficult to manage it. Khoury and Chan (1988) commented that the positive and
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negative effects of economic risk on a corporation’s performance may well cancel each 
other and it can therefore be ignored. Some of the economic long term risks which arise 
from the effect of uncertainty in the exchange rate movements on the cash flow is in fact 
a pre-transaction risk, while the foreign cash flows that create economic risk (pre­
transaction type) have not been contracted, but when they are contracted they will result 
in transaction risk. In addition, we should differentiate between the two different cases; 
first, when a company plans its hedging strategy to hedge its known cash flows for a 
long time period, which means a company hedges its expected transaction risks. 
Secondly, when a company plans to hedge its expected cash flows for a long time 
period, can be considered as hedging its expected pre-transaction risk, which will be 
expected to result in transaction risk. Consequently, it can be argued that company may 
plan its long-term foreign exchange risk management through a short term transaction 
management plan. It can be concluded that economic risk is considered to be an 
expected transaction risk or expected pre-transaction risk and will be excluded from 
further consideration in this thesis.
2.4 Foreign Exchange Risk Management
2.4.1 Risk attitude
The Middle East has attracted a lot of attention from global investors and academicians 
for the last decade to invest in these countries. This interest is affected by the foreign 
exchange risk and the way that this risk can be hedged. Hedging refers to all actions 
taken to protect a firm against the risks resulting from exposure to foreign currency 
exchange rate fluctuations (Kenyon, 1990). In order to manage exchange rate risk a 
treasury manager should first of all recognise the company’s attitude to the risk arising 
from foreign exchange movements. There are three different attitude strategies against 
risk; risk neutral, risk averse and risk seeking (Buckley, 1996). The risk neutral 
manager, doesn't view hedging action as necessary whether the risk results in gains or 
losses. This strategy views currency risk as small and insignificant or that currency risks 
will offset each other in the long-term period (Kenyon, 1990). The risk aversion 
manager is normally looking for a certainty in money terms about the outcome of an 
exposure and tries to minimise or avoid this exposure where it is possible by hedging 
(Coyle, 2000, a). Davis, Coates, Collier and Longden (1991) found that there are 
organisations in the UK, which are risk averse in currency exposure terms and the
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reasons given by companies generally refer to the view that the business was inherently 
profitable and therefore currency risk management is essentially defensive with the 
main objective the avoidance of significant losses. For example, the risk averse Saudi 
exporter would invoice the sales in Saudi riyal and if this is not possible, he will start to 
cover the sale revenues from the foreign exchange rate movements. In hedging their 
currency risk, risk averse treasury managers ignore the benefit of favourable exchange 
rate movements but at the same time provide stability to the companies' earnings and 
cash flow. The risk taker manager thinks that exchange rates will move in the 
company's favour and that currency exposure will result in gains rather than losses 
(Bennett, 1997). The risk taking company will only cover the currency when it expects 
to gain from the hedging position. For example, the risk taking Saudi exporter would 
choose to invoice his products in a currency that is hard or estimated to increase in the 
near future and before the settlement period. Different companies have different views 
toward currency risk and different attitudes, consequently, the hedging action which 
may be not acceptable in UK could be regarded as perfectly reasonable in Saudi Arabia.
Companies that select the 100% hedging policy are hedging not only their cash flows 
but also reported earnings (Drury and Errunza, 1985). Companies follow this policy 
because they care about the negative impact of the foreign currency fluctuations. Using 
this policy is costly even for large corporations and ignores the basis for economic 
decision making; risk versus reward (Anti, 1980). This strategy seems not to be 
attractive to most of companies, as it does not compare the cost of hedging to the 
exchange loss risk. Companies may decide to hedge selectively their individual 
currency risks in line with unexpected unfavourable currency movements, when the 
currency risk exceeds the cost of hedging. Batten, Mellor and Waii (1993) carried out a 
study concentrating on the foreign exchange risk management practice and product 
usage of large Australian based firms. They found that forty-eight firms (70%) appear to 
take on some foreign exchange risk. Thirty-four of these firms hedged their foreign 
exchange risk selectively. However, a company may choose not to hedge its foreign 
exchange risk and remain open to the risk. The main reason for a company choosing 
this policy is that the gains or losses from exchange rate movements in the long term 
will roughly balance each other, thus making hedging action unnecessary (Dhanani, 
1998). This policy ignores the impact of foreign currency fluctuations on consolidation 
statements, short-term cash flow and long-term cash flow. The problem with a never
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hedge policy is that history is not insured to repeat itself and that every thing will be as 
normal over the long-term period. It seems that a company which never hedges will 
expose itself to too great potential loss and company which uses a hedging everything 
policy will expose itself to too much costs over the long term period (Buckley, 1996). 
An alternative to eliminating the costs associated with always hedging and the potential 
loss associated with never hedging will be to take sensible policy by hedging 
selectively. However, a company that decides to hedge selectively, by carefully 
comparing the risks and the cost, may make the wrong decision as it deals with 
unpredictable events, emotions and future spot rates (Riehl, 1999). It can be concluded 
that a manager’s choice among the hedging strategies available depends on the financial 
and contingent factors that his company face.
2.4.2 Managing the foreign exchange risk
Since the inception of floating exchange rates, firms engaged in international operations 
have been highly interested in developing ways and means to protect themselves against 
exchange rate risk. For that reason hedging can be used with some effect, but the 
optimal hedging policy is still a matter of debate. This section will review the methods, 
which are commonly used and are likely to be most applicable to manage transaction 
and economic risks. Companies can hedge foreign exchange risk in different ways 
(Bodie and Merton, 2000). First, firms can simply ignore foreign exchange risk. An 
exporting firm can simply decide that the risk they are exposed to is trivial. Finns may 
ignore currency risk because they may fail to appreciate the importance of their 
currency risk, believing that unexpected currency rate changes are offsetting, firms may 
be unable to measure their exposure, and firms may feel reluctant to enter large 
derivative positions. Secondly firms can avoid risk. Saudi firms can simply decide to 
sell or buy in markets that are not exposed to currency risk. This can be achieved by 
trading in US dollar markets, since Saudi Arabia pegs its currency, the riyal, to the U.S. 
dollar, Saudi Arabia last devalued the riyal in June 1986 when it set the official selling 
rate at SR 3.75 = US$1. Thirdly firms can reduce the risk and the likelihood or the 
severity of losses; a Saudi company that imports from the UK can also sell to the UK in 
pounds. Finally, firms can transfer risk to others. There are basically three ways that 
company can follow, (a) firms can hedge risk. This means that firms cover losses from 
unfavourable changes by hedging. For example, Saudi exporter can enter into future
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contract to sell French francs to cover the turnover from its French customer, (b) Firms 
can insure risk. This means that firms pay another party to insure itself against 
unfavourable changes in currency. Firms can do that by involving in currency option 
contracts, (c) Firms can diversify risk. It is by diversifying in the world markets that 
firms can theoretically eliminate all their unsystematic foreign exchange risk. For 
example, a Saudi importer can purchase materials from different countries paying in 
different currencies.
Prindl (1976) classifies the techniques, which can be used in currency risk management 
according to their basic origin into different groups. The first are internal to the 
company, come under the company's regulatory and financial management. The second 
group which are external to the company, such as the financial instruments which can 
be used to insure against the negative impact of the remains currency risk to which the 
internal techniques have not been able to eliminate. The next two sub-sections describe 
the internal and external methods which can be used to hedge the currency risk.
2.4.2.1 Internal methods
Companies can use a wide range of internal methods to hedge foreign exchange risk. 
These methods can be created internally as part of a company's regulatory, financial and 
operational management (Demirag and Goddard, 1994). In general using the internal 
techniques is usually not costly, but some of the techniques are costly, for example a 
company may decide to change its productions location as a result of facing high cost 
from exchange rate movements. Using internal methods may be a good way to hedge 
long term foreign exchange risk (Bradley, 1998). However, using these techniques may 
not be enough to reduce all the company's risk, and a company should hedge the 
residual risk using the external methods (Soenen and Madura, 1991). Internal 
techniques include structural hedging, netting, leading and lagging, operational hedging, 
and currency invoicing.
Firms can minimize foreign currency risk possibly by matching exposures that occur in 
opposite directions. This is called structural hedging and can be achieved in two ways: 
transaction based structural hedging and strategic structural hedging (Coyle, 2000, a). 
Using the structural hedging technique, a company should match its currency inflows 
with its currency outflows with reference to the amount and time (DeRosa, 1996).
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However, any unexpected delays may consequently leave both output and input cash 
flows exposed to exchange risk. Transaction based structural hedging or offset 
hedging can be divided into a natural matching and cross matching (Coyle, 2000a). 
Natural matching strategy can be achieved by matching income against expenditure in 
the same currency (Bennett, 1997). Buckley (1992) estimates that sourcing and selling 
in the same currency is the common form of matching transaction risk. Exporter cash 
receives in foreign currency can be matched against cash payments, which should be 
made at the same time and in the same currency. Firms also can achieve cross matching 
o f currencies methods with receipt and payment in different currencies, whereas these 
currencies are expected to move closely together (Madura, 1992). This method is based 
on the idea that there are group or bloc of currencies, which behave the same or more in 
the same direction or the exchange rate between these currencies are much more 
constant than exchange rates with other group currencies (Coyle, 2000a). When the 
assumption that stability of group of currencies is valid, the future of firms’ incomes can 
be matched against payments in other currency on the same group.
Strategic structural hedging is a method of hedging economic risks or pre-transaction 
exposure. It is difficult for an international company to achieve complete hedging 
against economic risks but it is possible to eliminate these risks using strategic structural 
methods (Soenen and Madura, 1991). Firms in the long term can match their income 
currencies with their expenditure currencies and also try to match their cost currencies 
with those of their major competitors (Coyle, 2000a). The main problem associated with 
the structural matching method is that using this strategy may affect the company’s 
strategies. For example, a Saudi firm can export products to its UK customer and decide 
to match the pound revenues with the corresponding level of UK payments. However, a 
decision to purchase particular materials from the UK to fulfil the concept of matching 
may affect a company’s cost reduction strategy if it can buy the same materials cheaper 
from another country.
Netting can be used between a parent company and their subsidiaries or between 
affiliated companies, which trade with each other. The currency risk which should be 
hedged is the net amount of the output or input cash flows at regular periods (Arnold, 
1998). For a company with a group of subsidiaries, each pair of subsidiaries net out 
their own positions with each other. Marshall (2000) found that netting is the most
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popular internal method among the UK and USA MNCs, with 90% of USA and 88% of 
the UK MNCs using this method.
Leading and lagging technique concentrates on the adjustment of foreign denominated 
credit or debt cash flows. Leading refers to the payment or receiving in advance the 
foreign cash flows and lagging delayed payment or receiving (Watson and Head, 1998). 
This approach is difficult to apply as a clear conflict of interest between buyer and 
seller. Leading and lagging has its benefit in short term cash flow or balance sheet 
hedging as well as in long-term operation management. Leading and lagging are usually 
implemented on continuing basis rather than in response to a sudden shift in exchange 
rates.
Operational hedging is concerned with production, financial and marketing policies 
and can be used to manage long term currency risk (Soenen and Madura, 1991). The 
decision of using any operational hedging is the responsibility of the company's board. 
Soenen and Madura (1991) suggest that a company facing a high cost in sourcing its 
business due to exchange rate movements can move sourcing to countries that become 
low cost sourcing as a result of exchange rate movements. Aggarwal and Soenen (1989) 
and Moffett and Karlsen (1994) stated that production, financial and marketing policies 
can be adjusted to manage the foreign exchange risk. The foreign exchange risk 
management should be taken into account when the firm plans its corporate strategy 
(Ohmae, 1990). The treasury department responsibility lies only in dealing with short­
term exposure but it can generally be proposed that some operating policies may help in 
operating natural hedging. Departments like marketing, purchasing, production and 
planning should be involved in the process of choosing operation hedging techniques 
(Bradley, 1998). When a company plans its policies it should consider the objective of 
minimising foreign exchange risk in a long-term period, then the residual risks are the 
responsibility of the treasury department (Dufey, 1972). If we accept this view, this 
means that treasury departments should take care of the short-term exchange rate 
movements, rather than the long-term economic exposure. As economic exposure is 
viewed as a strategic issue (Glaum, 1990), it is best managed through operational 
strategies and the foreign exchange risk is viewed as joint responsibility of treasury 
departments and the strategic planning level in the company.
Currency invoicing technique is concerned with altering the currency of invoice
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(Arnold, 1998). An international company, which exports or imports goods or services 
is concerned with decisions relating to the currency in which goods and services are 
invoiced. Importing or exporting in a foreign currency gives rise to transactions and 
economic risk. For companies to minimize these risks they should trade in a home 
currency or the currency in which they incur cost. However, if for any reason an 
exporter elects to invoice in foreign currency, then he should choose only a major 
currency in which there is an active forward market for maturities at least as long as the 
payment period (Buckley, 1996).
2.4.2.2 External methods
The use of external techniques is one means of managing and controlling foreign 
exchange risk. In this regard, many different financial instruments can be used for 
hedging purposes. Generally, few companies will need to use the full range of hedging 
techniques or instruments. Each company should consider ones that are appropriate for 
the nature and extent of its foreign exchange risk activities, the skills and experience of 
management, and the capacity of foreign exchange rate risk reporting and control 
systems. Companies can use the external markets to hedge any residual exposure after 
cover from internal methods. Companies can use financial instruments like forward, 
option, future and swap contracts to hedge currency risks.
Geczy et al, (1997) examine the use of currency derivatives by the Fortune 500 non- 
financial firms in 1990. They found that 41 percent of their sample used currency 
derivatives to minimize currency risks. They found that firms with greater growth 
opportunities and tighter financial constrains were more likely to use currency 
derivatives. The General Accounting Office in U.S.A reports that between 1989 and 
1992 the use of derivatives, forwards, futures, options, and swaps, grew by 145% 
(Bodnar and Gebhardt, 1998). Fatemi and Glaum (2000) carried out a survey for all 
non-financial German firms listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and found that 88% 
of the firms indicated that they used derivative instruments. From the firms which used 
derivatives, 89% did so solely for hedging purposes, whereas 11% used derivatives to 
profit from open positions. However, the main problem associated with using financial 
instruments to minimize company currency risks is that these financial instruments 
cannot be used to manage a long-term cash flow risk, such as competitive, supply and 
demand risks. Adkins (1991) stated that using financial instruments to eliminate the
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long-term cash flow effects does not work effectively. He argued that forward contracts 
can only be used to manage the conversion effect of exchange rate risk rather than its 
strategic effect.
A forward exchange contract is a binding contract to exchange agreed amounts of two 
currencies on an agreed future date at a rate of exchange agreed (Winstone, 1997). The 
forward contract is a foreign exchange deal done at today’s rate for a future date or 
maturity. When the forward contract is agreed, each party must deal at the contracted 
rate, irrespective of what the spot rate turns out to be at the future date. Forward foreign 
exchange has been a standard treasury tool for nearly 30 years. Many empirical studies 
found that the forward contract is the most frequently used financial instrument in 
companies (Drury and Errunza, 1985; Mathur, 1985; Khoury and Chan, 1988; Cezairli, 
1988; Teoh and MengEr, 1988; Soenen and Aggrawal, 1989; Belk et al, 1992; 
Jesswein, 1992; Batten et al, 1993; Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston 1996; Phillips, 1997; 
Hakkarainen, et al, 1998; Marshall, 2000; Fatemi and Glaum, 2000). Bodnar, Hayt et 
al, (1996) found that 75% of firms in their study ranked the forward contract as one of 
their top three choices among foreign currency derivative instruments, with over 50% 
ranking it as their first choice. These companies prefer to use forward contract as it is 
easy to use, effective in hedging against short-term foreign exchange rate changes, 
provides flexibility in the size of contracts, has low transaction costs and is available in 
most currencies. Outside of forward market, the best-developed market for hedging 
exchange rate risk is the currency futures market.
Currency futures are a means of buying and selling exchange rate risk. A currency 
futures contract is a legally binding obligation, made on the trading floor of a future 
exchange, to buy or sell a particular currency against another at a specified rate of 
exchange for delivery at a specified time in the future (Hull, 1995). The advantage of 
using future contract is that a clearinghouse in a future market stands between the seller 
and the buyer of the contract. There are, however, disadvantages for a company in that a 
future contract contains administrative costs to be paid to a broker, margin 
requirements, is inflexible in size, and only available in a limited number of currencies. 
Marshall (2000) found that just 4% of USA and 3% of UK MNCs used future contract 
to hedge transaction risk. In addition, Glaum and Belk (1992) observed that none of the 
17 UK firms interviewed used future contracts to hedge foreign exchange rate.
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Currency option gives the holder the right but not the obligation to buy or sell a fixed 
amount of foreign currency at a specified price, the strike or exercise price, but is not 
required to do so (Winstone, 1997). The option seller receives the premium and is 
obliged to make (or take) delivery at the agreed-upon price if the buyer exercises his 
option. Chaudhry, Rohan, and Reichert (2000) investigate the relationship between 
market-based measures of risk and foreign currency contingent claims activity of US 
commercial banks. They found that banks use currency swaps as a hedging tool while 
currency options are viewed as playing a more speculative role. They suggest that the 
use of the instruments does affect risk, but these impacts vary over time. Marshall 
(2000) found that over half of the MNCs in Asia Pacific were using option contracts to 
manage the transaction risk. Kanas (1996) and Buckely (1992) also state that option 
contracts can be used in hedging economic risk in exporting firms. Unlike forward and 
future contracts, an option contract is better used by a company for hedging the foreign 
cash flow when the size and the time of occurrence of cash flows are uncertain such as 
pre-transaction risk (Giddy, 1983).
In a short space of time, currency swaps have become one of the most important and 
flexible instruments available to company treasurers for currency risk management. 
Like other hedging and treasury management products, swaps themselves are not debt 
instruments for raising new funds. Instead, they are tools which allow better 
management of existing funds (Kolb, 1997). A currency swap is a contract between two 
counter parties who agree to exchange obligations to pay interest and repay principal in 
one currency in exchange for receiving interest and principal in a second currency 
(Coyle, 2000b). A company can use currency swaps to minimize long term foreign 
exchange risk. Coyle (2000b, p. 98) state that “Currency swap can be arranged in 
currencies where long-dated forward contracts are not easily arranged. They can be used 
to hedge longer-dated transaction exposures and economic exposures, and might 
provide more favourable terms than a longer-dated forward contract. Swap spreads, 
being interest-rate driven, tend to be tighter than spreads for higher-risk FX forward 
contracts”. Glume (1990) confirmed that swap contracts are better tools for managing 
long-term foreign exchange risk than other financial instruments, such as forward 
contracts in that the transaction costs in swap contracts do not increase along the years.
Government Exchange risk Guarantees can be used as external tool for hedging
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foreign exchange risk. As a way of encouraging the exporters, government agencies in 
many countries, especially developing countries, offer the exporters insurance against 
export credit risks (Solnik, 1996). For example, an exporter protects himself from 
exchange movements by receiving export credit guarantees from the government for a 
small premium and handling all the exchange risk to the government agency.
Soenen and Aggarwal (1989) examine a variety of hedging methods in three European 
countries (Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands), and found that while a majority of the 
corporations surveyed used external hedging methods in hedging their foreign exchange 
exposure, they expressed the opinion that the exposure should first be minimized by 
other means before resorting to external hedging methods. They found that only 19% of 
U.K. companies, 26% of Netherlands companies, and none of the Belgian companies 
were hedging every thing. Joseph (2000) reported that large firms with scale economics 
are much greater users of external hedging techniques than internal techniques. 
However, the use of hedging instruments such as ‘derivatives’ may result in an 
unexpected impact on the firm's value (Srinivasula, 1983). Using derivatives to hedge 
foreign exchange risk without having enough experience may be difficult and generate 
some financial problems (Copeland and Joshi, 1996). Also, Feiger and Jacquillat (1981) 
state that forward exchange markets do not provide bargains, but only fair gambles. 
When a firm leaves its FX position unhedged, a firm may experience gains and losses 
which may in long term period be offset, and hedging or not become the same for a firm 
(Aliber, 1979). On a similar but more sophisticated level, Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) 
argue that since FX markets are efficient in the sense that forward contracts are priced 
on the basis of all currency available information, one cannot earn excess returns in 
those markets, and hedging is of no value.
One of the interviewees argued that “Our foreign exchange risk management strategy is 
to hedge only the significant exposures. However, there are not many hedging 
alternatives available in Saudi Arabia, and for that reason we sometimes take foreign 
exchange risks in the sense that we choose to leave part o f our exposures unhedged. We 
make such decisions through a team, one that includes operating people with bottom 
line responsibility”. Another risk management decision maker stated that “ While 
derivatives have enabled the company to isolate and manage currency risk, they can 
actually enlarge existing exposures and create new financial risks”. Another risk
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management decision maker said “our management is fairly conservative, and our 
corporate policy is to avoid use o f derivatives. We feel that derivatives are bad things to 
use”.
2.5 The Research Context
2.5.1 Introduction
Saudi Arabia is a large Middle Eastern nation that ranks as one of the world’s leading 
producers of petroleum. Saudi Arabia is a country full of actual and potential business 
and investment opportunities. However, it should be noted that the Saudi Arabian 
market is highly competitive and business transactions take place on the basis of quality 
and cost. Saudi Arabia imposes no foreign exchange restrictions on capital receipts or 
payments by residents or non-residents.
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) which was founded in 1952 (1372 AH), 
is the Kingdom's central bank. The Agency's charter requires it to act as the central 
government bank, to issue currency (paper and coin), to support the value of the Saudi 
Riyal at home and abroad. Saudi Arabia pegs its currency, the riyal, to the U. S. dollar. 
A key element in the Saudi Arabian government's economic strategy is industrial 
diversification, a process which has as its primary objective the reduction of the 
Kingdom's dependence on oil revenues. To this end, the government has encouraged the 
development of a wide range of manufacturing industries. The government has provided 
a range of incentives to encourage the private sector to participate in the Kingdom's 
industrial effort. The financial, industrial and trade sectors of the economy have made 
rapid progress, enabling the private sector to play an increasingly important role in the 
development and diversification of the economy, especially in the fields of construction 
and farming.
When the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce and Industry issued its 13th Annual 
Report, 1999, it stated that the Saudi private sector continued its positive performance 
during 1999 by registering a rate of growth estimated at nearly 2.4 per cent. The report 
elaborated the activities of the private sector, noting that the non-oil industries 
registered 6.3 per cent growth, construction and building sector 2.1 per cent and the 
electricity sector 3.9 per cent. The report expected that the private sector would continue
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its positive growth within the framework of the increase in governmental expenditure 
and the positive effects of various and continual economic reforms that were started by 
the government in 1998.
Saudi Arabia announced a significant new Kingdom-wide investment promotion and 
development system in April 2000. This new private sector focus is a key investment 
component of the official 2000-2005 Kingdom development plan. Over the past quarter 
century enormous growth occurred in the number of industrial plants operating in the 
Kingdom. In 1975, Saudi Arabia had about 470 industrial plants with overall 
investments estimated at $2.7 billion. By the end of 2001, the total number of factories 
in the Kingdom had reached 3,596, with a total capitalization of $66 billion (Central 
Dept, of Statistics, Ministry of Planning). The Saudi Arabian stock market has 
developed substantially over the past decade, and is now the largest in the Arab world, 
with a capitalization of $42.7 billion. The stock market operates through a 
computerized, order driven, continuous screen-based trading system which is supervised 
by SAMA. The system is transparent, efficient, and quick to settle. In the Kingdom, 
shares are settled on a same day basis. The number of joint stock companies which trade 
shares has climbed steadily with the implementation of the government’s privatization 
policy. Presently, there are over 70 firms listed on the stock market. A major opening of 
the Saudi stock market to foreigners was initiated during 1997. Previously, only Saudi 
nationals could deal in or own shares, although Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
nationals were also allowed to own Saudi equities (excluding banks) and certain other 
stocks.
Today, the Saudi economy has become increasingly exposed to international influences. 
This, together with the high volatility on foreign exchange markets, stresses the 
importance of foreign exchange risk management in Saudi firms.
2.5.2 Exports
The Kingdom's exports increased by 53 percent to SR 290,553 billion during 2000, 
from SR 190,084 billion in 1999 (Table 2.1) and decreased by 14 percent to SR 254,898 
billion during 2001. As can be seen from Table 2.1, that most of the revenues in Saudi 
Arabia came from the oil exports (around 88%). Oil export revenues reached 
approximately SR 266 billion in 2000. It seems that the effect on the Saudi exports in
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the currency exposure is low since most of the oil exports are priced in US dollar.
Table 2.1: Kingdom's exports by major items (Million Saudi Riyals)
Section Title 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 Animals & Animal Products 644 739 761 697 746
2 Vegetables & Vegetable Products 483 413 488 438 273
3 Fats & Oils 122 65 61 75 93
4 Prepared Foods, Tobacco Products 529 537 576. 574 j 549
5 Mineral Products 200,264 122,466 168,735 266,226 224,740
6 Chemical Products 11,123 10,017 9,293 12,194 . 13,511
7 Plastics & Rubber 5,723 4,192 3,572 3,854 6,253
.8 Leather Products 174 78 56 81 155
9 Wood Products 39 39 39 29 33
10 Paper Products ’ ■ 687 564 .593 . 579 650
11 Textiles & Textile Products 768 748 645 567 747
12 Clothing Accessories 17 20. 14 13 13
13 Stone & Glass Products 606 542 487 531 597
14 Precious Metals, Jewellery 8 127 : 83 36 249
15 Base Metals 3,157 2 342 2,358 2,145 2,302
16 Machinery & Electrical Equipment 1,505 1,489 1,343 , .1,454 1,629
17 Transportation Equipment 1.267 617 687 810 1,985
18 Miscellaneous Instruments 31 62 96 79 . 102
19 Arms & Ammunition 0 0 6 19 98
20 Miscellaneous Manufactured Items 295 328 193 151 167
21 Art Items and Others 1 2 1 1 7
Total 227,443 145,388 190,084 290,553 254,898
Source: Central Dept, o f Statistics, Ministry o f  Planning
Table 2.2 shows that most of the Saudi exports goes to countries other than U. S. The 
Kingdom's exports to U. S. A. decreased by 27 percent to SR 46,482 billion during 
2001, from SR 58,832 billion in 2000. However, as most of these exports are oil 
exports, their exposure to currency exposure was probably low.
Table 2.2:Kingdom's exports to its major trading partners (Million Saudi Riyals)
Rank Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 U.S.A. 34,600 23,695 37,185 58,832 46,482
2 Japan .39,360 21,668 28,496 .46,074 39,099
3 South Korea 23,150 13,886 20,429 31,273 24,621
4 Singapore 15,640 , 8,697 11,107 14,632 13,429
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Rank Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
5 India 9,250 6.083 8,175 12,823 12,336
6 China Formosa 5,696 3.470 4,185 7.742 8,472
7 China Mainland 1,582 1,231 2,352 5.630 8,159
8 Holland 10.610 6.043 7,845 11,592 7,971
9 France 8,950 5,456 7,469 10,910 7,459
10 Italy. ‘ 8,003 4,908 - 4,428 6.971 6,621
11 U. A. E. 7.375 4,912 4,710 5.886 6,576
12 Bahrain 6,270 4,387 5,560 7,158 5,304
13 South Africa 1,029 1,608 3,880 6,621 5,178
14 Spain , , 4.230 3,050 3,388 5,013 4,428
15 Pakistan 1,948 1,520 2,562 4,766 4,119
16 Thailand 2,980 1,607 2,100 3.578 4,042
17 Indonesia 1.650 2,280 3,318 4,071 3,802
18 Greece' 2,640 2,127 2,321 3.964 3,554
19 Philippines 3,606 2,020 2,828 4,023 3,382
20 England 1,996 1,258 • 1,637' 3,223 3,369
Source: Central Dept, o f Statistics, Ministry o f Planning
2.5.3 Imports
The Kingdom's imports increased by 8 percent to SR 113,240 billion during 2000, from 
SR 104,980 billion in 1999 (Table 2.3) and by 3 percent to SR 116.931 billion during 
2001 .
Table 2.3: Kingdom's imports by major items(Million Saudi Riyal)
SECTION 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 Animals & Animal Products 4,891 5,107 5,312 5.675 5,137
2 Vegetables & Vegetable Products 7.905 6,868 7,637 8,278 6,557
3 Fats & Oils 654 880 927 784 601
4 Prepared Foods, Tobacco Products 5,298 , 4,761 4,191 5,531 , 5,630
5 Mineral Products 1,092 1.055 1,274 1,062 1,490
6 Chemical Products 8,712 9,249 9,496 9,512 9,864
7 Plastics & Rubber 3,453 3,753 3,488 4,130 4,255
8 Leather Products 371 381 381 394 344
9 Wood Products 1,332 1,434 i 25Q 1,444 1,376
10 Paper Products 1,915 2,305 2,087 2,356 2,211
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SECTION 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
11 Textiles & Textile Products 7,093 7.464 6.494 6.674 6,557
12 Clothing Accessories 1,025 1,082 935 899 965
13 Stone & Glass Products 1,472 1,460 1,392 1,931 2,139
14 . Precious Metals, Jewelry 8.237 6.263 5,113 4.575 3,563
15 Base Metals 9,717 10,743 8,808 8,895 9,535
16 Machinery & Electrical Equipment 21,267 22.486 25,187 24,982
24,062
1-7 Transportation Equipment 16,737 20.705 15,201 19,996
25,356
18 Miscellaneous Instruments. 3,039 2.950 3.102 3,048 3,489
19 Arms & Ammunition 1,001 987 636 788 1,648
, 20 Miscellaneous Manufactured Items 2,038 2.133 1.929 2,260 2,127
21 Art Items and Others 393 330 127 23 24
Total 107,643 112,397 104,980 113,240 116,931
Source: Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning.
Table 2.4 shows that most of the Saudi imports came from countries other than US. This 
probably increases the currency exposure of Saudi firms.
Table 2.4: Kingdom’s imports from its major trading partners (Million Saudi Riyals)
Rank Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 i .2001
1 U.S.A. 23 933 23.984 19.882 21.802 20,770
ilS!!l!i!!i!!|i|I!|jIi JAPAN 7,124 9,666 9.650 11.837 13,042
3 GERMANY 5,830 7,052 7,648 9.164 9,403
ISSiilllSSllSlIll ENGLAND 11.281 9.535 8.456 7,308 8,037
5 CHINA MAINLAND 3.369 3.593 3.677 4,485 5,403
llSIIISSllilill AUSTRALIA 1,751 1,978 2,273 2,907 4,733
7 ITALY 4,962 4.667 4,424 4,698 4,543
l l j l l l l l l l l l l FRANCE 4,837 5,862 4.421 4,675 4,473
9 SOUTH KOREA 2,619 3.884 3.801 3,846 3,831
' 10 , SWITZERLAND 6,221 4,828 3,523 3,693 2,832
11 INDIA 2,584 3,058 2,770 3,132 2,811
12 BRAZIL 2,132 1,658 1,650 2,314 2.431 '
13 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1,610 1,842 2,213 2,206 2,375
14 HOLLAND 2,067 1,829 1,971 2,387 2,190
15 BELGIUM 1,635 1,386 1,558 1,707 1,892
16 SPAIN 1,415 1,813 1,962 1,607 1,666
17 SWEDEN 189 1.373 1,441 1.813 1,645
1 p P A M  A H A i i n / ; 1 2 0  1 . i n c o 1 4 0 C
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19 INDONESIA 1,608 1,696 1,508 1,699 1,407
20 TURKEY 1,209 1,316 985 832 1,319
Source: Central Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning.
2.5.4 Islamic Shariah
To understand the history of the Kingdom and its political, economic and social 
development, it is necessary to realize that Islam, which permeates every aspect of a 
Muslim's life, also permeates every aspect of the Saudi Arabian state.Islam is a unified 
way of life. It is not a political system, or nor it is an Economic System. But, being a 
unitary way of life it does have aspects upon which an Economic System can be built. 
Just as Islam regulates and influences all other spheres of life, so it also governs the 
conduct of business and commerce. The influence of religion upon business is not an 
issue that has been explored to a great extent in the conventional literature. Islamic law, 
the shariah5, claims to regulate all aspects of life, ethical and social, and to encompass 
criminal as well as civil jurisdiction. Every act of believers must conform with Islamic 
law and observe ethical standards derived from Islamic principles (Lewis, 2001). 
Managers, like any other adherent, must perform their duties in accordance with the 
rules and regulations of Islam and base their actions on Islamic ethical norms. The 
Islamic economic and financial principles have direct impact upon risk management 
practices and policies. Managers should not allow their business activities to dominate 
so that making money becomes a first priority and they neglect religious duties.
The Shariah developed through different schools of law. Nowadays, four schools of 
law still exist (Al-Malekiah, Al-Hanbaliah, Al-Shafeaiah and Al-Hanafiah). They agree 
on the main subjects, and mutually recognize each other. The Shariah is based on four 
main sources of law: the Quran, the Traditions of Prophet and his most faithful 
companions, the consensus of all Islamic scholars, and deduction by analogy. For a 
further discussion of these sources of law, see Schacht (1964).
5 Shariah is Islamic iaw as contained in the divine guidance of the Quran and Sunnah. Sumiah is the 
teaching and exemplary conduct of the Prophet Muhammad (sallah alih wasallam).
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The Islamic values are reflected in Islamic economic principles. Schaik (2001)select six 
of the most important of these economic principles;
• justice, equality and solidarity. Business should be conducted in an honest way. 
This precludes, for example, monopolization, or abusing of an inexperienced 
partner. Solidarity is encouraged by promoting almsgiving as a noble deed, and 
by duty of each Muslim to pay zakat, a tax on wealth (usually about 2.5% of 
personal wealth).
• Acquisition of property rights. Property may be acquired in the following three 
ways; (1) new rights can only be legally created by combining one’s labor with 
natural resources, old rights can be transferred, either (2) in exchange for a 
counter value of the same worth, or (3) as a voluntary gift/inheritance. Interest 
is not a legal form of property, because it is not acquired in one of the three legal 
ways.
• Property (wealth) should be used in a rational but fair way. Islam rejects 
unproductive hoarding as wasting money. It should be spent, but always in a 
responsible way.
• No gain without either effort or liability. Receiving a monetary advantage 
without giving a counter value is forbidden. Islam is not opposed to profit or 
financial gain as long as, (1) an effort is performed, or (partial) liability is 
accepted for the financial result of result of a venture, (2) the effort or venture 
was productive, i.e. it led to an increase of value, and (3) the profit was made in 
an honest manner, in line with the Shariah.
• General conditions of credit. Debtors in financial distress should be treated 
leniently. If the debtor is not able to pay back the principal, he should be given a 
delay without a penalty. Opponents claim that the difference between credit and 
spot prices is nothing more than an implicit interest rate.
• The duality of risk. Islam has a dual conception of risk. On the one hand, it 
considers the partial acceptance of liability (for risk) in a productive venture as a 
legitimating for a share in profit. On the other hand, risk should always be taken 
cautiously. Excessive, uncontrollable risks or uncontrollable obligations should
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be avoided. For example, the sale of an object, which the seller does not yet 
possesses, is illegal. Furthermore, gambling or speculations are forbidden.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted that there are three different company attitude strategies 
against risk, which are risk neutral, risk averse and risk seeking. These different 
attitudes can be used to explain that companies usually hedge foreign exchange risk in 
different ways. This chapter has explained the internal methods which can be used to 
manage exchange rate risk and argued that long term exposure is better managed 
through the internal method and the residual exposure can be minimized through the 
external methods. An understanding of the role to be played by portfolio theory in 
managing foreign exchange risk requires a careful description of the importance of the 
hedging or not to hedge decision. It should be noted that not all of the external 
techniques described previously are available for all companies. For example, the 
limitations of financial instruments and markets available in Saudi Arabia. Academic 
literature has argued that external hedging methods are inappropriate for the 
management of long-term economic risk. External methods are used usually to 
eliminate the conversion effect of transaction risk and leave the strategic effect of 
economic risk open. The hedging methods which are available to the exporting or 
importing company are limited, while a much further range is open to the true 
multinationals. Large companies increasingly turn to external methods to reduce their 
currency risks.
The motives for smaller export and import companies using these methods are not well 
understood. The foreign exchange risk management literature abounds with empirical 
studies which concentrate on “multinational companies”. A MNC is defined as that 
which has overseas operating subsidiaries. However, the focus of this study is largely 
concentrated on what we have defined as “international companies”, those which are 
mainly importers or exporters, and have a fairly limited range of internal and external 
currency risk management techniques available. MNCs have access to a much broader 
range of internal and external techniques than are available to the international firms, 
which may offset the impact of currency risks in both samples. In addition, the MNCs 
trade in many countries and have subsidiaries, which give the companies natural
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hedging against foreign exchange risk by diversifying their business.
The chapter has considered transaction risk to be straightforward to evaluate and hedge, 
whereas economic risk effects of exchange rate changes are difficult to ascertain so that 
economic risk is not easily hedged. As a result, it is more costly to hedge economic risk 
than transaction risk because the cost of implementing financial hedge, which in most 
cases is sufficient for hedging transaction exposure, is less than that of implementing 
real hedge, which usually necessitates rearranging sourcing, manufacturing and 
marketing operations. The chapter has shown that translation risk is often dismissed in 
the literature as illusionary, since it has no impact on earnings or cash flows. The 
absence of foreign operating subsidiaries in most of the Saudi's companies (as the study 
sample consists of exporting and importing firms only) and the apparent lack of interest 
in managing the translation risk through the literature reviewed, translation risk will be 
ignored in the remainder of this thesis. For the company, which trades in international 
businesses, economic exposures are so fundamental and cannot be ignored (Donaldson, 
1987). However, what most companies in the literature reviewed consider an economic 
risk would be considered by many academics as more typical of a transaction risk. It 
seems that economic risk should be managed at a strategic level (board) rather than 
using the day to day currency management by treasury management. The contribution 
of the treasury management in managing currency risk is to manage the short period 
risk and to help the Board in building a strategic decision to manage the long period and 
future risks.
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Chapter Three
The Potential Rationales for Hedging: Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe some of the optimal hedging theories. Finance 
theory suggests that hedging can increase firm’s value by reducing the expected costs of 
financial distress, reducing agency costs, increase the firms’ investment opportunities, 
and reducing tax costs. Finance theory suggests that corporate hedging is attributable to 
managerial risk aversion. This chapter outlines the explanation for currency hedging 
policy among others and offers empirical evidence on the relative importance of these 
corporate hedging motives. The chapter will be divided into four sections. The next 
section highlights the arguments against hedging decision. Section three reviews the 
determinants of corporate hedging decision. The final section outlines the main 
conclusion of this chapter.
3.2 Why Not to Hedge
What some firms describe as hedging is in fact taking a position on the prospects for a 
particular financial or commodity market that may increase the firms exposure to risk 
rather than reduce it (Copeland and Joshi, 1996). As a result, some literature and theory 
argue that top managers should not hedge, they say that shareholders can lay off these 
risks more cheaply themselves by holding a diversified portfolio of shares in a variety 
of companies. Clup and Miller, (1995), found that most value maximising firms do not 
hedge risk. The Modigliani and Miller (M&M), (1958), theory argues that anything a 
firm can do, its owners can do for themselves. They have assumed that corporate FX 
management is superfluous. As a result, managers cannot increase a firm’s value by 
doing something shareholders can do for themselves at the same or at a lower cost. 
Shareholders themselves can hedge corporate exchange exposure by taking out forward 
contracts in accordance with their ownership in a firm. Managers do not serve them by 
second-guessing what risk shareholders want to hedge. By hedging for their own 
account, investors can obtain “home-made hedging”. M&M theory suggests that buying 
and selling currency options contracts cannot alter the a firm’s value, since shareholders 
can always buy and sell such contracts themselves if they care to adjust their exposure 
to currency risk. In the basic M&M world, hedging does not alter a firm’s value. The
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M&M assumption includes the absence of agency costs, financial distress cost, 
contracting costs, information costs and capital market imperfections. The framework 
used in this study assumes that relaxing one or more of the M&M assumptions can 
derive the demand for corporate hedging. In addition, hedging by shareholders may not 
be efficient as a firm’s hedging which means that it may be in the shareholders interest 
to let the firm manage the exchange risk (Solomon, 1997).
Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) state that several obstacles to shareholders hedging are: 
(a) Size barriers, which are caused by the fact that certain markets impose minimum 
size requirements for transactions of goods and services. For example, the bank-based 
forward, option and the Eurocurrency markets are wholesale in nature and deal in 
minimum amounts that tend to be too large for individual investors, (b) Structural 
barriers,, which are the result of the way different economic entities can structure their 
activities. Firms also can use some of internal methods like netting, lagging and leading, 
and invoicing to minimize currency exposure, which are usually not available to the 
individuals, (c) Information gaps, in that to achieve efficient diversification, an investor 
needs to know the level and time of FX risk for all the companies in the portfolio. 
Investors should collect information not only on companies operations but also on the 
financial side for today and the future. However, in the absence of this information the 
individual cannot make an optimal exposure decision in a company. Transaction costs 
are typically greater for individual investors than for firms. Operating managers can 
make such estimates with much more precision than shareholders who typically lack the 
detailed knowledge of competition, markets and the relevant technologies. Furthermore, 
in all but the most perfect financial markets, the firm has considerable advantages over 
shareholders in obtaining relatively inexpensive debt at home and abroad, taking 
maximum advantage of interest subsidies and minimising the effect of taxes and 
political risk (Stulz, 1984). The managers may have more ability to use some financial 
instruments than the shareholders.
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the risk is the essential factor 
that has to be taken into account. If exchange rate risk can be considered as 
unsystematic, it can be diversified away by investors in the process of holding a 
diversified portfolio of shares (Eckl and Robinson, 1990). When the same exchange rate 
fluctuations affect these shares, gains on some shares would be offset by losses on other 
shares. If, however, FX risk is considered as a systematic risk and if hedging
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instruments are priced according to CAPM, a firm which hedges just moves along the 
security market line and there will be no added value from hedging, and indeed the cost 
of hedging will reduce shareholder value. When hedging instruments are priced in a 
rational way, the market can be said to be “efficient”. Modem capital market theory 
argues that under certain assumptions of market efficiency, FX risk management is 
totally superfluous (Eckl and Robinson, 1990). Logue and Oldfield, (1977), point out 
that a firm’s risk prospects are valued directly by the market on the basis of its expected 
profitability and its systematic risk. It should make no difference to the valuation of 
either the total market portfolio or the individual firm whether exchange risks are passed 
through to the capital market as part of the risk of the firm’s shares, or laid off or 
transferred directly to the market through forward exchange or foreign currency debt 
contracts. Looking further ahead in CAPM, as Cowdell (1998), contends that if 
considered valid with regard to FX exposure, and if accepted that FX markets are 
efficient, there could still be adverse changes in exchange rates coinciding with the 
receipt or payment of large sums of foreign currency. Then the exchange rate movement 
could give rise to serious liquidity problems. Although any gains or losses in the long 
mn should cancel out, that would be of little consolation to shareholders, managers and 
creditors if the liquidity crisis happened to force a corporation to go into liquidation.
According to the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) argument, movements in FX rates will 
be offset by changes in relative price levels (Eckl and Robinson, 1990). For example, if 
the rates of inflation in the U.S and the U.K are 20% and 15% respectively, the U.S 
dollar will depreciate against the sterling by 5%. PPP theory suggests that corporations 
have no FX exposure and therefore have no need to hedge. If the PPP works effectively 
in practice, without any time lags, there is no relative price risk and there wouldn’t be 
FX exposure since any loss due to FX rate movements will be offset by a gain in price 
and vice-versa. The implication of PPP is that gains and losses from exchange rate 
changes tend over time to be offset by differences in relative inflation rates. It matters 
little in which currency the firm buys its inputs or sells its products, since any 
devaluation (revaluation) of a foreign currency will sooner or later be offset by a 
correspondingly higher (lower) rate of inflation in that currency (Giddy, 1977). 
However, evidence shows that for long periods, currencies deviate form their PPP 
values and thus lead to exposure. Even if currencies moved exactly in line with the PPP 
theory, they will always reflect only the price movements in a “bundle” of goods and 
services making up the relevant national price index. Many of the empirical tests have
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confirmed that the adjustment between changes in prices and exchange rates is not 
instantaneous and that there are lags in this relationship (Dufey and Srinivasulu, 1983). 
For some periods, there are deviations from PPP which create price risks for at least 
some goods, implying the presence of exchange risk. Empirical evidence shows that 
forward market is not efficient and may create some collapse for companies (Quirk and 
Schoffs, 1988).
According to the Fisher effect, the difference between the interest rates of two 
currencies should equal the expected rate of change during the appropriate maturity 
period (Giddy, 1977). Hence, it would not matter in which currency the firm borrowed 
or loaned funds, given a sufficiently long time horizon, since any exchange loss (gain) 
would eventually be offset by an interest rate advantage (disadvantage)(Giddy, 1977). 
The question here is "does exchange risk matter?".
If these theories hold then it will not matter in which currencies a firm buys/sells or 
borrows/lends, since the effects of currency movements will be offset by countervailing 
changes inflation and interest rates. Unfortunately, however, both the PPP theorem and 
the Fisher effect fail a crucial test- they do not hold in the short run. When the theorems 
are tested on an annual basis there are significant deviations from the projected 
exchange rate path, and the correlations are much worse for quarterly tests (McRae and 
Walker, 1980). In other words, whilst the long term trend is accurately reflected in the 
PPP and Fisher paths, in the short run actual exchange rates will deviate around these 
paths. Hence, exchange risk stems from deviations from the expected rate (indicated by 
the forward rate or interest rate differential). These unexpected exchange rate changes 
cause variability in cash flow, and it is this which constitutes the firm's exchange risk. In 
short, exchange risk stems from unexpected changes in exchange rates. Yes this not 
surprising that FX rate changes are very dramatic.
3.3 The Determinants of Corporate Hedging Activity
This section reviews expected relations between hedging decision and the determinants 
of the corporate hedging decision. Some papers find limited evidence of relationships 
between a firm’s value and changes in exchange rates (e.g. Jorion, 1990, 1991; Amihud, 
1994), while others (e.g., Bartov and Bodnar, 1994; Booth and Rotenberg, 1990) 
document a significant relationship for MNCs. There are several possible reasons for 
finding weak evidence of a relationship between a firm’s value and changes in exchange
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rates. One possible reason, reported by Bartov and Bodnar (1994), is that there are 
potential drawbacks in the sample selection procedures in these studies. Choi and 
Prasad (1995) and Gao (2000) stated that most of the previous studies sample were 
MNCs, with various exchange rate exposures which offset one another causing the 
firm's exposure as a whole to vary with time. In addition, Chen and So (2002) argued 
that most of these studies had limitations in exposure measurement, which may be due 
to the selection of the exchange rate index to capture fluctuations in FX values. They 
argue that the findings of insignificant relationships between exchange rate changes and 
the value of multinational firms may also be the manifestation of superior FX exposure 
management through the use of various hedging instruments.
However, finance theories offer several hypotheses to explain why corporate hedging 
can be rational or value enhancing, each of which relies on some form of market 
imperfection. This section tries to explain these hypotheses and their effect on the firm's 
value. Indeed, if we consider the arguments that maintain that it is pointless for a 
corporate to hedge its position, some of them seem too theoretic and can be seen as 
theories of an imagined world. On the corporate hedging literature, two different 
hypotheses have been advanced to explain why risk should be managed: shareholder 
value maximization and managerial risk aversion. According to the shareholder value 
maximization hypothesis, a firm will engage in hedging activities if, and only if, they 
enhance the firm’s value and thus its shareholders’ value. Finance theory suggests that 
hedging activity reduces the financial distress costs, reduces agency costs, increases the 
growth opportunities, reduces tax costs, and reduces the corporate finance costs (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985; Bessembinder, 1991; Nance, et al., 1993; Froot, et ah, 1993; Mian, 
1996; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; Howton and Perfect, 1998; 
and Joseph, 1999).
Based on an agency argument, the managerial risk aversion hypothesis suggests that 
managers will seek to maximize their personal wealth at the expense of shareholders. 
Particularly, when managers’ interests are not perfectly associated with those of the 
shareholders, the managers may insulate their own personal wealth from the effect of 
exchange rate movements through hedging activities. In that hedging activity is 
positively associated with managerial ownership in the firm, a manager’s ability, 
managerial compensation, age, and diversification may explain hedging(Breeden and 
Viswanathan, 1990; Francis and Stephan, 1990; Tufano, 1996; Fok, Carroll, and Chiou,
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1997; and Haushalter, 2000). However, the extent and the intensity of hedging activity 
will not only depend on maximizing managers and shareholders value, since previous 
studies showed that hedging decision may depend on a firm’s size, FX exposure 
magnitude, and the cost of implementing hedging strategy (Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 
1997; and Hardwick and Adams, 1999).
Finally, we should clarify that all the studies mentioned above were about the 
determinants of corporate hedging in general or the derivative use. Only the studies by 
Mian (1996), Geczy et al., (1997), and Joseph, (1999) highlighted the determinants of 
the derivative currency use.
3.3.1 Financial distress costs
When a firm wants to borrow from the bank, accounting information has to be provided 
to define states where the firm’s activities are restricted. A firm that wants to' decrease 
the probability of financial distress must manage its accounting numbers so that the 
borrowing process does not require higher returns to compensate. Logue and Oldfield 
(1977, p. 21) state that "Creditors may be concerned with total variability of cash flows 
where default is possible. The realized yet unanticipated capital gains and losses that a 
firm experiences due to random currency fluctuations may influence valuation through 
the effect on debt capacity. When total variability is important, hedging in the FX 
markets may add to the firm's debt capacity". Thus, if financial distress is costly and if 
there is an advantage to have debt in the capital structure, (say due to taxes or agency 
problems associated with “free cash flow”), hedging may be used as a means to increase 
debt capacity (DeRosa, 1996). Lower risk should result in a lower cost of capital. Smith 
and Stulz (1985) developed the financial distress arguments for risk management in that 
risk management reduces the probability of financial distress which increases the 
expected value of the firms. Joseph (2000) argued that if foreign currency borrowing 
can increase the probability of financial distress, firms with greater variability in their 
leverage measures are expected to make greater use of internal techniques for hedging. 
Froot et al, (1993), state that for a given level of debt, hedging can reduce the 
probability that a firm will find itself in a situation where it is unable to repay the debt. 
Jia and Lilian, (1998), find that Japanese MNCs with weak short-term liquidity 
positions, or firms with high financial leverage have more incentive to hedge and hence 
have smaller exchange rate exposures. Also, Howton and Perfect (1998) found that 
derivative use is directly related to financial distress.
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Perhaps the best way to determine whether the observed hedging activity reflects a cost 
or benefit of financial distress is to examine the effect of leverage on a firm’s value. 
While Opler and Titman (1994) have focused in their study on the effect that leverage 
may have on the performance of firms. They found that more highly leverage firms tend 
to lose market share and experience lower operating profits than their competitors 
during an industry downturn evidence of significant business distress costs. Nance et 
al., (1993) suggest, that the probability of the firm encountering financial distress is 
directly related to the firm's debt size ratio. Managers usually favour to extend their 
firms' investment and financing policies by reducing the probability of financial 
distress. They will seek to reduce the effect of corporate risks on their operating cash 
flows by managing these risks (Froot et al, 1993). If the hedging activities are FX 
exposure driven, indicating that financial distress is costly, then we would expect to 
observe the more highly leverage firms hedge more relatively to less leverage firms. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Mayers and Smith (1987) argued that hedging can be used 
to reduce the probability of bankruptcy resulting in a decline in expected bankruptcy 
costs.
3.3.2 Agency costs and shareholder motives
Many theoretical discussions and empirical research have been carried out to explain the 
role that agency theory plays in managerial and financial decision making and 
external/internal monitoring. Agency theory attempts to explain the relationship 
between the manager and shareholders in two ways. First, by monitoring devices to 
ensure that managers are attempting to maximise the companies' share price. Secondly, 
by incentive schemes for management so that it is in the manager’s own interest to 
pursue share price maximisation.
Most of the theoretical corporate hedging studies argue that hedging activity reduces 
agency costs, Smith and Stulz (1985) and Mayers and Smith (1987) argued that hedging 
can be used to reduce the agency costs associated with outside finance. Shareholders 
interested in the value of shares in their investee company, see hedging as a means to 
protect the firm’s value from the effect of FX rates (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Using a 
questionnaire survey posted to a large sample of UK institutional investors, 
Almohaimeed (1999) found that institutional investors are concerned with the effects of 
FX rate fluctuations on both the values of their investee companies and on their wealth. 
He conclude that institutional investors prefer and require that investee companies to
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hedge for them. This means that hedging is of particular interest to shareholders. When 
managers hedge FX risk it means they work on shareholders satisfaction and general 
feeling of well being.
As it is difficult for shareholders to obtain full information on the FX position of all the 
companies in their portfolios, they prefer that managers make hedging decisions on their 
behalf. In DeMarzo and Duffle (1995), corporate hedging is optimal where managers 
have private information on the firm’s expected payoff despite shareholders' ability to 
hedge by themselves. For an individual investor, using hedging techniques is very 
costly and needs some experience (Solomon, 1997). Dobson and Soenen, (1993), 
suggest three reasons based on agency costs to explain why management should hedge 
exchange risk. Firstly, hedging reduces uncertainty by smoothing the cash flow stream 
thereby lowering the firms cost of debt. Since the agency cost is borne by management, 
assuming informational asymmetry between management and bondholders, hedging 
will drastically increase the value of the firm. Therefore, management will rationally 
choose to hedge. Secondly, given the existence of debt financing, cash flow smoothing 
through exchange risk hedging tends to reduce the risk of shifting agency problems. 
Finally, hedging reduces the probability of financial distress and thereby increases the 
duration of contractual relations between shareholders. By fostering corporate 
reputation acquisition, hedging contributes directly to the amelioration of the moral 
hazard agency problem. Agency costs start when management owns less than 100 
percent of the firm's equity. In that if the board of directors have the responsibility for 
both making hedging decisions and monitoring those decisions. This means that the 
board who does not have the ability to reasonably monitor the managers’ activities 
which may increase the conflicts associated with agency cost, resulting in firms needing 
to reduce these conflicts by hedging.
The results related to the effect of hedging activity to reduce agency costs are mixed. 
While, Fok, et al., (1997) found that hedging reduces the agency costs of debt, and 
reduce some agency costs of equity, Tufano (1996) found little empirical support for the 
predictive power of theories that view risk management as a means to maximize 
shareholder value. He found little empirical support for the predictive power of theories 
that view risk management as a means to maximize shareholder value.
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3.3.3 Firm’s size
The relation between a firm’s size and risk management activities has been extensively 
analysed in the international trade literature. A firm’s size is thought to be a useful and 
manageable approximation of a firm’s resources which are held to affect risk 
management activities. The relationship between a firm’s size and corporate hedging 
activity remains one of the most important analyzed hedging determinants (Francis and 
Stephen, 1990; Fok, et al, 1997). Francis and Stephen (1990) found that the primary 
important factor distinguishing hedger versus non-hedger firms is their size, and that 
over time, hedger firms increase their size differential. Several previous empirical 
studies (e.g., Nance et al, 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985; and Geczy et al., 1997) found 
that large firm are more likely to hedge, as there is a relation between a firm's size and 
economies of scales. Firms need specialized information to manage a hedging problem 
and to use the financial instrument (forward, swap, future, option .e.g.) and large firms 
are more likely to provide managers with this information (Booth, Smith and Stolz, 
1984). It is too costly for small firms to use the financial instruments for hedging, which 
means that large firms are more likely to hedge using these financial instruments (Geczy 
etal., 1997).
The implementation of the foreign exchange risk management needs sufficient 
resources for training and/or the employment of an expert (Breeden and Viswanathan, 
1990). Large firms are more likely to have the required resources than small firms 
(Hoyt, 1989). It seems that large firms are likely to employ more skilled managers, who 
are consequently wealthier, suggesting a higher level of managerial ownership. Firms 
with widespread foreign operations are likely to be able to hedge potential exchange 
rate exposure at low cost, just, as firms with inherently large exposures such as heavy 
exporters, will undertake hedging activities. More explanation regarding the extent of 
hedging activity in large size firms lies with the firm’s growth life cycle. Most of firms 
at the beginning of their life cycle will start growth in their domestic market first 
(Buckley, 1996). This means that small firms are less likely to engage in international 
market with less FX impact. Growth in size enables firms to improve efficiency, 
providing them with more power in controlling their operating environment. Size also 
can provide a firm with resources to expand its operations in global markets. Sometimes 
small firms may have limited choice to trade in domestic market and start early in 
international trade.
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However, Czinkota and Johnston (1985) found that small and medium size firms are 
quite similar in their export behaviour. They argued that there is a wide range of 
literature according to which small international firms face serious risks in their 
international activity in comparison with large ones. They argued that large firms are 
less risk-averse, due to a large size of operations combined with a greater spread (less 
correlation) of risks. In addition, Warner (1977) found a weak relationship between the 
direct costs of financial distress and firm size. This may mean that the direct costs of 
financial distress is similar in a large and small firms, implying that small firm are more 
likely to hedge to reduce these direct costs of financial distress. Small firms are more at 
risk of bankruptcy than large firms are which means that small firms prefer hedging to 
large firms (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Theories linking risk management to financial costs 
suggest that hedging can benefit firms with fewer assets more than those with greater 
assets (Haushalter, 2000). The empirical support in the firm size effect in hedging 
decision is somewhat introductory and that an important question remain regarding the 
extent to which the firm size may affect the FX risk management
3.3.4 Manager ownership
For managers, the primary goal in hedging FX exposure is to shelter corporate profits 
from the negative impact of exchange rate fluctuations. The secondary goal is to 
possibly profit from exchange exposure management. In managing FX risks, managers 
can either be risk averters or risk takers. Risk aversion managers seek to protect the 
returns of their primary business operations when engaging in FX transactions. Risk 
seekers, on the other hand, engage in FX transactions with the intention to profit from 
their currency hedging activities. According to the profit maximisation theory, 
managers of firms are interested in hedging because they feel that hedging will protect 
the volatility of profits, cash flows and firm value. Adler and Dumas, (1983), argue that 
the object of hedging is to minimise covariance between the future firm value and the 
exchange rates. To minimise variance, a firm should continuously hedge the present 
value of its foreign currency cash flows, (Kaplanis and Schaefer, 1991), and indeed, 
managers commonly employ a discrete version of this strategy. With regard to the 
different decisions which managers take, they are usually concerned about their jobs, 
promotions, portfolios, reputations and rewards, and are controlled by their degree of 
abilities. Smith and Stulz, demonstrate how risk-averse managers who hold a high 
percentage of shares are affected by the FX risk. In that, their expected utilities of
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wealth are significantly affected by the variance of the firms’ expected profits. The 
managers will hedge when they believe that its less costly for a firm to hedge the risk 
than it is for them to hedge the risk on their own account. Eales, (1995), suggests that 
“job risk” is one of the important reasons that encourage managers to hedge. A manager 
who feels worried about his job and wealth may decide to reduce the volatility of the 
firms’ cash flow by hedging. Hedging activity may be used by poorly diversified 
managers who might have private interests in managing risk to maximise their own 
utility (Stulz, 1984). Smith and Stulz (1985) and Breeden & Viswanathan (1990) 
predicted a positive relationship between the percentage of managerial wealth in the 
firm and the use of derivatives. Berkman and Bradbury (1996) found that a firm’s use of 
commodity derivatives is likely to increase when the value of stocks their managers and 
directors hold increase. Also, Tufano (1996) tested whether firms whose managers 
collectively own greater equity interests in firms tend to be more extensive managers of 
risk. He found that the probability of hedging increased with when managers’ wealth 
increases. He stated that corporate hedging choices might be the product of managers’ 
risk aversion and their exposure to the success of the firm, as provided by their 
compensation contracts and investment. Tufano (1996, p. 1109) argued that "Managers 
whose human capital and wealth are poorly diversified strongly prefer to reduce the risk 
to which they are exposed. If managers judge that it will be less costly for the firm to 
manage this risk than to manage it on their own account, they will direct their firms to 
engage in risk management". In addition, Schrand and Unal (1995), and May (1995) 
found that firms whose managers have more wealth invested in the firm's stock manage 
more financial risk. Treynor and Black (1976, p. 53) noted that "there is some difference 
between the stockholders' and managers' points of view on the question of risk. If the 
corporation undertakes a risky new venture, the stockholders may not be very 
concerned, because they can balance this new risk against other risk that they hold in 
their portfolios. The managers, however, do not have a portfolio of employers. If the 
corporation does badly because the new venture fails, they do not have any risks except 
those taken by the same corporation to balance against it. They are hurt by a failure 
more than the stockholders, who also hold stocks in other corporations". Assuming that 
managers are utility maximizers, we can expect them to engage in risk-reduction 
activities to diversify their employment risk. Managers’ attitude against risk should 
change as a manager’s ownership level is changed.
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However, Haushalter (2000) found no evidence that the extent of hedging is increasing 
in the degree of managerial stock ownership. Fok, et al, (1997) found that firms with 
high managerial ownership are less likely to hedge. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that 
a manager who owns a great proportion of the firm’s equity, controls the firm, and the 
board of directors and may expropriate the firm wealth. Colquitt and Hoyt (1996) argue 
that the owners’ decision, to minimize risks through the use of hedging financial 
instrument, is different from one firm to the other. It could be suggested that when a 
manager holds some equities in a firm, the hedging activities will cause an increase in 
transaction costs, hence the manager may think to decrease hedging activities in the firm 
as hedging decreases the manager's expected wealth. Understanding the relationship 
between managers wealth and currency risk management will make it easier to compare 
the managers’ incentives and arrangements with those of shareholders interest. The 
hypothesis that firms with more managerial ownership have a greater incentive to hedge 
depends on the firm’s agency costs being small. In other words, which one is more 
related to currency risk management decision; the agency cost or managerial 
ownership?
3.3.5 Managers’ ability
Firm managers have differing abilities as to their financial decisions. Manager can 
hedge FX risk by using financial instruments. If managers force to hedge the FX risk, 
the hedging activities would be more related to the abilities of the managers. It has been 
suggested that high ability managers always hedge, and when the difference in ability 
between high and low ability managers is small, low ability managers also hedge. It 
seems that when the differences in learning, training and experience level is high, the 
profit level is very different when both agents hedge. Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) 
in their model where managers care only for their reputations, found that when the 
ability difference is high, the higher ability manager hedges while the lower ability 
manager does not hedge. They found that it is more costly for the lower ability manager 
to hedge as his probability of going bankrupt is higher. Some managers are only 
concerned about their reputations and hedging for them is important when it becomes an 
observable activity.
Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) suggest that a treasurer wants to hedge not because of his 
desire for excess returns, but to achieve a level of risk return with which his 
management feels comfortable. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) suggest that it is difficult
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for investors to observe managerial quality and they cannot disentangle profits due to 
managerial quality as compared to exogenous market shocks. This may lead managers 
to prefer to engage in risk management to present their skills to the labour market. Gay 
and Nam (1998) argue that poor managers could be motivated to hide their low quality 
by spending more capital on long-term projects such as research and development 
expenditures (R&D) or by mimicking the hedging strategies of good managers. That is, 
as poor managers spend more capital on R&D, they might engage in greater hedging 
activities, thus masking their managerial ability and the quality of their projects.
3.3.6 Managerial compensation
Theory predicts that firms will use different compensation schemes to reflect 
heterogeneity on a number of dimensions, including firm size, managerial ability, and 
how informative shareholders interest is about managerial performance. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) point out that stockholders in a widely held firm rationally seek to 
avoid the deleterious effects of the owner-manager conflict by the choice of 
compensation system, by instituting contracts that bind managers’ performance with 
shareholder interests, or by using some combination of monitoring and bonding. To the 
extent that the contract contains some managerial compensation that is tied to good 
performance measures, the owner manager conflict is reduced. Schmid (1997) found 
some evidence that the compensation of a management board is affected by 
performance and by the firm’s shareholder structures. There are many studies focusing 
on the effects of managerial incentives on the hedging decision.
The empirical studies by Haushalter (2000) and Joseph (1999) are the only studies 
which focused on the effect of managerial compensation on the hedging decision. 
Haushalter examined the extent to which options (long-term compensation) are used in 
managers’ compensation using four variables. The first variable is the number of 
options held by officers and directors. The second measure is the number of options 
held by officers and directors divided by the number of officers and directors. A third 
proxy is the ratio of the sum of exercisable and unexercisable options to the number of 
officers for whom this information is provided. The fourth proxy is the ratio of the value 
of stock options awarded to the CEO in 1993 to the CEO’s 1993 salary plus bonuses. 
The specification used by Haushalter to explain the relationship between management 
compensation and hedging decision includes long-term compensation, but does not 
include proxy for a short-term compensation. This study extends Haushalter study by
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adding variables designed to proxy for the short-term and long-term management 
compensation. Haushalter (2000) found a negative correlation between the extent of 
hedging and the compensation of officers and directors. Joseph (1999) stated that 
hedging increases the firm’s value by reducing the amount of compensation required by 
managers, employees, suppliers and customers for bearing non-diversified risk. This 
result is opposite to that predicted by theory, Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that stock 
options awarded to managers reduce their incentive to hedge. Smith and Stulz argued 
that if manager’s compensation system depend on accounting earnings, one would 
expect the firm to hedge to increase the variance of the firm’s economic value.
3.3.7 Manager age
As it is mentioned before, the manager's attitude to currency risk management is 
different depending on the firm’s objective regarding risk management. However, there 
is no direct measure of the degree of risk attitude by managers. It may be argued that 
age might serve as a proxy for risk attitude, in that an older manager will be more 
sensitive to currency risk effects and therefore strongly adopt currency risk management 
(Tufano and Headley, 1994). It could be argued that an old manager would feel more 
hesitant in adopting new currency risk management technologies such as financial 
derivatives instruments as they may feel it is risky and costly (Tufano and Headley, 
1994). In addition, the period that managers spend in their job may affect their currency 
risk management decision, managers who have shorter periods on the job would be 
more sensitive from fluctuations in a firm’s earning and more likely to manage currency 
risk (Tufano, 1996). This study examines the impact of managers’ age and period on the 
job on the hedging decision. However, Tufano (1996) found no relationship between 
managers’ age and the extent of risk management activity. He explains that the lack of 
association between age and risk management might be the result of age action as a 
factor that influences both risk aversion and predilection to use sophisticated financial 
instruments.
3.2.8 Growth opportunities
Froot et al., (1993) considering the relationship between the growth opportunities and 
hedging decision, argued that to develop a coherent risk management strategy, 
companies must carefully articulate the nature of their cash flows and their investment 
opportunities. This means that firms should ensure that the role of potential investments
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is included when reaching hedging decisions. Currency risk hedging increases value by 
increasing the incentives to under-invest. This occurs because the hedge decreases the 
sensitivity of senior claim value to incremental investment, allowing equity holders to 
capture a larger portion of the incremental benefit from new investments (Froot et al, 
1993). Hedging also allows the firm to credibly commit to meet obligations in states 
where it otherwise could not, which improves contract terms and the firm can negotiate 
with customers, creditors and managers. Individual hedging cannot duplicate these 
benefits. Shortfalls in cash may be met with increases in outside financing, but also 
some decreases in investment. Thus, variability in cash flows disturbs both investing 
and financing plans in a way that is costly to the firm. To the extent that hedging can 
reduce this variability in cash flows, it can also increase the value of the firm. Lessard, 
(1990), argued that the most compelling arguments for hedging lie in ensuring the 
firm’s ability to meet two critical sets of cash flow commitments; 1) The exercise prices 
of their operating options reflected in their growth opportunities, (for example, the R & 
D or promotions budgets), and 2) Their dividends, the growth options argument, hinges 
on the observation that, in the case of a funding shortfall relative to investment 
opportunities, raising external capital will be costly. Firms with high growth 
opportunities derive a larger risk from future investments than from existing assets. The 
hedging decision of high growth firms is very important to be considered since efficient 
currency risk management of future investment is important for continuous progress. 
While the outcomes of these future investments and perhaps even the amount of 
currency risk and management that will need to be made are uncertain, high growth 
firms should use hedging activity in order to encourage managers to maximize 
shareholder wealth. Froot et al, (1993) argue that corporate risk management allows 
firms to take on more attractive growth opportunities.
There are some empirical studies which consider the growth opportunities as a 
determinant for hedging firms. For example, Geczy et al, (1997) use three variables as 
proxies for the growth opportunities available to a firm: the ratio of a firm's research and 
development expenditures to its sales; the ratio of a firm's capital expenditures for 
property, plant, and equipment to firm size; and the book value of a firm's common 
equity scaled by its market value. They found that the users of derivatives have 
significantly greater ratios of research and development expenditures to sales, and 
smaller book-to-market ratio, than do nonusers of derivatives. Fok, et al, (1997) found 
that hedged firms had significantly more growth opportunities. Also Berkman and
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Bradbury (1996) examine the relationship between hedging firms and the level of 
earning price ratio in these firms they found that the earnings price ratio is higher for the 
firms with derivatives and the ability to finance short term asset growth, lower for firms 
with derivatives. However, Mian (1996) found that hedgers and non-hedgers of 
currency price risk have no significant difference in market to book ratio, and that the 
correlation between market to book and currency price hedging is insignificant as well. 
Mian explains that one possible reason for not finding a positive association between 
hedging and market to book ratio is the constraints imposed by the mandated reporting 
requirements on hedging of anticipated exposures. Also Nance et al, (1993) examine a 
survey sample of 169 Fortune 500/ Standard & Poors 400 firms for the year 1986 
comprising 104 hedgers and 65 non hedgers. They found the probability of hedging to 
be unrelated to the ratio of book-to-market value of the firm's assets.
3.3.9 Corporate finance costs
If firms do not generate sufficient cash flow, they may tend to cut investment below the 
optimal level because of costly external financing. Lessard (1990) posit a strong link 
between cash flow and investment due to capital market imperfections, typically 
information asymmetries. The internally generated cash flow, which is important to the 
investment process, can be affected by external factors such as movements in exchange 
rates. When the external sources of finance become more costly to firms than internally 
generated funds, firms are likely to hedge (Smith and Stulze, 1985). Hedging helps 
firms to ensure that exchange rate movement will not affect their internal cash flow 
levels and they have as expected internal funds available to carry on in their activities. 
Many studies suggest that exchange rate movements will affect the firms’ internal cash 
flows and the firm's need to use external sources to raise money (Gay and Nam, 1998; 
Jia and Lilian, 1998).
The firm's reason for hedging cash flows is to protect their internal cash flows to meet 
their optimal investment needs so as to avoid having to bear the deadweight costs of 
external finance. Froot et al, (1993) stated that the supply of internally generated funds 
dose not always equal the investment demand for funds. Sometimes there is excess 
supply, sometimes there is a shortage. Because external financing is costly, this 
imbalance shifts investment away from the optimal level. They argued that risk 
management can reduce this imbalance and the resulting investment distortion, it 
enables companies to better align their demand for funds with internal supply of funds.
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Their view is that the purpose of corporate hedging is to ensure that the firm has enough 
internal cash flows for future investment. Hedging may help firms in reducing the 
volatility on their internal cash flow to avoid having to bear the deadweight costs of 
external finance. Gay and Nam (1998, p. 55) state that ‘since good managers know that 
they might be forced to reduce investment below the optimal level because of costly 
external financing, they are more likely to hedge market risks to ensure that the firm has 
sufficient funds for investment’. Haushalter (2000) argued that the firm is more likely to 
hedge when a company has difficulty in obtaining outside financing. Hedging can be 
used to reduce the underinvestment problem which results when firms find that the cost 
of external financing would limit desirable investment spending during times when 
internally generated cash flows are not sufficient to fund new investment. Howton and 
Perfect (1998) found that derivative use is directly related to the external financing 
costs. However, Geczy et al, (1997) and Berkman and Bradbury (1996) found no 
relation between hedging activity and the ability of the firm to finance its current 
investment program. One possible reason, for the contradictory results, is that there are 
potential drawbacks in the sample selection procedures in these studies as it was 
collected from different countries. Also the way that theses studies measure the 
corporate finance costs was different, see section 7.3.2.1.
3.3.10 Industry
Some studies consider the effect of industrial versus service oriented firms on hedging 
decision. For example, Roberts (1996) found that industrial firms are more likely than 
non financial service firms to hedge their FX risk. Belk and Glaume (1990) note that in 
some firms the decision on whether to hedge or not to hedge currency exposures is 
strongly influenced by what their competitors do. Many firms are more concerned about 
their relative market position. This is important in markets with many competitors when 
it is difficult to decide whether competitors experience unfavourable or favourable 
exchange rate change. Froot, et al, (1993) argue that the optimal hedging strategy for a 
given firm will depend on both the nature of product market competition and on the 
hedging strategies adopted by its competitors. Most of the previous studies concentrated 
on the relationship between the firm's competitive situation and the magnitude of a 
firm's currency exposure (Shapiro, 1992; Bradley, 1998; and Bradley and Moles, 2001). 
As proposed by Pringle and Connolly (1993), Bradley and Moles (2001) found that 
exchange rate movements lead to the indirect competitive effects. Williamson (2001)
57
found that industry competition play vital roles in the exposure to exchange rate
exposure to firm-value relation. Different industries have different competitive positions
which means that exchange rates movements affect these industries differently. Geczy 
et al, (1997) found that firms in the electronics and consumer goods industries are the 
most frequent users of hedging activities in their sample. The reason for this as 
presented by He and Ng (1998) who examined the FX exposure in Japanese firms, is 
that electrical equipment, precision machinery and transport sectors had the highest FX 
exposure in their firms sample.
3.3.11 The magnitude of the exposure
Firms will face FX risk if their international trade payments or revenues are
denominated in foreign currencies. This includes the payment or receipt of dividends, 
receiving the foreign currency borrowings and payments of interest and repayments of 
principal and owning foreign assets, foreign liabilities and overseas subsidiaries. It is 
obvious that the greater the proportion of foreign operations the higher is the degree of 
exposure to unanticipated exchange rate movements. As a result, firms that are involved 
in international trade will have greater need to engage in FX risk management.
Adler and Dumas (1984) and Hodder (1982) found that exchange rate fluctuations did 
not cause changes in firms' values. More recent research by (Jorion, 1990; Amihud, 
1994; and Bodnar and Gentry, 1993) found that US MNCs. exporters, and 
manufacturing industries are not significantly affected by exchange rate movements. 
However, these studies consider the idea that exchange rate exposure is measured by the 
percentage change in the rate of return on a firm's common stock against a 1% change 
in the exchange rate. The surprising result of these studies is easily explained by the fact 
that they ignore the effect of hedging strategies adopted by these firms on their level of 
exposure. In that, with more hedging activities carried out by exporters and importers to 
cover their exposure to exchange rate movements little effect should be expected from 
exchange rate movements on a firm's value1. It is accepted that exchange rate 
movements affect expected future cash flows, and therefore the value of the exporter 
(importer) firms (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot, et al., 1993). Almohaimeed (1999)
1 A recent study by Jia & lilian (1998) showed that FX has positive impact on stock returns.
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found that investors’ investment decision to invest in companies were affected by the 
level of sales generated in foreign markets, the level of foreign export, and the particular 
countries in which MNC operate.
Firms which generate a larger percentage of total sales or costs from overseas tend to 
have more formalised FX decisions. An increase in costs or revenues from foreign 
operations should increase exposure. Hence the hypothesis in previous literature suggest 
that exchange rate exposure should be positively and significantly related to the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales and foreign costs to total costs (e.g., Geczy et al, 1997). In 
that any increase in costs from foreign operations should increase firms' exposure. Flood 
and Lessard (1986) found a significant relationship between foreign sales and FX 
exposure. Ceglowskf (1989) using a sample of US industries found that there is a 
significant relationship between their imports and exports and their FX exposure. In 
addition, Hakkarainen, et al., (1998) carried out a questionnaire survey and used 
financial accounting data to explain the FX exposure management practices of Finnish 
industrial firms. They found that firms with formalised FX policies tend to have higher 
levels of total export.
There is no single measurement that is generally accepted and can be used to identify 
the degree of foreign operation involvement of the firm. Different studies use different 
measurements, for example, they sometimes use the number of countries in which a 
firm's operations are located, or an accounting ratio like the proportion of foreign 
earning, foreign sales and foreign assets. The decision to hedge should depend on the 
total foreign trade (imports plus exports) if they are in uncorrected currencies or firm 
hedge them separately. The exposure factors (foreign sales, foreign costs and foreign 
trade) should be significantly and positively related to a firm's decision to hedge and the 
hedging level, indicating that firms with higher exposure are more likely to hedge. 
Exposure factors not only direct the decision to hedge but also the extent of the hedging 
level. For example, we can use the firm size as an indicator for the firm's decision to 
hedge but not on the level of hedging, which may depend on the exposure factors and 
the hedging costs. Allayannis and Ofek (2001, p. 276) state that "Exposure factors 
(foreign sales and foreign trade) are the sole determinants of the degree of hedging 
activity. In other words, given that a firm decides to hedge, the decision of how much to 
hedge is affected solely by its exposure to foreign currency movements through foreign 
sales and trade". For example, a firm which uses forward contracts to minimise its
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exchange rate exposure, will find that exposure through foreign currency exposure is 
positively related to its decision to enter forward contracts. Allayannis and Ofek (2001), 
found evidence that a firm's exposure through foreign sales and foreign trade is a very 
important factor that both prompts corporations to hedge and guide their decision on 
how much to hedge. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found evidence that exchange rate 
exposure increases with the percentage of foreign sales and decreases with the 
percentage of foreign currency derivatives. However, Jorion (1991) found no evidence 
that exchange rate risk is priced in stock market. He feels that reasons other than 
exposure must explain why firms decide to hedge exchange rate risk.
The effect of exchange rate movements on the Saudi firm’s cash flows might be more 
significant than the case considered in previous studies. The reason is that many of the 
firms in Saudi Arabia are exporting or importing companies, with only sales or costs 
arising in foreign currencies. This means that these companies are not able to achieve a 
natural hedge from the effects of movements in FX rates as multinational companies 
can do with both sales and costs arising in foreign currencies.
3.3.12 Diversification
Diversification is one of the most successful ways of controlling currency risk (Aliber, 
1978; Solnik, 1996). The way in which trade is allocated to the many foreign countries 
determines the riskiness and the expected profitability of the firm. The basic arguments 
in favour of international diversification are that foreign exports and imports offer 
additional profit potentials while reducing the total risk of their business. In other 
words, international diversification helps to improve the risk-adjusted performance of a 
firm. Exporters can eliminate their FX risk by exporting to customers located in 
different countries. A manufacturing firm may take steps to reduce its FX exposure by 
diversifying its manufacturing base around the world in order to match the currency of 
costs and revenues. This manufacturing firm may achieve a lower-cost decision, with 
high probability of ensuring that FX rates movements would not take away the cost 
advantage. Haushalter (2000) found that production hedged is positively related to the 
location of the firm's products. However, exchange rate volatility made foreign 
investment very risky, thus, it is not surprising that the optimum level of foreign 
investment varied directly with the firm's willingness to accept risk. Goldberg (1993) 
argues that increasing the degree of international involvement decreases systematic risk 
but increases total risk.
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3.3.13 The cost of implementing hedging policy
Firms are different regarding their ability to bear the cost of implementing a hedging 
strategy. To manage their FX exposure, firms can use either operational or financial 
hedging approaches, or a combination of both. However, using the operational method 
or the financial contracts for hedging purpose is costly (Aggarwal and Soenen, 1989). 
Joseph (2000) found that only a small minority of firms are fully covered with respect to 
their FX position due to the reason of high transaction costs on the derivatives markets. 
The cost of hedging, inherent in reducing foreign currency exposure, must be measured 
against the foreseen loss due to a given exchange rate change. It is important for 
companies when considering whether to hedge or not to compare the cost of currency 
risk and the cost of hedging. The difficulty that companies face is that it is not easy to 
measure the effect of some forms of currency risk and to compute the cost of hedging 
properly. For example, companies using forward contracts for hedging may believe that 
the cost of hedging is the discount in the forward market. However, the gain or loss 
depends not on the forward premium or discount at the time the contract was made but 
rather on the difference between the contract forward rate and the spot rate at the time 
the contract matures. Since it is impossible for a company to define the cost or the 
benefit of using forward contract in hedging, a company may predict that by comparing 
the forward rate with its forecast of the future spot rate. Geczy et al., (1997), and 
Shanker (2000) considered the cost of hedging as a determinant for hedging strategy. 
However, these studies used a poorly defined proxy for the cost of hedging 
implementation. They used firm size as a proxy as economc of scale to measure the 
firm’s ability to carry hedging costs. They found that large firms were more likely to 
bear the cost of implementing hedging policy. Inconsistent with Geczy et al., Tufano 
(1996) and Gay and Nam, (1998) found an indeterminate relation between the use of 
hedging instruments and firm size. Soenen and Aggrawal (1989), Belk et al (1992), 
Marshall, (2000), Fatemi and Glaum, (2000) found that forward contracts are the most 
frequently used financial instrument in companies. The main explanation for that 
finding is that forward contracts provide a relatively low-cost method (Bodnar, Hayt 
and Marston, 1996).
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3.3.14 Taxes
Theoretical research predicted that firms with a convex tax schedule will hedge to 
minimize expected taxes (Mayers and Smith, 1982; Smith and Stulz, 1985). They 
suggested that the tax benefit of hedging is greater if the firm has more tax preference 
items. Nance et al, (1993) found that firms with more convex tax schedules hedge 
more. The corporate hedge increases the shareholder's wealth by reducing the effect of 
the tax payment on the firm's profit. However, Francis and Stephan (1990) and Fok et 
al., (1997) found no support for the hypothesis that hedging increases firm value by 
reducing expected tax liability. Also Mian (1996), and Haushalter (2000) did not find a 
clear relationship between a firm’s risk management policy and its tax function. It 
seems that the effect of the hedging activity in reducing the expected taxes is not 
strongly supported by empirical evidence.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter has showed that there is no accepted framework, which can be used to 
guide hedging decision. This chapter has illustrated how hedging determinations 
framework can be designed in a variety of settings. Finance theory indicates that 
hedging activity increases a firm's value. For example, this chapter has described how 
hedging can create value for the shareholders through lower expected costs of financial 
distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985), improving the firm’s expected investment 
opportunities (Froot et al, 1993), reducing the volatility of pre-tax income, to decrease 
expected tax liability (Mayers and Smith, 1982), and by reducing the agency costs 
associated with outside financing (Bessembinder, 1991). Other finance theories suggest 
that managerial risk aversion may affect corporate risk management. For example, 
Tufano (1996) found that firms whose managers hold more stock will be more likely to 
hedge. The chapter has revealed that hedging decision might be affected by the manager 
ability, age, compensation system (Breeden and Viswanathan, 1990; Tufano, 1996; 
Haushalter, 2000).
However, empirical support of FX risk activity determinants is somewhat limited. 
Almost all the research on the relationship between hedging activity and firm 
characteristics have concentrated in the corporate hedging activities in general (Nance, 
et al, 1993; Gay and Nam, 1998; Hardwick and Adams, 1999; Berkman and Bradbury, 
1996; Froot, et al, 1993; and Fok, et al, 1997) or hedging commodity risk (Tufano,
62
1996, Haushalter, 2000), or hedging interest rate risk (Mian, 1996), but few studies have 
examined the determinants of FX risk hedging (Geczy et al, 1997; and Joseph, 1999). 
In order to identify the hedging determinants of FX risk activity, this study will test 
whether cross sectional differences in FX risk management activity can be explained by 
theory. For example, theory predicts more extensive currency risk management by firms 
more likely to face bankruptcy. Other theories posit that corporate risk management 
activities might be linked to the firm. These theories would predict that a large firm’s 
size would be more inclined to manage corporate risk. However, most of these theories 
are most related to corporate hedging activity in general, and the question is whether 
these theories help in describing the choices made by corporations to manage their FX 
risk. Also theories that explain currency risk management as a means to reduce the costs 
of financial distress, to reduce agency costs, or to increase the growth opportunities for 
the firm are not supported strongly. Important questions remain regarding the 
determinants of the extent to which a firm hedges, and the interaction between a firm’s 
hedging policy ant its other policy decisions.
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Chapter Four
A Critical Review for the Determinants of Corporate Hedging 
Literature
4.1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, the studies in corporate hedging decision were focused in 
both the theoretical and empirical issues. Previous theoretical studies continued to 
develop new rationales for corporate risk management, and empirical studies sought to 
test these rationales in order to confirm or reject their predictions. This chapter reviews 
the theoretical and practical works on corporate hedging motives, in order to link the 
theoretical and empirical work to identify areas of agreement in corporate hedging 
motives. This chapter highlights the previous studies which have modelled the role that 
firms’ characteristics play as determinants of corporate hedging decision. The previous 
research aims, methodological issues, hypotheses, sources of data, limitations and 
findings are discussed. To achieve these purposes, the chapter is divided into five 
sections. The next section (section two) reviews theoretical literature relating to the 
determinants of corporate hedging decision. The third section highlights the main 
empirical literature on the determinants of corporate hedging and derivatives use. The 
aim of the fourth section is to critically evaluate the literature of relative corporate 
hedging decision determinants. The final section outlines the main conclusion of the 
chapter.
Table 4.1, on the theoretical studies section (4.2), summarizes the predictions of the 
theoretical studies. Table 4.2 and 4.3, at the end of this chapter, summarize the two 
groups of studies in terms of countries surveyed, the period of the study, type of 
companies in the sample, and method of collecting data and main findings.
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4.2 Review of the Theoretical Studies
The aim of this section is to highlight some of the theoretical studies in the area of the 
determinants of corporate hedging. Smith and Stulz (1985) highlighted the hedging 
behaviour of firms that differ fundamentally from the existing literature. They assumed 
that according to the finance theory, the incentives exist within the contracting process 
to maximize the market value of the firm. Smith and Stulz (1985) developed a positive 
theory of the hedging behaviour of value-maximizing corporations to provide 
theoretical explanations of the relation between hedging decision and firm value. These 
explanations suggest firms hedge to lower non-diversifiable costs that are associated 
with market frictions, such as taxes, financial distress costs, and external financial costs. 
They pointed out that a value-maximizing firm can hedge to reduce the costs of 
financial distress, to reduce the conflict of interest between the equity holders and senior 
claim holders, and when risk-averse agents who contract with the firm cannot fully 
diversify their claims. Hedging reduces the probability that the firm encounters financial 
distress by reducing the variance of firm value. Exogenous bankruptcy costs create 
incentives for bondholders to support optimal hedging. By reducing the variance of a 
firm’s cash flow (or accounting profits), hedging decreases the probability, and thus the 
expected costs, of financial distress. When a risk-averse manager owns a large number 
of a firm’s shares, his expected utility of wealth is significantly affected by the variance 
of the firm’s expected profit, and a positive relation between managerial wealth invested 
in the firm and the hedging activity, is predicted.
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that progressive tax rates cause the firm’s expected tax 
liability to rise with variance of taxable income, indicating that hedging increases firm 
value by reducing the present value of future tax liabilities. They argued that hedging 
can be used to reduce the volatility of pre-tax income to decrease expected tax liability, 
to reduce the probability of bankruptcy resulting in a decline in expected bankruptcy 
costs, and to reduce the agency costs associated with outside financing. Hedges also can 
reduce the compensating differential necessary to induce risk-averse agents who cannot 
fully diversify their claims to contract with the firm. The Smith and Stulz (1985) model 
predicts that managers with greater option holding will prefer less hedging if the option 
payoff function is convex.
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Table 4.1: Summary of the predicted result on the theoretical studies
Predicted signs of coefficient estimates for incentives to hedging decision based on the testable 
implications of Smith and Stulz (1985, S&S), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993, FSS), and Breeden and 
_______________________Viswanathan (1990, B&V). and Bessembinder (1991, B).______________________
Received theory suggested Prediction
that a firm is more likely to 
hedge S&S (1985) FSS (1993) B&V (1990) B (1991)
To reduce expected costs 
associated with of financial 
distress
Yes Yes na Yes
To increase the investment 
opportunities
na Yes na Y es
To reduce expected tax Yes Yes na Yes
To reduce agency costs Yes na na Yes
Due to managerial risk avers Yes Yes Yes na
To increase manager wealth Yes na Yes na
Due to manager 
compensation
Yes na na Yes
Transaction costs Yes na na na
Due to managerial ownership Yes na Yes na
To increase the internal funds na Yes na na
Due to management ability na na Yes na
Due to management 
reputation
na na Yes na
Note: “na” refers to non predicted sign
Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) developed ah asymmetric information model in 
which managerial reputation and ability provide incentives for managers to hedge. They 
have presented a model wherein managers use hedging as an indirect vehicle to 
communicate their abilities. Their hedging model posits that some managers hedge to 
communicate their higher ability and reputation to the market. They posited that high 
ability managers hedge to indirectly communicate their higher ability to the market. 
They argue that by hedging interest rate risk using the financial instruments, bank 
managers reduce noise in the earning process, and thereby provide investors with a 
more informative measure of profits that depicts their ability.
Bessembinder (1991) built a model to examine the effect of hedging on the agency 
costs and financial contracts. He identified two reasons why risk hedging by 
corporations can increase firm value: hedges reduce agency costs, and hedging increases 
value by improving contracting terms. The model showed that hedging activities are 
predicted to be greater in firms that enter valuable deferred obligations such as service 
contracts, warranties, deferred compensation obligations, and borrowing, and for firms
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that enter long-term operating contracts involving firm-specific investment by 
contracting parties. Also, Bessembinder predicted that hedging activities are to be 
greater at firms where growth opportunities constitute a large proportion of firm value.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) developed a general framework for analysing 
corporate risk management in the presence of costly external financing. They argued 
that firms can support good investments by internally generating a sufficient cash flows 
to fund those investments, and these internally generated cash flows can be disrupted by 
external factors such as movements in exchange rates, interest rate, or commodity 
prices. Under this framework, they show that hedging activities can be used to ensure 
that a firm has sufficient cash flow available to make value enhancing investments. In 
that framework, they identified four determinants that might give rise to the hedging 
decision: (a) increased financial distress costs, (b) increased corporate tax, (c) increased 
conflict of interest between the equity holders and senior claim holders, (d) when risk- 
averse agents who contract with the firm cannot fully diversify their claims. Froot, et 
al, (1993) argued that hedging activities can be used to reduce the underinvestment 
problem that would result when cash flow is volatile and access to external financing is 
costly. When external finance is more costly than internally generated sources of funds, 
it can make sense for firms to hedge. They argued that without hedging, firms are more 
likely to pursue sub optimal investment projects. They predict a negative association 
between liquidity and hedging, resulting from treating the liquidity available for the 
firms not as a substitute for long-term debt, but as a measure of the availability of 
internal funds.
4.3 The Previous Empirical Studies
There are two types of related empirical studies of corporate risk management. The first 
type classifies firms into two groups on the basis of their use of particular types of 
derivatives, and then examines the rationales for derivative use (Nance, et al, 1993; 
Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Fok, et al, 1997; Geczy, et al, 1997; Howton and 
Perfect, 1998; Gay and Nam, 1998; Hardwick and Adams, 1999). In these studies 
researchers asked respondents firms whether their firm used selected derivative 
instruments (Nance, et al, 1993;), or researchers searched financial statements or some 
public database (or published data) and defined a risk management firm as one whose 
financial reports included references to terms including ‘hedge’ or to particular
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derivative instruments (Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Fok, et al, 1997; Geczy, et al., 
1997; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Gay and Nam, 1998; Hardwick and Adams, 1999). 
The second type classifies firms into two groups on the basis of their use of hedging 
activity, hedging and non-hedging firms, and then examines the rationales for the 
hedging decision (Francis and Stephan, 1990; Mian 1996, Tufano, 1996; Joseph, 1999; 
Haushalter, 2000). The Mian (1996), Geczy, et al, (1997) and Joseph (1999) studies are 
the only studies which consider the determinants o f currency derivatives use. Geczy, et 
al, examined the determinants of the interest and currency derivatives use separately.
4.3.1 The previous studies on the determinants of derivative use
Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993) used survey data combined with COMPUTSTAT 
data on firm characteristics, on 169 firms’ use of forwards, futures, swaps, and options 
in 1986, to examine the determinants of the firm’s off-balance sheet financial 
instrument use, (as public data were not available on the corporate use of off-balance- 
sheet hedging instruments in 1986). However, they used a questionnaire only to ask if 
firms use any of the derivatives such as forwards, futures, swaps, and options. They 
offered empirical evidence on several hypotheses that explain the corporate purchase of 
hedging instruments and suggest that hedging can increase firm value by reducing 
expected taxes, by reducing the expected costs of financial distress, and by reducing 
other agency costs. Nance, et al, restricted the hedging activities to include only the use 
of financial instruments; they said “corporate hedging refers to the use off-balance-sheet 
instruments, future, swap, forward, and option contracts, to reduce the volatility of a 
firms value” p 267. They stated that their paper takes the firm’s investment and on- 
balance-sheet financing strategies as predetermined and focus only on off-balance-sheet 
financial hedging. They found that firms which use derivatives face more convex tax 
functions, have less coverage of fixed claims, are larger, have more growth options in 
their investment opportunity set, less liquid assets, higher dividends and employ fewer 
hedging substitutes. They also found that firms that use the hedging instruments have 
significantly higher R&D expenditures and that firms with more investment options 
have both lower leverage and more hedging suggests that firms that use the hedging 
instruments have more growth options in their investment opportunity set. However, 
Nance, et al, (1993) found that the findings for certain hypothesized relationships are 
often weak in both univariate and multivariate statistical tests.
68
Berkman & Bradbury (1996) examined the determinants of hedging which can be 
used as indicator to increase firm value by reducing expected taxes, expected costs of 
financial distress, and other agency costs. This study provided non-survey evidence on 
the use of derivative financial instruments. They test the management risk-aversion 
hypothesis, the relation between the use of derivative and level of foreign activities, and 
the need to coordinate investing and financing policies. Berkman & Bradbury paper is 
the first study to use a continuous measure to examine derivatives-use determination 
from the 1994 audited financial statements of 116 firms in New Zealand. Their results 
are generally in line with theoretical models of corporate risk management. Using non­
survey data, they found that derivative use increases with leverage, size, the existence of 
tax losses, the proportion of shares held by directors, and the payout ratio and decreases 
with interest coverage and liquidity.
Fok, Carrol, and Chiou (1997) used public available data to examine how off-balance 
sheet corporate hedging activities might increase firm value. They examined the firms’ 
financial distress, agency costs, tax liability, size, and growth opportunities as 
determinants of corporate hedging and derivatives. Their determinants model was built 
on the assumption that the primary purpose of hedging is to increase firm value. They 
examined the determinants of derivatives use to hedge the interest rate risk and FX rate 
risk. Fok, et al, stated that firms hedge with both on-balance sheet as well as off- 
balance sheet activities. However, Fok, et al., argued that it is very difficult to identify 
and measure on-balance sheet hedging, hence, they only use publicly available data. In 
order to examine the relationship between the hedging decision and firm value, they 
used measures of diversification, the convexity of the tax function, the probability of 
financial distress, firm size, the agency costs of debt, and the agency cost of equity, as 
well as an indication of whether or not a firm is a multinational corporation. They 
defined hedgers as the firms which used at least one of interest rate swaps, interest rate 
caps, floors, collars and swaption, future and forward rate agreements, futures, currency 
caps, FX forward, and FX options. They found that hedging reduces the probability of 
financial distress, reduces the agency costs of debt, and reduces some agency costs of 
equity. Also, large firms and firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to 
hedge. However, they found no support that hedging reduces the expected tax liability. 
The most important result is that, Fok, et al, found that operational hedging (as one 
kind of internal hedging) and derivative hedging are complements rather than
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substitutes.
A paper by Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) is one of several cross-section studies 
to examine the determinants of corporate derivatives used by employing annual report 
disclosures required by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, rather than survey 
data. They examined the currency derivatives use for 372 of the Fortune 500 non- 
fmancial firms in 1990. All the firms in the sample have potential exposure to foreign 
currency risk from foreign operations, foreign-denominated debt, or a high 
concentration of foreign competitors in their industries. Geczy, et al., empirical tests 
include a set of hypotheses that are more comprehensive than those of other empirical 
studies that use large cross-section samples. They “organize the various theories into a 
single framework by discussing the incentives for derivatives use from the perspectives 
of managers, bondholders, and equityholders” p i325. The Geczy, et al, study was 
mainly concentrated on the determinants of the incentives for hedging use. However, 
unlike other empirical studies, Geczy, et al, extended the testable implication of 
existing theories on derivatives use by considering how the cost of using derivatives 
affects the decision to use them. They used indirect measurements to measure the cost 
of using derivatives by suggesting that firms with economies of scale in implementing 
and maintaining a risk management program are more likely to use currency 
derivatives. For example, they used a firm's size as a measure of economic scale. 
However, Nance, et al, (1993) who measured firm size by the sum of the book value of 
its debt plus the market value of its equity, argued that since the direct costs of financial 
distress are less than proportional to firm size, it seems that smaller firms are more 
likely to use hedging techniques than larger firms. Inconsistent with Geczy, et al, 
suggestion, Tufano (1996) found an indeterminate relation between the use of hedging 
instruments and firm size.
Geczy, et al, built a framework for optimal derivatives using decision for three factors 
affecting a firm’s derivatives decision: the incentives to use derivatives, the exposure to 
FX rate risk, and the cost of implementing a derivatives strategy. This framework is one 
of the most comprehensive frameworks in the literature as it opened a new dimension 
on considering the decision of derivatives use, see the diagram in section (7.3.1). While 
these three dimensions are important for the derivative use decision, they are not 
sufficient conditions to control the derivative use decision. To obtain data about the use 
of currency derivatives Geczy, et al, used the firms’ accounting footnotes in their
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annual reports and/or 10-K filings for the fiscal year-end 1991. Because they observed 
derivatives use, not “hedging”, their dependent variable might measure speculation 
rather than hedging, for that reason, currency derivatives use can not be used as a direct 
measure of hedging. They found that firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter 
financial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives to reduce cash flow 
variation. The firm size also has positive relationship with derivative use, and firms with 
more FX rate exposure will use currency derivatives.
The purpose of Howton & Perfect (1998) paper is to study the patterns and 
determinants of derivatives use by examining a sample of large, and smaller, randomly 
selected, US firms. This study examined derivatives use in samples of 451 Fortune 
500/S&P 500 (FSP) firms (where 60% of them use derivatives) and 461 randomly 
selected firms (where 36% of them use derivatives). Howton and Perfect (1998) stated 
that ‘the theoretical determinants can be grouped into four categories: external 
financing, financial distress, tax-related costs, and risk exposure. Howton & Perfect 
extended Berkman & Bradbury work by using several continuous measures of US 
derivatives use as the dependent variable. Howton and Perfect found.that 60% of FSP 
firms and only 36% of the randomly selected firms use derivatives. Derivatives use in 
FSP sample were directly related to financial distress, external financing costs, tax 
costs, currency risk exposure, and inversely related to hedging substitutes. They found 
that the determinants of derivatives use differ across samples and are largely consistent 
with theory. One exception is that the random firms’ derivatives use and the theoretical 
determinants are not strongly related. Howton & Perfect stated that “the results for the 
random sample imply that the relation between derivatives use in the random sample 
and the theoretical hedging determinant proxies is not as strong as that found in the FSP 
sample.” PI 16-117. It seemed that there were some firms in the random sample that do 
not have any currency or interest rate exposure and did not use derivatives and this may 
have affected the study results.
Gay and Nam's (1998), paper extended the previous findings on the determinants of 
corporate derivatives use by examining more closely the underinvestment hypothesis 
modelled by Froot, et al, (1993). Specifically, they studied the interactional effects 
among a firm’s investment opportunities, cash stock, and internally generated funds, to 
more clearly distinguish the role of the underinvestment hypothesis in the determination 
of corporate hedging policy. They construct their sample both by combining
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all corporations in the 1996 Swaps Monitor database published by Swaps Monitor 
Publications, Inc. and the listing of Business Week 1000 firms. They had a common 
sample of 325 derivatives users and 161 non-derivatives users (interest-rate, currency, 
and commodity derivatives). They found consistent evidence that supported the role of 
potential underinvestment problems and a positive relationship between derivatives use 
and the firms’ growth opportunities. Firms with more investment opportunities and low 
level of cash flow, are more likely to hedge. Also their results show that firms can and 
do use derivatives as one strategy to maximize shareholder value.
Hardwick and Adams (1999) examined the determinants of financial derivatives use in 
U.K. life insurance firms (financial services sector). They examined the relation 
between derivatives use and firm’s size, leverage, international links, organizational 
form, and the extent of reinsurance. Sample data of U.K. based life insurance firms (n = 
88) were obtained at random from the insurance company database for 1995. The lack 
of appropriate data prevented them from including a suitable proxy for some 
determinants variables such as the duration of assets and liabilities. Hardwick and 
Adams results indicate that the propensity to use derivative instruments is positively 
related to a farm’s size, leverage and international links, and negatively related to the 
extent of reinsurance. They argued that the positive relation with leverage and the 
negative relation with reinsurance support the hypothesis that U.K. life insurers use 
derivatives to offset risk, rather than as a speculative means of income generation.
4.3.2 The previous studies on the determinants of corporate hedging 
decision.
Francis and Stephan (1990) examined systematic differences in the characteristics of 
hedging and non-hedging firms using cross-sectional and time-series tests. Using a set 
of proxy variables, they examined five theories explaining why firms hedge: restrictive 
debt covenants, bankruptcy costs, political costs, taxes, and managerial incentives. In 
order to assess the cross-sectional determinants of hedging firms, they examined 
whether the five explanations are consistent with time series changes in the proxy 
variables of hedging versus non-hedging firms. The hypotheses of the research were 
examined using a sample of 434 U.S. firms, for the period over 1972-82 and 1983-87. 
Using univariate tests, they found that the debt covenant and political cost were 
supported, but do not provide strong evidence consistent with tax motivations to hedge
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or the theory that firms hedge to avoid bankruptcy costs. Whereas, the multivariate 
tests, which assess each hypothesis separately, do not support the debt covenant or 
bankruptcy cost explanations, but provide strong evidence favouring the political cost 
explanation. The time series analysis shows some evidence that over time hedger firms 
experience reductions in the restrictiveness of debt covenants, the probability of 
bankruptcy and tax rates; and increases in size and managerial ability. They found that 
the most important variables affecting a firm's decision to hedge are its size, dividend 
policy and average tax rate. However, they used The National Automated Accounting 
Research System (NAARS) data base between 1972 to 1982 and between 1983 to 1987 
but firms at that time were not required to disclose any hedging activities, which might 
have affected their result as hedging companies which hedged but did not disclose their 
hedging activities were classified as non-hedging firms in the study.
Using a new database that details corporate risk management activity in North 
American, Tufano (1996) examined commodity-hedging activities in the gold mining 
industry. He discuses the implications of managers’ self-interest for derivatives use 
determination. Rather than analysing the determinants of the hedging decision, Tufano 
analysed the differences among firms employing different levels of risk management, 
none hedge, hedge between 0-40%, and hedge over that 40% of the risk (see page, 
1112). Tufano’s study concentrated only on the rationales of the commodity hedging 
activities. The study used data of 48 firms from the gold mining industry. Tufano stated 
that 'theorists have constructed two classes of explanations for managers' choice or risk 
management activities on behalf of their firms. One class of explanations focuses on 
risk management as a means to maximize shareholder value, and the second focuses on 
risk management as a means to maximize managers' private utility. He stated that “there 
are no firms that used financial transactions to increase gold price exposure; thus, it 
appears that the financial risk management programs produce risk reduction, rather than 
risk enhancement (or speculation).” PI 105. He found that gold mining firms’ risk 
management decisions are consistent with some of the existing theory. Managerial risk 
aversion seems particularly relevant and to have been supported, for example, theory 
predicts that firms whose managers hold greater equity stakes as a fraction of their 
private wealth would be more inclined to manage gold price risk, but those whose 
managers hold options might be less inclined to manage gold price risk. He found little 
empirical support for the predictive power of theories that view risk management as a
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means to maximize shareholder value. In other words, theories that explain risk 
management as a means to reduce the costs of financial’distress, and to lessen the firm’s 
dependence on external financing are not supported strongly in the study. He also found 
that firm risk management levels appear to be higher for firms with smaller outside 
block holdings and lower cash balances, and whose senior financial managers have 
shorter job tenures. However, a study which only concentrate on a specific industry, 
such as the gold mining industry in Tufano’s study, while providing greater detail on 
industry practices, typically lacks generalization of the study results of the existing 
theories.
Mian (1996) provided further empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate 
hedging decisions. Mian obtained data on hedging from 1992 annual reports for a 
sample of 3,022 firms. Out of the 771 firms classified as hedgers, 543 firms disclosed 
information in their annual reports on their hedging activities; the remaining 228 firms’ 
reported the use of derivatives but gave no information on hedging activities. Mian in 
his study had three different comparative samples for each financial characteristic, 771 
hedgers vs. 2,251 non-hedgers, 439 interest-rate hedgers vs. 2,583 non-hedgers of 
interest-rate risk, and 440 currency-price hedgers vs. 2582 non-hedgers of currency- 
price risk. He reported correlations between financial characteristics and hedging, 
interest-rate hedging, and currency-price hedging. He found that hedgers and non­
hedgers of currency-price risk have no significant difference in market-to-book and the 
correlation between market-to-book and currency-price hedging is insignificant as well. 
He found that currency-price hedgers are larger in size than non-hedgers of currency- 
price risk (mean: $8,355 million vs. $1,015 million). The evidence in the study is 
inconsistent with financial distress cost models; evidence is mixed with respect to 
contracting cost, capital market imperfections, and tax-based models. He also found 
that currency-price hedgers have lower leverage, shorter-term debt, lower liquidity, 
higher dividend yield, and higher dividend payout as compared to non-hedgers of 
currency-price risk.
There is a problem in the methodology adopted by Mian. Mian grouped the sample 
firms of 3,022 into two groups, currency-price hedgers (440 firms) vs. non-hedgers of 
currency-price risk (2582 firms) and examined the firms’ characteristics and differences 
between these two groups in order to find the hedging motivations. While this method 
was used to report the differences in financial characteristics between currency-
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price hedgers vs. non-hedgers of currency-price risk, a high percentage of non-hedger 
firms did not hedge because they did not have any currency-price exposure. In order to 
find the determinants of the currency-price hedging decision, both groups have to face 
currency-price exposure.
Joseph (1999) presented a brief discussion on the motives for hedging strategic 
exposure and related the theoretical work to a practical situation. The study focused on 
two important aspects; the theoretical motives for hedging strategic exposure, and the 
relevance of corporate hedging motives in practice. The study was built on the 
suggestion that strategic exposure management can have a favourable impact on the 
firm's value. Joseph argued that the academic literature lacks both a practical framework 
for implementing corporate hedging decisions and clarity about the potential impact of 
hedging on the firm’s value. He thought that the reason behind this deficiency was due 
to the lack of understanding of exactly how exposure is measured within firms and the 
strategies firms pursue in practical hedging situations. Joseph used a case study of a 
manufacture of computer and electronic office equipment in the U. S. and three 
European countries, as a method of collecting primary data. Using the case study, 
Joseph was the only one from the previous studies who has focused on the relevance of 
corporate hedging motives in practice. He examined the determinants o f  the FX  hedging 
decision. He found that the main hedging motives of the U. S. firm under consideration 
was to reduce the impact of the FX rate fluctuations on its future cash flows and net 
financial asset and to maximize shareholders’ wealth. He also found that when exposure 
information is generated locally, it is essential to establish an exposure strategy which 
does not adversely affect measures used to evaluate managers’ performance. Also, the 
corporate hedging can only be effective if all the organizational units agree on the 
hedging strategy.
Haushalter (2000) examined the hedging policies of 100 firms in oil and gas producers 
between 1992 and 1994. He examined the effect of several independent variables as 
determinants of corporate hedging, these are: external financing costs, investment 
opportunities, operating characteristics, convexity of tax function, compensation 
structure, ownership structure, basis risk (the risk a company encounters when the 
settlement price if the hedging instrument is different from the price of underling asset 
being hedged). He conducts tests in both the determinants of a company's decision to 
hedge and the determinants of the extent of hedging by companies that do hedge.
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These tests found substantial differences between the determinants of these decisions.
He argued that to examine the relation between hedging policy and a company's 
characteristics, the fraction of production hedged was regressed on variables pertaining 
to the financing policy, size, and ownership structure, as well as a number of control 
variables. Results from this study support several explanations for corporate risk 
management. First, the positive correlation between the extent of hedging and financial 
leverage supports theories that corporate risk management is used to alleviate financial 
contracting costs. This result is consistent with studies carried by, Smith and Stulz, 
(1985); Bessembinder, (1991); and Froot, et al, (1993). Secondly, the positive 
correlation between the decision to hedge and total assets is consistent with the notion 
that companies can face significant economies of scale in hedging, particularly in 
setting up a hedging program. This result is consistent with studies carried by, Mian, 
1996; and Geczy, et al, 1997. Thirdly, the association between basis risk and both the 
decision to hedge and the decision of the extent to hedge supports the view that the 
extent to which a firm should hedge to reduce risks is decreasing in the basis risk it 
faces in using instruments available for hedging. This result consistent with studies 
carried by, Ederington, 1979. Finally, he found a negative correlation between the 
extent of hedging and the compensation of officers and directors. Opposite to that 
predicted by theory, Haushalter (2000) found some evidence that the likelihood that a 
firm hedges is negatively correlated with the fraction of shares owned by managers. 
Rather than analysing the determinants of hedging decision in his univariate analysis, 
Haushalter analysed the determinants of the extent of hedging among firms that used 
different levels of risk management (to three levels: zero, minor, and extensive hedgers, 
seepage 126).
4.4 Critical Evaluation for the Previous Studies
This section critically evaluates the previous studies of the determinants of corporate 
hedging decision. The aim is not to evaluate the weakness and the strength of these 
studies with a view to lessen the value of the other studies, but to help this study in 
building an alternative methodology and method to analyse the determinants of the 
hedging decision.
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4.4.1 Data collection method
The twelve studies under review made use of four types of data sources: original 
financial statements (Nance, et al, 1993; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Tufano, 1996; 
Mian, 1996; Geczy, et al, 1997; Fok, et al, 1997; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Gay and 
Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000), national databases (Francis and Stephan, 1990; Howton 
and Perfect, 1998; Hardwick and Adams, 1999), surveys (Nance, et al, 1993; Tufano, 
1996; Haushalter, 2000) and case study (Joseph, 1999). The choice of data source is 
important for the overall research design, as each different source of data has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. Most of the previous studies argued that empirical 
examination of hedging theories had been difficult due to the general unavailability of 
data on hedging activities. Benston and Mian (1995) documented that only 7 percent of 
currency-price hedgers disclose hedging of anticipated exposures in the published data. 
The lack of the publicly available information about the firms’ hedging activities 
severely limited previous empirical studies of the determinants of corporate hedging 
decisions as firms have seen the risk management activity as competitive advantage and 
will not publicly disclose any of their hedging activities. Even when Nance et al., (1993) 
and‘Haushalter (2000) used the questionnaire they only asked one question in these 
surveys regarding the fraction of the financial contracts that been used for hedging 
purpose. Also Haushalter included in his sample the firms that responded and those who 
did not respond but provide hem with financial statements.
However, at the beginning of 1990s, firms in countries such as the UK, U. S. A, and 
New Zealand, were required to disclose their financial hedging activities in their annual 
reports. Allayannis and Ofek (2001, p. 288) stated that “until the beginning of the 
1990s, a firm’s exact position in derivatives was privately held information, and was 
considered a very important component of strategic competitiveness. It is only recently 
that corporations have been required to disclose in footnotes in their annual reports, the 
notional amount of derivatives they are using”. Main (1996, p. 420) also stated that 
‘recent changes in financial accounting standards have mandated that all entities 
disclose off-balance-sheet financial instruments in financial statement footnotes’. As a 
result of this new disclosure, most of the studies from that date relied primarily on the 
amiual reports or public database. For that reason most of the studies concentrated on 
the determinants of derivatives use, as the information about the firms derivatives use
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can be found in the annual reports and in other data bases (Fok, et al, 1997; Howton 
and Perfect, 1998; Bessembinder, 1991; Hardwick and Adams, 1999; Gay and Nam, 
1998; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Geczy, et al., 1997). In the absence of reported 
information on financial and operational hedging activities, it is very difficult to analyse 
and identify the hedging determinants from only the footnotes in the firm’s annual 
reports. Using financial statements data in corporate hedging studies may give the 
researcher the advantage to use these data on the way that he prefers. However, the use 
of financial statements or the company’s financial reports is not without limitations. The 
advantage of using national database is that this kind of information source has already 
been collected by someone else and usually related to a large number of companies, 
covering a wide range of accounting and financial information. The main problem 
associated with national database is that it may not be presented in the way in which the 
researcher needs them and that national database may not contain sufficient detail. This 
is a particular problem when a researcher uses data about derivatives use in general and 
specifies its use for hedging purpose only, ignoring the possibility that these derivatives 
contracts can also be used for speculation purpose. From these financial activities which 
are disclosed in firms’ annual reports and public database it is difficult for researchers to 
define which financial risks these hedging activities are intended to manage, and as a 
result studies mainly focus on the determinants of derivatives use and specific 
instruments or corporate hedge in general, but not the determinants of hedging specific 
risk. Using the firm’s annual reports or financial information to divide the firms to 
hedgers and non- hedgers (derivatives user and non-users) or to analyse the 
determinants of hedging activity or derivative use, may be affected by the degree of 
disclosure in different firms and countries. For example, theoretical and empirical 
studies on the relation between hedging decision and leverage, found or suggested that 
leverage is positively and significantly related to the decision to hedge (Haushalter, 
2000; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Howton and Perfect, 
1998). Nance, et al., (1993) using a sample of 169 U. S. firms on firm’s use of forwards, 
futures, swaps, and options, measured leverage using two different measures: the firm’s 
debt-size ratio, and the coverage of its fixed claims, found no evidence to support a 
positive linkage between hedging and leverage. The negative link with leverage in 
Allayannis et al, the positive link with leverage in Berkman et al., and Howton et al., 
studies, and the failure to find any evidence to support the positive relationship between 
derivatives use and leverage in Nance, et al., (1993) study, which is the opposite of
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what theories of optimal hedging would predict, may be affected by the degree of 
disclosure applied by different firms sample. It would also be used as support for the 
argument that firms can hedge their financial risk not only using derivative instruments 
(an external method) but also using internal methods. Another possible explanation for 
these mixed findings is that the accounting ratios for firms’ may have significantly 
changed from one year to another. A further possible limitation in these studies (e.g., 
Nance, et al, 1993; Geczy, et al, 1997; Allayannis, et al., 2001; Berkman, 1996; 
Howton, et al, 1998) is that the data used to define the derivative users cover only a 
single year and may therefore be affected by short-term fluctuations in derivatives 
usage. As more data becomes available, panel data studies of derivatives use may 
provide more robust evidence (Hardwick and Adams, 1999). Further, looking at 
hedging or derivatives use in general, rather than FX hedging in particular, may result in 
apparently interdictory results because of model misdirection.
4.4.2 The corporate hedging method
Some of the previous studies classified the firms into hedging and non-hedging firms 
with no clear definition for hedging activity. As suggested in chapter 2, FX risk can be 
managed using two alternative methods. Firstly, the use of external methods such as 
financial instruments. Secondly, the use of internal methods such as making adjustments 
in the operating policies and strategies of the firm or using price policies such as 
invoicing in the domestic currency of the firm. Firms, which have corporate risk, will 
try to use all the internal hedging strategies available to them before using the financial 
instruments (derivatives). Berkman and Bradbury (1996) argue that a firm has much 
more flexibility in adjusting size, maturity, and or denomination of its financial 
instruments than in adjusting its operating and financing strategies. However, other 
researchers oppose the use of financial instruments as hedging methods. Moffet and 
Karlsen (1994) argued that while the use of financial instruments in hedging may be 
able to replace earnings or losses, it does not replace actual market share. Copeland and 
Joshi (1996) examined the potential benefits of using the financial instruments to hedge 
FX risk and found that less than 10 per cent of the firms in their sample, which used 
derivatives for hedging, could reduce the volatility of their cash flows by 20 per cent. It 
can also be argued that using financial instruments for corporate hedging may increase 
over all corporate risk. Joseph (1999) stated that ‘the use of derivatives in corporate
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hedging decision has not always resulted in the expected (favourable) impact on the 
firm’s value. He gave as an example the Metallgesellschaft Company which used 
derivatives in hedging and this resulted in substantial economic losses. 
Metallgesellschaft used future and swap contracts to hedge its oil contracts and this 
strategy resulted in losses of over U.S. $1 billion and the need for an emergency line of 
credit (Financial Times, 16th November, 1994). While, the FX risk could be managed 
using internal methods and external methods or both, it may become difficult for the 
researcher to analyse the determinants of FX risk management decision only using a 
publicly available information as most firms’ did not disclose most of the details of their 
internal hedging methods.
Hence most of the previous studies state that it is very difficult to identify and measure 
the internal hedging activities (on-balance sheet hedging), and they only examined off- 
balance sheet financial instruments. Allayannis, et al, (2001, p. 276) stated that “SFAS 
105 requires firms to report information on financial instruments with off-balance sheet 
risk (e.g., futures, forwards, option, and swaps) for fiscal years ending after June 15, 
1990. In particular, firms must report the face, contract, or notional amount of the 
financial instrument, and information on the credit and market risk of those instruments, 
the cash requirements, and the related accounting policy. With the exception of futures 
contracts, disclosure was very limited for other off-balance sheet risk financial 
instruments prior to SFAS 105”. Nance, et al, (1993, p. 267) stated that “corporate 
hedging refers to the use of off-balance-sheet instruments-forward, future, swaps, and 
options-to reduce the volatility of firm value”. This definition ignored the role of the in­
balance sheet hedging activities and the operational strategies as a way of hedging the 
FX exposure. We can say that restricting the hedging activity to include only the off- 
balance sheet financing strategies hedging activities has its limitations, in that the 
difficulty of determining whether an on-balance sheet item is for hedging purpose, 
ignorance of the operating hedging strategies (such as smoothing, matching, netting, 
leading and lagging, e.g.), and not all of the on-balance sheet hedging items are publicly 
available. However, in some of the previous studies, mentioned above the internal 
hedging activities are identified as ‘ on-balance sheet activity’. For example, Tufano 
examined on-balance sheet hedging activities, also Nance, et al, (1993) and Fok, et al., 
(1997) highlighted on-balance sheet hedging activities. However, these studies did not 
use on-balance sheet activities to divide the firms in the sample to the user and non user
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and to examine the motives of using these activities. The on-balance sheet hedging 
activities in these studies recognized as financial policies which are 'substitutes for 
hedging' and they test them as a determinant and substitute for derivatives use. 
However, Fok et al, (1997), found that operational hedging (as one kind of internal 
hedging) and derivatives hedging axe complements rather than substitutes. Fok, et al., p. 
573, stated that "including on -balance sheet hedging production hedging activities is 
difficult. These activities include the decision to locate production facilities in major 
foreign markets to minimize FX exposure, and choosing a technology to minimize 
exposure to commodity price risk. Two problems preclude a detailed analysis of this 
type of on-balance sheet hedging: (1) determining whether an on-balance sheet item is 
for hedging purposes, and (2) availability of data”. Unfortunately, researchers cannot 
directly distinguish between derivatives use and risk management. For instance, two 
firms may differently manage their FX risk, one using forward or future contracts, while 
the other one uses currency invoicing or leading and lagging strategies. By only 
restricting the risk management concept to derivatives use, the first firm would be 
characterized as a hedging firm, and the second one as a non-hedging firm. Firms reveal 
only a small amount of details of their risk management activities and while they 
disclose their use of derivatives they do not disclose that they engage in hedging 
activities. For that reason, the studies which did not use survey to collect details about 
the firms’ risk management activities will only get details of the firms that do or do not 
use specific types of derivatives instruments without presenting a correct idea about the 
purpose of that use. Using a survey is generally more detailed than the other sources of 
data, simply because the researcher can ask firms related and updated questions for 
related and additional information. This method might also be necessary since the 
national database about firms’ financial and accounting figures is not available in many 
countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Further, the only kind of firms which are required to 
disclose their financial and accounting information are the ones that are registered on 
stock Exchange. In Saudi Arabia there are only 60 non-financial firms, of these 60 firms 
there are only 43 that can be categorised under this study sample conditions. Private or 
family firms in Saudi Arabia are not in the practice of sending their annual reports to 
anyone apart from their owners.
All of the empirical studies in the first group have examined factors which could be 
associated with the probability that a firm uses derivatives, none of these studies have
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looked for the factors that are associated with the hedging decision (e.g., internal and 
external hedging activities). As these studies observe derivatives use, not “hedging”, 
their dependent variables might measure speculation rather than hedging. These studies 
considered the determinants of hedging and speculating in financial markets, and 
reflected the implications of hedging and speculating using the financial instruments for 
their results. Because most of these studies report empirical relations between the firm's 
demands for risk transfer or risk taker through derivatives and firm-specific 
characteristics, speculative motives are likely to be substitute to the hedging incentives 
in these studies. In fact, these studies provided evidence on the motivations for 
decisions to use derivatives for both hedging and income enhancement purposes 
through speculation. There is no direct evidence that derivatives are actually used only 
to hedge rather than speculate. Hentschel and Kothari (1997) and Simkins and Laux 
(1997) examine directly firms’ use of currency derivatives, but the former do not find 
any evidence and the latter find only weak evidence that their use influences exposure. 
Mian (1996) separated his sample into two group, hedging firms (771 firms) and non­
hedging firms (2251 firms), however 228 of the hedging firms where only recognized as 
hedging firm as they disclose their use of derivatives but do not disclose that they 
engage in hedging activities. Mian (1996, p. 425-426) stated that “under current general 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), hedging activities are either classified as 
“hedging” or “speculative” activities...., one problem with classifying derivative users 
as hedgers is that these firms could potentially use derivative financial instruments for 
speculation and not for hedging”. He "conclude that the association between hedging 
and its determinants is robust with respect to inclusion or exclusion of derivative users 
as hedgers" p 433. Joseph (2000, p. 161-162 and 179) argues that “most theoretical 
studies seek to explain why industrial firms hedge exposure focus on differences in the 
financial characteristics of users and non-users of hedging techniques. The empirical 
work, which seeks to test the theoretical predictions, takes a similar focus.... Previous 
empirical studies which focus on the usual set of derivatives to identify hedgers and 
non-hedgers can capture some of the effects they seek to measure”. Joseph argued that 
since the firms are only required to disclose exposure information, if such information is 
material, this latter approach may not fully capture the hedging activities of firms. This 
problem may cause the discrepancies between corporate risk management theory and 
the results of these previous empirical studies that only address the decision of using 
derivatives as a means of hedging. Geczy, et al, (1997, p. 1324) who examined the use
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of currency derivatives in order to differentiate among existing theories of hedging 
behaviour, stated that “because we observe derivatives use, not hedging, our dependent 
variable might measure speculation rather than hedging. Therefore, we consider firms’ 
motives in using currency derivatives to speculate and the implications of speculation 
for our results.”. Nonetheless, the fact that derivatives can be used for both hedging and 
income enhancement purposes further underscores the need for academics, industry 
regulators, practitioners and others to obtain deeper insights into what motivates the 
decision to use derivatives for a hedging purpose and for speculating purpose.
4.4.3 The unit of analysis
Some studies’ samples were not restricted to those firms with FX exposure and 
contained firms that do not have any exposure (Francis and Stephan, 1990; Mian, 1996; 
and Howton and Perfect, 1998). Because they do not eliminate firms with no exposure, 
these studies are not able to concentrate on the major cross-sectional differences that 
affect the incentives for hedging. Also some firms in their sample may not hedge 
because they simply have no exposure or have small amounts of exposure. The 
researcher should be aware of the sample on which the data required are based, in that 
selecting unrelated samples may affect the suitability of the data in reaching the 
research purposes. Most of the previous studies samples consisted of different kind of 
companies such as domestic, export and import, and MNC firms (such as, Mian, 1996; 
France and Stephan, 1990). The domestic firms may not have any FX exposure, and the 
MNCs only face a small amount of FX exposure as most of these firms are well 
diversified and have foreign subsidiaries. Flood and Lessard (1986) postulated that 
MNCs that both buy and sell in the foreign markets, even within competitive 
international markets, will be less sensitive to changes in FX rates than those firms 
engaged solely in importing or exporting. In addition, the empirical studies reviewed in 
this chapter either used industrial specific sample (Tufano,1996; and Haushalter, 2000), 
broad but unrestricted samples (Francis and Stephan. 1990; Mian, 1996; Howton and 
perfect; 1998 and Gay and Nam, 1998), or the largest group of firms in a country 
(Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Geczy, et al, 1997; Nance, et al, 1993; and Fok, et al,
1997), or was based on case study (Joseph, 1999). This study contributes to the 
empirical literature through its sample of exporting and importing firms and adopting a 
new empirical methodology. This study’s sample of Saudi firms was chosen on the
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basis that they were heavily engaged in trading in foreign markets.
4.4.4 The underling assumption in the previous studies
The previous studies focus on two main considerations to analyse both the hedging 
decision and the derivatives use determinants. First, most of the previous studies 
presented in this chapter used a finance theory framework based on firm value 
maximization. The theory assumes that the economic behaviour of individuals and firms 
aim at maximizing economic utility. The behaviour of the decision maker is facilitated 
by the predicted return as rational for the decision. Most of the previous studies evaluate 
hypothetical outcomes in hedging decision situations, and mainly focused on too narrow 
an aspect of the risk and benefit relationship. These previous studies argue that hedging 
can increase firm value (e.g. Froot, et al, 1993; Nance, et al, 1993; Berkman, et al., 
1996; Fok, et al, 1997; Joseph, 1999). In order to build their model most of the 
theoretical explanations of the determinants of the hedging decision in these studies 
mainly concentrated on the incentives for hedging which are likely to benefit 
contracting parties. Most of the debates on the determinants of corporate hedging 
decisions have been mainly concentrated on the finance theory which argues that 
hedging increases the firm's value. Most of these studies used firms’ annual reports or 
public database which only provide numerical information such as accounting ratios, 
and most of the previous researchers when they examined the determinants of hedging 
decisions found themselves mainly and unconsciously critically evaluating that decision 
using accounting ratios.
The finance theory offers another explanation for why hedge. Most of the previous 
studies argued that corporate hedging and derivative use are attributable to managerial 
risk aversion (e.g. Tufano, 1996; Mian, 1996; Geczy, et al, 1997; Haushalter, 2000). 
These studies focus on the managerial differences in risk taking, so that these studies 
ascribe some of the firm’s risk behaviour to the link between corporate risk 
management activities and the risk aversion of corporate managers, their utility, and the 
form in which they hold a stock in the firm. According to this explanation, the main 
purpose of corporate hedging is to maximize the manager’s private utility and reduce 
the likelihood that managers will suffer adverse consequences (Hausalter, 2000). 
However, this explanation may contradictory with corporate hedging as a measure to 
maximize shareholder value. In that Haushalter, (2000, p. 87) argued that “if the
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maximization of the manager private utility is primary corporate motive for hedging, the 
benefits for shareholders not entirely clear, and to the extent there are costs associate 
with corporate hedging, for example, transaction costs- risk management may end up 
reducing shareholder value. From that point it is worth will to consider which one is 
more related to risk management decision, maximizing shareholders wealth or 
maximizing managers’ private utility. This question has not yet been clearly discussed 
except in the study of Tufano (1996). However, Tufano study has some limitations, in 
that, (a) it was focused only in the gold mining industry with typically lack 
generalization of the study results, (b) the sample of the study was small 48 firms and 
this small number may affect the results of the regression analysis (as the sample was 
divided into two groups from 0-40 and more than 40%), (c) Tufano only considered the 
determinants of the commodity hedging activities, (d) he used a national survey of the 
derivative use.
Most of the previous studies adopted both views and tried to present considerable 
empirical support for them. They proposed a two-factor theory that ‘uses both 
increasing managerial wealth and a firm's value factor to explain the hedging decision 
choice. To them the managerial difference factor describes the possibility that the 
hedging decision may affect the manager’s wealth and suggests that managerial risk 
aversion may affect corporate risk management policy. The firm value maximization 
factor refers to the view that the hedging decision can be used as a means to maximize 
shareholder value. Using the publicly available data divorces a currency exposure 
problem from its context so that attention can be focused on a few variables. However, 
while many studies used the same data method (publicly available data) different 
studies ended up with different conclusions, see Table 4.2. Also all these studies 
concentrated only in the accounting ratio differences as a determinant of the corporate 
hedging decision. The studies were mainly analyzing the same determinant variables 
using different representative samples. The problem in corporate hedging decision 
determinants is not only that of selecting a representative sample, the philosophy upon 
which the strategy is based is also important. Making profit might not be the sole 
motive for the firm. Most of the previous studies focused on whether the hedging 
decision in firms was adopted according to the shareholders’ or managers’ interest. 
Most of the determinant variables were examined to infer a relationship between 
managers’ and shareholders’ wealth and the hedging decision.
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All the above considerations have their impact on the classification of the previous 
studies and the findings of these studies. However, these studies report evidence which 
provided some useful insights to this researcher in building the theoretical model of the 
determinants of the hedging decision.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that insufficient research has been undertaken to date on the 
analysis of hedging decision determinants. The concepts involved have not been clearly 
defined, and this may explain the evidence of confusion in the methodology of some 
studies, and the inconsistent results between studies. All of the previous studies 
reviewed in this chapter have examined which determinants could be associated with 
the probability that a firm hedges or derivatives use. However, none of the previous 
studies reviewed involved a comprehensive model of corporate hedging decision 
determinants or a model which reflects the effect of the firm’s context in the hedging 
decision.
This chapter has reviewed research that studies the relationship between risk 
management or derivative use and firm’s characteristics. It is concluded that our 
knowledge of the corporate hedging determinants is limited, providing considerable 
scope for future research. It can be seen from the previous review that research evidence 
about the determinants of corporate hedging covers a limited range of perspectives and 
methods. Unfortunately, this limitation means that our body of knowledge remains in its 
early stages. In particular, in most of the previous studies certain aspects of the research 
design hamper the integration of the available evidence. This chapter has argued that, 
while the objective of most of the previous empirical studies were to analyze the 
determinants of corporate hedging, the hypotheses tested assume that firms pursued a 
shareholder value maximization strategy or a managerial risk aversion strategy when 
they consider a hedging decision. Most of the previous studies which examined the 
determinants of hedging decision were mainly focused on testing theories which 
assumed a potential gain from risk management, including reduction of financial 
distress costs, minimization of tax payments, protection of potential investment 
programs, minimizing the agency conflicts, and reducing the external financing costs. 
Most of the previous studies reviewed in this chapter adopted a hypothetic deductive 
approach to test these determinants. While, managers may use the hedging motivations
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argument to direct hedging decision, they may also consider other factors. The chapter 
has showed that these studies focus on the reasons underlying value maximization and 
the issue of agency conflicts and pay little attention to the other factors which may 
influence the corporate hedging strategy. There are some problems with investigating 
these factors. The data which can be used to do so is firm-specific and cannot be 
obtained through the annual report or published data. Also the absence of the additional 
theory which can explain to some extent the different aspect of factors which may 
influence the decision makers is incomplete.
This chapter pointed out that most of the previous empirical studies were mainly 
focused on the hedging activity in general, commodity risk management, or on interest 
rate risk management. Most of the previous studies on the determinants of the hedging 
decision ignored the idea of alternative solutions to the use of derivatives for risk 
management, those involve making adjustments in the firms’ operational and financial 
policies. For example, Soenen and Madura (1991) pointed out that long term FX risk 
should be managed by making adjustments in the firms’ operating and financial policies 
and strategies. Although these studies did not specifically include more variables to 
capture all internal and external hedging methods, it might be argued that firms with 
foreign operations may be more likely to engage in internal hedging activities. To 
summarize, despite increasingly sophisticated research designs, the reviewed studies of 
the corporate hedging decision determinations have not resolved the debate. In fact, a 
number of methodological and conceptual issues remain problematic.
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Chapter Five
Research Methodology and Methods
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to present the research design, methodology, and methods, 
adopted in this study in order to describe the manner in which the research objectives 
stated in the first chapter are addressed. At the end of this research, the outcomes should 
be relevant, understandable and of benefit for both academics and practitioners. The 
choice of research methods and methodology should reflect these outcomes. All these 
objectives have been reflected in the research design and the choice of research 
methodology. In order to help in the process of the research design and methodology, 
this chapter will try to answer several important questions. What theoretical perspective- 
philosophical stance- informs the research and can be used to achieve objectives and 
questions of this research? What philosophical assumptions and implications lie behind 
the methodology? What research design and methodological objectives link methods to 
outcomes- governs our choice and use of methods? What methods- techniques and 
procedures- does this research propose to use? Answers to these questions stem from 
the research objectives and the nature of the investigation.
Following this brief introduction, this chapter is divided into ten main sections. Section 
two presents the aim of the study process. Section three outlines the theoretical 
paradigm. Section four considers the positivism and interpretive assumptions and 
implications that this research intends to adopt and the rationale for choosing them. 
Section five outlines the research design that the study intends to follow and the 
rationale for choosing it. In section six the purpose of the survey study is presented. 
Section seven outlines the unit analysis which will be used in the study. Section eight 
presents the research methodological theories “finance theory” and “contingency 
theory”. Section nine outlines the research methods, and explains why this research uses 
different data collection methods to those employed in most other studies. In the final 
section, a short summary is presented.
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5.2 The Aim of the Study Process
As stated in chapter 1, the research aim is to explore and examine the determinants of 
the currency risk management decision in Saudi firms. In order to achieve this aim, the 
exploration and explanation of the determinants, this study is divided into two stages. 
The first stage is the exploratory study (chapter 6) and consists of the analysis of the 
interviews followed by the pre-test study and the pilot study to prepare the 
questionnaire. The second stage is the explanatory study (chapters 8 and 9) and consists 
of testing and analyzing the study questionnaire. To achieve the objectives from these 
two stages the study adopted the triangulation approach as the methodological approach 
for this study. Denzin (1978, p. 291) defines triangulation as ‘the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’. Using a multiple approach to 
research permits a wider and richer understanding of risk management practice than 
methodologically a singular approach. Sieber (1973) stated that the triangulation 
approach can provide the researcher with comprehensive and multiple viewpoints of the 
phenomena under study. In order to achieve the research aim, the triangulation approach 
offers the study with the use of multiple stages, multi theoretical perspectives, multi 
theories, multi methods, multiple research purposes, and different analysis approaches. 
The rationale of using this approach is that different theories or methodologies are 
complementary to each other; weaknesses of one theory or methodology can be 
overcome by strengths of another, and vice versa (Cunningham, Young, and Lee, 2000). 
This study adopted various types of triangulation that can be used in combination to 
study the determinants of currency exposure management decision such as, data- 
triangulation (documents, questionnaire, semi-structured interviewed), and theory- 
triangulation (contingency, finance, positivistic and interpretive approach).
5.3 Theoretical Perspective
The term theoretical perspective refers to the progress of scientific practice based on 
people’s philosophies and assumptions about the world and the nature of knowledge; in 
this context, about how research should be conducted (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). This 
section describes the philosophical stance that lies behind the research assumptions and 
methodology. Crotty (1998) attempts to list a representative sample of theoretical 
perspectives; positivism, interpretivism (symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and 
hermeneutics), critical inquiry, feminism, and postmodernism. Although each one of
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these positions have lists of assumptions and methodological implications associated 
with each position, it is not possible to identify any one researcher who ascribes to all 
aspects of one particular view. Indeed, occasionally an author from one position 
produces ideas which belong more neatly to those of the other position. The choice of 
any one of the alternative theoretical perspectives (paradigms) seems to be based on 
personal judgment. Chua (1986: p606) states that “the criteria for paradigm comparison 
and evaluation are essentially judgmental, open to change and grounded in social and 
historical practices”. However, this personal choice must be based on an acceptable 
justification and be sensitive to the nature of the research subject itself. The aim of this 
study is to explore and analyse the FX risk management determinants in Saudi firms. 
The research, therefore, needs an approach that enables us to obtain a better 
understanding of FX risk management activity and the relationship between hedging 
decision and these determinants.
5.3.1 Choosing an appropriate theoretical perspective
Hussey and Hussey (1997) and Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991) state that 
there are two main research paradigms or philosophies in business research and 
management research respectively. These two paradigms can be labelled as positivist 
and phenomenology (interpretivist). This section will try to draw up attention to the 
assumptions and methodological implications associated with each position, in order to 
compare the two possible alternatives of research paradigms and choose the one which 
is more appropriate to each stage in this research. This comparison will serve as a 
justification for our final selection of our research methodology. The difference between 
positivism and phenomenology may be very clear at the theoretical perspective level, 
but when it comes to the use of qualitative or quantitative methods and to the issues of 
research design the distinction breaks down (Burrel and Morgan, 1979). The 
phenomenological paradigm developed as a result of criticisms of the positivistic 
paradigm. Hussey and Hussey (1997) stated that some authors prefer to use the term 
interpretive rather than phenomenological because it suggests a broader philosophical 
perspective and prevents confusion with a methodology known as phenomenology. 
Hussey, et al, (1997, p. 52-53) stated that “the phenomenological paradigm is 
concerned with understanding human behaviour from the participant’s own frame of 
reference. A reaction to the positivistic paradigm, it is assumed that social reality is
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within us; therefore the act of investigating reality has an effect on the reality. 
Considerable regard is paid to the subjective state o f the individual. This philosophy 
stresses the subjective aspects of human activity by focusing on the meaning, rather 
than the measurement, of social phenomena. To varying degrees, a phenomenologist 
believes that social reality is dependent on the mind. There is no reality independent of 
the mind; therefore, what is researched cannot be unaffected by the process of the 
research”.
The idea of phenomenology is that reality is socially constructed rather than objectively 
determined (Babbie, 1998). Hence the task of the social scientist should not be to gather 
facts and measure how often certain patterns occur, but to appreciate the different 
constructions and meanings that people place upon their experience (Burrel and 
Morgan, 1979). One should therefore try to understand and explain why people have 
different experiences, rather than search for external causes and fundamental laws to 
explain their behaviour (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 1991). The 
phenomenological paradigm (interpretive approach) has strengths in its ability to look at 
change processes over time, to understand people’s meaning, to adjust to new issues 
and ideas as they emerge, and to contribute to the evolution o f  new theories (Easterby- 
Smith et al, 1991). Many researchers have referred to the limitations and drawbacks of 
applying interpretive approach to social sciences. One major limitation is the issue of 
theory validation (Chua, 1986). For instance, how does one judge the validity of an 
interpretation if actors cannot entirely be trusted, and interpretations are incomplete and 
dependent on the researcher’s subjectivity? Every thing is interpreted by the author and 
as such may be subject to his biases and influences and therefore may not be free of 
human values. Another related problem associated with interpretive approach is the use 
of actor agreement as the standard for judging the adequacy of an explanation (Chua, 
1986). Chua posts the following questions: How does one reconcile fundamental 
differences between the researcher and the actors? How does one choose between 
alternative explanations? One of the key features of phenomenology is to concentrate 
the study on a small sample investigated in depth or over time, this could limit the 
general pertinence of the study conclusions. Data collection also can take up a great deal 
of time and resources, and the analysis and interpretation of data may be very difficult. 
As stated before, part of the research aim is to explore the relationship between the 
hedging decision and the firm’s internal and external environment. One of the
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phenomenology variant, the interpretive approach, will be adopted in the ffrst stage of 
this study, the exploratory study. The rationale for choosing this approach is because the 
objective of the exploratory study is to discover new contingent factors that the research 
process identifies as important. To address the limitation of both finance and traditional 
contingency theories, the interpretive approach is adopted (see section 5.8). To better 
make sense of the financial, organizational, managerial, and environmental aspects of 
risk management policy the interpretive approach will be supplemented by the finance 
and contingency theories. An interpretive approach is attractive in terms of identifying 
what factors are important in determining risk management policy according to the 
understanding and beliefs of the practitioners. The unit of analysis in this study is a firm 
(see section, 5.7) and will be studied through its manager’s perceptions. While all the 
studies on the literature which analyse the determinants of the hedging decision were 
concentrating on the positivism point of view, this study uses the interpretive approach 
to improve our understanding of corporate hedging behaviour.
In view of the applicability of the interpretive approach to the first stage of this study 
(exploratory study, chapter 6, interviews), another approach has been suggested to be 
adopted in the second stage of this study (the explanatory study, chapters 8 and 9, the 
survey). This philosophy may offer research methods that can potentially enrich and 
extend our understanding of organizational practices. This is the positivistic philosophy. 
Positivist social science which is the approach of the natural science, is “a philosophical 
concept, and refers to a particular set of assumptions about the world and about 
appropriate ways of studying it” (McNeil, 1990, pi 16). The positivist point of view 
seeks to provide rational explanation and exploration to what is going on in the social 
world by searching for correlation and causal relationships between its elements. The 
purpose of the second stage of this research is to examine the determinants of currency 
exposure management decision which are identified in the first stage. The second stage 
of this study adopts positivist approach, in that it seeks to test a research hypothesis and 
produce a predictive model. Hypothesis is an idea or proposition which this research 
will test using statistical analysis. Another rationale for choosing this philosophy is that 
because it can provide wide coverage of range of situations the research findings can be 
generalized, particularly when statistics are aggregated from large samples. This may be 
of considerable relevance to policy decisions, and can be used for studying cause and 
effect relationships. Following from the discussion above, this study sees the generated
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theories from the exploratory study and the existing theories of the corporate hedging 
decision determinants as primary positive theories that explain why hedging decisions 
exist, and why and how firms are different in their attitude towards FX exposure. 
Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 50) stated that “If you are a positivist, you are likely to be 
concerned with ensuring that any concepts you use can be operationalised; that is, 
described in such a way that they can be measured. Perhaps you are investigating a topic 
which includes the concept of intelligence, and you want to find a way of measuring the 
particular aspect of intelligence you are interested in. You will probably use large 
samples and reduce the phenomena you are examining into their simplest parts. You 
will focus on what you regard are objective facts and formulate hypotheses. In your 
analysis you will be seeking associations or causality”. Positivists essentially attempt to 
produce general results through practical solutions to practical problems. As this 
research follows a positivistic philosophy in the second stage, it will be interested in 
determining how confident the research is in stating that the final findings in the sample 
will be present in the population from which the sample has been drawn. Furthermore, 
this philosophy assumes that researchers should specify means not ends which are left 
to decision makers to decide based on their needs and goals (Chua, 1986). In order to 
. look at the impact of the positivistic and interpretive approach on the research design 
and methodology, we should focus on the positivistic and interpretive paradigm 
assumptions and implications.
5.4 The Positivist and Interpretive Approach Assumptions and 
Implications
Both the positivist and interpretive approach consist of four assumptions which are, 
ontological, epistemological, axiological, and methodological assumptions (Creswell,
1994) see Table 5.1. These assumptions affect the type of methodology that has been 
adopted in this research.
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Table 5.1: Assumptions of the positivistic and interpretive Approach
Assumptions Question Positivistic paradigm Interpretive paradigm
Ontological What is the nature o f  
reality?
Reality is objective and singular, 
apart from the researcher.
Reality is subjective and multiple 
as seen by participations in a 
study
Epistemological What is the 
relationship o f the 
researcher to that 
researched
Researcher is independent from 
that being researched.
Researcher interacts with that 
being researched
Axiological 
(human nature)
What is the role o f  
values?
Value-free and unbiased. Value-laden and biased
Methodological What is the process 
o f research?
Deductive process, cause and 
effect, static design-categories 
isolated before study, 
generalizations leading to 
prediction, explanation and 
understanding, accurate and 
reliable through validity and 
reliability.
Inductive process, mutual 
simultaneous shaping o f  factors. 
Emerging design categories 
identified during research process, 
context-bound, patterns and 
theories developed for 
understanding, accurate and 
reliable through verification
Source: Adopted from Creswell (1994) p. 5.
Ontological assumptions raise basic questions about the nature of reality. A basic 
question in this respect is: whether the ‘reality’ is given ‘out there’ in the world, or the 
product of one’s mind; whether ‘reality’ is of an objective nature or the product of 
individual cognition; whether the ‘reality’ to be investigated is external to the individual 
or the product of individual consciousness (Creswell, 1994). The choice here is whether 
the reality is objective and singular, apart from the researcher (realism and objectivism) 
or that reality is subjective and multiple as seen by participants in a study (nominalism 
or subjectivism). The nominalist assumes that the social world external to individual 
cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used to 
structure reality, Burrell and Morgan (1979). Nominalist researchers assume that the 
phenomena are not independent of prior knowledge and the respondent's mind. For 
example, within this research the nominalist would assume that the hedging decision 
could not be examined independently from the firm context effect and the manager 
perspective. On the other hand, the realist postulates that the social world is external to 
the individual cognition and the real world is made up of hard, tangible and relatively 
immutable structures. On the ontological assumption, there is an objective reality out 
there to be known. Realism assumes that the phenomena exist in their own right, 
external and independent of the observer's mind. It assumes that the respondent's action 
against the phenomena is unaffected by his/her beliefs and prior knowledge. For
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example, within this research the realist researcher would assume that the hedging 
decision can be explained by factors separate from the financial manager, and that both 
the financial manager and the hedging decision would be directed by some 
determinants.
This study has adopted a nominalist view in the first stage of this study (exploratory 
study, interviews). The rationale for choosing a nominal approach is due to the 
assumption that the hedging decision could not be examined independently from the 
manager and the firm context effect. This research also has adopted a realism view in 
the second stage (the explanatory study, questionnaires). The rationale for choosing this 
view came from the ontological stand point that the positive approach is based on the 
assumption that reality is an objective phenomenon ‘out there’. It assumes that a 
material world, which exists, is independent from the observer. People are not 
characterised as active makers of their social reality (Chua, 1986). Therefore, 
individuals should attempt to discover a knowledgeable objective world as independent 
from themselves. Crotty (1998) stated that realism, is often taken to imply objectivism 
and in some cases we even find realism identified with objectivism. Guda and Lincoln 
(1994, p. 108) stated a link between the two when they claim that ‘if, for example, 
“real” or reality is assumed, the posture of the knower must be one of objective 
detachment or value freedom in order to be able to discover “how things really are” and 
“how things really work”. Objectivism holds that meaning, and therefore meaningful 
reality, exists as such apart from the operation of any consciousness. Objectivism may 
be described as consisting of, formulating a problem, developing a hypothesis, making 
predictions based on the hypothesis, devising a set of hypothesis, conducting the test, 
and rejecting or failing to reject the hypothesis based on the test result (Tull & Albaum, 
1973).
Epistemological assumptions are concerned with how one can understand the world 
and communicate this knowledge to others. Epistemology raises basic questions such 
as: how do we know the world? What is the relationship of the researcher to that 
researched? (Hussey et al, 1997). One of the important epistemological assumptions is 
to determine the relationship between the researcher and that researched. The choice 
here is whether the risk management decision makers should remain distanced from 
(independent), or get involved with (dependent), the material that is being researched. It 
seems that the philosophical view adopted by this research will affect the choice
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about whether or not it is possible for the observer to remain independent from or 
interacts with the phenomena being observed. The first stage of this research is based on 
the belief that the risk manager is involved in risk management policy. The rationale for 
this choice is that one of the exploratory study aims is to identify the factors that affect 
the hedging decision according to the understandings of the risk management decision 
makers. The second stage of this research is based on the belief that the risk 
management decision makers should be independent from that being researched as far 
as possible. The risk manager and the researcher are chosen to be independent from the 
phenomena being researched, since we are looking to the reality which assumes that the 
phenomena exist in their own right, external and independent of the observer's and 
practitioner’s mind. The rationale for this , choice is that the traditional positivist 
assumption in science assumes that the researcher must maintain complete 
independence if there is to be any validity in the results produced.
Axiological assumptions are concerned with the relationship between individuals and 
their environment. Two extreme views have been advocated to explain how individuals 
respond to their external world: value-free (deterministic) and value-laden
(voluntaristic) views (Burrel and Morgan, 1979). The value -free view regards people 
and their experiences as products of their environment; in other words, people are 
conditioned by their external circumstances (Burrel and Morgan, 1979). The value­
laden view, on the other hand, gives humans a much more creative role. Individuals are 
regarded as the creator and the controller of their environment (Creswell, 1994). The 
first stage of this research has adopted a value-laden view. The rationale for choosing a 
value-laden approach is that some of the corporate hedging determinants can be 
identified according to the value and beliefs of the actors involved with the risk 
management strategy. Using the value-laden view may help the study to make a balance 
between the degree of determinism of the hedging decision by contingency factors and 
the fact that managers exercise a free choice over the decisions in the organisation. The 
study has some tendency for the hedging decision to be associated with the contingency 
factors but the actual decision adopted depends on a managerial decision and is 
therefore affected by managerial perceptions, values and interests. The first stage of this 
study aims to explore the environmental conditions (the independent variables) as 
managers see these environmental conditions from their perceptions. The second stage 
of this research has adopted a value-free view that risk managers action is affected by
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their environment; in other words, the risk manager’s decision to hedge or not to hedge 
was conditioned by the financial and contingent factors. The rationale for choosing a 
value-free approach is because positivism assumes people are being completely 
determined by the situation or environment in which they are located. People are a 
product of the external forces in the world to which they are exposed (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980). Positivism assumes that people behave and respond to events passively 
in predictable and determinate ways. Hussey and Hussey (1997, p. 52) stated that “the 
positivistic approach seeks the facts or causes of social phenomena, with little regard to 
the subjective state of the individual. Thus, logical reasoning is applied to the research 
so that precision, objectivity and rigour replace hunches, experience and intuition as the 
means of investigating research problems.”
The methodological assumptions are concerned with the process of the research. The 
term methodology refers to the overall procedures and methods to the research process 
(Creswell, 1994). The main focus here, from the methodological philosophy, is between 
inductive and deductive approach (Burrel and Morgan, 1979). Inductive research is a 
study in which the observation of empirical reality is used to develop theory. Inductive 
approach is used when the research aim is to move from the specific to the general, to 
help the researcher moving from individual observation to statements of general 
patterns. The inductive approach process starts with generating a set of observations and 
moves on to develop theories (theory building approach, see DeVaus, 1996). Deductive 
research begins by formulating theories (hypothesis), and goes to test them by empirical 
observation (theory testing approach or hypothetico-deductive approach, see Blaikie,
1995). Deductive approach is used when the researcher wants to move from the general 
to the particular. For example, the researcher may have read about theories of the firm 
size effect on the risk management decision and wish to test them in the FX risk 
management decision. In a deductive approach one should start with a theory, or 
hypothesis, about the nature of the world, and then seek data that will confirm or 
disconfirm that theory. The main practical advantage of the deductive approach 
‘hypothesis testing approach’ is that there is initial clarity about what is to be 
investigated, and hence information can be collected speedily and efficiently (Easterby- 
Smith, 1991).
This study adopted a hybrid approach, focusing on the inductive approach in the first 
stage and on the deductive approach in the second stage of this research. The
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rationale for choosing this mixed approach is because the study’s objectives are to 
explore the FX risk management determinants, and to find  associations or causality 
between the hedging decision and the predicted hedging determinants. In order to 
achieve these objectives the study involved both inductive and deductive methods. 
Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1991, p. 22) state that ‘when one looks at the 
practice of research, even self-confessed extremists do not hold consistently to one 
position or the other. Although there has been a trend away from positivism towards 
phenomenology over the last few years, there are many researchers, especially in the 
management field, who adopt a pragmatic view by deliberately combining methods 
drawn from both traditions’. Using a mixture of deductive and inductive approaches, 
might help the researcher, first, to gain a wide understanding of the FX risk 
management and the rationale of the hedging decision in each firm. Second, to explore 
the specific determinants that may affect the hedging decision. Third, to highlight 
financial managers’ and shareholders’ perceptions against FX risk. Fourth, to explore 
the specific reasons that may affect the preference for hedging activities. Fifth, to 
highlight further factors that might affect the manager’s decision against FX risk (other 
than those mentioned on the interview guidance). Finally, to highlight and get feedback 
from issues explored in both interviews and questionnaires.
5.5 The Research Design
Research design is different from the method by which data are collected, the research 
needs a design or a structure before data is collected. “The function of a research design 
is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as 
unambiguously as possible” (DeVaus, 2001, p.9). DeVaus presented four broad types of 
design which are: experimental, longitudinal, case study, and cross-sectional (social 
survey design).
The experimental design is “a research that rules out alternative explanations of 
findings deriving from it by having at least (a) an experimental group, which is exposed 
to a treatment, and a control group, which is not, and (b) random assignment to the two 
groups” (Bryman, 2001, p. 503). Experiments include true experiments, with the 
random assignment of subjects to treatment conditions, as well as quasi-experiments 
that use nonrandomized designs (Keppel, 1991). The experimental research extends 
over time so that data are collected at least two points in time (before and after), and
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between time one (before) and time two (after) the experimental group is exposed to an 
experimental intervention (DeVaus, 1996). At both times one and time two the 
experimental and control groups are measured in relation to the key dependent variable 
that is of interest in the study. There are some problems associated with experimental 
design such as it is not possible to obtain repeated measures for the same group, thus 
making it impossible to get measures at both times one and two, and sometimes it is 
difficult to obtain a control group. Also practical and ethical considerations often make 
it impossible to introduce experimental interventions (DeVaus, 1996, p. 36). The 
experimental designs are very much hard to conduct within real organizations, or where 
it is important to draw volunteers from the population (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and 
Lowe, 1997). It seems that experimental design is not appropriate for this research since 
realism assumes that the phenomena exist in their own right, external and independent 
of the observer's mind. Also the epistemological assumption adopted in this study is 
based on the belief that the researcher should be independent from that being researched 
as far as possible.
Longitudinal survey ‘is a study that involving the collection of data over period of 
time in order to examine changes that occur in the intervening periods’ (Jones, 1996, 
p.334). This research design is similar to the experimental except that there is no control 
group only one experimental group. DeVaus (2000, p.50) argued that ‘the absence of a 
randomized control group makes it difficult to know whether the intervention or some 
other factor produces any change’. Also Hussey et al, (1997) argued that this research 
design is very time-consuming and expensive to conduct. The longitudinal design is not 
appropriate for this research since the pre-eminent technique used in this research to 
study the correlation and causal relationship is not based on variations in variables over 
time. Indeed, one motivation for remaining private could be to avoid regulatory 
mandates to publish such information. In this study, nearly 70% of the study population 
was owned by individual or family and none of which make a practice of distributing 
their financial statements to external parties. The limited availability of financial 
statement data effectively may preclude time-series analysis as a meaningful exercise. 
While, the traditional focus of time-series financial analysis is at one firm over time, the 
cross-sectional financial analysis focuses at firms at a point in time. However, a 
researcher can use cross-sectional survey in order to approximate the study of process or 
change. For example, a researcher may ask the respondents to identify their income
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improvement during the last five years or using a sample of different level of employees 
to achieve the same objective.
The case study design is described as a comprehensive description and explanation of 
the many components of a given social situation (Babbie, 1998). Using the case study 
method the researcher seeks to collect and examine as many data as possible regarding 
the subject of the study. DeVaus (2000, p.51) stated that ‘case study design might 
consist of a single case study (e.g. a community study, a study of an organization) or a 
series of case studies with perhaps each case testing a theory from a different angle. 
There are some problems associated with this research design: the costs and timetables 
for case study designs thus vary enormously, the choice of research staff with 
appropriate experience and skills, the ethical issue may arise when the case study is 
carried out by an active participant (in an organization), more limited considerations of 
case study design, their implementation and the analysis of non-quantitive data 
produced by this type of study (Hakim, 2000). Babbie (1998) argued that while most 
research aims directly at generalized understanding, the case study aims initially at the 
comprehensive understanding of a single, idiosyncratic case. The case study design is 
not appropriate for this research since the purpose of the case study design is theoretical 
rather than statistical generalisation to a wider sample of cases and that there is a little 
point in trying to find a typical case for a case study (DeVaus, 2001). Also the difficulty 
of getting access to the organization may reduce the acceptance of this research design.
The cross-sectional design is often called a social survey design (Bryman, 2001, p.40). 
A cross-sectional study is a research study for which data are gathered just once (maybe 
stretching over a period of days, weeks, or months) to answer the research question and 
are analysed by examining the extent to which variation in the outcome variable is 
linked with group differences (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). The survey is not 
synonymous with a particular technique of collecting information: questionnaires are 
widely used but other techniques such as structures, semi-structured, and in-depth 
interviews, observation, content analysis and so forth are also appropriate (Marsh, 1982; 
DeVaus, 1996). Surveys seem to assume that human action are determined by external 
forces and neglect the role of human consciousness, goals, intentions and values as 
important sources of action (DeVaus, 1996, p.8). This study adopts the cross-sectional 
design (survey design). Some of the important rationales for using the survey design in 
this research were presented by Babbie (1998, p 40-44). He stated that survey
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research, (a) can be used profitably in the examination of many social topics and can be 
especially effective when combined with other methods, (b) Survey data facilitate the 
careful implementation of logical understanding, (c) the fact that the survey format 
permits a clear and rigorous elaboration of a logical model clarifies the deterministic 
system of reasons for and sources of observed events, characteristics, correlations, cause 
and effect, (d) sample survey is never conducted for purposes of describing the 
particular sample under study, rather it is conducted for purposes of understanding the 
larger population from which the sample was initially selected, and (e) because survey 
researchers have a larger number of variables at their disposal, they are in an excellent 
position to carefully examine the relative importance of each and obtain the greatest 
amount of understanding from the fewest number of variables.
Comparing to the experimental design, the cross-sectional design to relies on comparing 
groups, where the groups are constructed on the basis of existing differences in the 
sample. The sample is divided up into groups according to the category of dependent 
variables to which they happen to belong. In this study the comparison groups would be 
those firms who hedge their currency exposure and those firms who did not hedge their 
currency exposure. The critical point is that the cross-sectional design allows the 
researcher to rely on real existing differences between groups and allows the researcher 
to be independent from that being researched as far as possible. This study is cross- 
sectional, with the data collected at one point in time. Data availability issues are less 
problematic in cross-sectional analysis of financial information. While, the existence of 
private and family held firms in this study means that the available data may not be 
representative of the set of firms of interest to the study, this problem can be solved by 
collecting this data through questionnaires or interviews. Two main limitations are 
associated with using cross-sectional designs: they do not explain why correlations 
exist; and they have difficulty in eliminating all the external factors which could 
possibly have caused the observed correlation (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991). However, 
this research tried to solve this problem using an interview method which allows the 
researcher to focus on the relevant factors. All the previous studies presented in Chapter 
4 tested the determinants of corporate hedging via correlation and regression models. 
They attempted to infer relationships between the hedging decision and its determinants 
using published data (such as the firms’ annual report). While the use of correlation and 
regression models in these studies seem to fit their objectives, the way used to collect
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the data may weaken the results achieved.
5.6 The Purpose of the Survey Design
There are three general objectives for survey research: description, explanation, and 
exploration (Babbie, 1998). The researcher in descriptive research is concerned not with 
why the observed distribution exists but merely with what that distribution is (Babbie, 
1998). The descriptive approach is mainly concerned with documenting the 
observations of the phenomenon of interest (Marshall and Rossman,1989). In 
descriptive research the researcher observes and then describes what was observed. The 
data collected in descriptive research is often quantitative and statistical techniques are 
usually used, for example, to summarise the firm’s characteristics. Descriptive research 
goes further in examining a problem than exploratory research, since it is undertaken to 
ascertain and describe the characteristics of firms (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The 
survey research may also be used as an explanation of why a firm chooses to hedge or 
not to hedge. To explain the firm’s hedging policy means to give a reason for it , to 
make it comprehensible. The explanatory research can be used to measure the cause and 
effect relationships, investigating the extent to which one variable (the effect) is 
explained by another variable (the cause) (Robson, 1993). The exploratory study is 
research in areas where very little prior knowledge or information is available on the 
subject under investigation (Easterby-Smith et al, 1997). The exploratory design aims 
to look for patterns, ideas or hypotheses, rather than testing or confirming a hypothesis 
(Hussey et al., 1997). This study mainly focuses on the exploration objective as we are 
aware that we might have overlooked some additional corporate hedging determinants. 
Using the exploratory study the study can gain insights and be familiar with corporate 
hedging area to generate more ideas and determinants that can be developed into more 
structured and detailed research hypothesis that can be tested in the next stage 
(questionnaire). To achieve this purpose the study mainly used the interview method. 
The respondents did indeed mention factors relevant to the currency hedging decision 
that we had not initially anticipated. These additional factors were subsequently taken 
into account in the main research method (questionnaire). This study is also an 
explanatory study as it seeks reasons for particular practices; and also descriptive study 
as it seeks to describe the firm’s characteristics that are associated with the hedging 
decision.
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5.7 The Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis can be individual, dyads, group, organization, machines etc. 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 1991). An important question arose at this point 
who should be considered a possible respondent company from the private sector? This 
required a decision on organisation characteristics. In other words, the researcher had to 
decide which private sector companies should be included in the population from which 
a respondent would be chosen i.e. all private sector companies or only those companies 
which have international trade. Due to the relatively recent introduction of FX risk 
problem in private sector companies, the researcher felt that the inclusion of all private 
companies in the population would not serve the objectives of this study. It was obvious 
that a large number of private companies had never dealt in international markets, and, 
as a result, would not be able to reflect an objective assessment of hedging 
determinants. Therefore, only respondents from private companies who had experience 
in FX risk through their dealings in international markets were considered as possible 
respondents from the private sector companies. For the purpose of the study export and 
import companies are the unit of analysis for the study. The exporting firms are those 
firms that sell their products in competitive world markets, but may source their input in 
their domestic markets and/or world markets. The importer firms are those firms that 
source their inputs in competitive world market, but may sell their products in their 
domestic markets or foreign markets. The exporter and importer firms are those firms 
that sell their products and source their inputs in competitive foreign markets. Although 
focusing on exporting and importing firms may raise concerns regarding the rationality 
of using this firm sample, several features of this sample make it particularly well suited 
for an analysis of the determinants of FX risk management decision. First, exporting 
and importing firms are exposed to FX risk: the volatility of FX rates has a substantial 
impact on cash flow variability for exporting and importing firms. Second, the rationale 
and methods of hedging against FX risk are available for these firms. Most of the 
previous studies were based on samples consisting of different kinds of companies, such 
as domestic companies, export and import companies, and MNCs (such as, Mian, 1996; 
Berkman et al, 1996). Most of the domestic firms do not have any FX exposure, and 
the MNCs also face small amounts of FX exposure because these firms are well 
diversified and have foreign subsidiaries. It seems that exporters and importers who do 
not have foreign subsidiaries face the largest degree of currency exposure and the
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impact of FX rate movements on their cash flows can be highly significant. The sample 
of exporters and importers with ex anti-FX rate exposure reduces noise in the empirical 
tests by excluding firms that may have incentives to reduce variance, but do not have ex 
ante exposure. Other empirical studies have either used broad but unrestricted samples 
(Francis and Stephan, 1990; Nance et ah, 1993, Mian, 1996; Howton and Perfect, 
1998;), industry specific samples ( Tufano, 1996; Hardwick and Adams, 1999; 
Haushalter, 2000), or MNCs (Joseph, 2000).
5.8 The Theoretical Framework
A combination of both finance theory (FT) and contingency theory is adopted as a 
framework for exploring and explaining the determinants of FX risk management in 
Saudi firms.
5.8.1 The finance theory
The previous studies reviewed in Chapter Four of the determinants of corporate hedging 
concentrated mainly on FT. Most of these studies argued that in choosing to hedge or 
not to hedge managers are assumed to be risk averse, income maximizers and thus to be 
seeking the maximum return for a given level of risk (i.e., Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Bessembinder, 1991; Froot, et al., 1993; Tufano, 1996; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; 
Fok, et al, 1997; Geczy, et ah, 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Hardwick and Adams, 1999; 
Haushalter, 2000). Haushalter (2000) stated that FT offers two basic explanations for 
why corporations hedge; corporate hedging is attributable to managerial risk aversion, 
and corporate hedging can reduce the likelihood that a company will encounter financial 
difficulties.
Managers should make only those decisions that will increase the firm value. 
Regarding the subject of the research under investigation in this study, it is important to 
introduce three major concepts taken from the FT approach; (a) shareholder wealth 
maximization, (b) efficient capital markets, and (c) the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). Finance theories offer several hypotheses to explain why corporate hedging 
can be rational or value enhancing, each of which relies on some form of market 
imperfection (see section 3.3). In an efficient market any new information would be 
immediately and fully reflected in prices. Solnik (1996, p. 155) stated that ‘CAPMs 
have been developed assuming efficient markets. When exchange risk can be fully
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hedged, i.e., if there exist forward exchange contracts in all currencies, it is shown that 
all investors should hold a combination of their national risk-free asset and the world 
market portfolio (partly) hedge against currency risk. A risk pricing relation in the 
CAPM spirit applies, which states that the expected return on an asset should be a linear 
function of risk premia on the market portfolio and on all currencies’. The CAPM is a 
method of share valuation based on the proposition that there exists a linear relationship 
between risk and return (Watson and Head, 1998). For managers, before hedging the 
currency risk, they should compare the risk with expected return. According to the 
CAPM, the risk is that the essential factor that has to be taken into account, can be 
divided into two parts; the unsystematic risk and systematic risk (Sharpe, 1964). While, 
Shareholders can eliminate the unsystematic risk by the diversification of their portfolio 
(i.e., by holding a portfolio of appropriate securities), however, the systematic risk 
cannot be avoided regardless of the level of diversification (Lintner, 1965). It is clear 
that FT indicates that managers should not manage unsystematic risk but should manage 
the systematic risk (Salter and Weinhold, 1979). FT recognizes the FX risk as 
systematic risk and can be minimized using hedging instruments. FT suggests that the 
equity markets will not reward unsystematic markets risk management, but will reward 
systematic markets risk management (Bettis, 1983). FT assumes that the goal of the 
firm is to maximize shareholder wealth. It assumes a normative wealth and utility 
maximizing framework for both manager and shareholder. From the FT perspective the 
important criteria for any managerial decision is the effect it will have on shareholder 
wealth (Brttis, 1983). Theoretical and empirical researches have presented ways in 
which FT assumes that corporate hedging, in general, might increase firm value 
(Mayers and Smith, 1982, 1987; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Bessembinder, 1991; Froot, et 
al., 1993; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Fok, et al, 1997; Geczy, et al, 1997; Gay and 
Nam, 1998; Hardwick and Adams, 1999). FT suggests that managing FX risk can 
positively affect the value of the firm (Smith and Stulz, 1985). For example, Chapter 
Three has described how hedging can create value for the shareholders through lower 
expected costs of financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985), improving the firm’s 
expected investment opportunities (Froot, et al, 1993), reducing the volatility of pre-tax 
income to decrease expected tax liability (Mayers and Smith, 1982), and by reducing 
the agency costs associated with outside financing (Bessembinder, 1991).
FT has made major advances in understanding how risk management activity is valued.
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FT has had scant impact on risk management strategy. Risk management strategy 
should learn to apply FT. However, FT must be extended in order to reconcile risk 
management strategy analysis. The financial side of risk management strategy has been 
given a particular focus in previous corporate hedging studies, yet has had little impact 
on risk management strategy. Despite the discussion on the determinants of risk 
management policy, to include only the theories of value maximization and managerial 
risk aversion may affect the validity of the framework provided. The valid hedging 
decision from the FT perspective is the one that stresses the expected return from the 
hedging process. While the above concepts are generally accepted by financial 
economists they seem to be not fully enough to explain the risk management strategy. In 
practice, Myers (1984) argued that manager do not use FT when they plan their firm 
strategy. Peary (1984, p. 152) stated that ‘sometimes FT is maligned as being too 
theoretical, possessing little, if any, practical applicability’. Myers (1984) believed that 
it is fair to say that most firms’ strategic planners are not guided by the tools of FT. The 
gap between risk management policy and financial analysis may reflect misapplication 
of finance theory (Chamber and Lacey, 1993).
The FT agrees that if managers do hedge, they must believe that the main condition for 
this decision is that the value of their firm is increased by hedging activity (Howells and 
Bain, 1998). If the only guidance for managing currency exposure is the maximizing 
value argument, this would imply the acceptance of the framework constructed from 
only the FT. The theory that can be used to explain the risk management strategy should 
consider strategy from different perspectives. The risk management strategy seems to be 
more contingent sophisticated. Using the contingency approach as support to guide the 
risk management policy may be an attempt to overcome the limited contribution of the 
financial analysis in determining the hedging decision. FT stresses fundamentals 
(Myers, 1984), but ignores the deflection by the firm's real-life context. Otley (1980) 
suggested that the contingency approach is particularly useful when exploring the 
context of a phenomenon of interest. A combination of both the FT and contingency 
theory will be better for more understanding of risk management policy in firms. FT 
still has some practical problems that must be resolved using the contingency approach 
and applying new methodology and method. The combination between the theories may 
extend the study arguments to cover both the value maximization theories and the firm 
real-life context (organizational, managerial, and environmental contingent factors).
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While the arguments in the effect of the FT against risk management strategy were to 
some extent discussed in the previous corporate hedging literature, however, the effect 
of the contingency approach is not yet explained. The exploratory study, in chapter 6, 
will be used mainly to explore the effect of the contingency factors on FX exposure 
management policy. It should be mentioned that chapter 7 presents the framework of the 
study which is constructed using both contingency theory and FT (as obtained from the 
literature review in chapter 3 and the exploratory study in chapter 6).
5.8.2 The contingency theory
Contingency theory establishes from the work of Bums and Stalker (1961), and 
developed by Woodward (1965) and Pugh and Payne (1978). Otley (1980), Macintosh 
(1981), provided an extensive review of the contingency theory literature. Contingency 
theory first became prominent as a means of explaining variations in organizational 
structure (Thomas, 1986). Contingency theory suggests that organizational design is 
contingent on environmental uncertainty, technology and size (Donaldson, 1996). 
Contingency theory argues that there is a best way to organize, dependent on 
environmental conditions (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The contingency theory argues 
that there is no universal approach to hedging decision which applies equally to all 
firms in all circumstances. There are many variables which influence the decision to 
hedge or not to hedge. The contingency approach rejects the views based on the idea of 
one best form of hedging decision. This study builds on this idea and attempts to 
analyse the determinants of the hedging decision in terms of relationships among its 
components and the environment of the firm. The choice between the decision to hedge 
or not to hedge will depend upon situational contingent variables for each particular 
firm.
There are no references to contingency theory in the determinants of corporate risk 
management literature which has been reviewed in this study. Using a contingency 
theory will be an important development in the theory of risk management. The idea of 
a universally applicable corporate hedging decision model may have been instrumental 
in fostering its acceptance, however, most of the previous studies did not produce the 
results expected. A possible explanation is that corporate hedging decision models 
employed by these studies were not adapted to the context/contingency variables of the 
firms concerned. The development of contingency models represents a major potential
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for research in the corporate hedging decision. The use of the contingency theory as a 
framework for this study allows an exploration of the firm’s context within the 
corporate hedging decision and the management of the firm’s characteristics which may 
influence the hedging decision.
The literature of contingency theory is replete with detailed discussions of many 
variables which are likely to be applicable to explain the firm’s hedging policy. Jones 
(1985, p. 304) stated that ‘the contingency variables may be broadly classified into 
environmental influences, which occur to a large extent independently of action taken 
by an organization, and internal variables in respect of which the organization can 
exercise more discretion’. For example, Jones (1985) in his empirical study of the 
changes introduced into management accounting systems following an acquisition 
adopted contingency theory. He used two environmental variables (competition and 
technology) and six internal variables (size of the organization, organizational goals, the 
degree of structural differentiation, management philosophy, prevailing culture, and 
choice by the dominant coalition). The identification of contextual variables potentially 
implicated in the design of hedge or not to hedge decision can be traced to the original 
structural contingency framework developed within organizational theory (Chenhall, 
2003). The most pervasive theories of organizational structure identified some of the 
main contingent variables such as environment, technology, size, structure, strategy and 
national culture (Bums and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Child, 1974; Otley, 1980; 
Chenhall, 2003). Contingency theory has focused on such contingency variables as 
environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961, Lawrence and Lorsch, 1976), organization 
strategy (Chandler, 1962, Child, 1972), technology (Thompson, 1967, Woodward, 
1965), and organization size (Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey, 1969). Brian (1979) stated 
that contingency theory is a useful tool in defining relationships between managerial 
work and behaviour, and training and development strategies. Luthans (1985) stated that 
the contingency approach can be seen as a form of ‘if-then’ matrix relationships. For 
corporate risk, the implication of contingency theory is that firms facing similar 
environments would display similar firm mechanisms to deal with corporate risk. The 
synthesis of this study is that a number of contextual factors influence the way a specific 
company organizes itself. If certain situational factors exist, then the choice to hedge 
decision will be the most appropriate.
The main focus of contingency theory will be concentrated on the way the
111
corporate hedging decision determinant is shaped so as to reflect the reaction to the 
environment and the needs of the resulting tasks. Both the internal and external 
environment factors are referred to as contingencies. Thus, while most of the previous 
studies in corporate hedging determinants focused only on the internal factors, this 
study will extend the exploration by considering the internal and external factors as 
contingencies. It considers the relationship between FX risk, diversity of the 
environment, and the degree of organizational differentiation: Each of the different 
aspects of the hedging decision is contingent upon one or more of the contingency 
factors. The major theme in this study is that when a manager faces the decision to 
hedge or not to hedge, there are often important relationship amongst organizational, 
environmental, and management variables affecting the decision.
While the traditional contingency theory can be used to contribute to risk management 
research, it has been subject to a number of criticisms or doubts about its practical value 
to this research. Contingency theory in corporate risk management is not without its 
problems. The choice to engage in hedging activity when faced with contingency 
variables has not been addressed in previous research. Also the nature of the 
contingency variables which may affect the firm’s risk behaviour has not been properly 
elucidated. The contingency theory is said to be deterministic, and suffers from 
conceptual and methodological problems (Schreyogg, 1980). Schreyogg argued that the 
contingency paradigm is deterministic as it leads to only one best structural ‘decision 
choice’ to a specific contextual situation. Greenwood, Rose, Hinings, Cooper, and 
Brown (1999) suggested that there has not been just one-way organizations response to 
the same environmental conditions. The assumed effect of independent environmental 
variables in the hedging decision (dependent variable) is open to question. In that a 
large firm, for example, may have the power to exercise control over certain aspects of 
its environment. Also a firm with monopoly position in the market may be less affected 
by the environment; also a firm can affect its environment by, for example, advertising 
or political pressure groups (Mullins, 1996). Mullins argued that some firms may be less 
dependent upon their environment (changes its contingency) and in a more secure 
position compared with other organizations.
There is a need to extend contingency theory to explain changes in the contingency 
(Donaldson, 1996, a). Donaldson (2001) argued that contingency theory has not drawn 
much on economics and tends to remain isolated from it. Contingency approaches
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have been extensively criticized for being overly deterministic and for neglecting the 
subjective and interpretive nature of hedging decisions. Some studies rejected the idea 
that the contingency model leads to organization structure (Child, 1972; and 
Whittington, 1989). Whittington rejected the contingency determinism and argued that 
managers under the strategic choice theory have the ability to exercise a free choice 
over the fare of their companies. As a result, any mismatch in contingency factors is 
likely to have less severe consequences for risk management decision. The contingency 
approach argues that the hedging decision is affected by the situational determinants. 
This argument alone can not provide us with accurate understanding of the hedging 
strategy and should be improved. The impact of contingent factors on hedging decision 
seems not to be a deterministic process; rather the currency risk hedging decision 
comprises of a set on inter-related management procedures which act as complements 
and perhaps as substitutes. In addition, Otley (1980) argued that the conceptualization, 
definition and measurements of key variables require greater theoretical and empirical 
attention.
These complications can be minimized by adopting new contingency theory by building 
the basis for the contingency framework through the inductive theoretical approach and 
testing the validity of applying this framework using the deductive theoretical approach 
with support from finance theories. The new theoretical framework is improved by 
recognizing the criticism made against the contingency theory. The process of the 
contribution of the contingency theory in this research will be organized in two stages; 
first using the exploratory study, and second using a survey questionnaire. Any 
recommended determinants contingent variables will be examined during these two 
stages. While most of the previous studies which used contingency theory claimed that 
contingency determinism posits that any change in the contingent factors should lead 
fairly and immediately to a change in the company’s structure (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Brian, 1979; Donaldson, 1987; Chenhall, 2003). This study applies the Child, 
1972; and Bourgeois, 1984, argument that managerial decisions and contingent 
detenninistic factors work together in shaping the organisation. To seek improvements 
in the instruments used within the contingency framework, this study will apply an 
exploratory study at the beginning in order to identify the contingency framework 
variables which can be applied to the research context.
The traditional contingency approach fails to address how subjective meanings
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underlay the operation of risk management in the significance of an organization’s 
traditions and the importance of culture in shaping how risk management decision 
operated. To address this limitation, the contingency approach has been supplemented 
by the phenomenological paradigm (interpretive approach). The interpretive approach 
can be used to identify what factors are important according to the understandings and 
beliefs of the managers involved with risk management strategy in company. In this 
study, contingency is used as guidance for the exploratory study rather than being used 
in the positivistic way as suggested in the literature. To better make sense of using the 
exploratory study in the risk management decision, the contingency and finance theory 
have been supplemented by an interpretive approach. Overall this study has tried to 
make improvement to the traditional contingency theory by solving the criticism made 
against it. The study has striven to fill in gaps and make the theory more coherent. In so 
doing the study has created a more flexible framework in order to understand the 
currency hedging policy. This study sees the managers as making hedging decisions 
that are acceptable from their perceptions, contingent to firm ’s context, and in the 
interest o f the shareholder to increase the firms ’ effectiveness. Changes in contingencies 
can be explained by the feedback from managerial perception and economic factors. In 
so doing we hope that using contingency theory in this way may break some new 
ground in applying ideas from the manager perception and finance into contingency 
theory.
While Donaldson (1996) argued that the origins of positivist organisation theory lie in 
the contingency theory, adopting the contingency theory using the positivist approach 
may eliminate the influence of the managerial value preferences, beliefs, ideologies and 
power in the hedging decision. The contingency, interpretive, finance and positivist 
theoretical approaches to the study of hedging decision are seen as complementary in 
that they offer alternative explanations which may add richness to the interpretation of 
data, and as conflicting to the extent to which they are based upon different theoretical 
perspective assumptions. This study agrees with Berry, Loughton, and Otley (1991, p. 
113) that ‘by adopting multiple initial perspectives, it was hoped that the researcher 
would remain open to the possibility of discovering new and alternative ways of 
understanding the phenomena observed’.
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5.9 The Research Methodology and Methods
The research method refers to the various means by which the research data is collected. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the subject under investigation and companies' 
perceptions of its nature and management, it is important when selecting a particular 
research methodology and methods to take into account the nature of the study 
objectives and the sensitive information needed to answer any related questions. Hussey 
et al., (1997, p. 64) stated that ‘having decided on the sample, it is necessary to decide 
how to ask the survey questions. The alternatives are face-to-face or telephone 
interviews or questionnaires’. Accordingly, to achieve the objectives of the research, the 
research plan consists of two parts. The first part is devoted to a review of the literature 
on FX risk management in firms in developed and developing countries. The purpose of 
this review is to identify various important aspects and key issues relating to the subject 
of FX risk management, which need to be explored throughout the study. More 
specifically, this review is used to develop the questions presented to the research 
participants during the second stage. In addition, this review will be used to test, 
whenever applicable, the extent to which the responses of the Saudi firms to the issues
raised in the study are significantly different from other studies in other countries. In
\
other words, circumspect comparisons between overseas studies will be made where 
specific aspects allow direct comparison with this study. This approach is necessary 
given the variety of methodologies employed by other authors in FX risk management 
research.
The second part is dedicated to the discussion of FX risk management in Saudi firms. 
This study deals with hedging determinants. Hedging data is not freely available 
because hedging data is company proprietary information. For a research in social 
science, it is more useful to use a number of different methods to collect data. However, 
this is not practically easy in terms of time and data availability. In this study collecting 
the same amount of data from different firms was in practice impossible to achieve. For 
example, the access to the information in stock exchange firms was greater than in 
private or family firms. Firms that are listed in the Saudi Stock Exchange were more 
able and willing to provide the researcher with documentary evidence. In general, the 
access to personnel was difficult and restricted in some of the firms in the sample. In 
this study, three research methods were used, documents, interviews, and
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questionnaires. These collective data methods were developed to gather information 
about Saudi firms and their hedging behaviour in order to measure the extent to which 
hedging activities are used and to determine the existence of certain characteristics such 
as size, ownership structure, industrial classification, and percentage of foreign 
operations that would lead firms to hedge FX risk.
5.9.1 Qualitative versus quantitative method
The research method chosen to study a problem should be compatible with the 
questions being asked. As stated in Chapter One ‘the aim of this study is to explore and 
examine the determinants of currency hedging decision by Saudi firms’. The aim of the 
thesis contains both ‘explore’ and ‘explain’ the determinants of currency hedging 
decision by Saudi firms. The study decided to use the method that is more appropriate 
to achieve each part of this aim. There are two main different methodologies which are 
qualitative and quantitative. One should not approach an investigation by looking for an 
excuse to use only quantitative or qualitative methods but should, instead, ask, what 
kind of method is most likely to give the best answers to the research questions? It was 
also made that using only quantitative methods could limit and weaken the final 
conclusions. Understanding the differences between the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches is critical because it not only tells the researcher the type of information that 
he is likely to need, but how much weight the researcher can place on it for a decision­
making purpose. To achieve the research aim, this study has adopted both qualitative 
and quantitative approach.
Qualitative research tells the researcher how managers think, what managers think 
about, how they evaluate or decide and why. What motivates, drives and pleases them, 
and can be used to explore new motivations. Qualitative research allows us to get inside 
managers’ experiences, perceptions, attitudes and values, to identify and understand 
what problems faces, how they will react when they face it, and what enables them to 
react (Denzin and Lincoln 1998). What qualitative approaches have in common is a 
reliance on the written or spoken word or the observable behaviour of the person being 
studied as the principal source of data for analysis. The purpose of such research is a 
greater understanding of the world as seen from the unique viewpoint of the people 
being studied. The qualitative approach is subjective in nature and involves identifying, 
examining and reflecting on perceptions in order to gain an understanding of social and
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human activities (Gordon and Langmaid, 1988). Some researchers may prefer to use the 
qualitative approach as they are not confident in designing a quantitative study and 
using statistical tools in analyzing data. Qualitative research aims to discover meaning 
and patterns and seeks understanding through inductive analysis, moving from specific 
observation to the general. It focuses on studying things (phenomena) deeply, in all of 
their complexity, in their natural settings; generally through observation without 
intervention or manipulation. By observing in depth, a qualitative study can provide 
insights into the interrelationships between population members, generate understanding 
of cultures, develop new concepts about phenomena, or help define what is important in 
an area that does not yet have a good theoretical base (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
Qualitative researchers start with general research questions rather than a specific 
hypothesis and are more likely to end with tentative answers or hypotheses about what 
was observed (DeVaus, 1996). It can be concluded that this study adopted the 
qualitative approach to the extent that it may help to highlight the theoretical work 
against the currency risk management practice in order to identify areas of agreement, 
and to address the currency risk management problem from the perspective of the firm.
Quantitative approach is objective in nature and concentrates on measuring 
phenomena, it involves collecting numerical data and analyzing them and using 
statistical tests (Maxim, 1999). It involves the collection of structured data which is 
more easier with analytical process. Research on the quantitative mode employs 
deductive logic, moving from the general to the specific, i.e., from theory to experience. 
Quantitative research usually start with a specific hypothesis to be tested and usually 
end with confirmation or discontinuation of the hypotheses that were tested (Creswell, 
1994). Quantitative research seeks causes and relationships demonstrated statistically, a 
theoretical perspective, positivism that is concerned with facts, prediction, and causation 
and not the subjective nature of groups or individuals of interest (Bryman and Cramer, 
2001). In quantitative research the research is usually concerned that his or her findings 
can be generalized beyond the confines of the particular context in which the research 
was conducted (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). In that if the study is carried out with a 
questionnaire to a number of firms which answer the questions, it is possible to say that 
the results can apply to firms other than those which responded in the study. This 
concern reveals itself in social survey research in that it often gives rise to the question 
of how one can create a representative sample. This problem was solved in this study by
117
focusing on large number of population of the exporting and importing firms in Saudi 
Arabia under some conditions (see sub-section 5.9.3.5).
Babbie (1983) stated that the major difference between quantitative and qualitative 
research lies in their fundamentally different assumptions about the goals of research. 
Babbie (1983, p. 537) defined qualitative analysis as “the nonnumerical examination 
and interpretation of observation for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings 
and patterns o f relationships”, as opposed to quantitative research, “the numerical 
representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose of describing and 
explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect. This research employed a 
mixture of both qualitative and quantitative methods. It is appropriate for the objectives 
of the thesis to gather both qualitative and quantitative data; qualitative to allow 
exploratory analysis for new currency hedging decision determinants; quantitative to 
allow describing, examining the correlations between the determinants and the hedging 
decision. Increasingly, authors and researchers who work in organizations and with 
managers argue that one should attempt to mix methods to some extent, because it 
provides more perspectives on the phenomena being investigated (Easterby-Smith et al.,
1991). Fielding and Fielding (1986) advocate the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods in one study. Hussey et al, (1997, p 72) stated that “once the 
researcher chooses the research paradigm. It is not unusual in business research to take a 
mixture of approaches, particularly in the methods of collecting and analysing data”. 
Bryman (1988) draws out some features of using quantitative methods which are 
sublimed by a qualitative method (a mixed method) on the same study. First, social 
scientists are likely to exhibit greater confidence in their findings when these are 
derived from more than one method of investigation (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, and 
Sechrest, 1966, cited by Bryman, 1988). Secondly, qualitative research can be used as a 
precursor to the formulation of problems and the development of instruments for 
quantitative research. Qualitative research may facilitate the construction of scales and 
indices for quantitative research, and also the presence of qualitative data may greatly 
assist the analysis of quantitative data. On the other hand, quantitative research also can 
be used to facilitate qualitative research, in that quantitative data can be used in the 
judicious selection of cases for further qualitative study. The initial quantitative research 
allows the structuring of the issue to be addressed and also provides the basis for the 
selection of comparison of groups for in-depth qualitative interviewing. Third,
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quantitative and qualitative research is combined in order to produce a general picture. 
Qualitative and quantitative research changeably can be used to fill some gaps between 
the theories and practices, because the gaps cannot be readily filled by a reliance on 
participant observation or semi-structured interviewing alone. Finally, the problem of 
using qualitative methods in collecting data is that it fails to provide a sense of the 
typicality or generality of the events described, the researcher can use the quantitative 
data as a means of establishing the generality of the study's findings. Several other 
writers have also pointed out the usefulness of merging qualitative and quantitative 
methods (see for example, Gill and Johnson, 1991; and Hakim, 1987). The hybrid 
approach (merging qualitative and quantitative methods) adopted in this study generates 
some debate among academics and practitioners so that a better framework for 
addressing the currency risk management determinants can be adopted.
5.9.2 Documents.
This involved collecting and examining relevant publications, annual reports, and 
documents from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Saudi Shares Registration 
Company, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (the Custom department), Central 
Department of Statistics in Ministry of Planning and Dammam and Jeddah seaport. This 
information is used mainly to provide background information relating, in particular, to 
the nature of the private sector and company systems in Saudi Arabia. This information 
is also used to define the study sample. Documents gathered from other sources, on the 
other hand, are mainly used to provide background information relating, in particular, to 
the nature of the export and import business and the economic and financial system in 
Saudi Arabia.
5.9.3 Interview method
Using the information and guidance obtained from the literature review and contingency 
theory, the second stage of the research involves visits to a random sample of the 
exporting and importing companies. The visits will be used to explain the differences in 
the exposure management determinants of the firms in sampling and exploring new 
determinants. There are three types of interviews identified in the literature: structured, 
semi-structured and unstructured (Kane, 1983). The structured interview is the most 
formal and standardized schedule interview, and it lends itself to quantitative analysis
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and establishing discrete facts. The semi-structured interview assumes that the 
researcher may ask different types of questions to get the same information from the 
interviewees (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). It typically refers to a context in which the 
interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an interview 
schedule but able to vary the sequence of questions. The questions are frequently 
somewhat more general in their frame of reference from those typically found in a 
structured interview schedule (Bryman, 2001). Also, the interviewer usually has some 
latitude to ask further questions in response to what are seen as significant replies. 
While on the unstructured interview there are no set of questions and the same 
information is not required from each person. Kane (1983) argued that the choice of the 
interview form to be used on the study will depend on the research being undertaken. 
While the unstructured interview has the advantage of being flexible and giving the 
interviewer the opportunity to generate new uncovered information, it was seen as 
inappropriate for the purpose and objectives of this study. Given the nature of the 
subject researched, the researcher believed that one type of interview was enough. The 
fonnal semi-structured interview was made with the risk management decision maker. 
Using this form of interview is more appropriate for making comparisons between firms 
and gathering more information at the same time. It was very important that all facts 
should be recorded. The semi-structured type is used in this thesis, because this type can 
provide the researcher with the same questions to be answered by different firms which 
enables us to compare the differences or similarities between these firms’ behaviour 
regarding the subject under investigation. While a predetermined schedule of questions 
is produced, they are designed to allow the interviewer to pursue other issues and to 
introduce new material as deemed appropriate depending on the firm’s situation. Whilst 
a tape recorder was available for all interviews, most of the interviewees refused to be 
recorded and asked only for notes to be taken.
Burgess (1984) identified some of the interview advantage; (a) interview is a useful way 
to get large amounts of data quickly, (b) immediate follow-up and clarification are 
possible, (c) it allows the researcher to probe and pursue interesting issues that arise in 
the course of the interview. For example, such probing may well uncover new 
determinants or reveal new dimensions to the hedging problem, (d) interviews allow the 
researcher to understand the meanings people hold for their every day activities, (e) an 
interview may permit a higher degree of confidence in the replies than questiomiaire
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responses, (f) enables respondents to expand upon their answers and reasons for 
responses, (g) it allows points to be made by respondents which were not envisaged by 
the person framing the questions, and allows for follow-up questions to be put.
To conduct the interviews a topic guide and questions were prepared; the design and 
content are discussed in chapter 6. A copy of the semi-structured interview guide is 
presented in Appendix B.II. Considering the aim and objectives of this research, it was 
important that the head of treasury department or the head of financial department or a 
director (the risk management decision maker) was interviewed in each firm. These 
persons were considered to be in a good position to provide the study with factual 
information relating to the FX risk management decision; also they are in a position to 
highlight new hedging decision determinants. While the interviewees should fell into 
two broad categories, hedging firms and non-hedging firms, the one basic interview 
schedule was considered appropriate, as the majority of questions were pertinent to both 
groups. The purpose of using two groups, hedging and non-hedging firms was to 
investigate the differences or convergence, if any, between these groupings. Most of the 
questions in the interviews were designed to be open-ended. The interviews succeeded 
in providing rich background information about hedging decision behaviour in Saudi 
Firms and the factors, which might affect the hedging decision: These exploratory 
interviews held with the risk management decision makers were useful in providing 
deep focus information on the firms’ FX risk management, and were used mainly to 
restructure the questionnaire design which was used in the final study. For more 
information about the interviews, see chapter 6.
5.9.4 Questionnaire method
5.9.4.1 Introduction
Studying the literature to establish an appropriate theory and construct a hypothesis, is 
the normal process under a positivistic paradigm. In order to acquire knowledge of the 
social world from the positivists’ point of view, one needs to identify the social 
structure using a positivistic research style. This methodological style is mainly based 
on quantitative methods and empirical analysis that are drawn principally from natural 
sciences. This approach seems appropriate for positivist researchers who seek to explain 
and predict a structured, determined, social world. They assume that the social world
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lends itself to ah objective form of measurement; and that the social scientist can reveal 
the nature of the world by examining lawful relations between elements that, for the 
sake of accurate definition and measurement, have to be abstracted from their context 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980). The convenient method within the positivist philosophy 
begins with seeking explanation for a phenomenon and its determinants, underlying 
assumptions about it, then the data are collected and tested through the hypothetico- 
deductive approach (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) where any theory can be subjected 
to conclusive testing against natural facts-similar to the way in which scientific research 
is carried out. The hypothetico-deductive method is derived from positivism, it views 
scientific research as a coldly logical process, searching step by step in a rational 
manner (Mcneil, 1990, p 127). In the positivist approach “researchers are likely to do 
quantitative social research and to use experiments, surveys and statistics” (Newman, 
1994, p58).
This study adopted the hypothetical-deductive approach (theory testing approach) in 
order to achieve the hypothesis testing objective. The method used in this research is 
proposing some theories (see chapters 3, section 3.3) and exploring new theories (see 
chapter 6, section 6.3), drawing from these theories a series of hypotheses (see chapter 
7, section 7.3.2) that propose empirical consequences, collecting quantitative data for 
testing these hypotheses using standard test procedures (e.g., statistical tests), and 
finally deciding whether theories are or not supported depending upon whether the data 
collected are or not congruent with the hypotheses. Hypotheses are always concerned 
with some measurable characteristic of the population of interest. This characteristic in 
the study is called a determinant. Hypotheses are then formed about the effect of this 
determinant on the hedge or not to hedge choice. A test of these hypotheses using 
objectivist methods can be made only by observing and recording overt determinants, 
using a recording procedure that has been used to achieve the research aim. A 
questionnaire method is commonly in use for the survey design, and can be used to test 
hypotheses which may be conducted using a sample of population of interest.
5.9.4.2 Why questionnaire
In sociology in particular, the social survey approach in contrast with experimental 
designs is one of the main methods of data collection, adopted in this study using a 
questionnaire. The rationale for choosing this method is that it can be used to generate
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quantitative data on a large number of firms who are known to be representative of a 
wider population in order to test theories or hypotheses as viewed by the exploratory 
study (chapter 6) and many previous studies. This method will be used, particularly, to 
elicit data from representatives of Saudi exporting and importing firms who manage the 
financial problems in the firm, regarding the nature and the determinants of the FX risk 
hedging decision. This method is often used to collect data when the issues raised are 
likely to be confidential and sensitive, such as providing information about the firm’s 
risk management policy and the financial affairs. In addition, using a questionnaire as a 
method for eliciting data gives respondents more time to consider their answers. With a 
questionnaire the respondents have the opportunity to answer at their leisure. The 
researcher can avoid a problem of non-contact by insuring that the mailing list is up to 
date for the sample. Furthermore, the questionnaire, as stated by Mason and Bramble 
(1979), has the merit of increasing the generality of data and ensuring a great level of 
veracity in the respondents' answers. In addition, Turney and Robb (1971) believed that 
a questionnaire is the appropriate means of obtaining information about attitude, 
opinion, feelings, and facts because of the sensitivity of the questions and the idea that 
the respondents may prefer to remain anonymous when they answer these questions.
The questionnaire is generally cheaper than a large sample of standardized interviews, it 
does not require a trained staff of interviewers, all it entails is the cost of planning, 
sampling, stamps, and providing self-addressed envelopes for the returns (Oppenheim,
1992). Oppenheim (1992) suggested that the main limitation with questionnaires is that 
of non-response, particularly when respondents have no special interest in the subject of 
the questionnaire. Researchers in a questionnaire have no control over the respondent’s 
environment and cannot be sure that the appropriate person completes the questionnaire. 
This problem will be minimised in this research by directing the questionnaire to 
individuals who have an interest in the subject. However, using a hand delivery 
questiomiaire may help to solve some of the postal questionnaire limitations. 
Questionnaires require simple questions. The language used in a questionnaire must be 
one that the population finds easy to understand. The answers in questionnaires have to 
be accepted as final, researchers do not have any opportunity to probe beyond the 
answers given, the researcher cannot go back to clarify ambiguous answers, or to 
appraise the non-verbal behaviour of respondents. These limitations will be tackled by 
adopting various processes in the questionnaire design stage, including the review of
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initial questionnaires in the pre-test study by PhD students and experienced academic 
staff and by conducting a pilot study. These steps will be very useful for developing the 
final versions of the questionnaires.
5.9.4.3 The Design of the questionnaire
One of the most significant considerations for many researchers is whether to ask a 
question in an open or closed format. In the open question format respondents are asked 
a question and can reply however they wish (Babbie, 1990). Whereas, in the closed 
question format the respondents are presented with a set of fixed alternative from which 
they have to choose an appropriate answer (Gill, and Johnson, 1991). Both types of 
questionnaire format have their advantages and limitations. There are various 
advantages to an open questionnaire format. First, it gives the respondents the chance to 
answer in their own terms, and the researcher can get different answers for the same 
question (Mason and Bramble, 1979). It gives the respondents an opportunity to express 
themselves in their own words and to put more emphasis on what they feel is important 
about the issues being researched (Oppenheim, 1992). Another advantage is that it can 
be used for exploring new areas or ones in which the researcher has limited knowledge. 
Third, open questions do not suggest certain kinds of answer to respondents, which may 
give the researcher the opportunity to examine the knowledge and level of 
understanding of the respondents relating to the issues researched (Bryman, 2001). 
However, there are some limitations pertinent to this type of question format in that it is 
difficult for answers to be coded, and the respondents may answer the question longer 
than would be the case for a comparable closed question. As it requires more effort from 
the respondents, the questionnaire is less likely to be completed and as a result the 
researcher may end up with poor results after the analysis.
By contrast, using a closed question format makes it easy for the researcher to pre-code 
the questionnaire, thus turning the processing of data for computer analysis into a fairly 
simple task. With the closed questiomiaire format it is easy for the respondent to process 
answers, it requires no writing, and can be quicker and easier to answer which may help 
to increase the response rate (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). One of the most 
important advantages of using a closed question is that it enhances the comparability of 
answers. Using a closed question may clarify the meaning of a question for respondents 
and gives them the available answers, which may help to clarify the situation for them.
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Finally, a close-ended questionnaire provides a range of critical answers and, thus, 
reduces the chance of overlooking issues of vital importance to the research. This type 
of questionnaire, however, has its own limitations. First, there is a loss of spontaneity in 
respondents’ answers, and a loss of the possibility that they might come up with 
interesting replies that are not covered by the fixed answers that are provided (Bryman, 
2001). Bryman argued that it can be difficult to make forced-choice answer mutually 
exclusive. Furthermore, closed questions may be irritating to respondents when they are 
not able to find a category that they feel applies to them. This may lead respondents to 
ignore questions when they have certain viewpoints that do not fit within the listed 
options.
After considering the advantages and disadvantages of both types of questionnaire, this 
study adopted a closed format. The questions in the questionnaire are of one format i.e. 
closed-ended questions requiring a simple tick in the appropriate box. Using a semi­
structured interview, it helps in formatting the closed-ended questionnaire and to the 
possibility of overcoming the limitations of questionnaires by maximizing the possible 
options set for each question. The questionnaire constructed the questions on the 
different types of variables that have been used to generate the empirical data. There are 
five different types of variables used in order to build the questionnaire, see table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Types of variable used in the questionnaire
Type Description Example in the 
questionnaire
Nominal
(categorical)
A classification of objects (people, firms, nations, etc.) into 
discrete categories that cannot be rank ordered.
Section one, questions 
4, 6 ,7
Ordinal The categories associated with an ordinal variable that can 
be rank ordered. Objects can be ordered in terms of a 
criterion from highest to lowest.
Section four, questions 
1,2
Interval (a) With ‘true’ interval variables, categories associated with a 
variable can be rank ordered, as with an ordinal variable, 
but the distances between the categories are equal.
Section two, question 1
Interval (b) Variables which strictly speaking are ordinal, but which 
have a large number of categories, such as multiple-item 
questionnaire measures. These variables are assumed to 
have similar properties to ‘true’ interval variables.
Section four, questions 
4,5
Dichotomous A variable that comprises only two categories. Section one, questions 
10, 13
Source: Bryman and Cramer, (2001X p.58.
Questions were generated from different sources such as, existing literature pertinent to 
the research, contingency theory, and the results of the exploratory study (chapter
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6). The questionnaire was divided into six sections see Appendix B.I. A short 
introduction for the subject under investigation was included to help the respondent 
understand the questionnaire and put them in the proper frame of mind for answering 
the questions. Section one aimed to get some background data relating to the respondent 
and his firm; questions were designed to elicit details of the individual respondent and 
his firm. This section started by asking respondent easy questions to gain confidence in 
answering them, such as the respondent’s age, education, etc. Section two focused on 
gathering data relevant to the characteristics of the respondent’s firm. Section three was 
to determine the magnitude of the FX risk that a firm faced. It was also focused on the 
effect of FX rate movements on the firm’s activities. The purpose of section four was to 
get some information regarding the firm’s internal environment. The aim of section five 
was to gather data relevant to the firm’s strategies against FX risk. In this section the 
study aimed to obtain information concerning the type of hedging methods used by the 
firm. The final section (section six) of the questionnaire related to the firm’s external 
environment.
Another issue worth noting relates to the language of the questionnaire. While the first 
draft of the questionnaire was formulated in English, it was translated into Arabic, the 
native language of the Saudis (see Appendix B.III). It was felt that a translated 
questionnaire would be easily understood and answered by the respondents since most 
of the respondents would not be familiar enough with the English language to fully 
comprehend the questions. To translate the questionnaire from English to the Arabic 
language, the translation processes consist of two stages, first, by the researcher and 
revised by other PhD students. In the second stage a copy of the English version was 
given to the professional translation office in Saudi Arabia to translate to the Arabic 
language. The results of both stages were compared with each other in order to achieve 
good result. Finally, before using the questionnaire in the explanatory study, the 
researcher decided to test the questionnaire using both pre-test study and pilot study (see 
section, 6.4).
5.9.4.4 The fieldwork content
The purpose of this section is to provide details of the research sampling plan for the 
empirical research. Great care was taken in the selection of the sample to ensure that it 
adequately represented the range of exports and imports firms in the population. The
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focus of the field study was Saudi firms. Most of the academic studies on the 
determinants of risk management (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Mian, 1996; 
Tufano, 1996; Fok, et al, 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) 
mainly focused on the MNCs or industry index. In contrast, this study is focused on 
exporting and importing firms, as there are only a small numbers of MNCs in Saudi 
Arabia which are insufficient to achieve the research objectives.
A positivistic paradigm often uses large samples in order to conduct statistical analysis. 
Given the aim and objective of this study, the primary focus of data collecting was the 
international firm. An international firm can be defined as a firm, which exports to or 
imports from foreign markets. However, while the firm is the principal unit of 
investigation the research issues must be investigated with personnel in firms. The focus 
of this study is to analyse the determinants of the FX risk management decision of non 
financial firms. The reason for not including the financial firms such as banks in this 
study's sample is that the exposure faced by these financial firms is significantly 
different from those of non financial firms.
This research was based on exporting and importing firms in Saudi Arabia. The 
explanation of currency risk management practices of Saudi exporting and importing 
firms is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, the currency risk management activities 
of Saudi international firms can be considered to be at a comparatively early stage of 
financial development since these firms have not traditionally been active in 
international financial markets. Secondly, the absence of local FX, money, and forward 
markets in Saudi Arabia and the limited number of Saudi stock companies may possibly 
affect the Saudi managers' attitude to risk and their FX hedging strategies. Thirdly, most 
empirical studies about currency risk management activities, concentrate on the 
behaviour of multinational companies (MNCs), whereas, this study will be concentrated 
on currency risk management activities of exporting and importing companies. Many 
Saudi firms are heavily engaged in global import and export and are susceptible to 
unanticipated fluctuations in FX rates. Fourthly, studies about the currency risk 
management practices are mostly concerned with companies located in large open 
economies such as United States (U. S.), the United Kingdom (U. K.), Germany, Japan, 
and Australia. Studies that concentrate on the behaviour of companies located in 
smaller, open economies are rather limited. Fifthly, Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country 
and firms there may adopt different hedging methods relating to the Islamic
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law (Shariah) perspective. Sixthly, the currency risk management activities of Saudi 
firms may be affected by the internal and external environment in Saudi Arabia. Finally, 
to the best of my knowledge, no study has yet given any explanation of the FX risk 
management practices of Saudi firms. Thus, concentrating on Saudi firms makes an 
interesting and attractive candidate for this study.
5.9.4.5 The distribution o f  the questionnaires
Distribution of the questionnaires took place during the researcher's visit to Saudi 
Arabia between the middle of March to the middle of July 2002. At the beginning, this 
study requested from The Commercial Ministry, Central Debarment of Statistics in 
Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Industrial, King Abdul Aziz Seaport in Dammam, 
Jeddah Seaport and the Customs department in Financial Ministry, lists of companies 
which export to or import from foreign markets. These bodies provided the researcher 
with useful lists of the private companies which export to or import from foreign 
countries, the companies in the lists were ordered from the highest involvement in the 
international markets to the lowest involvement in the international markets. At that 
time, the researcher visited the Saudi Chamber Of Commerce and Industry, 
accompanied by a letter from the Dean of the College of Arabic & Social Science at Al- 
Imam Mohammed Ibn Saud Islamic University (see Appendix A.I) illustrating the 
nature and importance of the study and asking for help and co-operation with the 
researcher. The central information officials, thankfully, agreed to participate in the 
study and to co-operate with the researcher and provided him with a list of Saudi's 
private companies based on five levels according to their total sale. After careful review 
of these three lists, a total of 171 companies were selected. For the purpose of this 
study, the selection of firms to be included in the sample should be according to the 
following criteria as of fiscal year 2001:
• The company must be listed on the export or import lists.
• The company should be based on first or second level companies of the Saudi 
Chamber of commerce and Industry list according to the total sales of not less 
than SR30 million (£5 million).
• The firm must not have all its exports and imports from US. (this condition was 
included because the firm which exports or imports only from US will not have
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any exposure since the US dollar is fixed against the Saudi riyal, and the only 
explanation in this firm for not to hedge is simply because it does not have any 
exposure)
98% of the companies' population located in only five cities, the first one in the capital 
city Riyadh, the second city Jeddah, and the last three cities are Dammam, Al-kuber, 
and Al-jubail, which are all in the same area (the destination between these three cities 
is only 100km). A visit to these cities was important, as the researcher advocated the 
distribution and gathering of companies' questionnaires directly by himself. The 
selection of this method was significantly influenced by the particular imperatives of the 
Saudi environment. For instance, whereas in a developed country a large sample of 
questionnaires can be distributed via the postal service and follow-up procedures 
conducted through post, telephone or e-mail services, the inadequacy of the 
communications services in Saudi Arabia meant that these methods were not feasible. 
As a result, the researcher sought to find an appropriate balance between efficiency and 
feasibility and what might be desirable in methodological terms. Another reason for 
selecting this particular method was that personal delivery and follow-up was perceived 
as likely to generate a higher response rate, particularly in the context of a developing 
country such as Saudi Arabia.
During the stay in all of the five cities, a telephone call was made to each company in 
the population list to explain the study’s nature and to identify the individuals most 
likely to complete the questionnaires. The questionnaires were distributed together with 
covering letters explaining the nature and importance of the study and the vital role to 
be played by each respondent in the success of this thesis. Selected companies filled in 
th e . questionnaire and the researcher collected them (see Appendix A.III). The 
questionnaires were addressed by name, to the risk management decision makers. To 
support his position, the researcher attached another letter from the Dean of the College 
of Arabic & Social Science, Al-Imam University (see appendix A.I). The letter attached 
to each questionnaire, stated that the researcher is a member of staff of the college 
studying for a PhD in Finance. The letter also asked the respondents to co-operate with 
the researcher. In addition, the general instructions on the first page of the questionnaire 
gave an assurance of confidentiality and a fax number was provided if the respondents 
prefer to send the questionnaire back using a telephone (copies of the English and 
Arabic versions of questionnaire as well as the covering letter were attached), also
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a prepaid enveloped was provided, in case the respondent was happy to fill in the 
questionnaire later and send it by post.
A period of 5 weeks was spent in each city, Ryiadh and Jeddah, and 6 weeks in 
Dammam, Al-kuber, and Al-jubail. A date for collecting completed questionnaires from 
particular companies was agreed at the time of delivery. A reminder telephone call was 
made as the deadline approached to ensure the completion of the questionnaires before 
collection. However, only 31 companies completed the questionnaires during the 
researcher’s stay in these cities, while most of the companies asked for more time to fill 
in questionnaires and promised that they will fill in the questionnaire later on and send 
using the prepaid envelop or fax. A total of 171 questionnaires were issued to the 
respondents in companies and 136 (79.5%) of the companies responded. Ninety-four 
(55%) of the questionnaires received from the sample were usable, four of the 
questionnaires were excluded from the analysis since most of the questions were left 
uncompleted, and 38 (22.3%) of the respondents refused to participate in the study with 
most of them explaining that it was company policy not to respond to questionnaires, 
with some of the financial directors apologising for not filling in the questionnaire as 
they were too busy: From the questionnaires received there were 11 questionnaires 
completed by companies with all their exports and imports from U. S. markets. These 
companies were excluded from the final sample since they did not have any transaction 
currency exposure. Also the other firms which did not respond (35 firms) were 
contacted by telephone over three times, between March to July 2002, and on each time 
they promised to fill in the questionnaires, but in the end they never did. In view of the 
purpose for the research, the relative issues being investigated, the time in which the 
empirical data had to be collected and the available resources, the respondents sample 
size was considered to provide a reasonable coverage of the phenomena being studied. 
The analysis of the responses is provided in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: An analysis of the responses to the questionnaires
Questionnaire Number %
Non- Financial Companies:
Usable questionnaires 83 48.5%
Complete questionnaires from companies trading only in 11 6.4%
US markets
Uncompleted questionnaires 4 2.3%
Refused to fill the questionnaires 38 22.3%
Not respond 35 20.5%
Total 171 1 0 0 %
The relatively good response rate from the responses may relate to the strategy followed 
by the researcher in distributing the questionnaires. Non- respondent bias is always of 
major concern in survey studies as this may affect the validity and general conclusion of 
this study. The problem is that the characteristics of the firms that did not respond may 
differ substantially from those that responded. As stated previously, every attempt was 
made to increase the respondents’ number. Table 5.4, presents the characteristics of the 
respondent and non-respondent firms, and provides the basis for non-response test 
consisting of the firm’s total sale, capital, and total assets obtained in the Saudi 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry database for the years 2001. Table 5.4, presents the 
characteristics of the survey of respondents compared to those of the non-respondents in 
order to determine whether there were any differences. From the table 5.4, we can see 
that there are no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents on 
the basis of total sales, total assets, capital, and foreign trading which might preclude 
generalisation of the results to the total sampled firms.
Table 5.4: The distribution of the respondents and non-respondents characteristics
The Firm Non-response Firms Response
Characteristics Firms
No. % No. %
Size (Total Sales):
Large size (more than 610 million) 2 0 41.7 28 58.7
Medium size (between 210 m -  600 m) 33 53.2 29 46.8
Small size (between 30 m -  200 m) 24 48 26 52
Total 77 48.1 83 51.9
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The Firm Non-response Firms Response
Characteristics Firms
No. % No. %
Total Assets:
Large size (More than 810m ) 2 2 34.4 42 65.6
Medium size (between 410 m -  800 m) 32 59.3 2 2 40.7
Small size (between 50m -  400 m) 23 54.8 19 45.2
Total 77 48.1 83 51.9
Capital:
Large size (More than 310m ) 29 52.7 26 47.3
Medium size (Between 8 1 m -  300 m) 30 < 52.6 27 47.4
Small size (between 5 m -  80 m) 18 37.5 30 62.5
Total 77 48.1 83 51.9
International Trade:
Export 5 62.5 3 37.5
Import 38 55.9 30 44.1
Export & Import 34 40.5 50 59.5
Total 77 48.1 83 51.9
5.9.4.6 The valid ity and reliability o f  the study variables
The validity represents "the extent to which a test, questionnaire or any other form of 
operationalisation is really measuring what the researcher intends to measure" (Hall and 
Hall, 1996, p.43). Both the reliability and validity of the questions were tested during 
the pre-test and pilot study. One of the most important ways to assess if  the research 
variables’ measures validity is to look at the face validity which simply involves 
ensuring that the measures and variables used by the study do actually measure or 
represent what they are supposed to measure or represent (Hussey et al., 1997). The 
questionnaire was checked and revised by: (a) doctoral students in Sheffield Hallam 
University (students in accounting and business fields), (b) doctoral Saudi students in 
UK Universities (students in accounting and business fields), (c) some of the academic 
staff in Al-Imam University in Saudi Arabia (Accounting and Business Department), 
(d) five financial managers suppose to be part of the study population. These people’s 
suggestions regarding the improvement of the questionnaire were taken into account 
before the last version of the questionnaire was distributed.
Reliability is "the extent to which a test would give consistent results if applied by 
different researchers more than once to the same people under standard conditions"
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(Hall and Hall, 1996, p.44). The approach is to look at the consistency of a person's 
response to an item compared to another scale item (item-item correlations). This 
provides a measure of the overall reliability of the scale. The index of this is given by a 
statistic called 'alpha'. This ranges between 0 and 1. The higher the figure the more 
reliable the variables and as a rule of thumb alpha should be at least 0.7 before we say 
the variables are reliable (DeVaus, 1996, p.256). The reliability of the research group 
variables were tested using Cronbach’s Alpha. As stated in Chapter 7 there are four 
groups of variable which are: The determinants of the firm’s incentives to hedge, the 
determinants of the management risk aversion, the determinants of the firm’s need to 
hedge, and the determinants of the firm’s ability to hedge. The result for testing the 
reliability for these groups as presented in Table 5.5, indicates that the group variables 
were reliable.
Table 5.5: The research variable reliability
The Group Variable Alpha Coefficient
The determinants o f  the firm’s incentives to hedge (Accounting ratio measures) 0.73
The determinants o f the firm’s incentives to hedge (Indicator measures) 0.83
The determinants o f the management risk aversion 0 .8 6
The determinants o f the firm’s need to hedge 0.81
The determinants o f the firm’s ability to hedge 0.72
Finally, the existing literature suggests that triangulation, or the use of multiple theories, 
methodologies, and data sources, would produce more valid and reliable data 
(Cunningham et al., 2000). The validity and reliability of data would be enhanced by 
using different methods for collecting the data.
5.9.4.7 Testing the normality of the data
It is important before starting the analysis of the data to identify the normality of the 
data whether the data is normally distributed or not. This step is important since some of 
the statistical analysis tools (parametric tests) are more appropriate to be used with 
normally distributed data, and other statistical analysis tools (non-parametric tests) are 
more appropriate to be used with non-normal distributed data. There are a relatively 
large number of statistical tests which can be used to determine whether a difference 
between two or more groups is significant. To decide which of these statistical tests is 
more appropriate to use it should be recognized if the analysed data is parametric or 
non-parametric data. Bryman and Cramer (2001) argued that it is only appropriate to
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use parametric tests when the data fulfils the following three conditions, (a) the level or 
scale of measurement is of equal interval or ratio scaling, that is, more than ordinal, (b) 
the distribution of the population scores is normal; and (c) the variances of both 
variables are equal or homogeneous. From the level of scale used the variances and, 
from testing the normality of the data distribution (Appendix D), we would describe the 
data to be non-parametric data. Appendix D shows that using Kolmogorov-Smirnov to 
test the normality of the data distribution for the four groups (the determinants of the 
firm’s incentives to hedge, the determinants of the management risk aversion, the 
determinants of the firm’s need to hedge, and the determinants of the firm’s ability to 
hedge), the test indicates a deviation from normality since the test reports a highly 
significant (Sig. less than 0.05), except for the determinants of hedging incentives 
measured by the accounting ratio.
5.10 Conclusion
This chapter has stressed the importance of the research methodology and methods to 
guide the study in answering the research questions. Two methodologies appear to 
dominate the study of the determinants of corporate hedging, the interpretive 
(phenomenological) approach and the positivist approach. The chapter has pointed out 
that the interpretive approach is adopted in the first stage of this research (the 
exploratory study, chapter six, interviews). Also the chapter has showed that the 
positivist approach can be used as a theoretical perspective for the second stage in this 
research (the explanatory study, chapter eight and nine, questionnaires). This chapter 
has also briefly described the research assumptions under the positivist and interpretive 
approaches. This chapter has described the research design that shaped the study 
choices and uses of particular methods and linked them to the desired outcomes. The 
discussion showed that the cross-sectional design or social survey design is more 
appropriate for the study. This chapter has not only described the research methodology 
but also provided an account of the rationale for the choice of methods and the 
particular forms in which the methods are employed. This chapter has outlined some 
important aspects around the methods used to collect the research data. The 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews were chosen to be the appropriate methods 
for collecting the research data. The chapter has outlined the process of preparing the 
questionnaire.
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This chapter has suggested that particular determinants of hedging decision will depend 
upon the specific circumstances in which a firm finds itself. Contingency theory must 
identify specific aspects of the corporate hedging determinants associated with certain 
defined circumstances and demonstrate an appropriate matching. The traditional 
contingency theory implies that managers must match their environment and 
organizational settings, suggesting that the different situational context of business will 
dictate a distinctive set of firm characteristics. Using a contingency theory in corporate 
hedging decision, we would suggest that the choice to hedge or not to hedge may result 
from a matching of an organization’s environment, strategy and internal structures, 
management characteristics, and systems (see section, 5.8). The contingency theory 
assumes that a firm moves from non-hedging decision to hedging decision because of a 
change in the level of one or more of its contingencies, such as an increase in manager 
ownership or manager experience. This chapter has highlighted the importance of 
developing the traditional contingency theory in a number of directions. This chapter 
tried to recognize the criticism made against the traditional contingency theory and then 
to suggest solutions to them. Combination between the contingency theory, finance 
theory, and the interpretive approach may present some modifications to contingency 
theory and make it more realistic and more dynamic. In so doing, this study sees the 
hedging decisions that firms made to be related to their managers’ perceptions, related 
to the contingent situational determinants, and in the interest o f  the shareholder to 
increase the firms ’ effectiveness.
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Chapter Six
The Exploratory Study: The Interviews
6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discus the interviews and to identify the determinants of 
currency exposure policy in Saudi firms. The objective from carrying out the work 
discussed in this chapter is to examine the role of contingencies and the environmental 
context in the corporate hedging decision, and to facilitate the building of the study 
framework. This chapter is divided into four sections.
The next section defines the purpose and the benefit from carrying the exploratory 
study. It examines the rationale of using the interviews in this study and how this 
benefits the research. The third section presents the description of the interviewees’ 
answers. The fourth section presents the process of testing the questionnaire. The last 
section outlines the main conclusion of this chapter.
6.2 Why Exploratory Study
The study at this stage was much more interested in the interviewee's point of view, it 
directed the study into what the interviewee sees as relatively important in the hedging 
decision, and helped to ask new questions that followed up the interviewees' replies. It 
was the finance and contingency approach framework that formed the basis of a series 
of questions in the interviews with risk managers regarding the expected determinants 
of foreign exchange exposure management decisions. The main areas of interest are the 
influence of the firms’ characteristics, the firms’ external environment, and the 
management characteristics in a manager’s choice to hedge or not to hedge. The study's 
main assumption is that the decision to hedge or not to hedge the foreign exchange 
exposure is contingent upon environmental, organizational, economical and managerial 
characteristics. As a result of the environmental differences between Saudi Arabia and 
developed countries, which all the previous studies related to, respondents interviewed 
were expected to be able to discern, and hence provide more explanations about 
contingency and financial factors which have effect on the hedging decision. The 
objective of the interviews is to use both finance and contingency theory in an inductive
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approach to establish if there is a relationship between the hedging decision and the 
6 0 1 1 ’s internal and external environment. As chapter 4 presented the limitations in the 
current literature in the determinants of corporate hedging, this chapter introduces the 
contingency theory and new methodology (as presented in chapter 5) as should be 
combined with finance theory. The contingency theory holds that, while the hedging 
decision can be achieved in more than one way, selection of the decision which is most 
suitable depends on circumstances. The use of contingency theory in this study is to 
identify a richer set of firms characteristics associated with the hedging decision through 
the interviews to incorporate in the theory building approach.
Chapter 3 presents the theories of optimal hedging which have been examined in 
previous studies. While these existing theories on corporate hedging might be important 
as determinants of the hedging decision, they are incomplete determinants. Hedging 
decision strategy is different from one firm to another depending on different 
circumstances faced by a firm. The hedging decision is contingent upon the 
circumstances in which a firm finds it self, so a model that relates the hedging decision 
to those circumstances must be constructed. The interview content will be based on the 
previous literature and the effect of the contingency factors on the hedging decision. 
The exploratory study (the interviews) will be used to model and measure the degree of 
misfit between a contingency variable and several different foreign exchange risk 
management variables of each firm in the interviews.
In order to identify the determinants of the hedging decision with the focus of extending 
the findings of the previous studies, it is important to rely first on explorations 
embedded in the extensive responses collected from the risk management decision 
makers in the firms under study. Thus the study in this point is exploratory in nature. 
Given these circumstances, the interview method was the one used at this point of the 
research (Burgess, 1984).
6.3 The Description of the Main Findings From the Interviews
6.3.1 Introduction
The exploratory study concerned the firms’ internal and external environment and the 
management characteristics which might affect the firms’ attitudes to foreign exchange 
exposure. Interviews were conducted with 18 risk managers in firms affected by the
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changes in foreign exchange rates, see Table 6.1. Prior to undertaking the questionnaire 
survey, these interviews were held during November and December 2001. These semi- 
structured interviews allowed the interviewees to explain how they determine the 
foreign exchange exposure management decision. The interviews were held with 
individual risk management risk decision makers with the aim of allowing the 
interviewees to talk about the nature of their work and the factors that influence their 
choice to hedge or not to hedge. On the basis of the information gathered from these 
interviews, a formal questionnaire was compiled (see Appendix, B.I). The interview 
study used semi-structured interviews.
The sample of the interviews was drawn from the list of 171 firms selected by the 
researcher, see section 5.9.3.6 . The research interviews were concentrated in the firms 
in the capital city ‘Riyadh’. A total of 63 firms in Riyadh were contacted directly to 
identify the best person to be interviewed. A number of 18 firms (29%) accepted to be 
interviewed. Before starting any interview, the interviewee was assured of 
confidentiality, and that particular attention would be paid to avoiding the use of leading 
questions. From the 18 firms interviewed there were 3 firms with all their exports and 
imports from U.S.A markets and using the US dollar only. These three companies were 
excluded from the descriptive analysis in this chapter, since a natural hedging is 
achieved with the US dollar is fixed against the Saudi riyal. Of the 15 financial 
managers interviewed, 9 of them were not hedging their currency exposure, and 6  were 
hedging their foreign exchange exposure.
Table 6.1: An analysis of the responses to the interviews
Questionnaire Number %
Non- Financial Companies: 
The interviewed firms 15 23.8
The interviewed firms which their companies trading only in US 3 4.8
markets
Refused to be interviewed 24 38.1
Not respond 21 33.3
Total 63 100
Most of the interviews took more than an hour with most not recorded (13 interviews). 
The interviewer asked questions and took down notes of the responses. For that reason 
the notes written during the interviews concentrated mainly on identifying the 
determinant factors which may influence the decision-makers and drive them to hedge
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or not to hedge, and generates an appropriate proxies used to measure these factors. A 
copy of the interview guide is presented in Appendix B. The first section starts with 
general description of the interviewed firm. The objective of the first section in the 
interview guide is to explore deeply the amount of foreign exchange exposure in the 
firm. These include issues relating to the degree of international involvement, the 
foreign currencies, the effect of FX movements in the firms’ operations, and the 
currency exposure management strategy. In the second section, the interviewees were 
invited to talk about their firms risk management policy and how this risk management 
policy may influence their decision. Section four was designed to focus on the 
managerial and ownership characteristics and attitude toward foreign exchange 
exposure management. The purpose of the fourth section was to explore the firm’s 
external environment and to discuss how it might affect the firm’s choice to hedge or 
not to hedge. The last section sought to identify directly the determinants of foreign 
exchange exposure management policy from the managers’ perspective. The purpose of 
this section is to highlight uncovered factors regarding the foreign exchange exposure 
hedging decision.
To analyse the interviews, the research used content analysis as an appropriate approach 
(Hussey et al., 1997). Content analysis is a way of systematically converting text to 
numerical variables to explain the findings. Jones (1996, p. 330) stated that content 
analysis is a research method in which texts-such as books, speeches, and television and 
movie scripts or descriptions generated by subjects for the purpose of the study are 
examined for the presence or absence of certain specified types of information or 
concepts’. Content analysis is an approach to the analysis of the interviews that seeks to 
quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable 
manner (Bryman, 2001).
6.3.2 The firm’s internal characteristics
The purpose of this section is to explore the firms’ internal characteristics which may 
affect the hedging decision. The questions in this section seek to identify the firms’ 
characteristics for both the hedging and non-hedging firms. In the first and second part, 
the interviewees were asked to identify their industry, and the firm’s ownership 
structure. Table 6.2, shows the industry membership, and the firm’s ownership 
structure. The firm’s characteristics presented in Table 6.2, show that the interviewed
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firms located in different industry, and that firms in some of these industries seem likely 
to hedge. It was expected that all of the chemical and oil companies would not have to 
hedge as most oil products are priced in U. S. dollar (dollar is fixed against Saudi riyal). 
But one of the interviewee from an exporting oil company confirmed that ‘company 
hedge the currency exposure because some o f the customers in foreign countries 
stipulated to pay in their currencies. The reason was that a high proportion o f  the Oil 
Industry output, is exported to highly foreign competitive markets ’.
The Table also shows that the interviewed firms consist of three different structures, 
shareholders, family, and private firms. While, it can be seen from the table that family 
firms were more likely to engage in hedging activity, this may open new questions of 
why these firms engage in hedging activities more than others. One of the main possible 
explanations can be found from one of the interviewee explains that ‘the members o f  the 
family mostly work as a group in the company and have a better control fo r  the 
company and that they are always looking for increasing the reputation o f their family 
name’. One of the interviewees from a shareholder firm stated that ‘the absence o f  
appropriate criteria and standard to evaluate the managers ’ work may affect the output 
o f the job that these managers d id’. This may open up new questions such as, to what 
extent the level of control by the owners may affect the managers’ attitude against the 
currency exposure, and to what extent the nature of management performance system 
may affect manager risk attitude. The evidence showed that the more control that the 
owners had in the firm, the more likely the manager may get worried about the currency 
exposure and more likely to engage in hedging activity. This prediction is explored 
more fully at the next step in this study.
In question three, four, and five the interviewees were asked to identify their foreign 
business activity and the magnitude of their firms’ foreign exchange exposure. Table 
6 .2 , shows the trading activity, the foreign purchases as a percentage of the total 
purchases, and the foreign sales as a percentage of the total sales. All of the firms 
export, import, or export and import from and to foreign markets. Also all the 
interviewed companies sell some of their products or purchase some of their import 
from foreign markets other than US markets, although the proportions range from 21% 
of the total sales or total purchases to 100%. The results in Table 6.2, shows that there 
are no significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding their 
involvement in international trading. If there are no differences between hedging
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and non-hedging firms regarding their currency exposure magnitude, what are the 
factors which drive the hedging firms to feel that their exposure matters and should 
hedge? Could it be that the use of the way that the study used to measure foreign 
exchange exposure magnitude may not be enough?
Table 6.2: A profile of the firms selected for interview
The variables The measurement Hedging
No.
Firms
% -
Non-Hedging
firms
No. % No
Total
%
Industry Chemical & Oil 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100
Membership Food & Drink Distribution 1 100 - -- 1 100
Electric & Electronic 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 100
Cement & Building Tools - -- 2 100 2 100
Cars dealer &Equipments 2 6 6 .7 .... 1 33.3 3 100
Firm structure Shareholder firm 1 16.7 5 83,3 6 100
Family firm 4 80 1 20 5 100
Private firm .1...... . 25 , 3 llllill 4, 100
The International Export - - 1 10-0 1 100
Trading activity Import 2 25 6 75 8 100
Export & Import _ ........4 ____ 66.7 2 33.3 ■ 6 100
Foreign purchases - lllllll 1 100 1 100 .
as % of the Total
purchases 1 % - 20% —
21%-50% 1II1ISS1I 33.3 2 66.7 3. 100
51%-80% 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 100
81%-100% ; . . . 3 . . .. 60 2 ... 40 5, 100
Foreign sales as % No 2 25 6 75 8 100
of the Total Sales
1 % - 20% - -- - - - --
21%-50% 2 66.7 1 33.3 3 100
51%-80% 2 66.7 1 33.1 3 100
81% - 100% - -- 1 100 1 100
The following comments from financial managers of hedging and non-hedging firms 
are indicative of the general feeling towards extending the measures of the firm’s 
foreign exchange exposure magnitude. First, while two financial managers from non­
hedging firms mentioned that their firms’ foreign denominated costs are not that big, 
however, they argued that their firms usually faced problems because of the increasing 
volatility of foreign exchange rates. Financial manager from hedging firm said that ‘As 
all competitors source their raw materials in currencies other than US dollars, we are 
on a different level o f  currency exposure and therefore there is competitive advantage 
or disadvantage from exchange rate movements'. This may open up new logical
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argument that the level of the firm’s foreign exchange exposure magnitude is not 
enough reason to drive the risk manager to hedge unless unexpected changes in foreign 
exchange rates are experienced. The level of volatility in the firm’s foreign exchange 
rates can be used as additional measure for the firm’s currency exposure magnitude. 
Second, some financial managers from both hedging and non-hedging firms expressed 
their worry about their firms’ debt in foreign currencies and that these debts increased 
their currency exposure magnitude. This led the study to consider a firm’s foreign debt 
as another measure for its currency exposure magnitude.
Table 6.3, presents the results of question six. Interviewees were asked about their total 
sales, total assets, and the capital of their companies. The purpose of this question is to 
examine the effect of a firm’s size and its currency exposure hedging decision and to 
identify an accepted proxy to measure the firm size. The results in Table 6.3, are mixed 
and do not express any clear relationship between the firm size and the currency 
exposure management decision even when the study used three different proxies. This 
result may be affected by the small size of the study sample, and needs to be examined 
using a large sample of firms. While theory predicts that there is a positive relationship 
between firm size and the hedging activity, one of the financial managers from a non­
hedging firm argued ‘our company is too big and I  have difficulty to measure the 
foreign exchange exposure, we have ineffective information system and a less 
cooperation between departments in the company, which affects my decision to manage 
currency risk or not. I  feel that we should build a good inter information system, and 
that hedging strategy and the decision to hedge should be organized with board o f  
directory’. Another financial manager from a non-hedging firm said ‘while I  am 
responsible for the company’s financial affairs, and one o f my jobs to some extent is to 
solve any financial problem in the company, currency exposure is one o f  them. But 
because o f the limited information that I  get from other operational departments, I  have 
difficulty deciding whether or not we should hedge the currency exposure ’. As can be 
seen from the previous statements and other interviewees’ opinions, the limited 
cooperation and flexibility between the different departments in the company regarding 
the currency exposure problem, may prevent the risk manager from considering an 
appropriate hedging decision. This may open up new questions such as, to what extent 
does the level of help that a risk manager may have from operating a department affect 
the manager’s attitude toward currency exposure?
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Another financial manager in a hedging firm said ‘almost all our financial risk 
including the currency exposure is considered in any improvement strategy in the 
company. In the company we have some flexibility in exchanging the information 
between different departments, specially in the management o f  the currency and 
commodity risks. I  always get some help from the production, marketing, and 
purchasing and sales departments'. Also from the interviews, there was only one 
company that had a treasury department, meaning that the responsibility of the financial 
risk is in other departments such as the financial or accounting department. In addition 
to the effect of that on the risk management strategy, it also may affect the availability 
of enough information for risk management practices. The person who is responsible for 
corporate risk management should have enough support from other departments, 
especially the operation departments.
Table 6.3: The interviewee firms size.
The variables The measurement Hedging Firms Non-Hedging
firms
Total
No. % ■ No. % : No %
The Total sales Large (more than SR 610m) 3 42.9 4 57.1 7 100
Medium (from SR210 to less than SR 
600m)
1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100
Small (from SR30m to less than 
SR200m)
2 40 3 60 5 100
The Total Large (more than SR 790m) 4 44.4 5 55.6 9 100
assets Medium (from SR410 to less than SR 
780m)
0 00 1 100 1 100
Small (from SR50m to less than 
SR400m)
2 40 3 60 5 100
The Capital Large (more than SR 310m) 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 100
Medium (from SR80m to less than SR 
300m)
3 75 1 25 4 100
Small (from SR5m to less than 
SR70m)
1 20 4 80 5 100
The purpose for questions 7 to 10, is to generate acceptable indicators for the agency 
costs, the financial distress costs, the investment opportunities, and for the corporate 
finance costs. As can be seen in Appendix B.II, the interviewees were asked first, to 
identify how possible it is to reduce the conflicts between managers and the owners. To 
define the things that may increase the probability of bankruptcy. Identify how possible 
it is for the company to increase the investment 'Opportunity. Finally identify how 
possible it is for the company to reduce the corporate finance cost. The interviewees 
described many reasons for the purpose of the questions. In order to identify possible
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measures (indicators) for hedging incentive variables (agency cost, financial distress 
cost, investment opportunities, and corporate finance cost). The respondents were asked 
to identify some important indicators regarding, the possible steps to reduce the agency 
cost, what increases the financial distress cost, how to improve the investment 
opportunities, and how to reduce the corporate finance cost. The interviewees in their 
response pointed out some hedging incentive indicators, and Table 6.4 presents the ones 
which are repeated by some of the interviewees. These hedging incentive indicators are 4 
easy to use and can be generated using the proposed method for collecting data (the 
questionnaire).
Table 6.4: The most important indicators presented by the interviewees that are suitable 
for measuring the different hedging incentive variables.
The variable The indicators The number of the
firms repeat the 
indicator
How possible it is to reduce By increasing the participation of the owners in the company 8
the conflicts between _ . lt_ _ , t  ^ ,managers and the owners By improving the Sim s total sales 6
■the agency cost" By Increasing the dividend payment 5
By increasing the firm value 4
By using a monitoring device system to control the relationship 4
between managers and owners
By improving the management compensation system and make a 3
_____________________________link with managerial performance_________________________________________________
What are the things *that may When the ability of the company to service its debt is low 10
increase the probability togoing bankrupt When the percentage of the firm's debt is high 10
“the financial distress costs" Some industries have a high probability of going bankrupt than . 5others
When you enter into a new investment that has equal probability 3
of gaining and losing
____________________________ When the company face more financial risk_____________________________ 2_________
How possible it is for the By increasing and protecting its cash flow 7
company to increase the „investment opportunity By generating new ideas for new investment 5
“the investment By increasing the ability to solve the financial problems 3
opportunities________________ By protecting our position in the markets_________________________________ 3_________
How possible it is for the By increasing the company’s capital or asking the owners for help 6
company to reduce thecorporate finance cost By Presentin9 the financial statements in a way which can 4increase the probability and flexibility of having external finance
“the corporate finance costs” _ . . .  ..By receiving external funding under flexible conditions 4
By receiving cheaper external funding 4
By improving the. cash flow 3
 _________________________ By protecting the cash flow_____________________________________________ 3
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6.3.3 The foreign exchange exposure management strategy
The aim of this section is to explore the firm’s foreign exchange exposure management 
strategy. This part sought to identify if the firms in the interviews were hedging their 
currency exposure and to identify some factors that may discourage a firm from 
hedging. A brief introduction with hand out for the different currency exposure 
management methods available is presented. The interviewees were asked if  their firm 
hedged the currency exposure. Six firms from fifteen pointed out that they hedged their 
currency exposure. Nine firms noted that, while they had currency exposure they did not 
hedge their currency exposure. In asking this question, the study recognized the firms 
that use any or all of the hedging techniques available such as, the internal hedging 
techniques, operational hedging techniques, and financial hedging techniques as a 
hedging firm, see section 2.4.2. While all the non-hedging firms had a large amount of 
foreign exchange exposure, four of them expressed the view that hedging activities are 
not important to their firms. Whereas three firms expressed the view that hedging 
foreign exchange exposure is important to their firms, two financial managers expressed 
the view that hedging foreign exchange exposure is of considerable importance.
The interviewees, in the second question, were asked if their firms had a risk 
management policy. Table 6.5 shows that all the hedging firms have a risk management 
policy, while only 4 from 9 non-hedging firms had a risk management policy. It seems 
that most of the non-hedging firms do not have any risk management experience. The 
reason for the relatively poor risk management practice was spelt out by one of the non­
hedging financial manager the following way: ‘applying risk management policy is not 
easy task, firms need to have qualified employees in risk management activity in order 
to think about establishing a new risk management policy’. Consistent with this view, 
the financial manager from hedging firm stated ‘ while we have risk management policy 
and engage in hedging activity, however we always relied on a bank’s technical support 
in managing the firm currency exposure as our experience in using derivative contracts 
is not that much\ The manager of an electronic firm stated that ‘the company sells 
electronic equipment. to retailers in domestic markets, but produces no electronic 
equipment but instead source products from manufactures in Japan and Taiwan. Most 
o f our purchased costs denominated in Japanese Yen and are highly sensitive to 
changes in the Yen exchange rate. While the need for hedging existed, but we do not
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hedge since we do not have qualified staff to carry our financial hedging activities’. 
These three statements show that non-hedging firms and some of the hedging firms may 
suffer from the shortage of qualified staff in risk management activity. Also from the 
interviews, there are some financial managers from non-hedging firms with difficulty to 
understand the importance of currency exposure management. A financial manager 
from a non-hedging firm pointed out that the firm is sometimes affected by changes in 
foreign exchange rates, but feels that his company has more serious problems than 
currency exposure, and these problem have to be solved first. The risk manager stated: 
‘ while we believe that foreign exchange risk existed in the company we feel there are 
more serious problems than foreign exchange exposure (such as competitive and debt 
risk) to focus first ’.
The above discussion leads to consideration of some factors expected to affect the 
hedging decision. First there is need to examine the question as to whether the absence 
of a qualified risk management staff affects the firm’s attitude towards currency 
exposure? Whether the risk management experience matters? It is also important to find 
out how firms see currency exposure and the importance of the currency exposure 
problem relating to the other financial problems that firms may face, such as interest 
rate risk, commodity price risk, country risk and so on. One of the interviewees in an 
electronic equipment industry stated that ‘more than 80 per cent o f  the company’s 
purchases are sourced from competitive foreign markets, and the purchase costs are 
extremely sensitive to changes in foreign exchange rates. For that reason the firm ’s 
directors were asked to hedge, but the director saw hedging as a way o f speculating in 
the market and refused to hedge, as speculating is not one o f the company’s activity’. 
One manager stated that firm  will not make any risky decisions such as hedging foreign 
exchange exposure unless it have some level o f  influence or control over the outcome o f  
the decision, and we thought that entering into hedging decision with lack o f  influence 
or control over that decision is a way o f speculating and gambling and prefers not to 
speculate ’. Also there are some firms which do not understand the difference between 
hedging activity and speculation, and at the end they saw hedging in the financial 
markets as a way of speculating.
The third question in this section examines the influence of the cost of implementing the 
hedging strategy on the managers’ decision to hedge or not to hedge. Table 6.5, shows 
that most of the non-hedging financial managers describe the hedging strategy
146
implementation as a costly activity. But also 4 out of 6  financial managers from hedging 
firms had the same idea about the cost of the hedging strategy.
Table 6.5 : The interviewees risk management strategy.
The variables The measurement , .Hedging Firms Non-Hedging firms l Total
No. % No. % ! No. %
The risk management policy Yes 6 60 4 40 10 100
No 0 00 5 100 5 100
The cost of implementing High 4 36.4 7 63,6 11 100
hedging strategy ;., Low illiilll . 50. 2. _ 50 , 4 100
Forecasting the foreign Yes 6 66.7 2 33.3 8 100
exchange rates No 0 00 7 m 100 7 100
Diversification Two currencies or 2 33.3 6 66.7 8 100
less
Three currencies or 4 57.1 3 42.9 llllliii 100more
The following views expressed by financial managers from non-•hedging firms
exemplify the general attitude towards the hedging costs; ‘we are unable to employ 
operational hedging techniques since we have low level o f operating flexibility, and for  
us it's difficult to rely on financial hedging such as forward currency contracts as these 
kinds o f  contracts are very risky and costly. Few years ago we decided to hedge the 
currency exposure and the treasury department in the bank helped us. After sometime 
we found the cost o f hedging exceeded the benefit from using the financial hedging 
techniques, and for that reason we decided again to stop hedging currency exposure 
and letting our position open to the changes in exchange rates. In general we have the 
feeling that the changes in the foreign exchange rates were offsetting in the long-run". 
Other financial managers from a non-hedging firm argued, ‘we do not hedge since we 
thought that a hedging strategy can only provide a small relief from the transaction 
exposure effects o f changes in exchange rates ’.
Some financial managers from non-hedging firms saw the cost of hedging currency 
exposure as exceeding the benefit that many firms get from this activity. In addition, 
most of the interviewees in the study described using derivative contracts in hedging as 
risky techniques and very costly. One of the financial manager from a hedging firm 
said, ‘while his company relies heavily on financial hedging contracts such as forward 
and option contracts, the financial hedging contracts are limited in Saudi Arabia ’. The 
absence of local forward, future, and option markets in Saudi Arabia may affect the 
firms there, and may increase the costs of using the derivative contracts. The only
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access available for Saudi firms to use derivative contracts is through the banks. It 
seems that both the cost of implementing the hedging strategy and the absence of the 
financial markets in Saudi Arabia may eliminate the manager’s interest towards the 
currency hedging activity.
Interviewees were asked, in question four, to point out if their firm usually forecast 
future foreign exchange rates. Results of their responses are recorded in Table 6.5. It 
can be seen from the Table that all hedging firms made a forecast of future foreign 
exchange rates. The Table shows that only 2 out of 9 non-hedging firms made forecasts 
the future foreign exchange rates. One of the financial managers from non-hedging 
firms said, ‘we plan our future investment on the spot rate, we do not make any forecast 
fo r  future spot rate’. It seems that for financial managers, it is difficult to measure the 
effects of the currency exposure in their firms’ operations unless they have the ability to 
forecast future exchange rates. The absence of information regarding the expected 
changes in the foreign exchange rates may affect the financial managers’ ability to 
identify the currency exposure magnitude, and therefore choose inappropriate decision. 
The difference between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the forecast of 
forward exchange rate may affect the hedging decision and this will be examined in the 
next stage of the study.
Question five in this section considers the degree of currency diversification in the 
interviewed firms. The respondents were asked to identify how many foreign currencies 
they used in their exports and imports activities. Their responses are recorded in Table 
6.5. The Table shows that most of the hedging firms interviewed were trading using 
three or more currencies, while most of the non-hedging firms were trading using only 
two or less foreign currencies, and these results were compiled against the predicted 
diversification theory. The only possible reason for that is the sample of the small firms 
interviewed may affect the result of the diversification argument. One of the managers 
stated that ‘the decision to enter into a new geographical location for our business is 
affected by factors such as taxation issues and political risks. But currency exposure is 
a less significant factor affecting our decision to extend our business'. While one of the 
non-hedging firms interviewed stated that ‘in the company, the effect o f  the changes in 
the exchange rates on the overall position o f the company, was not that bad \ One of the 
financial manager from a hedging firm who holds a PhD with 6  years of experience in 
risk management activity confirmed the above finding, said: ‘our company
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currency exposure increased with the number o f foreign currencies that we use in the 
international trading. It increased the sensitivity o f  our costs, sale volume, and profit to 
the changes in foreign exchange rates'. A similar view was given by another financial 
manager from a hedging firm, he said: ‘during the last four years we started to increase 
our hedging strategy to cover 80 per cent o f  our costs denominated in foreign exchange 
by taking out forward contracts. Before taking this strategy, the currency exposure hurt 
us too much but after that we were able to hedge at better rates
Regarding the sensitivity of the firms’ operations to changes in foreign exchange rates, 
while all of the hedging firms confirmed the increasing effect of the changes in foreign 
exchange rates on their costs, profit, sale and purchase volume, and cash flow, there 
were only four non-hedging firms who experienced the same problem. In contrast to 
most of those non-hedging firms interviewed, the hedging firms confirmed that they do 
not have the ability to make pricing adjustments in response to changes in foreign 
exchange rates. These hedging firms confirmed that the effect of changes in foreign 
exchange rates on their costs, profits, cash flows, and sale volumes are high, and 
because of that these companies have tried to minimize these effect.
The last question in this section considers the Islamic solution for the currency risk. The 
respondents were asked to identify the available Islamic method to hedge currency 
exposure. All of the respondents argued that banks did not introduce any acceptable 
solution for the currency risk (acceptable from Islamic Shariah). One of the financial 
managers from a non-hedging firm who holds an MBA degree, stressed the above point 
by saying 'Most o f our costs denominated in UK sterling, and during the last three 
years the changes in the UK sterling caused some problems fo r  us such as increasing 
the cost o f our raw materials and decreasing our importing volume. And while we asked 
our banks to provide us with financial contracts which can be used to minimize the 
effect o f  the changes in UK sterling on our firms, all the financial hedging contracts 
advised by the banks were not acceptable from The Islamic view and our management 
board did not accept any unaccepted activity ’. Another financial manager from a non­
hedging firm pointed out 'Our company is prevented from using derivative contracts 
due to the Islamic “Shariah”. And we asked Al-Rajhy bank (Islamic bank) to provide us 
with an accepted financial contract to minimize our currency exposure. The bank 
advised us to use Islamic swap contract, as the only one available in the bank, while we 
found that this contract divided the risk between us and the bank but very risky to
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be used’. One of the managers in a non-hedging firm said “when one o f  the bank’s 
treasury department visited us and ask us to hedge currency exposure we asked hem i f  
there was any acceptable way to do that (from an Islamic point o f view) and he argued 
that all the financial contracts available are from international markets and were not 
accepted in Islamic ‘Shariah Most of the interviewees suffered from the unavailability 
of an Islamic solution for their currency exposure. One of the financial manager from 
hedging firms confirmed that Islamic ‘Shariah’ prohibited the use of derivative 
contracts, arguing las this is the only way available for us to minimize the currency 
exposure we found ourselves using them\
From the above discussion, the exploratory study provided the research with two 
important factors which may affect the firms’ attitude against the foreign exchange risk. 
The first is the degree of the firm’s operational (costs, profit, sale and purchase volume, 
and cash flow) sensitivity to changes in foreign exchange rates. The high level of 
sensitivity may increase the firm’s foreign exchange exposure magnitude and the 
probability that firms would hedge the currency exposure and this prediction should be 
considered further in the following study (using the questionnaire). The second factor is 
that the Islamic view may affect a firm’s attitude towards currency exposure. Also the 
debate surrounding the effect of a firm’s diversification strategy in the hedging decision 
is not clearly understood and needs further investigation.
6.3.4 The management characteristics
The aim of this section is to explore the effect of management and the risk managers’ 
characteristics in the hedging decision. This section is to determine the attitude and 
ability of the financial manager against currency exposure management in their firms 
and whether they see hedging as important for their firms. The interviewees were asked, 
in the first question, about their position in the firms. The interviewees’ job title is 
reported in Table 6 .6 . The Table shows that four non-hedging firms asked the 
accounting managers to take responsibility of the financial risk in the firms. The 
accountants usually did not have enough experience on risk management, and as shown 
in the table this affects their attitudes against currency exposure. The Table also shows 
that only one company in the sample had a treasury department, which meant that, in 
general, these companies do not give enough attention to the different risks they faced.
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Table 6.6: The risk managers’ qualification
The variables The measurement Hedging Firms Non-Hedging firms I Total
No. % No. % ’ No. % -
Title of Interviewee The director 2 40 3 60 5 100
The financial manager 3 60 2 40 5 . 100
The accountant - -- 4 100 4 100
The Treasury 1 100 - — 1 100
The length of working on the More than 10 years 3 42.3 4 57.1 7 100
company . Between 4 to 10 
years
2 33.3 4, 66.7 6 100
Less than 3 years 1 50 1 50 2 100
The length of working in More than 10 years 2 50 2 50 4 100
current job Between 4 to 10 
years
3 42.3 4 57.1 7 100
Less than 3 years 1 25 3 75 4 100
The qualification degree PhD 2 100 0 . 00 • 2 100
Master 2 40 3 60 5 100
• Bachelor . - 2  . 25 6 75 8 . 100
The qualification area Management & 
Business
5 62.5 3 37.5 8 100
Accounting 0 00 6 100 6 100
Finance & Economic 1 100 0 00 1 100
One of the accounting managers from a non-hedging firm argued ‘7 am the one who is 
supposed to he responsible for foreign exchange exposure, but as most o f  my experience 
is concentrated on accounting issues, for that reason I  think I  am not interested to 
undertake a risky decision such as adopting a hedging activity to minimize currency 
exposure \  One of the respondents interviewed stated that, because of the Asian crisis in 
1997, the company has started to establish a treasury department with the main 
suppliers in Japan and South Korea. He says; "The Asian financial collapse o f 1997 put 
issues o f  financial risk and highlighted the importance o f the risk management in our 
company and encouraged us to establish a new department fo r  risk management". 
However, the purpose for a treasury department is not only to manage foreign exchange 
risk but also in general to enable the company to progress toward its goals and 
objectives in the most direct, efficient, and effective path. The risk management carried 
out by a treasurer is not a specialized management function, it is a general management 
function. This is not to say that a treasurer does not have to concentrate deeply on 
hedging foreign exchange risk activities, it shows however, that treasury functions are 
broad and interdisciplinary and not to be narrowly described as foreign exchange risk 
hedging function. A treasury department is concerned with all risks and should have a
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broader understanding of risk and uncertainty and their effects on the company. The 
findings above raised the question of whether the use of unsuitable managers to look 
after a firm’s financial risk is affecting its attitude against these risks.
The second and third questions focused on the working experience in the company, the 
interviewees were asked to identify the period of work in their company and in the 
current job. Inconsistent with theory, the responses reported in Table 6 .6 , shows that a 
high number of financial managers with more than four years of experience in the 
company or current job were not-hedging their currency exposure. Most of the 
respondents from non-hedging firms argued that their experiences were in business, 
management, accounting issues but not in risk management activity. While all of the 
financial managers in hedging firms confirmed that they had experience in risk 
management activity, there were only two interviewees in the non-hedging firms who 
confirmed that they had experience in risk management activity. This may indicate that 
for a company to engage in risk management activity, it needs to be with staff that at 
least has some experience in risk management activities. While it was considered that 
most of the firms in the interviews should hedge currency exposure, only six from 
fifteen firms were hedging their currency exposure and this may be affected by the 
absence of experience in risk management activity. Four respondents from hedging 
firms and two respondents from non-hedging firms pointed out that their companies ran 
training programs in risk management activities, and some of these programs had 
connections with their banks. In order to improve the employees’ experience, firms 
usually ask their employees to attend some training programs from time to time. From 
the discussion above, we can suggest that the decision to hedge or not to hedge currency 
exposure may be affected by the risk manager’s experience in risk management activity 
and the risk management training program available in the company.
The interviewees, in question four, were asked about their qualifications speciality. 
From the responses, there were four out of six financial managers in hedging firms with 
a postgraduate degree (Masters or PhD), whereas only 3 out of 9 financial managers in 
non-hedging firms had a Master degree. The qualification level and area may be 
important to be further discussed in the following stage (the explanation study) as they 
can serve as proxies for a manager’s qualification. This is because most of the hedging 
managers come from a management and business background while most of the non-
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hedging managers have an accounting background.
An important observation from the interviews was the nationality of the interviewed 
persons. In that there were a high percentage of employees working in financial 
departments from foreign countries. The first reaction from the interviews is that the 
firm that employs risk managers from western or Asian countries is more likely to 
engage in hedging activity. The reason behind this is that these managers, before they 
came to Saudi Arabia, they had some experience in dealing with financial risk in 
companies in their countries. One of the managers said that he was a member of the risk 
management team in another company outside Saudi Arabia and had some experience 
on how to minimize the foreign exchange exposure. He has been working in his current 
company for several years, and during these years he became convinced of the 
importance of hedging activity. This new factor may need to be further examined as a 
determinant of hedging decision.
The fifth question in this section was about the companies’ managerial compensation 
system. Interviewees were asked to identify if  their companies had special 
compensation systems for managers, and if yes, to describe them. While most of the 
respondents agreed that their firms had a managerial performance related compensation 
program, they differed between companies. For example, the responses from the 
interviews showed that there were three different managerial compensation programs in 
these companies; the performance ideal monetary compensation system, an equity 
compensation system, or an attractive managerial high salary unrelated to result. The 
evidence from the interviews shows that most of the non-hedging firms (6  out of 9 
firms) used the performance ideal monetary compensation programs and only one 
company used the equity compensation system. In contrast most of the hedging firms 
(three out of six firms) have an equity compensation system to encourage managers 
working in the interest of shareholders, see Table 6.7. Through the interviews five of 
interviewees from hedging firms clarified that their companies measured the manager’s 
performance. Some of these interviewees pointed out that their companies had criteria 
and standards for manager’s performance. Other interviewees stated that their company 
measures the manager’s performance through the improvement in the profit or the 
dividend payment. In addition, some of the interviewees confirmed that their company 
performance was usually evaluated by the banks. The manager performance system may 
play an important role in encouraging the managers to work in maximizing the
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firm’s value whenever the company is able to compensate them.
Table 6.7: The managerial stockholding and compensation program in the companies
The variables The measurement Hedging Firms Non-Hedging Total
firms
No. % No. % No. %
The performance related Yes 4 40 6 60 10 100
monetary compensation
program No 2 40 3 60 5 100
The equity compensation Yes 3 75 1 25 .4 100
program
No 3 27.3 8 72.7 11 ' 100
The fixed managerial salary 
unrelated to result The manager annual income is less than 
50000 pounds
3 50 3 50 6 100
The manager annual 
income is between 
50000 and 150000 
pounds
2 40 3 60 5 100
The manager annual 1 25 3 75 4 100
income is more than
150000 pounds
The manager stockholding Yes 5 62.5 3 37.5 8 100
in the company
No - iisu iii 14.3 6 85.7 7 100
The last question in this section is about the level of managerial stockownership in the 
firms. Interviewees were asked to point out if a firm manager could be an owner. The 
responses reported in Table 6.7, shows that firms are more likely to hedge when the 
managers own some of the a company’s shares. It seemed that the more close a 
manager’s interest is to that of a shareholder the more likely that manager may decide to 
engage in decisions such as hedging. One of the financial managers from a non-hedging 
firm said 7  am an employee in the company and not one o f  its owners, and fo r  that 
reason I am not willing to take a sole responsibility o f using the derivative contracts for  
hedging as these contracts are very risky, because one o f the company’s strategy is not 
to engage in a risky activity ”. A proportion of the manager’s stockholding in the firm
154
will be an important determinant for the hedging decision.
The last observation from the interviews in this section is that two interviewees from 
non-hedging firms argued that their companies should hedge the currency exposure but 
their managers refused. These interviewees pointed out that their managers were too old 
(over 55 years) to understand the hedging activity. They refuse to accept new ideas such 
as using derivative contracts. It seems that the decision to hedge or not to hedge in these 
firms were partly affected by the age of the managers, and this need to be explored 
further using the questionnaire.
6.3.5 The external environment
As stated in section (6.2), using the contingency theory in this study, will give more 
opportunity to. discover the external and internal environmental factors, and the 
possibility to examine the extent to which these factors may affect the hedging decision. 
The aim of this section is to identify the firm’s external factors which may influence the 
decision to hedge or not to hedge the currency exposure. The first question in this 
section was about the market of the company. Respondents were asked to describe their 
markets. The responses in Table 6 .8 , shows that there are three different markets, these 
are, competitive market, price regulated market, and oligopolistic market. The Table 
shows that most of the companies in a competitive market were hedging their currency 
exposure. While it was expected that companies in a price regulated market are more 
likely to hedge, the Table shows an unexpected result. One possible reason for this may 
be found in a financial manager from a company with prices regulated by the 
government. 'We source most o f our raw materials from foreign markets (70% from  
Japan, 20% from USA, and 10% from Europe), and we sell all o f  our products in 
domestic markets. While our prices are controlled by the government, it also takes our 
product costs in mind when the prices are identified ’.
In the second question the interviewees were asked to describe the level of competition 
that their companies face in the markets. Most of the interviewees who described their 
markets as highly competitive markets were hedging their currency exposure. The 
financial managers from the non-hedging firms said ‘we sell our products (cars and 
parts) to customers directly or to wholesalers who sell to their customers. As all our 
products are imported from foreign competitive markets, the company's costs are
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extremely sensitive to changes in foreign exchange rates, with most o f our products sold 
in the domestic markets. And as we are the only company in Saudi Arabia with an agent 
o f this kind, it is possible for us to transfer the currency exposure to our customer ’.
Table 6.8: The firms’ external environment
The variables The measurement Hedging Firms Non-Hedging Total
firms
No. % No. % No %
The Market Competitive market 5 71.4 2 28.6 7 100
Price regulated 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100
market
Oligopolistic market 0 00 5 100 5 100
The competition position High 4 80 1 20 5 100
Medium 1 25 3 75 4 100
Low 1 16.7 5 83.3 6 100
The relationship with Strong 3 37.5 5 62.5 8 100
banks
Normal 3 50 3 50 6 100
Weak 0 00 1 100 1 100
However, other interviewee from a hedging firm in a car industry said lwe sell our 
products in competitive domestic markets. For that reason any changes in the foreign 
exchange rates automatically affect our costs, prices and demand. We have little ability 
to pass on the effect o f the changes in exchange rates to our customers. This always 
drives us to hedge in order to minimize the effect o f the changes in foreign exchange 
rates in our costs’. One of the interviewee points out that ‘company mainly imports 
from UK and sells its products in competitive domestic markets. He claimed that any 
appreciation in sterling has given their competitors, particularly those who import from  
U. S. A. and Germany, the opportunity to discount their product prices in the domestic 
markets Another stated ’most o f our competitors import alternative products and so i f  
we are not able to control our currency exposure, then we may lose our position in the 
markets’. Another manager said ‘In our markets the products can be used as 
alternatives, with elastic demand. The foreign exposure that our company has is higher 
and in order to secure our competitive advantage with prices that are accepted in the 
market we hedged our exposure. High quality and low prices are the core competence
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o f  our business, and that drove us to manage any risk that may affect our prices, on the 
other hand, we are only prepared to take risks i f  they have a synergistic effect on our 
marketing strength ’.
The interviewees were asked to specify the reasons that made them describe their 
markets as competitive markets or the reasons that made them feel that their markets are 
not competitive markets. They described many reasons but for the purpose of 
identifying possible measures (indicators) for competitiveness in the markets, these 
competitive indicators should be easy to use and can be generated using the proposed 
method for collecting data (the questionnaire). The respondents identified some 
important indicators which give some of them reasons to describe their markets as 
competitive markets and for others to describe their markets as less competitive. The 
interviewees in their responses pointed out some competitive indicators, we chose from 
them the ones most often repeated by the interviewees; (a) the differences in the 
products available in the markets, (b) the number of the competitors in the markets, (c) 
the price demand elastic, (d) the differences between competitors regarding their costs 
denominated foreign currency. The following comments from some of the financial 
managers are indicative of the general feeling towards their markets:
‘as we are the only dealer o f these products in Saudi Arabia, it is possible for us to pass 
the effects o f the changes in foreign exchange rates to our customers'.
‘Our company is one o f  eight other companies in the same industry which sell the same 
products but each one o f  these companies sell their products within their area, and this 
protects us from being involved in a competitive problem ’.
Two of the interviewed non-hedging financial managers said most of their main 
competitors were importing from the same countries that their companies imported 
from. This has put them and their competitors under the same effect if  the exchange rate 
changes. A financial manager from a non-hedging oil company said ‘the company 
generated approximately 80 per cent o f its sales revenues in UK. And during the last 
few  years changes in the UK sterling vis-a-vis the Saudi riyal exchange rate has 
increased dramatically. And the prices for our products are fixed prices, and as a result 
we can not pass through the impact o f unfavourable changes in UK sterling to our 
customers. For that reason we suffered too much from exchange rate changes and 1
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asked the board o f  directors to allow us to engage in financial hedging contracts but it 
was found that all the advised financial contracts are not acceptable in the Islamic 
Shariah Another financial manager from a non-hedging firms of cement and building 
equipments said ‘Most o f our raw material costs are paid in Deutsch Mark, Yen, and 
Italian lira. Although, our company is the only cement factory in the area, and fo r  that 
reason the demand for our products by customers is highly insensitive to changes in 
price. This gives us an increased ability to transfer any unfavourable effects o f  foreign 
currency movements to the customers, which reduces the need to hedge in our 
company ’.
From the above findings, it can be suggested that when changes in foreign exchange 
rates have some impact on increasing the competitive position of a firm in the foreign or 
domestic market, the firm may engage in hedging activity. Most of the hedging firms in 
this exploratory study, showed that the impact of the changes in foreign exchange rates 
do not depend only on the magnitude of the exports or imports exposed to the changes 
but also to the competitive environment in which these firms operate.
The third question in this section was about the companies’ relationship with banks. The 
respondents were asked to describe their companies’ relationship with banks. It was 
predicted that the companies with strong relationship with banks will be more likely to 
hedge, however, Table 6 .8 , shows mixed results and we can not draw a clear 
relationship between hedging and the level of the relationship with banks. However, the 
following views expressed by financial managers are indicative of the strong 
relationship between hedging firms and banks in the following way: one of the financial 
managers said 'the company relies primarily on derivative contracts fo r  the 
management o f currency exposure. While we do not have enough experience to exercise 
these contracts the bank’s treasury staff helps us on the use o f these contracts’. One of 
the interviewees in a small company found that using a part-time risk officer from banks 
is more helpful to extend the risk management function far beyond the capabilities of a 
single manager. This respondent claimed that part-time treasurers from the banks 
treasury departments may have high risk management skills and technical knowledge. 
From the interview, one of the respondents said that the involvement of a senior 
treasurer from the bank in matters relating to foreign exchange risk is critical for 
ensuring that a company devotes a sufficient amount of attention and resources to 
controlling this important risk. The involvement of the bank treasury
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department should encompass the development of policies for measuring and reducing 
the company's foreign exchange risk and the implementation of these policies. In some 
of Saudi companies, senior treasurers from banks are usually and formally involved in 
managing foreign exchange risk, though the degree of this involvement did vary. Two 
of the hedging companies interviewed stated that the reason for using a senior treasury 
manager from banks was that these companies had a poorer understanding of key 
concepts relating to foreign exchange risk and its measurement and management.
In the fourth question, the interviewees were asked to identify if the accounting methods 
used by their companies played any role in minimizing the effect of currency exposure 
in their financial statements. Most of the interviewees confirmed that the currency 
exposure did not affect their choice of accounting method. The fifth question in this 
section, asked the interviewees to identify if exchange rate policy affected the level of 
their companies currency exposure. Some of the interviewees, in companies where part 
of their companies’ foreign trade started in U. S. markets, argued that the fixed price 
between the US dollar and Saudi riyal (SR) minimized their currency exposure.
6.3.6 The determinants of hedging decision
This section focuses directly on the determinants of the hedging decision in the 
company. The aim of this section is to address any missing or uncovered factors that 
may influence the currency exposure hedging decision. To ask the interviewees about 
the determinants of the currency exposure hedging decision, it was decided to ask the 
interviewee this question, ‘what are the determinants of the hedging or not to hedge 
decision in your company’? After which the interviewer asked the further question, ‘are 
there any further factors that influence your decision to hedge or not to hedge’? This 
was followed by the question; When you decided to hedge or not to hedge on what basis 
do you form your decision?
In this part of the interview the study was able to determine the general determinants of 
the hedging decision. Some of the interviewees repeated some of the specific 
determinants discussed in previous sections in this chapter, and talked about the 
determinants which control the firm’s ability and needs to hedge. Most of the 
interviewees stated that the needs for the hedging decision, the ability to hedge, and the 
benefit from hedging were important in determining the decision to hedge or not to
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hedge. The following views expressed by financial managers exemplify the benefit, the 
ability, and the need towards hedging and the feeling of pressure generated by them.
The determinants of the hedging decision can be summarized from one of the manager’s 
statements, ‘Before deciding to hedge or not to hedge we asked ourselves do we need to 
hedge? Are we able to hedge? What benefit we would get from hedging? For example, 
while the need fo r  hedging exist in the company, however the ability and our board o f  
directors ’ attitude against risks affects our decision to hedge as they are not sure about 
the benefit o f  hedge. The owners o f the company are different in their acceptance o f  
risk, some owners accept more hedging activity but others are worried about the risk 
associated with hedging activity and asked not to engage in hedging activity In 
addition to what the manager said, it was felt his attitude or the manager’s risk aversion 
also plays an important role in the decision that his firm reached. Another manager said 
‘ hedging in a financial market is a very risky activity, but we feel that the need for  
hedging has increased and we must hedge as it can help us to survive’. Another 
manager added ‘ our bank advised us to hedge the foreign exchange risk and helped us 
on the best way. Our firm decided to go head with the hedging decision since the 
outcomes were acceptable ’. It seems that the feedback on positive outcomes increases 
the likelihood of hedging decision. Thaler and Johnson (1990) argued that decision 
makers tend to be risk averse following prior losses and risk seeking following prior 
gains. The following comments from financial managers are indicative of the general 
feelings towards the hedging benefits: One of the managers said 4the company at the 
beginning refused to hedge the foreign exchange exposure and have started to hedge 
since the firm experiences returns below some reference point ’. On the other hand one 
of the managers in a non-hedging firm stated that, 7  believed my firm should hedge the 
exposure but they prefer not to do since the firm 's returns are in an expected level ’.
In order to get more details, the interviewees were asked about what they meant by the 
ability and the need to hedge. Most of the interviewees explained that the firm’s need to 
hedge increased when the currency exposure and its effect on the firm increased. Also 
the interviewees argued that the firm’s ability to hedge depends on the staff risk 
management qualification, the owner’s ability to understand the benefit of the hedging 
activity and to encourage the manager to do so, and the financial ability to finance the 
hedging activity. Some of the interviewees argued that the availability of hedging tools 
are important determinants of their companies. One of the managers
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interviewed confirmed that ‘our ability to transfer the currency exposure to the third 
party affects the company’s need to hedge
As one of the interviewees explained ''Unfortunately, while I  feel that the company 
should engage in hedging activity, the possibility to do this is not available in the 
company. Qualified staff in risk management, financial sources, the safety way to do 
this, all affected our attitude against currency exposure. Once I  explained to the board 
o f directors the importance o f the hedging activity for the company, its benefit from  
their point o f  view was not clear at that time. They argued that the benefit from a 
hedging decision can not be compared with the level o f risk associated with decision 
and that the need for hedging is not that important. One of the managers interviewed 
said 'My company has different financial risks that are part o f  its core business, 
however, the management and financial sources did not help us to establish risk 
management strategies'. Another manager added 'the harm that the changes in 
exchange rates cause to the firm ’s costs and cash flows identifies the level o f  need for  
the hedging decision. But our ability to resolve this bad effect influenced our decision to 
minimize this effect’. In addition, another interviewee pointed out this 'Our core 
competency is the capability to provide our customers with best services in a higher 
competitive market. Managing our currency exposure is the essence o f  our competitive 
advantage, really the needs for hedging the currency exposure increases from time to 
time, so we are ready to take high risk in this activity by accepting the hedging 
decision \
One of the managers noted this ‘In our industiy currency risk is an integral part o f  the 
business. And we do care about this risk, but using the financial instrument contracts 
fo r hedging this risk is not an easy task, and for this reason we did not try to hedge ’. 
One of the managers argued, 'In Saudi Arabia, we have shortages o f  qualified people 
who can organize and present a training program in financial and management risk 
One manager who had a training program in risk management said 'For him the 
program resulted in increasing awareness o f risk management process, and his 
understanding o f  the company's foreign exchange exposure phenomena w>as 
considerably strengthened'. He explained that a training programme in financial 
contracts for hedging purposes developed his personal interpretations of the foreign 
exchange risk and affects his attitude against that risk. The results of the interviewees’ 
opinions regarding the hedging decision shows that in addition to the managers’
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attitude against currency exposure (the management risk aversion), the hedging decision 
is also affected by the manager and the firm’s ability to hedge, the need for a hedging 
decision, and its benefit to the firm.
Finally, as mentioned in Chapter Two, there are three different attitude strategies against 
the risk, which are risk neutral, risk averse and risk seeking (see section, 2.4.1). During 
the exploratory study the researcher observed further management attitudes towards 
currency exposure (see Figure 6.1), as follow:
• Risk ignorance. Company does not understand the significance of the risk or 
does not look at risk at all and takes no hedging action.
• Risk resigned “sufferance”. Exposure likely to result in losses and there is a 
possibility of avoiding or reducing them but still no hedging action is taken.
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6.4 Testing the Questionnaire
6.4.1 The Pre-test Study
It is important to conduct a pre-test study before administering a self-completed 
questionnaire to the research. The rationale for choosing to make a pre-test study is not 
only to ensure that a questionnaire operates well; but also to ensure that the research 
instruments as a whole function well. During the pre-test study, questionnaires were 
given to some colleagues in Sheffield Halam University and some Accounting and 
Business PhD Saudi students in the UK to read through and play the role of 
respondents, even though some of them knew little about the subject. Also during the 
pre-test study, both the Arabic and English versions of the questionnaires were reviewed 
by various members of the College of Accounting and Business at Al- Imam University. 
This was done to obtain their opinions on the above issues as well as on the translation 
of the questionnaires. The pre-test study demonstrated that the questionnaire was 
reasonably well understood, but some changes were necessary. This process resulted in 
several substantive changes to the questionnaire
6.4.2 The pilot study
The pilot study which was adopted in this research used not only the questionnaire but 
also the interview method. Using a questionnaire only in the pilot study was deemed 
inadequate since there would not be an interviewer present to clear up any confusion. 
Also, with interviews, persistent problems may emerge after a few interviews have been 
carried out and these can then be addressed. The pilot study also helped the researcher 
to identify questions that made respondents feel uncomfortable and to detect any 
tendency for respondents’ interest to be lost at certain junctures. It also helped to ensure 
that the questionnaire was free from any difficulties and ambiguities which could lead to 
inadequate or misleading responses. A pilot study was carried out to raise issues that 
might need to be addressed before a more formal survey was used for the final stage. It 
is always advisable to “pilot” the questionnaire as fully as possible on a small number of 
firms before using it for real. After designing the questionnaire and pre-testing, there is 
a need to undertake a pilot study to make sure that the questionnaire is clear from any 
discrepancies or misunderstandings that it may have (Goode and Hatt, 1952). During
164
the design of the pilot study and preparing the questionnaire, it became clear that in 
seeking to confirm some of the output of the exploratory study regarding the 
understanding of a Saudi firm’s role against FX risk, background, relationships between 
hedging decision and its external and internal environment, and the hedging methods, 
the study identified the gap between findings in th£ exploratory study and practice. This 
helped to fill the gap between the theories used to describe the situations in the 
developed countries to that of the theories which can be used to describe the situations 
in developing countries. For most studies of the hedging decision behaviour, this type of 
questionnaire and interviews are a novel approach. Indeed, some results from the pilot 
study about these subjects are extremely important. Preliminary reading of the literature 
concerned with determinants of hedging decision suggested a framework which might 
be useful for underpinning the pilot study. Conversely, it can be said that the pilot study 
provided an opportunity to test this framework to see if hedging decision behaviour can 
be described in such ways, and to see if this framework promoted useful debate.
After the pre-test step, the second step was to try the questionnaire out on people who 
were similar to those who are in the research sample. Questionnaire surveys often face 
difficulties before reaching their final versions. Oppenheim (1992, p. 47) stated that 
“questionnaires have to be composed and tried out. Improved and then tried out again, 
often several times over, until it is certain that they can do the job for which they are 
needed”. At the time of doing the interviews (on November, 2001), five interviewed 
firms were happy to comment on the final form of the questionnaire, which was helpful 
in gaining a clear understanding of the quality of the questionnaire. Five interviews 
were conducted in which discussion was focused around what was in the questionnaire. 
A sample of 5 firms located in the capital city Riyadh, obtained from the Export and 
import data gathered before the explanatory study relating to the top 171 of the 
population firms (see section. 5.9.3.6), was used as a sample for piloting the 
questionnaire. The pilot study occurred on March, 2002 and involved the distribution of 
the questionnaires to firms directly by the researcher.
To ensure that the format and the content of the questionnaire were clear and 
unambiguous, the questionnaire was filled in the presence of the researcher. On the pilot 
study, the respondents were asked to evaluate the questionnaire content and language. 
The feedback from these was used to modify, reclassify or delete some items in the
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questionnaire. No valid statistical analysis can be conducted on such a small sample 
(only 5 completed questionnaires), as the results would be biased and any statistical 
inferences would be invalid. The responses to the pilot study were not included in the 
analysis. After the end of the pilot study, which helped the study to reach the final 
design of the study questionnaire, the confidence in the process of using this 
questionnaire to collect the needed empirical data had increased.
6.5 Conclusion
Results are reported of an interview survey conducted with 18 firms. The objective of 
the interview was to identify and categorize the determinants of the firm’s foreign 
exchange exposure management decision. The results of the interviews indicate that the 
determinants of a hedging decision can be grouped under four groups; the hedging 
incentive (benefit), the hedging ability, the hedging need, and management risk 
aversion. When previous studies analyzed the determinants of a hedging decision they 
mainly consented on the determinants of hedging decision as a way of increasing a 
firm’s value. However, using the contingency theory approach adopted in this chapter 
gives more opportunity to discover the external and internal environmental factors, and 
the possibility to examine the extent to which these factors may affect the hedging 
decision. The interview evidence to some extent helps to explain why many companies 
choose to hedge or not to hedge their currency exposure. The interview findings help to 
identify the factors which can be used to explain why firms may hedge or not their 
currency exposure.
The interviews revealed that while most of the firms interviewed are highly vulnerable 
to changes in foreign exchange rates, there are factors which influence their ability to 
engage in hedging activity. These are the manager’s qualification, the firm’s size, the 
ability to pay the cost of hedging, the availability of qualified people in risk 
management, management performance evaluation and reward, bank relationship, 
availability of risk management policy, hedging tools, the ability to forecast exchange 
rates, the participation of the operating departments, a risk management training 
programme, and the manager’s nationality. This chapter has argued that the hedging 
decision depends on the level of the firm’s need to hedge, in that firms with high 
currency exposure and high sensitivity to changes of exchange rates are more likely to 
hedge, and that the exposure increases as the competitive position increases. The
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level of exposure can also be affected by the accounting method used by the company, 
the currency and market policy.
This chapter has argued that management risk aversion plays an important role in 
determining the hedging decision. The interviews showed that the manager’s risk 
aversion is affected by the firm’s ownership structure, its control, the manager’s 
ownership and age, the manager’s compensation arrangements and the Islamic view. As 
found in previous studies, this chapter has shown that the hedging decision was affected 
by the expected outcome from the hedging activity. The interviews showed that the 
hedging incentive was important from the shareholder (board of directors) point of 
view. At the end of the exploratory study, which influenced the final design of the 
questionnaire, the confidence in the process of using it to collect the needed empirical 
data had increased.
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Chapter Seven
Theoretical Framework
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter reported results of the interviews that were conducted with people 
responsible for foreign exchange exposure problems in some Saudi firms. The purpose 
for interviews was to generate information relating to the determinants of the decision to 
hedge the foreign exchange exposure from the participants interviewed. The main 
objective in that chapter is to explore new determinants for the hedging decision and to 
examine the existing determinants in order to build the study's theoretical framework. 
This step was taken as a result of the lack of an existing theoretical framework which 
has been used to examine the determinants of hedging foreign exchange exposure.
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the research theoretical framework (Model) and 
identify its use in this study. The procedures used for constructing the model, the 
dependent and independent variables are described and defined. This chapter is divided 
into four sections. The following section presents the process of building the theoretical 
framework. Section three describes the study's theoretical framework. The last section 
outlines the main conclusion of the chapter.
7.2 The Process of Building the Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this section is to present the main sources used to construct the 
theoretical framework of the study. In order to build the study’s theoretical framework, 
three stages have been employed in the preparation of the theoretical framework. First, 
the literature review, covered in chapter 3 and 4, provides the first step for constructing 
the theoretical framework. The literature covered in these two chapters was used to 
review the corporate hedging determinants recognized in the previous studies. The 
review of the literature has revealed a large number of determinants of corporate 
hedging. The determinants examined in many of the studies are similar, the only 
differences being the methods and methodology adopted. However, previous studies 
provide us with little guidance in defining the expected determinants of foreign 
exchange risk management. It was stated in chapter four that while most of the
168
literature on corporate hedging concentrated on the determinants of the corporate 
hedging decision and the derivatives used, only limited studies have been carried out to 
examine the determinants of the decision to hedge foreign exchange exposure. Due to 
the lack of an existing theoretical framework to guide the determinants of the decision 
to hedge or not to hedge the foreign exchange exposure, the details which are provided, 
in chapters 3 and 4 will be used in connection with other sources as a basis for 
constructing the theoretical framework in this chapter.
This study attempts to extend prior models and address criticisms of specific 
applications. In the second step, the study expands the scope in defining corporate 
hedging determinants to also include contingency factors that may have influence on the 
hedging decision, and which may improve the exploratory ability of a research model. 
The third step in the preparation of the theoretical framework is the interview analysis 
data which played an important part in identifying and clarifying the relevance of 
additional factors. On the basis of the interviews data, attention was focused on 
determining whether the firm’s external and internal context affect the firm’s decision to 
hedge or not to hedge. In this aspect, the detailed analysis presented on chapter 6 
regarding the determinants of the foreign exchange exposure strategy in the interviewed 
firms was of great value. In this chapter the exploratory study (chapter 6, the interviews) 
is used in order to model and measure the degree of misfit between a contingency 
variable and several different foreign exchange risk management determinant variables. 
Using the interpretive approach within the exploratory study may help the study to 
understand the hedging decision from the manager’s point of view who is directly 
involved in the decision, and to highlight the influence of the manager’s attitude, 
contingency variables, and financial variables in the hedging decision. This brings out 
the desirability of building a framework that not only considers the association between 
a contingency and foreign exchange exposure management determinant variables, but 
also between contingency variables and all of the foreign exchange exposure 
management variables for which it is a contingency.
To date, most corporate hedging determinants studies have focused on providing 
business practitioners with set prescriptions for hedging benefits. However, this 
approach has resulted in inconsistent findings to direct hedging decision, and provides 
incomplete framework. Our alternative is through a combination of finance theory and 
contingency theory, which posits that a firm’s hedging decision determinants are better
169
defined by a firm's manager and dependent on the context in which the firm operates. 
This study therefore uses both the finance theory and contingency theory in order to 
discover the main determinants of the hedging decision which depend on the context in 
which the firm operates.
7.3 Developing a General Framework of Hedging Decision 
Determinants
7.3.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 reviews previous studies of the determinants of corporate hedging focused on 
two main reasons to analyse the hedging decision determinants. The first view focused 
on managerial differences in risk aversion, so that these studies ascribe some of the 
firm’s risk behaviour to the link between corporate risk management activities and the 
risk aversion of corporate managers, their utility, and the form in which they hold a 
stake in the firm (e.g. Nance, et al, 1993; Mian, 1996; Berkman, et al, 1996; and 
Tufano, 1996). The second view is that the effect of the hedging decision in increasing 
the firm's value can be used as an incentive to determine the corporate hedging (e.g. 
Froot, et al., 1993; 1996; Fok, et al, 1997; Joseph, 1999). In order to build their model, 
most of the theoretical explanations of the determinants of the hedging decision in these 
studies, were mainly concentrated on the incentives for hedging which are likely to 
benefit contracting parties and on the manager's risk aversion. Most of the previous 
studies in corporate hedging were mainly analyzing the same determinant variables 
using different representative sample.
Geczy, et al., (1991) provides a simple framework which could be used to describe 
general differences in hedging strategy between companies mainly built on the level of 
hedging activity. Geczy, et al, study mainly concentrated on two views of hedging 
decision determinants, namely the managerial wealth and firm value maximization or 
what we can see as hedging motivations theory. However, unlike other empirical 
studies, Geczy, et al, extended the testable implication of existing theories on 
derivatives use by considering how the cost of using derivatives and the magnitude of 
the exposure affects the decision to use them. This framework is one of the most 
comprehensive frameworks in the literature as it covers to some extent some 
dimensions which are important in considering the decision of derivatives use, see
170
Figure 7.1. Geczy, et al, (1997) organized various theories into a single framework by 
discussing the incentives for derivatives use from the perspectives of managers, 
bondholders, and stockholders. They used indirect measurement to proxy the cost of 
using derivatives by suggesting that firms with economies of scale in implementing and 
maintaining a risk management program are more likely to use currency derivatives. 
However, while the factors that been considered as corporate hedging determinants in 
Figure 7.1 are important for hedging decision, there are also other factors which might 
be necessary to consider for the hedging decision (see the exploratory study, Chapter 6).
Figure 7.1: The Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), the determinants of derivatives use
decision framework
The
derivatives
use
decision
Hedging Costs
Variation and
exposure
The incentives for derivatives 
use from the perspectives o f  
bondholders, and equity 
holders
The derivatives use incentives
The managerial risk aversion
Analysing the hedging determinants from only the view of the benefits from that 
hedging activity may affect findings of previous studies. Joseph (2000) argued that 
contrary to the general view found in the finance literature, hedging does not always 
decrease the variability of the firm’s value. However, few studies acknowledge the 
multi-dimensional nature of the hedging decision. Also these few studies narrowed their 
view to only cover some of the dimensions relating to the firm’s internal environment. 
While most of the previous studies only tested for associations between the hedging 
decision and internal variables, this study argued that the hedging decision should be 
considered by recognizing patterns between many interrelated environmental and 
organizational variables. The need for a more comprehensive framework for the 
determinants of the hedging decision exist,.since most of the previous empirical studies
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of the corporate hedging decision only concentrated on the determinants of managerial 
dispositional differences and a firm's benefit from hedging. It seems that it is difficult 
for the decision makers in a firm deciding to hedge or not without understanding the 
firm’s needs and ability to do so and the possible limitations of the decision. The 
exploratory study argued that corporate hedging policy and decision should not only 
consider the determinants of a firm's benefit from hedging and the management risk 
aversion but also the determinants of the firm’s ability and needs to do so.
7.3.2 Describing the theoretical framework groups
This chapter establishes a theoretical framework which will then be examined with 
reference to the empirical results from questionnaires in this study. Using all these three 
sources presented in section 7.2, this study attempts to bring all the views which are 
generated from these sources together into a coherent summary. The development of the 
framework is based on the belief that there is a relationship between the hedging 
decision and the firm's environmental, organizational, financial, and managerial 
characteristics. This study sees the hedging decisions that firms made to be related (to 
some extent) to their managers’ perceptions, related to the contingent situational' 
determinants, and in the interest of the shareholder to increase the firms’ effectiveness.
The focus of this study is the corporate hedging decision as a dependent variable. The 
primary issue in this subsection is to model the determinants (independent variables) 
that affect the choice of the decision to hedge or not to hedge. Finance theory offers two 
basic explanations for why corporations hedge. The first proposes that corporate 
hedging is affected by managerial risk aversion. A second explanation is that corporate 
hedging increases firm value by reducing expected financial distress costs, expected 
agency costs, expected corporate finance costs, and increasing expected investment 
opportunities. The contingency approach argues that the dependent variable will be 
determined by the environmental, organizational, and managerial factors. In other 
words, the contingency model assumes that the hedging decision is influenced by 
factors which are external to the firm as well as those operating within it. The choice to 
hedge or not to hedge is determined not only by the direct result of the decision, but by 
many others such as the firm ’s ability and need to adopt hedging activity. Contingency 
and financial variables for corporate hedging determinants are categorised in four 
groups of determinants termed the hedging incentives, the managerial risk aversion, the
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firm’s need for hedging, and the firm’s ^bility to hedge.
7.3.2.1 The determinants of hedging incentive. J
Theoretical research has presented ways in which corporate hedging, in general, might 
increase firm value (Smith & Stulz, 1985; Bessembinder, 1991; Froot, et al, 1993, 
Joseph, 1999; Breeden & Viswanathan, 1990). These academic works tried to build a 
framework for implementing corporate hedging decision depending on the potential 
impact of hedging on the firm's value. Finance theory indicates that hedging increases a 
firm's value by reducing expected cost of financial distress, reducing expected costs of 
agency conflicts, reducing expected cost of corporate finance, and improving the firm’s 
investment opportunities (Nance, et al., 1993). Clearly, the question of whether or not 
hedging activity can be used to maximize shareholders’ wealth remains unresolved. 
This statement can be established if there were market imperfections of some sort. Since 
some of the previous studies’ findings can be attributed to poorly defined proxies for 
corporate hedging incentives, this study employs indicators along with accounting ratios 
as measures of hedging incentive variables. Indicators are an appropriate measure 
because they are a direct indicator of the real situation in the firm. Thus its reflection 
can be used to measure a specific variable, whereas using accounting ratio alone to 
measure a specific idea may be misleading as it may reflect the fluctuations of an entire 
industry or economy rather than the expected variable.
Financial Distress Costs
As argued in Chapter 3, hedging decisions can be used to decrease the firm’s financial 
distress costs. FT indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing the expected 
financial distress costs. Smith and Stulz (1985) argued that the transaction costs of 
financial distress could encourage firms to engage in hedging activities. They argue that 
hedging reduces the probability that a firm encounters financial distress by reducing the 
variance of its value, and the expected costs of financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 
1987). Fok, et al, (1997) used leverage ratio and the firm size as indicators of expected 
bankruptcy costs. The larger the debt relative to a firm's value, the higher the probability 
of bankruptcy, and the higher the likelihood that a firm will hedge to reduce the 
volatility of operating income. They measured the financial distress via debt ratio, debt 
to firm value ratio and times interest earned. Howton and Perfect (1998) and Berkman 
and Bradbury (1996) used the interest coverage and leverage as proxies for the expected
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costs of financial distress. To measure the financial distress Tufano (1996), used a cash 
cost and leverage (long-term debt scaled by firm size).
Geczy, et al, (1997) used two measures of borrowing capacity as proxies for a firm’s 
pre-hedging probability of financial distress: the long-term debt ratio. The higher the 
firm’s long-term debt ratio the greater the probability of financial distress. Therefore, 
the higher the firm’s long-term debt ratio, the more likely the firm is to hedge. A firm in 
financial distress will typically face two defaults in its financing strategy: long-tenn 
financial strategy as indicated by leverage and short-term financial strategy as indicated 
by liquidity. Joseph (2000) used liquidity and leverage as proxies for financial distress. 
Haushalter (2000); Allayannis and Ofek (2001) used the leverage to examine the effect 
of the financial distress costs on corporate hedging. Nance, et al, (1993), measured 
leverage using two different measures: the firm’s debt-size ratio, and the coverage of 
fixed claims. Haushalter (2000) found that corporate hedging is positively associated 
with leverage. In contrast, Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found that leverage is negatively 
associated with the hedging decision and is the opposite from what theories of optimal 
hedging would predict. Also Nance, et al, (1993) did not find any evidence to support a 
positive linkage between hedging and leverage, which does not support the leverage 
hypothesis.
There are many studies which have used the long-term debt ratio as a proxy for leverage 
(Jia and Lilian, 1998; Geczy et al, 1997; Haushalter, 2000. Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) 
carried out a study of the financial firm sector and found a positive relationship between 
usage of financial instruments and a firm's leverage level. In addition, using a sample of 
non financial firms, Geczy et al, (1997), Dolde (1995) and Tufano (1996) found as 
predicted by theory, some evidences of a positive relationship between leverage and risk 
management activity in general. However, Block and Gallagher(1986), Dolde (1993) 
and Nance et al, (1993) did not find evidence to support a positive linkage between 
hedging and leverage.
However, using a sample of firms from Saudi Arabia to collect financial measurements 
to examine the effect of leverage on hedging decision and makes it difficult to obtain 
any information regarding the firm's interest coverage ratios. Saudi Arabia is an Islamic 
country and religious companies are not supposed to accept any contracts containing
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paying an interest rate as it is called “Riba1” and prohibited in Islamic ‘Shariah’. Firms' 
annual reports do not include any information about interest rate. There are many 
financial ratios which can be used as a measure of failure of rates. Two measures of 
financial distress costs used by Nance, et al, (1993); Geczy, et al, (1997); and Gay and 
Nam (1998), are employed: Leverage, which is defined as the firm’s long term debt to 
total sales, and debt service coverage, which is defined as the firm’s earnings before 
interest and taxes (Zakah, the Islamic tax) to debt.
In order to examine the effect of financial distress costs on the hedging decision from 
different perspectives, this study in addition to the use of accounting ratios will use 
indicators to measure the firm’s financial distress cost. From the findings in the 
interviews and from the managers’ perspective this study has established new indicators 
to measure the financial distress cost. These indicators are presented in Table 7.1. The 
study predicts that the more the respondents agree with financial distress cost indicators 
the more the financial distress cost will be and the firms are more likely to be hedging 
firms. In order to find whether the differences in the responses of the two participating 
groups regarding the financial distress costs are statistically significant, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:
Hi: There is significant difference between hedging and non­
hedging firms regarding the financial distress cost
Table 7.1: The determinants of the incentives of hedging indicators.
V ariables Indicator
A gen cy  C osts • The company's owners participate in the decision o f  the strategy and plan to grow the 
company
• The company's total sales have been improved
• M ost o f  our com pany’s profits are paid as dividend to the firm's owners
• The owners o f  the company satisfied with improvement in the com pany
• Our company has adopted a monitoring device system  to control the relationship between  
managers and owners
• In our company the management compensation system has been linked to the corporate 
performance
Financial D istress  
C osts
•
•
Our company's ability to service its debt is low  
The percentage o f  our firm's debt is high
1 Riba in debts occurs when interest in and form (either as money or as goods) is paid as compensation for 
a loan, unless it is not agreed on beforehand and is paid completely voluntarily. Riba is prohibited from 
Islamic point of view.
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Variables Indicator
•  In our industry the probability o f  going bankrupt is very high
•  W e are dealing in business where the probability o f  gain and loss are equal
•  The risk management tools available in the markets to hedge foreign exchange risk are very
_______________________________________ risky_______________________________________________________________________________________
Investm en t •  Our ability in managing the financial risk protects our expected cash flow
O pp ortun ities
•  W e always have a plan to improve our investment opportunities
•  The ability o f  our company to get over the financial problems increase our financial 
opportunities
_________________________________ •  The investment opportunities in our market are good_________________________________________
External &  Internal •  W e finance our investment by increasing the com pany’s capital or asking the owners for
F inance help
•  W e present our financial statements in a w ay which can increase our probability to receive  
more flexib le external finance
•  W e have more flexib ility to get external funding under flexib le conditions
•  In our com pany the cost o f  external finance is cheaper as our financial risk is low
•  Our cash flow s have been improved
_________________________________ •  From our normal activities w e can generate enough cash flow  for future investm ents__________
Agency costs
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that agency theory proposes that owners and managers 
have different goals for the firm. Amihud and Lev (1981) stated that, agency theory 
suggests that owners seek to maximize their wealth while managers tend to maximize 
their own best interests. FT indicates that hedging increases firm value by reducing the 
expected agency costs. To calculate agency costs as a ratio, this study uses the one used 
by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) in their study, the turnover ratio of annual sales to total 
assets. Turnover can be used to generate an aspect of the efficiency with which assets 
are utilized. This ratio indicates how many times annual sales cover total assets. This 
ratio is a measure of how effectively the firm’s management deploys its assets. When 
the ratio of annual sales to total assets become low it may mean firms experience 
positive agency costs, because the manager of a firm works against the interest of 
shareholders, by making poor investment decisions or concentrating on their own 
interest. This study also uses the operating profit margin ratio, a profitability ratio. The 
operating profit margin ratio can be defined as operating profit to total sales. The greater 
a firm’s profitability ratio, the more the manager's work on the interest of the firm's 
shareholder. The more the shareholder will be satisfied with the firm’s management. 
Almohaimeed (1999) found that the financial indicators such as profitability and stock 
return have great impact in the institutional investors’ investment decision in UK. To 
examine the reflection of the hedging decision on the agency cost, we started by
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determining the effect of hedging decision on the firm’s total sales ratio and operating 
profit margin ratio.
As used with financial distress cost, to examine the reflection of the hedging decision on 
the agency cost, this study uses two different ways of measuring the agency cost, first, 
using the accounting ratios as described above, and second, using the indicators. The 
results of the exploratory study show the importance of the agency conflicts in 
influencing the hedging decision. The interviewees identified some factors that may 
influence or decrease the level of agency conflict in the firms, and as summarized in the 
interviews results, Table 7.1 shows the main agency costs factors which can be used as 
indicators to measure the level of agency conflict in each firm in the study sample. The 
firm is more likely to hedge when the survey respondents show a high level of 
agreement with agency costs indicators, which means that the agency conflict is low in 
hedging firms. To examine the effect of the agency conflict level on the hedging 
decision, this study will test the following hypothesis:
H2: There is significant difference between hedging and non­
hedging firms regarding the level of agency conflict.
Growth opportunity
Despite the central importance of the issue to financial risk research, there is no 
theoretical or empirical consensus on whether the firm’s growth opportunities affects 
the hedging decision. Studies on this issue generally take one or two very different 
directions, as two seminal studies illustrate. On one hand, Nance, Smith, and Smithson 
(1993) found that firms which hedge had more growth options in their investment 
opportunity set. On the other hand, Mian (1996) found no evidence that hedgers had 
more growth options in their investment opportunity set. These two studies make 
different assumptions about the nature of the problem
There are some empirical studies which consider the growth opportunities as a 
determinant for hedging firms. For example, Geczy et al., (1997) use three variables as 
proxies for the growth opportunities available to a firm: the ratio of a firm's research and 
development expenditures to its sales; the ratio of a firm's capital expenditures for 
property, plant, and equipment to firm's size; and the book value of a firm's common 
equity scaled by its market value. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) used the
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R&D expenditures, defined as the ratio of R&D to total sales as proxy for growth 
options in the firm’s investment opportunity. Also Nance et al. (1993) and Wysocki
(1996) used the firm’s R&D expenditures as proxy to measure the growth options in the 
firm’s investment opportunity set.
Other common measures used as proxies for growth opportunities is the market to the 
book value of total assets (market-to-book ratio). The market-to-book ratio has 
previously been used by Smith and Watts (1992), Mian (1996), Nance, et al., (1993); 
and Gay and Nam (1998). Mian (1996) stated that the basic assumption behind the use 
of this to the market and book value of total assets ratio is an empirical proxy for the 
growth opportunity set is that firms with more growth options will have market values 
far in excess of their book values. Hence, the incentive contracting hypothesis predicts 
that hedgers will have higher market to book ratio as compared to non hedgers. The 
ratio of book-to-market value of the firm's assets proxy can not be used in this study, as 
half of the sample is private firms and it is difficult to find the market value of their 
assets. Therefore, to gain a better insight into the relation between a firm's hedging 
decision and its growth opportunity, this study analyzes the results by using several 
alternative proxies. To test the underinvertment hypothesis, two measures will be used: 
the R&D expenditures and operation expenses to sales ratio. The rational for using the 
R&D expenditures as a growth proxy is justified on the basis that these expenses are 
predictors of the development of future projects (Gay and Nam, 1998). Using operation 
expenditures to sales provides an indication ratio of the firms’ financial capacity to take 
future investment.
To examine whether hedging can be used to minimize the underinvestment problem, 
this study uses two different ways of measuring the investment opportunities available 
to firm, first, using the accounting ratios as described above, and second, using the 
indicators. The interviewees identified some factors that may influence or decrease the 
level of underinvestment problems in the firms, and are summarized in the interview 
results. Table 7.1 identifies the main underinvestment problem factors which can be 
used as indicators to measure the level of the problem in each firm in the study sample. 
The firm is more likely to hedge when the survey respondent shows a high level of 
disagreement with investment opportunity indicators, which means that the 
underinvestment problem is high. In order to find the influence of the level of the 
underinvestment problem on the hedging decision, this study examines the following
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hypothesis:
H3: There is significant difference between hedging firms and non 
hedging firms regarding the level of underinvestment problem.
The corporate financial costs
Geczy et al, (1997) used two variables as proxies for a firm’s short term liquidity: the 
quick ratio, which is cash and short-term investments divided by current liabilities.; and 
the dividend payment ratio. The quick ratio can be used to measure the firm’s ability to 
finance short-term investment with readily available cash. The greater a firm’s quick 
ratio, the lower its need to hedge to reduce the expected financial distress and agency 
costs of straight debt. Froot et al, (1993) also predict a negative association between 
liquidity and hedging, resulting from treating the liquidity available for the firms not as 
a substitute for long-term debt, but as a measure of the availability of internal funds. If 
the external source of funds is costly, the firms may hedge in order to avoid a shortage 
in internally generated funds.
Many proxies for corporate finance costs hypothesis have been used by previous 
research, such as the leverage ratio. For example, Whited (1992) argues that highly 
leverage firms face high premiums for external funds. Similarly, Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) report that the likelihood of a firm being financially constrained increases with 
its leverage. Howton and Perfect (1998) use the ratio of R&D to sales and the ratio of 
cash flows to total assets as proxies for external financing costs. The corporate finance 
costs can be reduced depending on the ability of the firm to generate enough cash flows 
or having assets which can be quickly used to generate cash flow (Froot et al, 1993). 
This study will use two proxies, one of them was used by Howton and Perfect which is 
the ratio of cash flows to total assets as proxy for external financing costs, and the other 
is the ratio of the tangible assets to total assets. Froot, et al, (1993) argue that the level 
of cash available for investments is inversely related to the need for external financing, 
and thus derivatives use for hedging purposes. The cash flow defines as the operating 
income minus interest expense minus cash dividends minus net ‘zakah’.
The findings of the exploratory study indicate that we can use some indicators in 
addition to the accounting ratios to measure the corporate finance cost in each firm in 
the sample. The interviews provided the study with some measurement indicators for 
corporate finance cost, see Table 7.1. According to these indicators, the firm will be
179
more likely to hedge if it shows a high level of disagreement with these indicators 
which lead to an increase in the corporate finance cost in the firm. In order to examine 
the effect of the corporate finance cost on the firm’s strategy to hedge or not to hedge, 
this study will test the following hypothesis:
H4: There is a significant difference in the financial source costs
between hedging and non-hedging firms.
The relationship between a hedging decision and the determinants of the firm’s 
incentives to hedge are shown in Figure 7.2. The Figure shows that the hedging decision 
is affected by the level of the firm’s financial distress costs, agency costs, investment 
opportunities, and corporate finance costs.
Figure 7.2: The relationship between the hedging decision and the determinants o f the 
__________________________ firm’s incentives to hedge____________________________
HH
Agency Cost
Financial D istress Cost
Investment opportunities
C orporate finance cost
W)
7.3 .2.2 The determ inants o f  m anagerial risk aversion
It can be suggested that a firm value can be improved by hedging when risk-aversion 
agents who contract with the firm cannot fully diversify their claims (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). It has been argued that the strategies of an organization reflects the dispositions
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of the top managers in terms of their subjective attributes, such as their age, control, 
compensation, and ownership (Das, 1986). Finance theory suggests that corporate 
hedging is attributable to managerial risk aversion. Haushalter (2000, p. 87) stated that 
‘according to this suggestion the main purpose of corporate hedging is to reduce the 
likelihood that managers will suffer adverse consequences, including loss of their jobs, 
from fluctuations in the price of a major input and output’. The purpose of this section is 
to identify the relationship between hedging strategy and managerial risk aversion. This 
study uses six variables to represent the level of managerial risk aversion in each firm in 
the sample. These variables are firm ownership structure, firm control, managerial 
ownership, managerial compensation, manager age, and the Islamic view.
The firm  ownership structure
The findings of the exploratory study showed that the hedging policy can be affected by 
the form of the firm's structure. In general, a number of empirical studies have 
examined whether or not the type of firm ownership structure makes any difference to 
the behaviour of firms. The question in the exploratory study that focused on the firm's 
structure provides potentially a useful theoretical risk management determinant. 
Drawing on it, this subsection framed hypothesis concerning the effects of the type of 
the firm ownership structure on the hedging decision. The examination of the 
relationship between the hedging decision and the firm's ownership structure only has 
been given weak attention in previous research. In the literature, there was no support 
for this view that changes in firm ownership structure leads to changes in corporate 
strategy and policy. However, if the structure of shareholding is wildly dispersed across 
equity holder managers are relatively free to exercise their discretion and pursue their 
own preferences. While in family and individual firms, where ownership is 
concentrated, the larger equity holders are generally able to exert rather tight control on 
managers’ decisions (Amihud and Lev, 1981).
According to the exploratory study finding and relating to Saudi firms, the firm 
ownership structure can be measured using three dimensions: individual, family, and 
shareholder firms. According to the ownership structure argument, we would expect 
family and individual firms to have a greater propensity to hedge than shareholder 
firms. In the Smith and Stulz (1985) model, the estimate of the managerial ownership is 
positively related to the hedging decision. This suggests that, of those Saudi firms in 
this study sample which adopted hedging activities, the family and individual firms
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tend to hedge more than shareholder firms. The relationship between hedging policy 
decision and the firm structure can be identified following the test of this hypothesis:
H5: There is significant difference on the firm structure between
hedging and non-hedging firms.
Firm control
Fogelberg (1980, p. 55) defines “control” to be “The ability to direct the affairs of the 
company, or to directly influence the policy decisions that are made...the ultimate 
control of any company is determined by the distribution of voting shares and the ability 
of any shareholder, or group of shareholders, to directly influence decisions which the 
board of directors make”. This study expects that monitoring will increase the need for 
hedging activities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that external monitoring activity 
can be used to control the agency conflicts. Control for agency problems in the 
decision-making process is important when decision makers who initiate and implement 
important decisions are not the major residual claimants and therefore do not bear a 
major share of the wealth effects of their decision. Without effective control procedures, 
such decision managers are more likely to take actions that deviate from the interests of 
shareholders.
Some evidences in the interviews revealed that there was a distinction between firms 
that are controlled by their owners and those controlled by managers regarding their 
foreign exchange exposure management policy. From the findings in the exploratory 
study, we can argue that firms which are controlled by their owners were more likely to 
engage in hedging activity. To distinguish between owner- controlled and manager- 
controlled firms, most of the previous researches define the owner-controlled firm as a 
firm that at least one of its owners has 5 percent stock ownership (Palmer, 1973; 
Gomez- Mejia, Tosi, and Hinkin, 1987; and Han and Suk, 1998). They argued that as 
firms grew, and stocks become more widely distributed, the fraction needed to exercise 
control would shrink. However, a Saudi stock exchange market was recently established 
and firms stocks in a market were narrowly distributed. Using a 5 percent ownership 
convention, may not help this study to demonstrate significant differences between 
owner- controlled and manager- controlled firms in Saudi Arabia. This study designated 
firms as owner- controlled if at least 10 percent of its stocks are in the hands of one 
individual or organization of the owner. Manager- controlled firms are those whose 
stocks are so disparately owned that no single shareholder is able to effectively
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guide the decision of managers (no single shareholder has more than 10% of the firm’s 
stocks). There is some empirical evidence suggesting that the behaviour of managers in 
manager- controlled firms is systematically different from those of managers in owner- 
controlled firms (Boudreaux, 1973; and Amihud and Lev, 1981). For example, Tosi, 
Katz and Gomez-Mejia (1997) have suggested that managers make different decisions 
when owners have an active involvement in the firm (owner- controlled) versus when 
paid managers are relatively free to set the strategy of the firm (manager- controlled). 
Palmer (1973) has shown that owner- controlled firms differ from manager-controlled 
firms in term of risk aversion. Katz and Niehoff (1998, p. 759) stated that "Owner- 
controlled firms benefit from the influence of equity holders who positively impacts on 
the setting of policies and the day- to- day operations of the firm". Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) suggested that owners believe they can influence the success of their firms and 
that all outcomes are neither completely random nor completely foreseeable. The 
potential for managerial self-interest is greatest when owners do not adequately monitor 
managers.
The firm's control argument classifies firms into owner- controlled firms if one or more 
of its owners have 10% or more of the firms’ equity. Firms can be classified as 
manager- controlled firms if no owner has 10% or more of the firms’ equity. This 
criterion provides two groups of firms which are sufficiently different in determining if 
the type of control has any effect upon the hedging decision. Using these two groups the 
following hypothesis will be tested:
H6- There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging
firms regarding their firms’ control.
Manager ownership
The managers’ approach to foreign exchange exposure management regarding the 
decision to hedge or not to hedge will depend on the risk they personally bear (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). To know what risks managers face, we need to know if they are one of 
the firm’s owners or only employed by the firm’s owners, and their level of equity 
ownership. Here, we compare the manager ownership of hedging and non-hedging 
firms and examine how a manager ownership affects the firm’s foreign exchange 
exposure management strategies. According to the exploratory study most of the 
interviewees whose firms hedge their foreign exchange exposure were more likely to be 
managed by one of their owners. In addition, Smith and Stulz (1985) stated
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that if the manager is one of the firm's owners, one would expect the firm to hedge 
more, as the manager's wealth is more of a linear function to the value of the firm. In 
looking at managerial ownership in the ownership structure at hedging firms we expect 
managers to be more concerned with the volatility of exchange rates, which affects the 
firms cash flow and earnings. Theory would predict that firms whose managers have 
stock as a fraction of their private wealth would be more inclined to manage foreign 
exchange risk, but those whose managers are only employed by firms’ owners and do 
not hold any equity in these firms might be less inclined to manage foreign exchange 
risk (Tufano, 1996). It seems that managers use hedging activity primarily for reducing 
the risk associated with their equity holding and human capital investments in the firm.
The hypothesis regarding managerial ownership assumes that firms can be divided into 
two groups according to the managerial ownership in the firms, in theses groups the 
distinguish between the managers of the firms holding 10% or more of the firm’s stock 
and between the managers have less that 10% of the firm's stock. To examine the 
relationship between hedging strategy and the level of managerial ownership in the 
firm, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H7: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging
firms regarding their manager stockholding.
Managerial compensation system
According to the literature review, and the results of the exploratory study, the 
managerial compensation system is one of the corporate hedging determinants. 
Managers cannot use their expertise on maximizing shareholder wealth unless they have 
some discretion in the choice of their actions, and faced with proper incentives (Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). They argued that making managerial wealth a concave function of a 
firm's value bonds the firm to a hedging policy. This study examines a sample in which 
some firms adopted “target ownership plans”, under which managers are required to 
own some amount of stock. There is no theoretical or empirical consensus on whether 
the adoption of managerial equity ownership plans affects firms’ hedging decision. 
Previous studies were only concentrated on the relationship between the percentage of 
managerial wealth and the use of derivatives, currency derivatives, or hedging decision 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985; Breeden and Viswanathan, 1996; Geczy, Minton, and Schrand, 
1997; Fok, Carrol, and Chiou, 1997). To encourage managers working in shareholders’ 
interest, boards of directors must link managers’ interests with the same wealth
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creation goals of owners through a share ownership programs (Katz and Niehoff, 1998). 
By insuring that managers have the incentives to ‘fit’ functional strategies consistent 
with the long-term direction set by the board, the firm will have a greater chance of 
achieving the suitable hedging decision.
In order to examine the effect of the firm’s managerial compensation programs on 
hedging decision, this study distinguishes between the effect of the short-term 
compensation program and the long-term compensation program. To measure the short­
term managerial compensation, this study uses the performance related monetary 
compensation level and the managers’ income salary. In the case of measuring the long­
term managerial compensation, this study uses the equity compensation program. When 
they discussed the effect of management compensation on the hedging decision, the 
previous studies were only concentrated on the effect of long-term compensation such 
as stock options in Haushalter’s work, 2000. Previous studies of corporate hedging did 
not separate the effects of manager stockholding reward (long-term compensation) and 
monetary compensation (short-term compensation) on the hedging decision. It seems 
that the primary reason for this omission was the lack of an effective method of 
collecting data for measuring the value of shot-term compensation.
As a more direct test of whether managerial compensation contracts affect the hedging 
decision, we asked the respondents to indicate the level of their firms’ performance 
related monetary, and equity compensation system. Clearly, the question of whether or 
not the firm’s managers are rewarded for hedging their firm’s financial risk remains 
unresolved. This study will test the following hypotheses:
H8- There is significant difference in the managerial performance 
related monetary compensation system between hedging and non­
hedging firms.
H9: There is significant difference in the managerial equity
compensation system between hedging and non-hedging firms.
HKT There is significant difference in the manager annual income 
between hedging and non-hedging firms.
Manager’s age
One of the observations from the interviews was that the manager’s age may affect 
his/her attitude toward foreign exchange exposure. In that young interviewee managers
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were more likely to hedge than older interviewee managers. On the literature, Tufano 
(1996) argued that manager’s age may play a role in directing the manager’s risk 
attitude. In order to examine further the exploratory study observation, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:
H l l :  There is significant difference in the manager’s age of hedging and
non-hedging firms.
The Islamic view
The exploratory study has shown that some firms did not hedge because the financial 
instruments (derivatives contracts) available in the markets for hedging were prohibited 
by Islamic ‘Shariah’. Kamali (2000) reported the juristic debate over the validity or 
otherwise of future contracts (future, forward, and option contracts) revolving around 
five points. Firstly, that the counter values in these sales are both non-existent at the 
time of contract: no goods are delivered at the time and no price is paid. The contract 
that is concluded is, therefore, said to be no more than a paper transaction and not a 
genuine sale. Consequently, futures sales consist merely of an exchange of promises 
made for the sole purpose of speculative profit-making. To validate a sale from the 
perspective of the Shariah, it is necessary that at least one, if not both, of the counter 
values should be present at the time of the contract. Either the price or delivery of the 
subject matter may be postponed to a future date, but not both. Secondly, the proponents 
of the prohibitive argument also state that future trading is invalid in the eyes of the 
Shariah as it consists of short-selling in which the seller neither owns nor possesses the 
commodity he sells. The reason given for the prohibition is that the essence and purpose 
of a sale is to transfer ownership of the object of sale to the buyer; if the seller does not 
own the underlying commodity in the first place, he cannot transfer ownership. Thirdly, 
that future sales fall short of meeting the requirements of actual possession, that is, the 
taking into possession of the subject-matter prior to resale. A fourth issue has been 
raised over the deferment of both of the counter values to a future date, which 
effectively turns future sales into what is known in jurisprudence as the sale of one debt 
for another, which is said to be forbidden. And lastly, that futures trading partakes of 
speculation that verges on gambling and consists of uncertainty and risk-taking (gharar). 
Albaz (1999), Ershed (2001), Al-Shbany (2003) stated that the future contracts are 
prohibited in Islamic Shariah. Saudi Arabia as a country which is ruled by Islamic 
‘Shaiah’, the firms in the country may be affected by what The Islamic view says about
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the future contracts. We would suggest that religious managers would be more likely 
not to use any of the future contracts for hedging purposes.
In order to examine whether the hedging and non-hedging firms are different regarding 
the effect of the Islamic view in their currency exposure policy, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:
H12- There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the effect of the Islamic view on their decision (to hedge 
or not to hedge).
The relationship between the hedging decision and the determinants of the firm’s 
managerial risk aversion can be drawn as shown in figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3 The relationship between hedging decision and the determinants o f the firm’s 
_____________________________ managerial risk aversion______________________________
WD
Firm Control
Manager Age
Managerial Ownership
Firm Structure
Managerial compensation 
System
The Islamic veiw
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7.3.2.3 The determinants of the firm ’s needs to hedge
The interviewees in the exploratory study showed the importance of the firm’s need to 
hedge. The findings indicated that firms differed regarding the degree of hedging need. 
Some of the non-hedging firms in the interviews stated that their need for hedging 
activity was reduced for such reasons as being in less competitive market or less 
sensitive to changes in exchange rates. The use of contingency theory as framework for 
corporate hedging decision in the exploratory study showed to what extent a firm’s need 
to hedge may affect the firm’s attitude toward currency exposure. Different industries 
and markets provide firms with different levels of need to hedge. A firm’s need to hedge 
is affected by several factors which influence the hedging decision. The following 
sections present these factors.
Industry
Firms are different in their exchange exposure effects, and the cash flow impact of 
exchange rate changes depends on the nature of the business in which firms are 
engaged. He and Ng (1998) examine foreign exchange exposure in Japanese firms and 
found that different industries had different levels of foreign exchange exposure and 
different attitudes towards the foreign exchange exposure management. As seen from 
the exploratory study, there are some indications regarding the effect of the nature of the 
business on hedging policy. Although the interviews covered six different industries, the 
hedging firms were related to four of these industries. The nature of the business that a 
firm undertakes may become one of the hedging decision determinants, and this can be 
confirmed by testing the following hypothesis:
H I3: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding their industry.
The magnitude o f  foreign exchange exposure
It is one of the main conditions in the choice of the study population that firms must 
have foreign exchange exposure, whatever the amount of the exposure, small or large. 
While the effect of other factors in the currency hedging decision can not be assumed 
without the existence of the currency exposure the question arises is that to what extent 
the level of exposure might affect the foreign exchange management decision.
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While it was not clear, from the exploratory study results that the foreign exchange 
exposure magnitude alone had a significant effect on the hedging decision, the 
theoretical and empirical literature suggests that the exposure magnitude played an 
important role in encouraging the hedging decision. For this reason, the foreign 
exchange exposure magnitude variable will be classified as one of the variables which 
may affect the firm’s need to hedge and will be examined further using survey data.
Measuring foreign exchange exposure is difficult. This study will consider the export 
and import activities as an indication for foreign exchange exposure. The final sample in 
this study contains firms that have at least one source of foreign exchange exposure. 
Geczy et al., (1997) argued that a firm’s ultimate decision to use derivatives also 
depends on the level o f its exposure to risk, e.g. foreign exchange rate exposure or 
interest rate exposure. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found that exposure factors (foreign 
sales and foreign trade) are the sole determinants of the degree of hedging. They found a 
strong positive relation between exchange rate exposure and the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales. To control exposure factors, this study used the ratio of foreign sales to total 
sales and the ratio of foreign purchases to total purchases. A hedging decision should 
depend on the total foreign trade (exports plus imports) if  they are in different 
currencies. For example, foreign exchange exposure resulting from trading in Europe 
markets is more likely to hedge than the exposure from American markets. This study 
suggests that firms with most of their exports and imports priced in U. S. dollars, are 
unlikely to hedge. The fixed exchange rate between U. S. dollar and Saudi riyal helps 
these firms to minimize the effect of the currency exposure. The higher a firm’s ratio of 
foreign denominated sales the higher its ratio of foreign denominated purchases the 
greater the benefits from hedging.
To measure the degree of exposure, the following measures are used: (a) the percentage 
of the firm’s sales generated overseas to the total sales; (b) the percentage of the firm’s 
foreign purchases to the total purchases; (c) the percentage of the firm’s foreign debt to 
the total debt, (d) the magnitude of the firm's foreign denominated exports in currencies 
other than SR or U. S dollar, (e) the magnitude of the firm's foreign denominated 
imports in currencies other than SR or U. S dollar, (f) the volatility of the foreign 
exchange rates a company is exposed to. To examine the effect of the foreign exchange 
exposure magnitude on the hedging decision, this study will test the following 
hypothesis:
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H14: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the magnitude of their foreign exchange exposure.
Market
The exploratory study showed that hedging and non-hedging firms operate in different 
markets. Most of the hedging firms in the exploratory study operated in competitive 
markets. According to the exploratory study markets can be classified into three 
categories: competitive markets, price regulated markets, oligopolistic markets. In this 
context, the findings on the exploratory study showed that firms in oligopolistic markets 
were less likely to hedge foreign exchange risk, whereas firms in competitive markets 
were more likely to hedge. It shows that, in a competitive market the price of goods can 
be altered in response to the competitors’ pricing strategies, and the advantage or 
disadvantage change in exchange rates. Price regulated markets are most frequently 
regulated by government which sets controls on firms’ sales and price levels. In some 
Saudi markets the government controls prices in order to protect resident customers, as 
a result there is no real competition in the market place. In order to examine the effect of 
the market type on the foreign exchange exposure management policy, this study will 
test the following hypothesis:
H15: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the type of the market that these firms are located in.
Competition
The findings of the exploratory study imply that the level of competition is one of the 
corporate hedging determinants. The high level of competition might lead a firm with 
foreign exchange exposure to hedge this exposure in order to have a competitive 
advantage to minimize the effect of foreign exchange rate movements on the firm’s 
operation. It could be possible that an unfavourable currency movement that negatively 
affect one firm may not to be unfavourable for other competitors. Economists see the 
effects of foreign exchange rates in a competitive position to vary from one firm to 
another even in the same markets (George and Schroth, 1991). The studies mentioned in 
chapter 4 did not consider the competitive situation as one of the determinants of the 
corporate hedging decision. This study will try to provide a formal theory of corporate 
hedging decision in an environment where the level of competition provides some effect 
to corporate decisions. Most of the previous studies concentrated on the relationship 
between the firm's competitive situation and the magnitude of a firm's currency
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exposure (Flood and Lessard, 1986; Shapiro, 1992; Bradley, 1998; Pringle and 
Connolly, 1993; and Bradley and Moles, 2001). Most of the recent research examined 
the effect of indirect factors on the degree of currency exposure, but no one of these 
studies concentrated on the effects of these indirect factors on the hedging decision. The 
reaction of firms in a competitive market against negative exchange rate risk is usually 
controlled by competitors’ reaction, since the customers have the chance to choose from 
the different goods available. In a competitive market there is little chance for firms to 
pass exchange rate risk to customers. The findings in the exploratory study show that 
the extent to which the firm’s products differ from competitors’ products, the sensitivity 
of the firm’s products to changes in prices, the number of the firm’s competitors in the 
markets, and the percentage of the competitors costs denominate in the same foreign 
currency, can be used as possible proxies to measure the competitive position in each 
firm. A further reason for considering these four measures of competition is that some 
of the previous findings showed that foreign exchange volatility affects the firm's costs 
and profits, and that a firm may transfer the bad effect to the customer or supplier. 
Panagariya, Shah, and Mishra (2001) stated that at the intuitive level, trade economists 
generally believe that most developing countries do not have market power in the world 
market, meaning that they face infinitely elastic demand for their goods. However, 
being in a competitive product market or elastic demand market may affect the firm's 
need to hedge.
Breadly (1998) examined the effect of a competitive position on the level of foreign 
exchange exposure using the same measurement used in this study. Sundaram and 
Black (1991) suggested that the firms' currency exposure position is affected by the 
extent to which a firm offers products that are different from their competitors. The 
firm’s output or input prices are sensitive to changes in demand and expectations about 
future demand. Changes in commodity and material prices can also reflect movements 
in exchange rates. The degree of completion in markets can affect how much of the cost 
increase is passed on to consumers. For example, if the firm’s products are different 
from its competitors or have few substitutes, the demand for these products is likely to 
be price inelastic. In that case, any unfavourable movements in the foreign exchange 
rate will be transferred to the firm’s customers. There is a positive relationship between 
the magnitude of currency exposure and the extent to which the demand for the firm's 
products is sensitive to changes in price, and a positive relationship with the probability
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of a hedging decision.
In order to examine the relationship between the competitive position and hedging 
decision, this study will test the following hypothesis:
H I6: There is significant difference between hedging firms and non­
hedging regarding the competitive situation.
The effect o f  the foreign exchange rate movements
The exploratory study points out that there are differences between hedging and non­
hedging firms regarding the effect of the foreign exchange exposure in firms’ activities. 
The interviewees in hedging firms argued that changes in foreign exchange rates 
affected their costs, sale volume, cash flow, and profit margin. We suggest that a firm’s 
operation in a competitive market would be more sensitive to the changes in foreign 
exchange rates. The exchange rate movements affect both the prices and quantities of 
the inputs and outputs of exporting and importing companies, which leads to 
competitive advantages or disadvantages in the global marketplace. We know that an 
unexpected rise in the exchange rate that leads to a price rise will lead customers to buy 
less but this effect will be different from one firm to another. For example, if the firm's 
foreign cost rises as a result of foreign exchange rate movement, the firm's ability to 
raise the price of its product will depend on the product demand elasticity to the change 
in price. Low sensitivity of the firm's product demand to the change in price allows the 
manager to transfer the effect of the change in the firm's costs to the customer. It seems 
that a firm with a highly sensitive demand to the change in price will try to reduce the 
effect of the change in the cost by hedging its foreign cost. Changes in commodity and 
material prices can also reflect movements in exchange rates. Prices are determined by 
the interaction of supply and demand. For example, if the sterling/riyal exchange rate 
rises, the cost of raw materials prices in sterling will rise. Importers might accept lower 
profit margins rather than raise prices. They are more likely to do this if demand is weak 
or because of competition. The degree of competition in markets can affect how much 
of a cost increase is passed on to consumers. The argument here is that, unfavourable 
movements in foreign exchange rates affect negatively the firm’s operations. The 
hypothesis is that the greater the firm’s exposure to exchange rate changes, the more 
sensitive its sales volume, purchase volume, costs, cash flow, and profit margin to 
changes in exchange rates and the greater the likelihood that the firm will hedge. In
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order to examine to what extent the effect of exchange rate movements on the firm’s 
operations may influence the hedging decision, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H17- There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the influence of foreign exchange rate movements on 
the firm’s operations.
Currency and market policy
Blin, Greenbaum, and Jacobs (1980) saw exchange control as affecting U.K. 
companies’ decision to hedge the currency exposure. Edelshain (1995) viewed 
American firms as having far less experience in dealing with currency problems than 
U.K. firms as the exchange policy had encouraged U.K. firms to manage their exchange 
risk2. The question here is whether exchange control policy adopted by the government 
encouraged the companies to hedge the currency exposure. Also the market policy may 
affect the companies’ attitude toward the currency exposure, and whether these policy 
have been designed to compensate for the impact of exchange rate changes. Saudi 
corporations in the oil industry have prices in foreign markets calculated in U. S. 
dollars, and this may protect these corporations from currency exposure. The 
exploratory study showed that currency control policy affected the hedging decision 
more than the market policy. This led the study to further examine the influence of the 
currency control and market policy in the hedging decision. In order to explore the 
effect of the currency control and market policy in the hedging decision, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:
H18: There are significant differences between hedging and non­
hedging firms regarding the effect of the currency control and market 
policy in their decision (to hedge or not to hedge)
2 Edelshain (1995) stated that ‘in the U.K., exchange controls and declining sterling were imperatives 
during most of the 1970s. The earlier demise of sterling’s international reserve role prompted U.K. firms 
firstly to deal in an expanding array of currencies; secondly to accept the consequent transaction 
exposure; thirdly to adopt a partially covered foreign-currency financial structure; and fourthly until 
exchange control liberalization in October 1979, to effect capital flows and foreign investment under 
restrictive exchange policy’. P76.
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Accounting method
The exploratory study showed that the accounting method had no serious effect in the 
interviewees hedging decision. However, the alternative view is that the accounting 
method may be used by the manager to present the firm’s accounting statements in the 
way that may minimize the effect of exchange rate changes on the financial ratios of the 
company. Dehnani (1998) found that most firms interviewed commented that 
accounting methods alter significantly important balance sheet ratios, such as the 
gearing ratio. Angelos (1993) criticized this argument by claiming that the change in 
this ratio is again a paper one, i.e. not resulting from a real change in the financial 
structure of the firm. In order to examine the effect of the accounting method adopted 
by firms in their currency exposure management strategy, the following hypothesis will 
be tested:
H19: There is a significant difference between hedging and non-hedging
firms regarding the accounting method adopted.
Diversification
While the predicted theory suggests that firms with more international diversification 
are less likely to hedge, the results in the exploratory study suggested that international 
diversification did not affect the firm’s hedging decision. This inconsistent result led the 
study to further focus on the effect of international diversification in the hedging 
decision. Fooladi and Rumsey (2002, p. 44) stated that "it has been the decrease in the 
correlation across currencies that have maintained the benefits of international 
diversification. In particular, our results indicate that if the exchange rate volatility been 
hedged away, the benefits of international diversification would have decreased". This 
theoretical prediction is built on a very common belief that financial hedging and 
corporate diversification are substitutes in risk management, implying that firms that 
trade internationally using diversified currencies will have less need to manage their 
foreign exchange exposure. The opportunity to hedge in financial markets changes the 
benefit from diversification, and the ability of firms to use hedging instruments to 
decrease the firm’s intended diversification. As a result, the more the firm diversifies 
internationally the less likely it will engage in foreign exchange exposure management 
activity. This study uses the number of currencies that a rm uses in international trading 
as a proxy for diversification. This relationship can be tested by the following
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hypothesis:
H2CK There is significant difference in the level of diversification 
internationally between hedging and non-hedging firms.
The relevance o f  the foreign exchange risk
The interviewees in the exploratory study revealed that to hedge or not to hedge the 
currency risk is related to its important effect in the company. Some of the interviewees 
pointed out that their firms were facing other important risks, which their firms 
considered had to be managed first. As a result of the uncertainty in internal and 
external environment, the firm may face too many different risks, such as interest risk, 
industry risk, and political risk. These different risks may affect the firms differently 
and the motivations for hedging these risks might be different. The level of importance 
and effect that these risks have in these firms might affect the overall sensitivity of these 
firms against foreign exchange exposure. The level of relevance that foreign exchange 
exposure may have in the firm might affect the firm’s motivation to hedge. This 
relationship can be tested using this hypothesis:
H21: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the relevance of the foreign exchange risk to the firm.
The relationship between hedging decision and the determinants of the firm’s need to 
hedge is shown in figure 7.4.
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Figure 7.4: The relationship between hedging decision and the determinants of the firm’s
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7.3.2.4 The determ inants o f  the firm ’s ability to hedge
The exploratory study revealed that most of the interviewees thought that their firms 
suffered from their inability to hedge currency exposure effectively. The interviewees 
argued that firms should have the management and financial ability in order to engage 
in hedging activity. Most of the non-hedging firms in the interviews failed to hedge 
currency exposure due to the lack of qualified staff in this risk management activity. 
Hedging foreign exchange risk is a new idea in many Saudi firms, and for that reason 
the managers in these firms may have less experience in dealing with this problem and 
be concerned about adopting a new technique. The effect of the firm’s ability to hedge 
in the hedging decision can be examined using eleven independent factors. The 
following headlines present the determinants of the firm’s ability to hedge.
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Manager’s qualification
Knowledge is information stored in memory (Schank and Abelson, 1995). Grant (1996) 
argued that as individuals have limited information storage and processing capability, 
they specialize in particular kinds of knowledge. Bonner and Walker (1994) and Bonner 
(1990) suggested that knowledge and experience is a better predictor of managerial 
performance. As the jobs differ in the amount and type of knowledge that they require, 
this study expects that there are differences in the experience of the persons who are 
responsible for risk management in the firms. Also the opportunities for job-related 
learning differ by jobs. For example, we expect a treasurer or risk manager to have a 
level of technical knowledge primarily through instruction before beginning full-time 
work. Alternatively, this study expects that some of the risk management knowledge 
will be learnt on the-job, through self-study, and interaction with colleagues, all of 
which improve personal experience. It is expected that these three processes will 
provide knowledge differences among the persons responsible for foreign exchange 
exposure problems in the firms. Davis and Solomon (1989) assumed that manager 
related work experience was a proxy for the knowledge needed in a specific job. 
Solomon, Shields and Whittington (1999) suggested that employee experience can 
improve the accuracy of employee's knowledge of business operations.
The findings in the exploratory study showed that the risk manager’s qualification plays 
a significant role in determining the currency hedging decision. Risk management can 
also benefit managers by enabling them to demonstrate their superior abilities in the 
way in which they deal with risks such as foreign exchange' risk. Breeden and 
Viswanathan (1990) argued that hedging enables managers to ‘lock in’ their superior 
abilities. Managers may imprint their firms with their own values, many of which are 
manifested in the organization’s decision-making processes (Keeney, 1992). 
Management skill is an important strategic concept, and can provide a company with 
lasting competitive advantage in the market. It seems that managers who work in the 
firms for a long time are more likely to engage in risk management activity, and 
managers with more experience should be more flexible and have the ability and skills 
to use new and difficult risk management strategy. However, Breeden et al, (1990) 
argued that newly appointed financial managers are more attracted to use hedging 
instruments in order to build their reputation, and to put themselves in the interest of the 
shareholders. Tufano (1996) suggested that firms whose managers have fewer years in
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their current jobs are more likely to engage in greater risk management activities. 
Hedging issues are probably greatest for start-up managers, where managers have less 
experience in current jobs and there is more uncertainty over the financial managers’ 
ability. However, old and more experience financial managers are often less sensitive 
against risk (Tufano, 1996). Tufano found that risk management levels appear to be 
higher for firms whose senior financial managers have shorter job tenures. In addition to 
classifying a manager’s qualification as a proxy to measure the firm’s ability to hedge, 
managerial qualifications might serve as proxy for risk aversion, in that managers with 
strong qualifications would be more likely to hedge. It seems that managers with 
degrees in finance and international business are also more likely to understand hedging 
activity.
To understand the role of knowledge and the ability of a manager in the foreign 
exchange exposure management decision, this study follows these steps; (1) identifying 
the knowledge that is perceived as important by managers and treasurers, and (2) 
examining the relationship between knowledge and hedging decision. According to this 
and the findings in the exploratory study, this study uses six different proxies to 
measure the managers’ knowledge, (a) the subject specialisation studied, (b) the level of 
qualification, (c) the working period in the firm, (d) the experience period in the current 
job, (e) the experience period in risk management, and (f) the availability of qualified 
staff in risk management practice. In order to examine the effect of qualification in 
hedging decision, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H22: There are significant differences between hedging and non­
hedging firms regarding managers’ qualifications.
Manager performance
Managerial performance, like all aspects of human behaviour, is a function of both the 
personal attributes of the actor and the situation in which he or she exists. Managers 
work in a wide variety of situations and it is clear that job demands, job role, colleagues, 
organizational systems and other situational factors will exert an influence on the 
behaviour of any individual manager (Roberston, Gibbons, Baron, Maclver, and 
Nyfield, 1999). The exploratory study points out that most of the hedging firms have 
management performance evaluation and reward systems. We would suggest that the 
availability of the management performance program may affect the manager’s attitude 
towards currency exposure. By engaging in hedging activities, however, managers
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can reduce the sensitivity of their wealth to the management performance. The 
exploratory study suggests some indicators to measure management performance which 
are; the dividend payment to shareholders, the availability of criteria and standards to 
evaluate management performance, and the possibility that the firm’s profit has been 
increasing during recent years. In order to find whether the hedging decision is affected 
by manager performance program in firms, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H23' There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging
firms in the management performance program.
Risk management training program
According to the exploratory study, the training program in corporate risk management 
gave the managers a positive experience since most of the risk mangers interviewed in 
hedging firms had risk management training program. The findings in the exploratory 
study predicted that managers who attend risk management training programs are more 
likely to engage in hedging activity. The risk management training program improves 
worker awareness towards currency exposure. The interviewees pointed out that banks’ 
treasury departments visited their companies and presented programs on how to 
minimize currency exposure. The banks also provided the company with documents and 
leaflets regarding the currency risk management tools available in the banks. This led 
the research to focus further on the effect of the risk management training program in 
the hedging decision. In order to examine that, the following hypothesis will be tested: ■
H24: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging
firms regarding the availability of risk management training program.
Banking relationship
Recent theoretical models argue that close relationships between banks and firms may 
improve access to financing for firms, create value, and ultimately, improve firm 
performance (Rajah, 1992). Close relationships may enable reputation building as a 
means for establishing enough advice and financial services which help the firm to 
manage foreign exchange risk. A good relationship may drive banks to reduce 
transaction costs. It is argued that for banks to protect their relationship with customers, 
they should be able to offer services at cost to the best customers and hold on to 
customers to prevent them from receiving competitive services elsewhere (Sharpe,
1990). Most studies focus on the impact of the exclusivity of a relationship between
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banks and firms on credit availability and interest rates. For example, US surveys found 
that a close relationship between a firm and a single bank increases the quality and 
availability of financial services offered by the bank (Cole, 1998; and Scott, 2000). 
While, Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) reported that financial services available for 
small Italian firms decrease with the weaknesses of the relationships with banks. These 
results have not been examined within the hedging activity offered by banks. In a 
country like Saudi Arabia the roles that banks play relating to firms are very important 
since banks have become the main providers of financial instruments. The absence of 
forward and money markets in Saudi Arabia strengthens the importance of the 
relationship between firms and banks. According to Saudi firms, banks should be the 
major source of external hedging methods and advisers on hedging activity. The 
exploratory study showed that firms with strong relationship with banks were more 
likely to hedge. To measure the relationship with banks, this study uses two variables to 
represent the link between companies that hedge and the strength of their relationship 
with banks. The number of banks from which the firm obtains external financial 
services, and the length of the firm’s and bank relationship (the length of a firm’s 
relationship with its primary bank). The hypothesis examined through this study is:
H25' There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging
firms regarding the relationship with banks.
Finn size
FT indicates that there is a relation between firm's size and economies of scale in the 
costs of hedging. The findings in the exploratory study did not provide us with a clear 
relationship between the hedging decision and firm size. This result, led the study to 
further focus on the relationship between hedging activity and firm size, since the 
predicted theory suggested a positive relationship between them. Mian (1996) find that 
firms with more assets are more likely to hedge. Jia and Lilian, (1998), found that FX 
rate exposure increases with a firm’s size, and firms with a large size will carry a high 
level of hedging.
The most widely used measures of firm size are total assets, firm value and total sales. 
Many empirical surveys have investigated the relationship between these measures and 
financial risk management. Table 7.2, reports the major findings of these studies based 
on an extensive review of the existing literature. Most of these studies find the
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relationship between firm size and corporate risk management is positive.
Table 7.2: Review of selected studies on firm size and corporate hedging activity.
S tu d y  & Sam ple Sam ple K in d o f S ize R esu lt
D ate L ocation R isk m easure Sign al
Tufano 32 North com m odity Firm value -
1996 American risk
Francis and 1,061 respondents US Corporate risk Firm value +
Stephan, 1990 from 434 firms Total assets 
Total sales
+
+
Fok, Carrol and 
Chion, 1997
396 US Corporate risk Firm value  
Total assets 
Total sales
+
+
+
N ance, Smith and 
Sm ithson, 1993
169 US Corporate risk Firm value +
G eczy, M inton 
and Schrand, 
1997
372 US Currency risk Firm value +
A llayannis and 
O fek, 2001
378 US Currency risk Total assets +
Hardwick and 
Adam s, 1999
88 UK Financial firma 
risk
Firm value +
M ian, 1996 3 ,022 US Interest risk Firm value +
Gay and Nam , 
1998
486 US Corporate risk Firm value -
Berkman and 
Bradbury, 1996
116 N ew  Zealand Corporate risk Firm value +
Howton and 
P erfec t, 1998
461 US corporate risk Firm value +
Nance, et al, (1993), and Gay, et al, (1998), employed the ratio of market value (the 
sum of the book value of the debt plus the market value if the equity) for the firm size. 
This study cannot use a similar variable as most of the firms in the sample were not 
registered on the Saudi Stock Market and hence it is difficult to define the firms’ market 
value. Nance, et al, (1993), Mian (1996), and Geczy, et al, (1997) found that firms 
with more assets were more likely to hedge. Also Francis et al, (1990) used the total 
sales to measure the firm’s size. This study will use three proxies to measure the firm’s 
size, the total sales, the total assets, and the capital. In order to examine the effect of the 
firm’s size in the hedging decision, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H26: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging
firms in the firm size.
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Risk management policy
The interviewees in the hedging firms indicated that a risk management policy is existed 
in their firms, whereas, most of the interviewees in non-hedging firms pointed out that 
they did not have a risk management policy. Firms with a risk management policy are 
more likely to manage the foreign exchange exposure. Mathur (1985) indicated that the 
more a firm relies on revenues generated by foreign operations, the more emphasis it 
places on foreign exchange policy. He argued that large firms have a higher propensity 
for formalising the foreign exchange policy. Such policies help the organization to 
achieve its goals. Without formulating such policies, managers cannot operate 
effectively towards achieving the company goals (Mathur, 1985). The availability of a 
general risk management policy, and policy for derivatives use, may affect the currency 
hedging decision. The study will test this suggestion using the following hypothesis:
H27: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the availability of risk management policy.
The local market fo r  risk management financial contracts
The interviewees in non-hedging firms complained about the against the absence of a 
local market for the future, forward, and options contracts in Saudi Arabia. They argued 
that the banks were the only places available to buy or sell the financial contracts. Also 
they argued that the financial contracts available for hedging purposes were very risky 
and costly. However, this factor alone did not affect the hedging firms’ decision to 
hedge their currency exposure. The effect of the availability of local financial markets 
for risk management financial contracts in hedging currency exposure needs to be 
further analysed. The following hypothesis will be tested:
H28: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the effect of the absence of the local market for risk 
management financial contracts in their decision (to hedge or not to 
hedge).
The cost o f  implementing hedging activity
The exploratory study showed that the cost of the hedging activity plays significant role 
in determining the hedging decision. Most of the interviewees in the non-hedging firms 
argued that the hedging methods available for their firms were very costly. Costs also 
can be recognized as the main determinant of the firm’s decision to hedge currency
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exposure. Geczy, et al,. (1997) extended the testable implication of existent theories on 
derivatives use by considering how the cost of using derivatives affects the decision to 
use them. They used indirect measurement to measure the cost of using derivatives by 
suggesting that firms with economies of scale in implementing and maintaining a risk 
management program are more likely to use currency derivatives. They argued that 
large firms may face lower hedging costs than smaller firms, since they may find it 
easier to hedge using future and option markets, due to institutional features of 
economies scale that favour large firms. They predicted a positive relationship between 
hedging decision and firm size since hedging costs are proportionately lower for large 
firms. Shanker (2000) used the same measure to examine the effect of hedging costs on 
the hedging decision. Geczy, et al, also used foreign denominated debt and pre-tax 
foreign income to measure the firm’s ability to bear the cost of the hedging activity. 
Based on the findings the exploratory study, this study considers three indicators to 
measure the effect of the hedging cost on the hedging decision which are; the cost 
associated with implementing foreign exchange exposure management, the firm’s view 
regarding whether the benefits of hedging currency exposure exceed its cost, and the 
cost of using derivatives contracts in hedging. Before a firm decides to hedge, it must 
consider the general costs associated with implementing the hedging policy and the 
specific costs associated with using financial instrument for hedging. This study 
suggests that risk management strategies will not be implemented unless the expected 
benefits outweigh the costs. In order to examine the effect of the hedging costs in the 
hedging decision, the following hypothesis will.be tested:
H29: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms regarding the effect of the hedging costs in their decision (to 
hedge or not to hedge).
Forecasting exchange rates
While all the hedging firms in the exploratory study attempted to forecast the exchange 
rate they were exposed to, only four non-hedging firms from nine were forecasting their 
exchange rates. Because exchange rates are continually changing any unexpected 
change may affect the firm’s currency exposure. A firm should generate information 
about the likely future exchange rate movements in order to evaluate its currency 
exposure. Without the ability to forecast the future exchange rate, the hedging decision 
becomes more difficult for the manager. In order to examine the effect of the
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forecasting ability in the hedging decision, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H30: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms in the ability to forecast future exchange rates.
Operating department’s role
The exploratory study showed that most of the interviewees in the non-hedging firms 
experienced problems in planning the risk management policy because of limited 
participation from operating departments. Most of the interviewees in non-hedging 
firms argued that they received little information regarding the firm’s exports and 
imports which affected their ability to evaluate the currency exposure. Firms with high 
level of coordination between different departments and good information systems will 
be more likely to hedge. Departments such as marketing, sale and purchase of products 
should participate in preparing the firm’s risk management strategy. To evaluate the 
effect of the other operating departments in the currency hedging policy, the following 
hypothesis will be tested:
H31'- There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms in the level of participation of the operating department in the 
hedging policy making.
The Nationality
One of the interesting observations during the interviews was the finding that most of 
the interviewees who hedged their companies’ currency exposure were from Western or 
East Asian countries. It seems that risk managers who are from Western or East Asian 
countries have more experience in risk management than managers from Arabic 
counties. In order to examine whether the risk manager’s nationality has significant 
effect in the hedging decision, the following hypothesis will be tested:
H32: There is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms in the risk manager’s nationality.
The relationship between hedging decision and the determinants of the firm’s ability to 
hedge is shown in figure 7.5.
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Figure 7.5: The relationship between hedging decision and the determinants of the firm’s
________  ability to hedge_____ ■_________________________
Q ualification Manager Performance 
System
Risk Management Training 
Program
The Bank Relationship Firm Size Risk Management Policy
Risk Management Financial 
Contracts
The costs of Implementing 
Hedging Policy
Forecasting Exchange Rate
The Participation of the Nationality of Manager
Operating Department r~~ 7
The Determinants of the Firm’s Ability to Hedge
The Hedging Decision
7.3.2.5 The study theoretical framework
The expected impact of finance theory and contingency theory for the purpose of this 
study may be summarized in the following model, see Figure 7.6. The Figure presents 
the financial and contingency theory model of the hedging decision. Each of the 
contingency and hedging factors in each of the groups presented in the figure will be 
measured, either as a quantitative accounting ratio, frequency, scale or as a series of 
ordered categories in the next Two Chapters (Ch 8, and 9,). Each firm is allotted a score 
on each contingency and hedging decision factor. The cross-sectional distribution of 
scores of the firms on a pair of contingency and hedging decision factors is then 
examined to see whether there is an association. Also the study will apply the 
Multivariate Logistic Regression, so that the influence of the hedging determinant
205
variables on the hedging decision can be considered in a simultaneous multivariate way 
rather than as a collection of univariate links. In this study, the contingency factors 
chosen were determined by their suitability for illustration in a questionnaire survey. 
These factors were grouped into four different groups of determinants. It is expected 
that the choice of these groups is contingent upon these factors, see Figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6: A contingency model for hedge or not to hedge decision.
The Groups of Contingency Factors Hedge or not to Hedge Decision
The Determ inants o f
H edging Incentives
T he D eterm inants o f  
M anagem ent R isk  
A version
The D eterm inants o f the
F irm ’s N eed to H edge
The Determ inants o f  the
F irm ’s A bility to H edge
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter has established a theoretical framework for the determinants of currency 
exposure management policy. The framework is based on three main sources, the 
previous literature, contingency theory and finance theory, and the interviews based on 
the interpretive approach and concerning the corporate hedging and its determinants. 
Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 have helped to build the framework for this research. Chapter 3 
has reviewed the determinates of corporate hedging policy found in the literature 
review. In the chapter it is argued that the risk management theories reviewed in the
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literature were incomplete. This led the researcher to look at the contingent context 
within the organisation and outside the organisation. Chapter 4 reviewed the previous 
studies on corporate hedging determinants. It highlighted the research aims, hypothesis, 
method, data, limitations, and findings. The aim of the chapter is to provide a detailed 
critical analysis for these studies. Chapter 5 highlighted the research method and 
methodology. It also illustrated how the contingency approach will be used to improve 
the way that we are looking at the risk management policy. The contingency theory 
adopted in this research has led the researcher to look at the determinants of corporate 
hedging policy from different firms’ contexts.. Chapter 6 contains the results of the 
exploratory study. The findings considered are used to identify a link between currency 
exposure management policy and the firm’s contexts (internal and external context). 
This chapter highlights the important determinants of corporate hedging policy from the 
decision-maker’s point of view.
This study attempts to address the research gaps mentioned in chapter 4 by investigating 
the determinants of hedging decision choice across four discrete modes (incentives, risk 
aversion, needs, and ability) and from managerial perspective. A contingency 
framework for the decision to hedge or not to hedge was developed on the premise that 
a hedging decision conducted by an individual firm is adopted regarding the specific 
characteristics of each firm. The philosophy behind the use of both corporate hedging 
theories and exploratory study is to enables us to define the specific characteristics of a 
firm and to determine meaningful ways of adopting hedging decisions to the relevant 
dimensions. The contingency factors that appear to make firms choose to hedge rather 
than not to hedge have been described in this chapter.
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Chapter Eight
The Determinants of Hedging Decision: Empirical Evidence
(Part One)
8.1 Introduction
Statistical analysis is undertaken in this chapter to analyse a firm’s specific 
characteristics which Finance Theory (FT) predicts to be the determinants for foreign 
exchange risk management decision. This chapter aims to provide answers to the main 
research question as to why some firms hedge foreign exchange risk and others do not, 
from the FT’s point of view. FT offers two groups of corporate hedging determinants. 
The first is corporate hedging incentives (value-maximization) and the second is 
managerial risk aversion. In order to examine these two groups, the analysis will begin 
with simple mean-difference tests for the hedged and non-hedged firms (univariate 
analysis). Also a multivariate analysis will be used. This chapter will show the extent to 
which finance theories can be used to understand the corporate hedging decision.
This chapter consists of four main sections. After this brief introduction, the second 
section will examine the relationship between the determinants of hedging incentives 
and the foreign exchange risk management decision. The relationship between the 
determinants of managerial risk aversion and foreign exchange risk management 
decision will be discussed in section three. Finally, section four presents the conclusion 
of the chapter.
8.2 The Determinants of Hedging Incentives
8 .2 .1  In tro d u c tio n
Foreign exchange risk management decision may be affected by its motivation to 
increase a firm’s value. The field of risk management draws heavily on studies of firm’s 
value maximization. The rationale is that, to a certain extent, the hedging decision 
increases the firm’s value by reducing the agency costs, reducing the financial distress
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costs, increasing the investment opportunities, and reducing the corporate finance costs 
(Smith et ah, 1985; Bessembinder, 1991).
8.2.2 The determinants of hedging incentives (accounting ratio analysis)
8.2.2.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients of proxy variables
In order to examine the role of hedging incentives in driving firms to hedge currency 
exposure, this study will examine the relationship between the hedging decision and the 
four groups of hedging incentives variables (financial distress cost, agency conflict, 
investment opportunities, and the corporate finance cost). Table 8.1, describes how 
these variable will be measured.
Table 8.1: The description of the hedging incentive variables (the
accounting ratio)
Hypothesis (Variables) Variable proxy Predicted
sing
Data Description (Source)
Financial Distress 
Costs
Leverage + The long term debt to total sales
Debt Service 
Coverage
- Earnings before interest and taxes (Zakah) to 
debt
Agency Costs
Operating Profit 
Margin
- Operating profit to total sales
The Total Sale to 
Total Asset Ratio
+ The total sales to total assets
Investment
Opportunities
The Expenses to Total 
Sales Ratio
+ The expenditures to total sales
R&D Ratio + The R& D expenditures
Corporate Finance 
Costs
The Cash Flow to 
Total Assets Ratio
- The operating income minus interest expense 
minus cash dividends minus net zakah.
Tangible Assets - Tangible assets to total assets
This sub-section presents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the proxy 
variables of the hedging incentive determinants. Table 8.2 presents summary statistics 
of the independent variables. For all the firms in the sample, this study obtained data 
about their financial statements of years-ending of 2000 and 2001, except for the R&D 
ratio which is only for 2001. The study sample consists of 83 firms with a mean value 
of leverage defined as 32% of the firm’s total assets. The ratio of debt service coverage 
ranges from zero percent to 93 percent. Haushalter (2000) reports that the amount of 
debt financing in 177 U. S. oil and gas companies, varied from zero to little more than 
79 percent of total assets. From the table, it seems that a small amount of money was 
invested in research and development activities in Saudi firms with an average of 0.009
209
percent in the 2001. Table 8.2, shows that the firms varied in total sales to total assets 
ratio, in that the ratio ranged from 2% to 1.38%. The relative amount of sales expenses 
varied from 24% to 1.14% of total sales. The operating profit marginal ratio ranged 
from zero to a little more than 55 percent of the firm’s total sale. The table also indicates 
that the cash flow to total assets and the tangible assets have a mean ratio of 9 percent 
and 44 percent respectively.
Table 8.2: Descriptive statistics for the hedging incentive 
 independent variables (the accounting ratio)______
Variables N Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Leverage 83 0.32 0.28 0.19 0.9 0.90
Debt Service Coverage 83 0.31 0.30 0.14 0.00 0.93
Operating Profit Margin 83 0.21 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.56
The Total Sale to Total 
Asset Ratio
83 0.36 0.31 0.28 0.02 1.38
The Expenses to Total 
Sales Ratio
83 0.69 0.71 0.14 0.24 1.14
R&D Ratio 83 0.009 0.00099 0.0221 0.00 0.12
The Cash Flow to Total 
Assets Ratio
83 0.09 0.09 0.046 0.00 0.24
Tangible Assets 83 0.44 0.44 0.16 0.14 0.76
Table 8.3 presents the correlation among the above eight hedging incentive proxy 
variables. Correlations exist among some of the independent variables, in that 4 out of 
the 28 Pearson correlation coefficients1 reported in the table are statistically 
significantly different from zero. There is a positive and significant correlation between 
leverage and debt service coverage (0.36 at the 0.01 level), which would not be 
expected, since they are measures of leverage and expected to be negatively correlated. 
These findings may affect the rationality of using them jointly as measures of financial 
distress costs. However, the correlation Table shows that the leverage and the tangible 
assets could be better used jointly as measures of financial distress. In addition, the 
significant correlation between the total sales to total assets ratio and operation profit
1 A Pearson correlation coefficient is a statistic devised for the purpose of measuring the strength or 
degree of a supposed linear association between two variables, each o f which has been measured at an 
interval or ratio level (Field, 2001).
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margin ratio (0.26 at the 0.05 level) gives the rationality of using them jointly as a 
measure of agency costs. The two measures of investment opportunities are positively 
correlated with each other although not statistically significant. It is clear that there is a 
relationship between the total sales to assets ratio and the leverage and debt service 
coverage, which indicates that the total sales ratio can be used as a measure of financial 
distress costs. These findings suggest that the total sales ratio can be used at the same 
time as a measure of the agency conflicts, and the financial distress costs. There is also a 
positive association between the cash flow ratio and the two measures of agency costs 
which are the total sales ratio and the operating profit margin, supporting the 
assumption that the larger the cash flow available in the firms, the smaller the agency 
conflicts in these firms. Also it seems that a large percentage of the firms in the sample 
did not payout their profit as a dividend and preferred to use these profits for their future 
funding. Finally, there is negative correlation between the cash flow and the tangible 
assets, which would not be expected since they are measures the corporate finance 
costs.
Table 8.3: Pearson correlation coefficients of proxy variables
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8
X1 1 0.36** -0.05 0.15 0.14 -0.17 0.01 0.09
X2 1 -0.09 0.17 -0.13 -0.15 0.16 -0.09
X3 1 -0.24* 0.17 -0.09 0.08 -0.15
X4 1 -0.23* 0.05 0.17 0.26*
X5 1 -0.13 -0.10 0.11
X6 1 -0.11 -0.08
X7 1 0.19
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Notes:
X I: Leverage
X2: D ebt Service Coverage 
X 3 : R & D  Ratio
X4: The Total Sale to Total A ssets Ratio 
X5: The Expenses to Total Sales Ratio 
X6: Tangible A ssets
X7: The Cash Flow  to Total A ssets Ratio 
X8: Operating Profit Margin
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8.2.2.2 Univariate analysis
In this section, the study separated the respondent firms into two groups, those that 
chose to hedge their currency risk and those not, and then compared the two groups 
with respect to the incentives for hedging decision. The respondents were asked to 
identify if their firms were using any methods to hedge their currency exposure. The 
respondents were provided with three different groups of methods and asked to choose 
the one that their firm adopted for hedging their currency exposure, (see Part Two in the 
Questionnaire, Appendix B). The respondents were asked if their firms used any of the 
financial hedging techniques, internal hedging techniques, or operational hedging 
techniques, see section (3.3). Table 8.4, presents classification of the firms in the sample 
into hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding the respondents’ answers to the 
questions. The Table shows that 35 firms (42%) in the sample were hedging their 
currency exposure.
Table 8.4: The classification of the firms currency exposure 
_________________management strategy________ ________
The Firms The Number of Firms The Percentage
Hedging Firms 35 0.42
Non-Hedging Firms 48 0.58
Total 83 100
The comparison of the means for hedgers of foreign exchange risk and non-hedgers in 
Table 8.5 indicates that firms in the sample which hedge differ little in their leverage 
and debt service coverage from those that do not hedge. The t-test shows that the 
differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the leverage and the debt 
service coverage are not statistically significant. The results did not support the 
hypothesis (HI), that firms with more financial distress are more likely to hedge. The 
examination of the reflection of the hedging decision on the agency cost, involve 
determining the effect of hedging decision on the firm’s total sales ratio and operating 
profit margin ratio. As the table shows, the t-Test for difference in means indicate that 
the mean of the total sale to total asset ratio differs significantly between firms which 
hedge and those, that do not at the 5% significance level. The mean operating profit 
margin ratio for hedging firms is 22 percent compared to a mean of 20 percent for those, 
that do not hedge. However, this difference is not significant at the 5% confidence level.
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These findings gave some support to the hypothesis (H2) that hedging firms have a 
higher total sales ratio and operating profit margin ratio than non-hedging firms and 
therefore less agency conflict.
There is weak support for the hypothesis that firms hedge to increase investment 
opportunities. Using R&D-to-total sales ratio as proxy for investment opportunities, 
table 8.5 shows that hedging firms have less R&D ratio (0.01 vs. 0.02). The evidence is 
contradictory to the hypothesis that hedger firms have higher R&D ratio. The negative 
relationship between R&D ratio and hedging firms weakens support for the hypothesis 
that firms hedge to increase investment opportunities, and raises doubt as to whether the 
R&D ratio is a good proxy for investment opportunity. On the other hand, hedging 
firms have a low expenses to total sales ratio than non-hedging firms (0.67 vs. 0.71), 
which indicates that hedging firms are having more resources to engage in new 
investment than non-hedging firms. By reducing the variance of a firm’s total sales and 
the sale expenses, hedging decreases the probability, and thus the expected costs, of the 
underinvestment problem.
As expected from the theoretical model, the relationship between the cash flow ratio and 
the hedging decision is negative. The difference in the mean in Table 8.5, indicates that 
firms with lower cash flow to total assets ratios have a greater incentive to hedge, the 
difference in the mean as found is significant at 5% confidence level. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that firms can use hedging activity to decrease corporate finance 
costs by protecting the cash flows in the firms from exchange rate movements. The 
other proxy for corporate finance costs is rejected, since the evidence in table 8.5 shows 
that the tangible assets ratios in hedging firms is higher than those in non-hedging firms. 
The mean of tangible assets for firms which hedge is 48 percent as compared to 41 
percent for firms which do not hedge. There is also evidence that the mean of the 
tangible assets differ significantly between the two groups of firms at the 5% confidence 
level. This finding rejects the hypothesis that firms hedged as a result of shortages in 
their cash flow resources. This finding is inconsistent with the argument that firms that 
have more tangible assets have greater flexibility in meeting cash flow needs, and thus 
they have less need to decrease the cash flow volatility and less need to hedge.
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8.2.2.3 Multivariate analysis
It can be argued that the univariate analysis tend to be weak as it does not allow for 
interactions among the determinant variables. Using the tests of mean differences 
analysis only provides the study with unconditional relationships, between the different 
variables in the group and the hedging decision. For further assessment on the hedging 
decision choice and in order to have the conditional relationships, logistic (LOGIC) 
regression is applied. Investigating a dichotomous dependent variable means that 
regression analysis of interval dependent variable is inappropriate. By using the logistic 
regression the influences of the hedging determinant variables on the hedging decision 
can be considered in a simultaneous multivariate way rather than as a collection of 
univariate links. In this logistic regression the dependent variable is the firm’s risk 
management decision to hedge or not to hedge. The dependent variable was a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if a firm hedged, and 0 if a firm did not hedge.
Using logistic regression, the study will attempt to find which of the incentive hedging 
variables predicts the hedging decision, and the technique will also allow us to predict 
whether a certain firm is likely to be a hedging firm. It is not enough only to know the 
relationship between the hedging decision and the incentive variable, and the findings of 
the logistic regression have implications for an appropriate decision to hedge or not to 
hedge. Using a linear regression analysis, it is possible to find to what extent the 
hedging incentives variables as a group explain the decision whether to hedge or not. 
The logistic regression can tell us the frequency that the model correctly predicts the 
dependent variable, and how well the model minimizes the errors of prediction.
In order to apply the logistic regression, the study should explain the basic ideas 
underlying the logic model. This study will present the one that used by Gujarati (2003, 
p 595-596). To estimate unknown parameters in logistic regression, Gujarati used the’ 
maximum likelihood method. In simple linear regression model:
Y =/?„ + /?, X, + £„ [8.1]
Where X = the value of the predictor variable (hedging incentive variable), Y = 1 if the
firm hedges and 0 if it does not hedge, is the Y intercept, /?, is the gradient of the 
straight line, and s n is a residual term. In multiple regression in which there are several 
predictors (such as the hedging incentive variables), a similar equation is derived in 
which each predictor has its own coefficient. The probability of Y is predicted from a 
combination of each predictor variable multiplied by its respective regression 
coefficient.
Y =  fio + A  X, + p 2 x2   + P; X, + [8.2]
The conditional expectation of Y, given X/5 E( Y f 1 X,.), can be interpreted as the 
conditional probability that the event will occur given X,., that is, Pr (Yf. = 1\ X.). 
Thus, E(Yj I X,.) gives the probability of a firm to hedge and whose incentive hedging 
variable is the given amount X,.. Assuming E ( e j  -  0, we obtain
Pr ( Y/ = 1\ X,) = p0 + /?, X, + p2 X 2  * p, X,+ s„ [8.3]
Now, if Pi = probability that Y, = 1 (means the event occurs), and (1 -  Pi ) = 
probability that Y;. = 0 (means the event does not occur). Using the definition of 
mathematical expectation, we obtain:
E (Y i) = 0(1 -  Pi) + l(Pi) = Pi [8.4]
Comparing [8.3] with [8.4], we can equate
Pr (Y, = U X,) = PQ + p i X, + p 2 X 2  + p t X/+ £„ =Pi [8.5]
Now consider the following representation if a firm decides to hedge:
Pi = E (Y = \\X ,)  = ------ ^ x ;- ■■ [8.6]\ i'  ^^g-(/}u+/3lX]+p2\ 2+....+/JiXi+e„) L J
To make it more easier, [8.6] can be written as
Chapter iiigtn I  l i e  u e i a  fiiim irnA  u j sjLK-uguig •r
[8.7]
where Zi = PQ + P , X, + P2 X 2  + /?,• X, + sn
If Pi, the probability of the firm to hedge, is given by [8.7], then (1 -  Pi), the probability 
of the firm not to hedge, is:
Now Pi / (\ -  Pi), the odds ratio in favour of hedging, is defined as the ratio of the 
probability that a firm will hedge to the probability that it will not hedge,
If we calculate the value of Z from the regression equation it will provide an estimate of 
the probability that the event will occur given the particular values of X. If Pi represents 
the probability of the presence of hedging decision in a firm, the logistic regression 
model to be estimated is as follows:
1 — n  i  +  e
[8.9]
The relation is linearised by transformation into a logic function:
I, = I n ( —^ —)= Z, = A + A x, + A X2  + p, X,+ s,1 ~Pl [8.10]
In ( —- -) = + fix Lv + p 2 Dcov + /?3 R&D + /?4 Sa + fi5 Exs +1 - P i
fi6 T a s +  p n Cas+ /?8 P rm + s [8.11]
Where:
p 0 = Constant term
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Lv = Leverage
Dcov = Debt service coverage
R&D = R & D expenses / Total sales
Sa = Total sales / Total assets
Exs = The expenses / Total sales
Tas = Tangible assets / Total assets
Cas = The cash flow / Total assets
Prm = Operating profit /total sales
/?, to J3g = Coefficients for each firm-specific variables
s  = Residual term
From equation [8.11], it can be seen that each hedging incentive variable has its own 
coefficient, and the hedging decision is predicted from a combination of all the hedging 
incentive variables multiplied by their respective coefficient plus a residual term. Using 
equation [8.11], the study seeks to find the linear combination of hedging incentive 
variables that correlate maximally with the hedging decision. The result from the 
equation is a probability value that varies between 0 and 1. A value close to zero means 
that the hedging decision is very unlikely to have occurred, and a value close to 1 means 
that the hedging decision is very likely to have occurred. Given that we have collected 
several values of Y and X, the unknown parameters in the equation can be calculated. 
They are calculated by fitting a model to the data, the values of the parameters are 
estimated using the maximum-likelihood method, which selects coefficients that make 
the observed values most likely to have occurred (Field, 2001).
After running the logistic regression analysis for the model for the first time, we should 
check for the validity of the assumptions of the logistic regression analysis. This was 
done by: checking that no collinearity (or colinearity) problem exists within the
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independent variables, and checking that the residuals all lie within 3 standard 
deviations from the mean. When collinearity increases among the independent 
variables, or the measurements, or indicators, it may affect the linearity and the 
assumption that the logistic regression coefficients are unbiased, and consequently the 
level of efficiency of the estimates may be poor (Menard, 2002). To avoid the problem 
of collinearity between the independent variables, we run a linear regression model 
using the same dependent and independent variables used in logistic regression model 
to check the tolerance statistic for each independent variable. Menard (2002) stated that 
a tolerance of less than .20 is cause for concern; a tolerance of less than .10 almost 
certainly indicates a serious collinearity problem. Table C.5 in Appendix C, confirms 
that the model’s tolerance exceeds .80, indicating no serious problem of collinearity. To 
check that the residuals in the logistic regression analysis all lie within 3 standard 
deviations from the mean, the SSPS logistic regression analysis was used to save the 
standardized residuals and examine them using a boxplot, see figure, C.6 in Appendix 
C. The Figure shows that all the residuals lie within 2 standard deviations from the 
mean.
After testing the applicability of the model to be used with the logistic regression, it is 
possible now to evaluate the hedging incentives linear regression model. The main 
purpose of the following analysis is to describe how well the overall model works, by 
describing the relationship between all of the independent variables and the dependent 
variable and the strength of this relationship. It examines how much each hedging 
incentive variable (the independent variable) contributes to our ability to predict the 
hedging decision (the dependent variable), in other words which variables are stronger 
or weaker, better or worse predictors of the dependent variable. Finally, it is important 
to see if the form of the model appears to be correct, and to see if the assumptions of the 
model appear to be satisfied. As some of the independent variables in this study are 
measured in different units or in different scales and as the study aims to compare the 
strength of the relationship between the hedging decision and different factors that are 
hypothesised to affect this decision (independent variables), the study uses both 
standardized and unstandardized logistic regression coefficients.
A standardized coefficient is a coefficient that has been calculated for variables
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measured in standard deviations units. For example, a standardized coefficient indicates 
how many standard deviations of change in a hedging decision (dependent variable) are 
associated with a 1 standard deviation increases the hedging incentive variable 
(independent variable) (Menard, 2002). However, Menard (2002) argues that, in 
presenting substantive results, it may make sense to focus on standardized coefficients 
for unitless scales (such as the hedging incentive indicator variables), but 
unstandardized coefficients for categorical variables (such as industry and markets 
variables), and perhaps for variables with natural units of measurement (inches, 
kilograms, dollars, number of occasions), as well. The coefficient for the hedging 
incentive variables estimated by the logistic regression model are summarised in Table 
8.6. Results of the LOGIC regressions are reported in Table 8.6. The Table shows that 
when all hedging incentives variables were included as independent variables, the 
coefficients of the ratio of total sales to total assets and the ratio of total cash flows to 
total sales were significant at conventional level. Also the signs for both the total sales 
to total assets ratio and the total cash flows to total sales ratio were as expected. The 
result shows that firms with higher total sales to total assets ratio are more likely to 
hedge, and firms with lower cash flow to total sale ratio less likely to hedge.
Table 8.6: Model 1a: Logistic regression analysis results for the
hedging incentive variable (accounting ratio) and hedging 
________decision, all variables included.________________
Variables Predicted Sign of Unstandardized Standard Wald Statistical Standardized Logistic
Parameter Logistic Error of b Significance Regression Coefficient
Estimate Regression 
Coefficient (b)
of b
Constant Na 0.286 1.895 0.023 0.880 -
Leverage + 0.842 1.432 0.345 0.557 0.019
Debt service 
coverage
- -1.322 2.074 0.406 0.524 -0.041
Operating profit 
margin ratio
- 2.166 2.403 0.812 0.367 0.084
The total sale to 
total asset ratio
+ 1.808 0.987 3.356 0.067 0.178
The expenses 
to total sales 
ratio
+ -2.271 1.797 1.598 0.206 -0.112
R&D expenses 
ratio
+ 4.065 12.454 0.107 0.744 0.032
2 2 0
L. llUpiCt' Ihlgill i  ift ilHtlllllHiHHU yj   -r.
Variables Predicted Sign of 
Parameter 
Estimate
Unstandardized 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient (b)
Standard 
Error of b' Wald Statistical Significance 
of b
Standardized Logistic 
Regression Coefficient
Tangible ratio - 2.501 1.612 2.407 0.121 0.141
The cash flow 
to total assets 
ratio
- -12.918 6.151 4.411 0.036 -0.209
As in the univariate analysis, logistic regression shows that the coefficients of leverage, 
debt service coverage, R&D ratio, the expenses to total sales ratio, and the operating 
profit margin ratio were not significant. Firms with larger tangible assets ratios are 
predicted to have a smaller incentive to hedge. The signs of the operating profit margin 
and the expenses to total sales ratio are inconsistent with those predicted by the theories 
considered. The positive coefficient for the operating profit margin implies that firms 
with the greater operating profit margins are more likely to hedge, and the negative 
coefficient for the expenses to total sales ratio implies that firms with less expenses ratio 
are more likely to hedge.
From the results presented in Table 8.7 we can see that 15.246 and is statistically 
significant (significance = P = .055), leading us to reject the null hypothesis that the 
independent variables, the hedging incentive variables (accounting ratio), are not related 
to the dependent variable, hedging decision.
Table 8.7: The logistic regression model analysis of the hedging 
____________ incentives ‘accounting ratio’ output._____________
Panel A: The classification Table
The Step Observed Predicted
Hedging or non-hedging 
company
Percentage Correct
Non-hedging
company
Hedging
company
Step 0 Non-hedging company 48 0 100.0
The model includes 
only the constant
Hedging company 
Overall percentage
35 0 0.0
57.8
Step 1 Non-hedging company 39 .9 81.3
The model includes 
all the independent 
variables
Hedging company 
Overall percentage
18 17 48.5
67.5
2 2 1
’L'/l Wl
Panel B: Model Summary
Step Initial -2 Log 
likelihood
Ending -2 Log 
likelihood “ DM"
Cox & Snell 
R Square
Nagelkerke 
R Square
1 113.018 97.772 0.168 0.226
Panel C: Association / Predictive Efficiency
Gu Rl /Lp Tp d R2 The model improve our efficient choice to hedge or not to hedge 
by
15.246 0.136 0.229 0.333 1.789 0.133 %13.6
(p = 0.055) (p = 0.022)
Panel D: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-Square ' Df Sig.
1 12.394 8 0.134
111 Table 8.7 Panel C, the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit measure is not 
statistically significant, indicating that the model with only the independent variables as 
predictors fits the data well. R 2L =0.136 suggesting a small association between hedging 
decision and hedging incentive variables. As can be seen from the Table, Panel C, Ap, 
and Tp are 0.229, and 0.333 respectively, indicating that the independent variables 
(hedging incentives variables) allows us to classify the cases (into hedging and non­
hedging firms) with a low degree of accuracy, as reflected in the classification table, and 
the binomial d = 1.789, with statistical significance p = 0.022 (one-tailed), suggesting 
that the classification of the dependent variable (hedging decision) is not statistically 
significantly related to the value of the independent variables (the hedging incentive 
variables). Also the Table, Panel C, shows that R 2 is 0.133 indicating that the hedging 
incentive variables have a weak power to allow us to predict the individual hedging 
decision for any firms in the sample by 13 per cent perfectly.
As the main part of this study is to identify the main predictors in the different hedging 
decision predictor groups, and because theory in this area is not well developed, and 
because the number of firms in the study sample is small relative to the number of 
predictor variables suggested in this study, stepwise logistic regression is used. 
Backward elimination rather than forward inclusion was selected as the method of 
stepwise regression. In some cases, a variable may appear to have a statistically 
significant effect only when another variable is controlled or held constant (a
2 2 2
suppressor effect). With backward elimination, because both variables will already be in 
the model, Menard (2002) suggests that there is less risk of failing to find a relationship 
when one exists. Menard suggested that in order to prevent the failure to find a 
relationship when one variable exists, the usual 0.05 criterion for statistical significance 
probably should be relaxed. Bendel and Afifi (1977) suggested that the 0.05 criterion 
for inclusion appears to be too severe; based on the comparisons of goodness-of-fit and 
predictive efficiency statistics, more reasonable results are obtained with a more liberal 
cutoff point for statistical significance. They suggested that the statistically significance 
criterion for inclusion can be set in the range .15 to .20. However, this study will use the 
0 . 1 0  criterion of statistical significance for inclusion of the independent variables in the 
final model. Table 8 .8 , presents a reduced model (model lb) with all variables for which 
p  > 0 . 1 0  are eliminated.
Table 8 .8 , shows that the relationship between the hedging decision and the hedging 
incentive variables in the reduced model (model lb) is statistically significant, with 
Gm~ 12.602 with 3 degree of freedom,/? = 0.006. The reduced model (p < .10) has a 
smaller GM than the full model, but the GM in the full model (model 1 a) is statistically 
significant at the .05 level, whereas the GM in the reduced model (p < .10) is 
statistically significant at the .01 level. However, in the reduced model, the Rj 
decreases to 0.112, in comparison to the full model 0.136. The reduced model has a 
weak predictive efficiency, Ap= . 2 0  and t p = .31, and the ability of the full model to 
reduce the error of classifying the firms as hedging and non-hedging firms is better than 
with the reduced model. In this case, it could be that some variables in the full model 
(lb) may appear to have a statistically significant effect in the model efficiency when 
other variables are interacting with them.
Table 8.8: Model 1b: Logistic regression analysis results for the 
hedging incentive variable (accounting ratio) and hedging 
decision, variables with maximum p = 0.10 included ._____
Dependent
Variable
Association/
Predictive
Efficiency
Variables Unstandardized 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient (b)
S. E. 
of b
Statistical 
Significance of 
b
Standardized
Logistic
Regression
Coefficient
Hedging
Decision G M = 12.602
Constant -1.345 0.969 0.165 -
The model 
improve our 
efficient 
choice to 
hedge or not 
to hedge by
%11.1
(P= 0.006)
Rj = 0.112
R~ = 0.133 
/Ip = 0.200
Tp = 0.309
The percentage of 
firms correctly 
classified by the 
model = 66.3%
The total sale 
to total asset 
ratio
Tangible ratio
The cash flow 
to total assets 
ratio
2.104 0.915 0.021
2.741 1.546 0.076
-10.757 5.682 0.058
0.207
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8.2.3 The determinants of hedging incentives (indicators analysis)
8.2.3.1 D escriptive statistics and correlation coefficients o f  ind icator variab les
This sub-section investigates measures of hedging incentives. In the previous sub­
section the study measured hedging incentives in the sample using accounting ratios. 
This sub-section presents a more detailed description of these hedging incentives in the 
sample by taking the respondents’ views regarding factors which may also be used as 
measures of the degree of hedging incentives in the firms. It should be noted that in the 
literature there are no specific variables that can be used to measure the level of hedging 
incentives other than accounting ratios. The exploratory study (Chapter 6 ) suggests a list 
of 2 1  factors to assess the degree of agency conflicts, financial distress costs, growth 
opportunities, and the corporate finance costs,. Factors were grouped in four different 
groups. Six factors to measure the agency conflicts, five factors to measure the financial 
distress costs, four factors to measure the growth opportunities, and six factors to 
measure the corporate finance costs. In order to find the firms’ characteristics according 
to these factors, a list was presented to respondents, who were then asked to indicate the
Ksiiuptet juigiii a in- m .i..
extent to which these factors applied to their firm. The results are shown in Table 8.9. In 
order to understand the results on the table, there are four suggestions that will be 
considered, (a) the higher the mean the lower the agency conflict costs, (b) the higher 
the mean the greater the financial distress costs, (c) the higher the mean the greater the 
growth opportunities, and (d) the higher the mean the lower the corporate finance costs
Table 8.9: Descriptive statistics of independent incentive
variables
(1 = “disagree”, 5 = “agree")
Variables . Indicator 
number Indicator Mean S.D PR4or5 PR1or2
Agency Costs 1 The company's owners participate on the 
decision of the strategy and plan to grow the 
company
3.52 1.47 65.1 30.1
2 The company's total sales have been 
improved
3.59 1.47 69.9 27.7
3 Most of our company’s profits are paid as 
dividend to the firm's owners
3.25 1.43 60.2 36.2
4 The owners of the company satisfied with 
improvement in the company
3.72 1.20 61.4 21.7
5 Our company has adopted a monitoring 
device system to control the relationship 
between managers and owners
2.70 1.40 44.6 54.2
6 In our company the management 
compensation system has been linked to the 
corporate performance
The average
3.18
3.33
1.40 49.4 39.4
Financial 
Distress Costs
. 7 Our company's ability to service its debt is low 3.22 . 1.51 49.4 35
8 .The percentage of our firm's debt is high 3.01 1.34 49.4 44.6
9 In our industry the probability of going 
bankrupt is very high
2.66 1.58 38.6 44.1
10 We are dealing in business where the 
probability of gain and loss is equal
2.65 1.54 36.1 51.8
11 The risk management tools available in the 
markets to hedge the foreign exchange risk 
are very risky
The average
3.32
2.97
1.43 55.4 38.6
Investment
Opportunities
12 Our ability in managing the financial risk 
protects our expected cash flow
3.40 1.52 61.4 38.6
13 We always have a plan to improve our 
investment opportunities
3.18 1.55 54.2 41
14 The ability of our company to get over the 
financial problems increase our financial 
opportunities
3.61 1.38 63.9 20.4
15 The investment opportunities in our market 
are good
The average
3.63
3.46
1.33 59 31.3
Corporate 
Finance Cost
i 6 We finance our investment by increasing the 
company’s capital or asking the owners for 
help
2.88 1.59 47 48.2
225
c napier m gm i  /It' i /a t 'f  //HKfMtU K/J JL/IUJH/.K . ....
17 We present our financial statements in a way 
which can increase our probability to receive 
more flexible external finance
2.54 1.55 30.1 57.8
18 We have more flexibility tp get external fund 
under a flexible conditions
2.82 .1.53 43.4 50.6
19 . In our.company the cost of external finance is 
low as our financial risk is low
3.12 1.54 50.6 41
20 Our cash flows have been improved 3.24 1 39 54.2 39.7
21 From our normal activities we can generate 
enough cash .flow for future investments
The average
2.89
2.92
1.47 43.4 54.2
The descriptive statistics in table 8.9 reveal that the level of agency conflicts on firms’ 
sample are found to be low (mean = 3.33). On the agency costs variable, the item 
number 2  ‘the company’s capital and total sales have been improved’ is considered to 
be a very important factor in affecting the degree of agency conflicts; 69.9 percent of 
respondents in the sample were indicating a score of 4 or 5 as opposed to 27.7 percent 
who rather disagreed (by indicating a score of 1 or 2). The respondents also showed 
great agreement on item number 1 ‘the company’s owners participate on the decision of 
the strategy and plan to grow up the company’ (mean = 3.52); 65.1 percent of the 
respondents agree with this statement (by indicating a score of 4 or 5). While, the 
owners or shareholders in 65 percent of the firms in the sample can participate on the 
strategic decision, only 42 percent of the firms in the sample were hedging their foreign 
exchange risk. The investment opportunities on the sample were seen to be high (mean 
= 3.46). 63.9% agreed that ‘the ability of their companies to get over the financial 
problems increases their investment opportunities (item 14 in investment opportunities).
The suggestion at the beginning of this sub-section, indicates that the higher the mean 
the lower the corporate finance costs, showing that corporate finance costs in the firms 
sample were slightly over the average with a mean of 2.92. One of the most important 
findings in the corporate finance cost variables is that 47 percent of the respondent 
companies were financing their investments mainly by increasing their companies’ 
capital or by asking the owners for additional funding. 50.6 percent of the respondent 
companies were facing difficulty in obtaining external financial resources. Finally, the 
results on the table also show that the mean average of the financial distress cost 
variables is 2.97, which indicates that the financial distress costs are not high. These 
findings are consistent with the finding that only 49 percent of the respondent
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companies described their debts to be high, while another 49 percent also described 
their companies’ ability to service their debts to be at an acceptable level.
The Spearman correlation coefficients in Table 8.10 reveal that there are significant and 
positive correlations between most of the agency cost factors. The agency cost factor 
number 1 is the only agency cost factor that is not significantly correlated to other 
factors in the group. It can be seen that there is a significant and positive correlation 
between adopting a monitoring device system between managers and owners and the 
improvement of a company’s total assets. It is clear that there is a relationship between 
the companies which adopted monitoring device systems to control the relationship 
between managers and shareholders, and the level of an improvement in their total 
sales. Also there is a significant and positive association between the ability to manage 
financial risk and having a monitoring system between managers and shareholders in 
companies. There is a significant and positive correlation between the satisfaction of 
shareholders with the level of improvement in the company, and dividend payment and 
the improvement of the company’s total sales (p<0.01). These findings may affect the 
rationale of using all of these group factors as indicators for agency conflicts in the 
sample. The table shows that there is a significant and positive correlation between the 
level of monitoring and device system between managers and shareholders in 
companies and the company’s ability to manage the financial risk (p<0.01). It also 
appears that the level of satisfaction by shareholders is also significant and positively 
correlated with the investment opportunities available to the company, also there is a 
significant and positive correlation between the level of investment opportunities in the 
market and the level of the improvement in total sales. There is also a significant and 
positive correlation between the role that the shareholders play in the company’s 
decisions and the ability to get over the financial problems. Surprisingly, the degree of 
shareholders feeling satisfied with company managers appears to be positively 
correlated with a company’s total debt though this correlation is not,significant.
All the four investment opportunities factors are positively correlated to one another. 
There is significant and positive correlation at the 0.01 level, between Saudi firms’ 
ability in managing their financial problems and, risk and the possibility of protecting 
the expected cash flows which may increase the investment opportunities. At the same
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time, there is a significant and positive correlation between the firms’ ability to get over 
the financial problems and the cost of external funds. It is suggested that companies can 
get external funding with low cost when the investment opportunities in their market are 
good, this result is significantly supported at the 0.01 level. An unexpected finding from 
the table is that there is a significant and negative association between having good 
investment opportunities and the ability to generate enough cash flow from the normal 
activity. For the five factors of financial distress costs, four of them are positively 
correlated, although the correlation is not statistically significant. The only financial 
distress cost indicator which is not correlated to all indicators in the group is X21, ‘the 
risk management tools available in the market to manage foreign exchange risk are very 
costly’. There are significant and positive correlation between the availability of risk 
management tools for some companies, and the probability of going bankrupt, and 
being in a business where the probability of gains and losses are equal. There is a 
negative correlation between the availability of risk management tools for some 
companies and a company’s ability to service its debt. Two of the financial distress 
costs factors have a large, significant and positive correlation between them, a high 
probability of going bankrupt and to be in a business where the probability of a gain and 
a loss are equal (p<0 .0 1 ).
The correlations between most of the six indicators of corporate finance costs are 
significant and positive. The level of improvement in the company’s cash flows ‘X I6 ’ 
is the only indictor which is positively correlated to some of the corporate finance costs 
indicators X I5 and X I8 , but not significantly, and negatively correlated to the 
indicators X14, X I0 and X20, but not significantly. These findings may affect the 
rationale of using this group of indicators to describe the corporate finance costs in the 
sample.
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Using a group of indicators to measure certain variables raises the question of whether each 
of these indicators measures a single variable. In order to explain and examine the rationale 
of using these different groups of indicators to measure the different variables, Table 8.11, 
provides the internal reliability of using these different indicators to measure the defined 
variables. Internal reliability is particularly important in connection with multiple-item 
scales1. The reliability of these measures refers to their consistency to measure the specific 
variable, and can answer the question of the possibility of using these indicators to measure 
a specific variable. To estimate the internal reliability, Cronbach’s alpha2 is used and the 
results presented in Table 8.11. The table gives the average of all possible split-half 
reliability coefficients for the different groups of indicators.
Table 8.11: Reliability analysis for different variables indicators
Indicators N of cases N of items Alpha
Agency cost indicators 83 6 0.78
Financial distress cost indicators 83 5 0.71
Investment opportunities indicators 83 4 0.82
Corporate finance indicators 83 6 0.77
As seen from table 8.11, the investment opportunities indicators are internally reliable since 
the coefficient is 0.82, and can be used to measure the investment opportunities in the 
sample. The table suggests also that the agency cost indicators, financial distress cost 
indicators, and corporate finance indicators may be internally reliable since the coefficients 
are 0.78, 0.71, and 0.77 respectively. However, as these coefficients have a less than a 
preferable correlation coefficient (at over 0 ,8 ), a strategy of dropping one or more 
indicators can be used in order to increase the internal reliability of the indicators. Table
8 .1 2 , shows the alpha reliability levels when each constituent indicator is deleted from the 
different groups. From the table, in the case of investment opportunities indicators, this step 
would not be necessary since the internal reliability is over 0.8. For the agency cost 
indicators if we delete the indicator number 6  the internal reliability increases from 0.78 to 
0.85 and is more acceptable. Table 8.12 shows that if we delete the indicator number 5 from
2 To exam ine whether different indicators is measuring a single idea or variable, the internal reliability o f  the 
Cronbach’s alpha  can be calculated in SPSS (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). The C ronbach’s  alpha  essentially  
calculates the average o f  all possible sp lit-half reliability coefficients.
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the financial distress cost indicators list in Table 8.4, this increases the internal reliability of 
these indicators as a measure of the financial distress cost on the sample from 0.71 to 0.77 
and is more acceptable. The internal liability of the corporate finance cost indicators, can be 
increased from 0.77 to 0.85 by deleting the indicator number 5.
iability of the different groupTable £1.12: The re
Indicators Indicator
number
Alpha if item 
deleted
Agency cost 
indicators
1 0.68
2 0.68
3 0.77
4 0.77
5 0.72
6 0.85
Financial distress 
cost indicators
1 0.69
2 0.67
3 0.55
4 0.55
5 0.77
Indicators Indicator
number
Alpha if 
item 
deleted
Investment
opportunities
indicators
1 0.69
2 0.70
3 0.80
4 0.82
Corporate finance 
indicators
1 0.70
2 0.72
3 0.69
4 0.71
5 0.85
6 0.69
8.2.3.2 Univariate analysis
The decision to hedge or not to hedge, which is the subject of our investigation, will be 
based on and influenced by a number of hedging incentive factors. As discussed in section 
(7 .3 ) there are four variables to measure a firm’s incentives to hedging decision which are; 
agency costs, financial distress costs, growth opportunities, and corporate finance costs. 
These variables have been identified in the literature as determinants for the hedging 
decision, as detailed in Chapter Three. In order to define the effect of these incentive 
variables in the hedging decision, the respondents were asked to indicate their agreement 
concerning a list of given indicators.
Firms may have different perceptions regarding the impact of foreign exchange rate 
movements on the firm’s value. FT indicates that, hedging can reduce expected agency 
costs, financial distress, underinvestment problems, and corporate finance costs. 
Accordingly, in order to analyse the effect of these four variables on the hedging decision, 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with each variable. Table
8.13, presents a summary of respondents’ responses regarding a list of five agency cost 
indicators, four financial distress indicators, four investment opportunities indicators, and
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five corporate finance cost indicators. In order to understand the Table, we should clarify 
the relationship between the hedging incentive variables and the means. These relationships 
were built on four conditions, as detailed in section (8.2.2.1). One of the premises of this 
section is to discern whether the foreign exchange risk management decision made by 
managers might be consistent with shareholder value maximization. The alternative 
possibility is that foreign exchange risk management decision made by managers might 
reduce agency conflicts between them and shareholders. As indicated in theory, Table 8.13 
shows that, the over all mean average for the agency conflicts in hedging firms is higher 
than that in non-hedging firms (3.46 vs. 3.28), which can be interpreted as meaning that the 
agency conflicts in hedging firms is less than that in non-hedging firms. It can be seen that 
the companies’ shareholders in hedging firms participated in decision making and plan to 
make the company grow, more than those in non-hedging companies (3.74 vs. 3.35), 
although the difference is not statistically significant. In addition, respondents of hedging 
companies agree more than non-hedging respondents that their companies have adopted a 
monitoring device system to control the relationship between managers and owners (item 
(5): mean = 2.97 vs. 2.50). However, the difference between the two groups is not 
statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that hedging 
activities are in the interest of the shareholders. These results show that shareholders in 
hedging firms do value their company’s strategies and systems, and prefer to hedge the 
foreign exchange risk. This is also supported by the strong agreement from respondents in 
hedging firms that their owners have been satisfied with improvement in their companies 
(item (4); hedging firms mean = 3.89, and non-hedging mean = 3.60). There is a strong 
agreement in hedging firms to item number (2 ) that the company’s total sales have been 
improved (mean = 3.80) providing evidence that hedging may help these firms to decrease 
the volatility of their total sales.
Item (3) in Table 8.13, by contrast, shows that the percentage of non-hedging firms indicate 
a relatively high level of agreement (mean = 3.52) on the strategy of paying most of the 
profits as a dividend. As the Table shows, the Mann-Whitney Test of difference in mean 
indicates that the mean of “most of the companies’ profit were paid as dividend” differs 
significantly between firms that hedge and those that do not at the 5% significant level. The 
Mann-Whitney test gives a weak support to the hypothesis (H2) that firms with high agency 
conflicts are more likely to hedge.
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At the beginning of this section, it is suggested that firms with a high mean should have 
greater financial distress costs. This suggests that the various financial distress cost 
indicators for the sample of hedging firms should be higher than those of non-hedging 
firms. From the results of the entire sample reported in Table 8.13, the hedging firms’ 
means for the four financial distress indicators are higher than those for non-hedging firms. 
The results in Table 8.13 are consistent with the explanation that firms in the hedging group 
hedge to avoid the costs of financial distress.
According to Table 8.13, item (7) indicates that 62.9 percent of hedging firms agreed that 
the percentage of their companies’ debt is high, while only 39.6 percent of non-hedging 
firms agreed that their companies’ debt is high. The mean for a high percentage of debt for 
hedging.a firm is ‘3.34’ compared to a mean of ‘2.77’ for those that do not hedge, with the 
difference statistically significant. Tufano (1996) argued that instead of managing risk with 
financial contracts, managers could adopt conservative financial policies such as 
maintaining low leverage. Some of the evidence shows that firms with a high level of debt 
associated with low ability to service this debt will be more likely to hedge. This also, as 
indicated in Table 8.13, is associated with being in a business where the probability of a 
gain and a loss are equal. Hedging firms agreed that the probability of a gain and a loss in 
their business are equal (item (9); mean = 3.11) and this becomes a good reason for firms to 
hedge. It seems that hedging firms perceived themselves as facing higher financial distress 
costs, in that they were more likely to agree that the probability of bankruptcy in their 
business is very high, with a mean of 2.86 than those firms that do not hedge (mean = 2.52), 
although the difference in the mean is not statistically significant. The Mann-Whitney Test 
gives strong support to the hypothesis (HI) that firms with high financial distress costs are 
more likely to hedge.
Table 8.13 reports evidence that supports the investment opportunities hypothesis. The 
mean difference in investment opportunity indicators between the two groups show that for 
three of the four indicators of the investment opportunities indicators (numbers 1 0 , 1 1 , and 
12) the hedging firms mean are higher than those in non-hedging firms. One exception of 
this result is that non-hedging firms and hedging firms both agree that the investment 
opportunities in their markets are good (item (13), mean = 3.60 vs. 3.65 respectively).
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It can be seen from the table, that hedging firms have greater growth opportunities 
(mean = 3.69) than non-hedging firms (mean = 3.28, the higher the mean the more the 
investment opportunities available to a firm). The Mann-Whitney Test indicates that 
there are no significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms for the 
investment opportunities indicators (numbers 10, 11, and 13). These findings provide 
weak support for the hypothesis (H3) that hedging activity increases with the firm’s 
investment opportunities.
Table 8.13, shows that the corporate finance costs in hedging firms are higher than that 
in non-hedging firms. In that non-hedging firms confirm that they have more flexibility 
to get external funding under flexible conditions (mean = 3.06). Also the non-hedging 
respondents agreed more than the respondents in hedging firms that the cost of external 
funding is cheaper. In addition, the respondents from non-hedging firms agreed more 
than those from hedging firms that their firms can generate enough cash flow for future 
investment from their normal activities. Table 8.13, represents the use of internal 
financing source in both hedging and non-hedging firms. It can be seen from the table 
an unexpected result which appears to show that hedging firms agree in financing their 
investment by increasing the company’s capital or asking the owners for help (mean = 
2 .9 7 ), or in other words they are more likely to use internal source of finance than to use 
external ones. By hedging, Saudi exporters and importers can protect their future 
expected cash flows from exchange rate volatility. The Mann-Whitney Test in the 
Table, indicates that in most of the corporate finance cost indicators (indicators number 
15, 17, and 18) there are no significant difference between hedging and non-hedging 
firms. The test shows that indicators numbers 14 and 16 were significantly different 
between hedging and non-hedging firms. This finding implies low support for the 
hypothesis (H4) that firms with high corporate finance costs are more likely to hedge.
8.2.3.3 Multivariate analysis
To provide evidence on the conditional relationship for the hedging incentives 
indicators, the study employs a logistic regression analysis. This can be done clearly if 
we write [8 .1 1 ] as:
PiIn ( ------- ) = J3q +/?, Agency 1 + p 2 Agency2 + J33 Agency3 + J34 Agency4 + /3S Agency51 - P i
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Where as
A
Agencyl 
Agency2 
Agency3 
Agency4 
Agency5
Distress 1
Distress2
Distress3
Distress4
Opportunityl
0pportunity2
0pportunity3
Opportunity4
Financel
Finance2
Finance3
Finance4
Finance5
P\ to P18
+ /?6 Distress 1 + p1 Distress2 + pz Distress3 + P9 Distress4 + /?10 Opportunityl 
+ P\i Opportunity2  + pn Opportunity3 + /? 13 Opportunity4 + p l4 Financel 
+ P\ 5 Finance2 + Pl6 Finance3 + /? I7 Finance4 + px% Finance5 +e [8.12]
Constant term
The company's owners participate in the decision strategy and plan to make the company grow
The company's total sales have been improved
Most of our company’s profits were paid as dividend to the firm's owners
The owners of the company satisfied with improvement in a company
Our company has adopted a monitoring device system to control the relationship between 
managers and owners
Our company's ability to service its debt is low
The percentage of our firm's debt is high
In our industry the probability of going bankrupt is very high
We are dealing in business where the probability of a gain and a loss are equal
Our ability in managing the financial risk is to protect expected cash flow
We always have a plan to improve our investment opportunities
The ability of our company to get over the financial problems increases our financial opportunities 
The investment opportunities in our market are good
We finance our investment by increasing the company's capital or asking the owners for help
We present our financial statements in a way which can increase our probability to receive more 
flexible external finance
We have more flexibility to get external funding under flexible conditions
In our company the cost of external finance is cheaper as our financial risk is low
From our normal activities we can generate enough cash flow for future investments
Coefficients for each firm-specific variables 
Residual term
After running the hedging incentive indicators logistic regression model for the first 
time, we analysed the standardized residuals using the boxplot, see figure C l, Appendix 
C. The Figure shows that the residuals lie within the accepted area (within 3 standard 
deviation from the mean). For the hedging incentive indicators model, all of the 
tolerances exceed .24, indicating no serious problem of collinearity, see Table C l, 
Appendix C.
The maximum likelihood estimates of a logic regression are reported in Table 8.14. The 
signs of the indicators for each hedging incentive variables were mixed. This evidence 
does not support the argument that hedging decision increases a firm’s value. While 
using the univariate analysis, the study found that hedging and non-hedging firms were
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significantly different in indicator number 3, ‘Most of our company’s profits were paid 
as dividend to the firm's owners’, with a standardized coefficient of -0.571. However, 
the logistic regression analysis shows that the unstandardized coefficient and 
standardized coefficient for indicator 3 is negatively significant (as expectedin theories) 
and for indicator 5 positively significant (opposite from that expected by theories) at the 
5% confidence level. This evidence does not support the hypothesis that firms with high 
agency conflicts are more likely to hedge. The evidence from the unstandardized 
coefficients for the other agency cost indicators (1, 2, and 4) is not significant. 
Consistent with the univariate analysis, the coefficients for the financial distress cost 
indicators number 6 , and 9 are positive and significant at the 5% confidence level. This 
means that firms with less ability to service their debt, and those that deal in businesses 
where the probability of a gain and a loss are equal, will be more likely to hedge. The 
mixed sign of the results provide mixed support to the argument that hedging firms have 
high financial distress costs.
Table 8.14: Model 2a: Logistic regression analysis results for the
hedging incentive variable (the indicators) and hedging decision,
all variables included.
(the dependent variable from 0 ‘non-hedge’ to 1 ‘hedge’, and independent variable 
from 1 ‘disagree’ to 5 ‘agree’).
The
variable
The 
number of 
the 
indicator
The indicator 
(the independent variable):
Unstandardized 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient (b)
S. E. Wald probability 
value (p 
value)
Standardiz 
ed Logistic, 
Regression 
Coefficient
The . 
Constant
2.438 1.677 2.113 0.146 -
Agency
Costs
1 The company's owners 
participate in the decision 
strategy and plan to make 
the company grow
-0.192 0.377 0.260 0.610 -0.112
(the 
expected  
sign for the
2 the company’s total sales 
have been improved
0.108 0.399 0.074 0.786 0.062
coefficient
is
negative)
3 Most of our company’s 
profits were paid as 
dividend to the firm's 
owners
-0.976 0.333 8.596 0.003 -0.571
4 the owners of the 
company satisfied with 
improvements in a 
company
0.650 0.450 2.089 0.148 0.343
5 our company has adopted 
a monitoring device 
system to control the 
relationship between 
managers and owners
0.620 0.314 3.904 0.048 0.300
6 our company's ability to 
service its debt is low
0.661 0.297 4.967 0.026 0.412
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The
variable
The 
number of 
the 
indicator
The indicator 
(the independent variable)
Unstandardized ( 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient (b)
S. E. Wald
w b
probability 
value (p 
value)
Standardiz 
ed Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient
7 The percentage of our 
firm's debt is high
-0.242 0.334 0.526 0.468 -0.134
8 In our industry the 
probability of going 
bankrupt is very high
-0.668 0.405 2.719 0.099 -0.438
9 we are dealing in 
business where the 
probability of a gain and a 
loss are equal
0.810 0.404 4.012 0.045 0.515
Investment
Opportuniti
es
(the
10
11
Our ability in managing 
the financial risk 
protection expected of the 
cash flow
We always have a plan to 
improve our investment 
opportunities
-0.555
1.032
0.456
0.492
1.483
4.394
0.223
0.036
-0.348
0.660
expected  
sign for the 
coefficient 
is positive)
12 the ability of our company 
to get over the financial 
problems increases our 
financial opportunities
1.087 0.412 6.966 0.008 0.610
13 the investment 
opportunities in our 
market are good
-0.974 0.442 4.851 0.028 -0.543
The
corporate
Finance
costs
14 we finance our investment 
by increasing the 
company's capital or 
asking the owners for help
0.582 0.317 3.377 0.066 0.382
(the 
expected  
sign for the 
coefficient
15 we present our financial 
statements in a way which 
can increase our 
probability to receive 
more flexible external 
finance
0.179 0.306 0.344 0.558 0.114
negative) 16 We have more flexibility to 
get external funding under 
flexible conditions
-0.574 0.331 3.011 0.083 v -0.365
17 in our company the cost 
of external finance is 
cheaper as our financial 
risk is low
0.274 0.330 0.692 0.406 0.174
18 from our normal activities 
we can generate enough 
cash flow for future 
investments
-0.722 0.392 3.390 0.066 -0.438
Consistent with univariate analysis, the unstandardized coefficient for the investment 
opportunities indicator number 1 2  is positive and significant at the 1% confidence level, 
which means that a firm with more ability to get over financial problems is also more 
likely to hedge. It seems that the firm with high ability to manage financial problem will 
be more likely to hedge currency exposure. Firms with qualified staff to manage a 
financial problems appear to be more engaged in currency risk management activity. 
The logistic regression result shows that the firm which always has a plan to improve its
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investment opportunity is more likely to hedge, this is statistically significant with p < 
0.036. The unexpected result is that the unstandardized coefficient for the investment 
opportunities indicator number 13 is negatively significant, meaning that a firm with 
good investment opportunities in its markets is less likely to hedge. The contradictory 
signs for the investment opportunity indicators coefficients, suggest a mixed result 
regarding the argument that a firm with more investment opportunity is more likely to 
hedge. Consistent with univariate analysis, the coefficients for the corporate finance 
cost indicators numbers 14, 16, and 18 are statistically significant. This evidence, as in 
the univariate analysis, supports the arguments that a firm with more flexibility to get 
external funding under flexible conditions and with ability to generate enough cash flow 
for its future investment from it normal activities, is less likely to hedge, whereas the 
firm which finances its future investments by increasing its capital or asking the owners 
for help is more likely to hedge. However, the mixed signs for the coefficients of the 
corporate finance cost indicators gave little support for the argument that a firm with 
high corporate finance costs is more likely to hedge.
Table 8.15, shows that the model predicts 79.5 % of the firms correctly. The Table also 
indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that hedging incentive indicator variables 
are unrelated to the hedging decision, based on the 44.615 with 18 degree of 
freedom, p = .000. The measures of the strength of association between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable, RI = 0.395, andR 2= .293, indicate a moderately 
strong relationship between the dependent variable and its hedging incentive indicators 
as hedging decision predictors. The indices of predictive efficiency also indicate a 
model that reduces the error of classification of firms as hedging and non-hedging firms 
by over half: Xp = 0.514 and r? = 0.580.
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Table 8.15: The logistic regression model analysis of the 
________________ hedging incentive Indicators output._______ _________
___________________________________ Panel A: The classification Table________________________________
The Step Observed Predicted
Hedging or non-hedging Percentage Correct
company
Non-hedging Hedging
company______company
Step 0 Non-hedging company 48 0 100.0
The model includes Hedging company 35 0 0.0
only the constant Overall percentage 57.8
Step 1 Non-hedging company 39 9 81.3
The model includes Hedging company 8 27 77.1
all the independent 
variables Overall percentage 79.5
Panel B: Model Summary
Step Initial -2 Log likelihood Ending -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell Nagelkerke
■d m- R Square R Square
1 113.018 68.403 0.461 0.559
Panel C: Association / Predictive Efficiency
2-p T? R 2 The model improve our efficient choice to hedge or 
not to hedge by
44.615 0.395 0.514 0.580 0.293 %39.5
(p = .000)
Panel D: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-Square df Sig.
1 8.301 8 0.405
Table 8.16, presents the reduced model 2b with all variables for which p  > .10 were 
eliminated. The results reported in the Table showed that the relationship between
dependent variable and the independent variables is statistically significant: kjm = 
27.752 with 5 degrees of freedom, (p = .000). Measures of the strength of association 
between the dependent variable and independent variables, R 2L = .246, and R 2 = .293, 
indicates a moderate association between dependent variable and independent variables.
The indices of the predictive efficiency, p =  0.314, and Tp = 0.407, indicates a model 
that predicts well.
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Table 8.16: Model 2b: Logistic regression analysis results for the 
hedging incentive variable (the indicators) and hedging decision, 
variables with maximum p = 0.10 included .
Dependent Association/
Variable Predictive
Efficiency
Hedging
Decision
The model 
improve 
our 
efficient 
choice to 
hedge or 
not to 
hedge by
%24.6
Gm = 27.752
(p = 0.000)
Rl = 0.246
i? =0.293
Zp = 0.314
T p = 0.407
The percentage 
of firms correctly 
classified by the 
model = 71.1%
Variables
Constant
Agency Costs
“O u rcom pan y h a s a d o p t e d . 
a monitoring d ev ice  system  
to control the relationship  
b etw een  m anagers and  
owners".
“Most o f ou rcom p an y’s  
profits w ere paid a s  
dividend to the firm's 
ow ners’.
Financial Distress Costs
“W e are dealing in b u s in e s s : 
w here the probability o f a 
gain and a  lo ss  are eq u al”.
Investment 
; Opportunities
“The ability o f our co m p a n y : 
to g et over the financial 
problem s in crea ses  our 
financial opportunities".
“The investm ent 
opportunities in our market 
are good".
Unstandardized 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient (b)
S. E. 
of b
8.3 The Determinant of Managerial Risk Averse
8.3.1 Introduction
Statistical 
Significance 
of b
1.717 1.030 0.096
0.633 0.230 0.006
-0.763 0.251 0.002
0.358 0.181 0.048
0.824 0.272 0.002
-0.396 0.242 0.102
Standardized
Logistic
Regression
Coefficient
0.306
-0.450
0.228
0.462
- 0.221
The Finance Theory proposes that corporate hedging is attributable to managerial risk 
aversion. The main objective of this section is to find the relationship between 
managerial risk aversion factors in Saudi firms and the hedging decision. This section 
focuses on the possible role of managerial risk aversion as a determinant of hedging 
decision, as predicted by FT, by examining the relationship between organizational 
form, a firm's control, ownership structure, managerial compensation arrangement, and 
manager age and hedging decision. Tufano (1996, p. 1097) stated that “theorists have 
constructed two classes of explanations for managers' choices of risk management 
activities on behalf of their firms. One class of explanation focuses on risk management 
as a means to maximize shareholder value, and the second focuses on risk management 
as a means to maximize managers' private utility”. To document the extent to which the 
hedging decision is endogenously determined by managerial risk aversion, this study
243
extends previous empirical studies (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 2000). Most 
importantly, this study includes previous studies’ variables (such as manager ownership, 
and the firm’s compensation system) and the factors that we found from the results of 
the exploratory study such as the firm’s control, the ownership structure, the manager 
age, and the Islamic view. This study also uses new measures to measure the managerial 
compensation level, such as the performance ideal monetary compensation system, the 
attractive managerial high salary unrelated to result, and equity compensation system, 
designed to control the level of managerial risk aversion. The differing levels of 
managerial compensation across countries may affect the level of incentive to a hedging 
decision. While the academic literature has focused mostly on the effect of the 
managers’ compensation contract in the hedging decision in developed countries, this 
study examines the relationship in one of the developing countries, Saudi Arabia. This 
section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section presents a univariate 
analysis for management risk aversion variables. The second sub-section contains a 
multivariate analysis of the management risk aversion variables.
8.3.2 Univariate analysis for management risk aversion variables
The specific objective for this section is to classify firms according to the degree of 
managers’ risk aversion sensitivity, hence to measure their degree of influence on the 
hedging decision. It will concentrate on a preliminary empirical investigation of the 
relationship between organization form, the level of shareholders’ and managers’ 
ownership, control, manager compensation system, and manager’s age and the hedging 
decision of Saudi firms. Since the behaviour of a firm is largely a function of the basic 
value of its shareholders, and since most highly concentrated shareholders in Saudi 
Arabia are concerned with the long- term growth of the firms in which they invest, these 
values are expected to influence corporate strategy and policy. It has been suggested in 
section (7.3) that the hedging decision may also be motivated by the management risk 
aversion sensitivity. Testing the validity of this argument is obviously not an easy task, 
since most firms are run by managers who are not full owners.
It is important in this study to establish some criteria to explain the relationship between 
the manager and the different forms of firm ownership structure and its effect on the 
firm’s control. Pondy (1969) believed that the extent to which stockholders can enforce 
their goals effectively on management is a function primarily of how closely or widely
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the stock is held. This study has used five critical variables to measure the effect of the 
management risk aversion level on the hedging decision, see Table 8.17. The first 
variable is the firm’s ownership structure which can be measured using three 
dimensions: individual, family, and shareholder firms. The second variable is firm 
control. In that, firms can also be classified as owner- controlled firms if one or more of 
its owners have 10% or more of the firm’s equity. A firm can be classified as manager- 
controlled firm if none of its owners has 10% or more of the firm’s equity. This 
criterion provides two groups of firms, which are sufficiently different to determine if 
the type of control has any effect upon the hedging decision. The third variable is 
regarding the managerial ownership, in that firms can be divided into two groups 
according to the managerial ownership in the firms, in these groups we distinguish 
between where the managers of the firms hold 1 0 % or more of the firm’s stock and 
between the managers who have less that 10% of the firm’s stock. The fourth variable is 
the managerial compensation system. In this study we distinguish between a 
performance related monetary compensation system, and a fixed manager annual salary 
to examine whether managerial short-term compensation arrangements affect the 
hedging decision. This study uses also the equity compensation system to examine 
whether managerial long-term compensation affects the hedging decision. The last
variable is managerial age.
Table 8.17: Classification of managerial risk aversion variables
Classification Deemed to exist when:
Organization Form • Individual owned company
• Family owned company
• Shareholder owned company
Firm control • Firms can be classified as owner- controlled firms if one or 
more o f its owners have 10% or more o f the firms’ equity.
• Firms can be classified as manager- controlled firms if no 
one of its owners has 10% or more o f the firms’ equity.
Managers Ownership 1. Managers owns less than 10% of the firm's equity.
2. Managers owns more than 10% o f the firm's equity.
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Classification Deem ed to exist when:
M anagerial 
com pensation system
1. The level of the firm's performance ideal monetary 
compensation system (No, low, or high).
2. The availability of equity compensation system (No or 
yes).
o The level of a fixed manager’s annual salary (The 
manager’s annual income is less than 50000 pounds, The 
manager’s annual income is between 50000 and 150000 
pounds, and The manager’s annual income is more than 
150000 pounds).
The Islam ic view • The derivative contracts (forward, future, option, and 
swap contracts) are prohibited from Islamic “Shariah”
• As there are no acceptable financial contracts (from 
Islamic ‘Shariah’) in the market to hedge currency 
exposure does affect the ability to hedge.
The m anager age • Less than 40 years old
• Between 41 and 50 years old
• Over 51 years old
In the survey, the respondents were requested to identify whether their organizations’ 
form could be classified as shareholders individual, or family firm. The responses about 
their firms' structural form are shown in Table 8.18. As can be seen from the table, firms 
that had their shares trading in a stock exchange were less likely to hedge, in that 65.7% 
of shareholder firms were not hedging their FX risk. About 72.2% of the family 
companies in the sample, assumed to be more controlled by a small number of 
individual owners, hedged their FX risk. These results are consistent with the ownership 
structure argument, and as stated on section (7.3), this research would expect that family 
and individual firms to have a greater propensity to hedge than shareholder firms. The 
probability of hedging in family firms were very high in comparison with the same 
probability in shareholder and individual firms, so the expectation that the family firms 
are more likely to hedge than shareholder and individual firms is supported. In contrast 
with the expectation that most of the individual firms will hedge their foreign exchange 
risk as a result of a small number of individual owners, table 8.18 shows that 66.7 
percent of individual firms were not hedging. To see if there is a significant difference 
between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the organisation form (Hypothesis, 
H5), the Chi-Square is used. The test shows that there is a significant difference on the 
organization form between the hedging firms and non-hedging firms. In that the 
calculatedp  value (0.01) is less than the criticalp  value (0.05).
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The basic hypothesis to be tested here is that owner- controlled firms are more likely 
than manager- controlled firms to hedge their foreign exchange risk. In order to test 
these arguments using a classification close to that used in previous studies, the 
researcher classified the firms into two new groups. The first group contains the firms, 
which their owners own 1 0 % or more of the firm’s stock even if some of them work in 
the firms’ management team. The second group involves the firms in which their 
owners own less than 10% of the firm’s stock. To test this hypothesis, the respondents 
were asked to point out if any of firm’s owner or shareholder has 1 0 % or more of the 
firm’s stocks while not being one of the management teams.
When the two groups of firms are compared, after each firm has been classified as 
owner-controlled firm or manager- controlled firm, as in Table 8.18, we found that 85% 
of manager- controlled firms were not hedging their foreign exchange risk. In contrast, 
4 9 .2 % of the owner- controlled firms were not hedging their foreign exchange risk. 
Whereas, 50.8 percent of the firms whose owners hold 10% or more of the firm’s stock 
were hedging their foreign exchange risk. It seems that these owners were affecting the 
manager’s idea against exchange risk and encouraging them to hedge. There are some 
differences between owner-controlled firms and manager-controlled firms regarding 
their behaviour towards foreign exchange risk management. In order to find out to what 
extent the differences between these two groups are statistically significant, the Chi- 
Square Test is employed (see table 8.18). The result revealed that there are significant 
differences between hedging and non hedging firms with respect to the firm's control (p 
< 0.05). The Hypothesis (H6 ) that there are significant differences between hedging and 
non hedging firms with respect to the firm's control can be accepted.
We now turn to examine the effect of the manager’s ownership on the hedging decision. 
Katz and Niehoff (1998) found that the level of ownership affects the strategies chosen 
because strategic decisions are affected by different degree of risk- sharing between 
owners and managers. It has been suggested that managers with small proportion or no 
stockholding in the firms fail to maximize shareholder wealth because they have an 
incentive to consume prerequisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In order to explain the 
effect of managerial ownership on the firm's risk management strategy, the respondents 
were asked to point out the percentage of stockholding that their managers have in the 
firm. From table 8.18, it can be seen that in particular high levels of managerial
248
ownership might be the optimal incentive arrangement for hedging activity in a firm 
with high level of risk. It can be seen from the Table, 8.18 that the firms which their 
managers owned more than 1 0 % of the firm’s equity, were hedging their foreign 
exchange risk. Generally, most of the managers’ wealth and human capital were 
invested in their firms. While there are some differences between hedging and non­
hedging firms on the percentage of stockholding by managers the idea is to find whether 
these differences are statistically significant or not. The Chi-Square test results shown in 
Table 8.18, reveal that there are significant differences on the percentage of manager 
ownership between hedging and non-hedging firms, the calculated p  value (0 .0 0 ) is less 
than the critical p  value (0.05). This allows us to accept the hypothesis (H7) that there is 
a significant difference between hedging and non-hedging firms on the percentage of 
equity owned by a manager.
As can be seen from Table 8.18, 71.8 percent of the firms with a high level of 
performance related monetary manager compensation were not hedging their foreign 
exchange risk, so that only 28.2 percent of firms with high level of performance related 
monetary manager compensation were hedging. In other words, there are 58.3 of the 
non-hedging firms with a high level of performance related monetary compensation 
program, whereas only 31.4 percent of hedging firms have a high level of monetary 
performance related compensation programme. In addition, according to the table, 65.7 
percent of the respondents in hedging firms indicated that their firm’s monetary 
compensation system was very low, and consequently not to be attractive and an 
encouragement for a good management performance. In order to examine whether the 
hedging and non-hedging firms are different regarding the level of performance related 
monetary compensation, the Mann-Whitney Test was used. The test, in table 8.10, 
revealed that the respondents of the two groups differed significantly with respect to the 
performance related monetary compensation arrangements for managers (p = 0.03). The 
hypothesis (H8 ) that there are significant differences in the management performance related 
monetary compensation arrangements between hedging and non-hedging firms, can be 
accepted.
This study also tests to see whether the managerial stockholding reward system and 
their salary are powerful influences on managers’ behaviour. With a managerial 
stockholding reward system, any unfavourable movements of the exchange rate will 
affect the firm’s cash flows and would also affect the personal wealth of managers
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holding shares of the companies they manage. The greater the effect of foreign 
exchange risk in the firm’s cash flow and the greater the manager’s stockholdings, and 
the more their personal wealth would be affected, thus, the more likely they would 
adopt corporate hedging activity.
From Table 8.18, we can see that hedging firms were mainly using an equity 
compensation system in order to encourage managers to take a decision which will 
maximize the shareholders’ wealth. 64.7 percent of the firms with an equity 
compensation programme, managers were hedging their firms' foreign exchange risk. It 
can be seen from the Table, that 75 percent of the respondents in non-hedging firms 
stated that their firms did not have an equity compensation programme for managers. In 
order to explore whether the differences in the hedging and non-hedging firms regarding 
the management equity compensation are statistically significant, the Chi-Square test 
was used. The Chi-Square Test reveals that there was statistically significant difference 
in the management equity compensation programme between the two groups, the 
calculated p value (0.001) is less than the critical p  value (0.05). The hypothesis (H9) 
that there is significant difference between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding 
their management equity compensation programme can be accepted.
As discussed in section (7.3.2.2) and found above, regardless of the motivational effects 
of stock holding reward on a manager’s hedging decision, the need for consistent 
feedback for different aspect of a reward system remains crucial. Thus, salary should 
reinforce value-maximizing manager performance independent of the effect of stock 
holding reward. As salary is an independent reward system its relationship to hedging 
decision warrants individual study. As the data on managers’ salary compensation is not 
publicly available, the data about salaries was gathered from the questionnaire. The 
major proportion of managers’ total income comes from their employment income, 
which consists of the employment salaries, bonuses, profit- sharing schemes, and the 
value of a firm’s stock held by managers. The risk, which will affect the firm’s value, is 
closely related to the manager’s total income. If their firm failed to avoid certain risk 
this may affect their wealth and seriously hurt their future employment. It follows that 
with hedging, the manager’s job and income will become more stable. To predict the 
effect of management salary reward on the hedging decision, the managers responsible 
for the hedging decision were asked to indicate their annual salaries in the firm during 
the year. In the exploratory study with 15 firms, three categories were identified to
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classify managers’ salaries. In the exploratory study, there were 6 firms in which 
managers received less than 50,000 pounds yearly, 5 firms where managers received 
between 50,000 and 150,000 pounds yearly, and 4 firms where their managers received 
more than 150,000 yearly. In the final questionnaire the same categories are used to 
classify managers’ salary. In order to find out the difference between respondents in 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the manager’s salary, a list of three levels of 
yearly salaries were presented to them, and then were asked to indicate their yearly 
salary. Table 8.18 presents the effect of the changes in annual income salary figures on 
the hedging decision. Four respondents were eliminated from the data of salary reward 
cited in the table as they did not answer this question.
From Table 8.18, we can see that 69.2 percent of the respondents with high annual 
income salary were not hedging their firms' foreign exchange risk, with only 30.8 
percent of the high annual income salary hedging. Also, it can be seen from the table 
that 32.4 percent of the respondents in hedging firms had an annual income of less than 
50000 pounds, in contrast to only 20 percent of the respondents in non-hedging firms 
pointing out that their annual income being less than 50,000 pounds. The large number 
of hedging firms in the sample with managers with a smaller average amount of salary 
than those in non-hedging firms, suggests that managers salaries may not be related to a 
firm’s earning performance.
There is a difference in the overall medium and high level annual income between 
hedging and non-hedging firms, in that 67.6 percent of the respondents in the hedging 
firms received a medium or high level annual income, on the other hand there are 80 
percent of the respondents in the non-hedging firms who received medium and high 
annual income. As there are 35.4 percent of non-hedging firms controlled by managers 
(see table 8.18), the boards of directors in these firms may use salary as a mechanism 
for controlling managers. Overall, it seems that the difference is not that high in order to 
play a role in directing the management risk management strategy. In order to explore 
the extent to which the differences between the respondents annual income from salaries 
of the two groups are statistically significant, the Mann-Whitney Test for exploring 
differences was used. The Mann-Whitney Test in Table 8.18 shows that there are no 
statistically significant differences in the annual income from salaries between the 
respondents of the hedging and non-hedging firms, the p  value (0.17) is higher than the 
critical p  value (0.05). The hypothesis (H10) that there are significant differences in the
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annual income from salaries between respondents in hedging and non-hedging firms, 
can not be accepted.
The managers’ age, also might be used as a proxy for risk aversion, in that older 
managers who are nearly to be retirement from their jobs may prefer to minimize any 
random fluctuations in their portfolio, and more likely to use hedging activity (Tufano, 
1996). The research respondents were given a list of three levels of age, and asked to 
specify their age group level. As can be seen from Table 8.18, most of the young 
respondent managers less than 40 years old (nearly 60 percent) chose to hedge their 
firms’ foreign exchange risk. Also, we can see that 72 percent of the old respondent 
managers (over 50 years old) were not hedging their firms' foreign exchange risk. These 
results are inconsistent with Tufano’s prediction. From these results, it can be argued 
that hedging issues are probably greatest for young managers, where by managers of 
that age look to build their reputation and improve their experience by adopting and 
encouraging new ideas in the organization. On the other hand, an old manager who may 
have more experience in his job is often less sensitive to corporate risk, and may decide 
to ignore some of the firm's risks. It seems that young managers are more likely to be 
entrepreneurs with significant human capital investment in the firm and may have more 
uncertain prospects compared to old managers. Old managers who are over 50 year old 
might be more cautious in using hedging instrument contracts, and hence young 
managers might be more attracted to new hedging techniques in order to establish 
themselves. One of the interviewed financial mangers said in the pilot study that the 
director in his firm was over 50 years old, and for that reason he did not feel that he was 
happy to understand derivatives. In order to find whether the differences in the 
responses in age of the two participating groups are statistically significant, the Mann- 
Whitney Test was used. The Mann-Whitney Test shows that there is a significant 
difference between the respondents in hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding 
their age. In that the calculated p  value (0.046) is less than the critical p  value (0.05). 
We can accept the hypothesis (H ll) that there is a significant difference between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the age of the manager.
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The Islamic view
As found in the exploratory study, most of the interviewees in the non-hedging firms 
argued that the financial contracts available in the markets to hedge currency risk were 
unacceptable under the Islamic view. This problem needs to be considered using a large 
sample in order to see if this problem is more general. The respondents were asked two 
questions; first, if they think that the derivative contracts are prohibited in Islamic 
“Shariah”, second, if there are no acceptable financial contracts (in Islamic ‘Shariah’) in 
the markets to hedge currency exposure, does this affect their ability to hedge currency 
exposure? To estimate the internal reliability of using these two questions to reflect the 
effect of the Islamic view on the hedging decision, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated. 
The result shows a high internal reliability of using these two questions as a measure for 
one variable, the Alpha = .97. The high internal reliability made it possible to combine 
these indicators with each other to generate one variable (we call it the Islamic view). 
Table 8.19, presents the respondents answers regarding the new variable (the Islamic 
view).
Table 8.19: The Islamic view and hedging decision.
(from 1 ‘disagree’ to 5 ‘agree’)
V ariables Indicator Hedging Firms
PR PR
; 2  4or 1or2 2! <D . C O: S °  5 % §
The The derivative 2.23 1.14 17.1 65.7 3.85 1.25 66.7 16.7 0.000
Islamic contracts (forward,
view future, option, and
sw ap contracts) are 
prohibited from 
Islamic “Shariah” 
and th is affects our 
strategy against 
currency exposure.
As can be seen from the Table, 66.7 per cent of the respondents in non-hedging firms 
agreed that the Islamic ‘Shariah’ regulation affected their attitude against currency 
exposure. The Mann-Whitney Test indicates that there is significant difference between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the effect of the Islamic view in their hedging 
decision. The hypothesis (HI2) that there is significant difference between hedging and 
non-hedging firms regarding the effect of the Islamic view in their hedging decision, 
can be strongly accepted.
Non-hedging Firms Mann-
' Whitney PR PR ; T e s ty
w 4or5 1or2 ’
O  o/_ or
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8.3.3 Multivariate analysis
The study estimates the managerial risk aversion of the firms in the sample using 
equation [8.11]. It was expected that managerial risk aversion might be affected by the 
firm’s structure, the firm’s control, manager ownership, manager compensation system, 
manager’s age, and the Islamic view. All of these factors are used in equation [8.13] in 
order to generate the managerial risk aversion hedging model. The study includes all 
managerial risk aversion factors in the cross-sectional regression equation shown below:
PiIn ( — — ) = p o + p ] Structure + p 2 Control + Ownership + fi4 Comoney 1 - P i
+ fi5 Comequity + p 6 Comsalary + /?7 age + p % Islamlaw + s  [8.13]
Where as
A Constant term
Structure Firm structure
Control Firm control
Ownership The manager stockholding in the firm
Comoney The monetary compensation system
Comequity The equity compensation system
Comsalary The manager annual income
Age The manager’s age
Islamlaw The Islamic view
P i t0 Coefficients for each firm-specific variables
S Residual term
In order to examine if the collinearity problem exists between the independent variables 
in the model, the linear regression model was applied using the same dependent and 
independent variables used in the logistic regression. The linear regression model shows 
that all of the tolerances exceed .43, indicating no serious problem of collinearity, see 
Table C.2, Appendix C. Also the test for the residuals shows there are no serious 
problems as most of the standardized residuals lie within 2 standard deviations from the 
mean, see Figure C.2, Appendix C. The results of the logistic regression are shown in 
Table 8.20. In the equation there are seven categorical variables (structure, control, 
ownership, comoney, comequity, comsalary, and age).
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Table 8.20: The logistic regression for the managerial risk 
aversion variables model (model 3a).
The
variable
The Indicator
Unstandar
dized S.E. Sig.
Odds
ratio
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)
Coefficient
(B)
Exp(B) Lower Upper
Firm
structure
Shareholder firms (the 
reference)
.465
Individual firms (1) -.258 1.129 .819 .772 .084 7.065
Family firms (2) 1.791 1.789 .317 5.997 .180 200.013
The firm 
control
The manager-controlled firms 
(1)
-4.761 2.089 .023 .009 .000 .514
Managerial
ownership
Manager owned more than 
10% of the firm’s equity (1)
.851 1.242 .493 2.343 .205 26.749
Managerial 
compensat 
ion system
No monetary compensation 
system (the reference)
Low monetary compensation 
system (1)
7.063 3.253
.020
.030 1167.477 1.987 685845
High monetary compensation 
system (2)
3.473 2.840 .221 32.226 .123 8428.90
The manager annual income 
less than 50000 pounds (the 
reference)
.095
The manager annual income 
between 50000 -150000  
pounds (1)
-.242 1.186 .838 .785 .077 8.027
The manager annual income 
more than 150000 pounds (1)
-3.092 1.506 .040 .045 .002 .870
There is an equity managerial 
compensation system (1)
3.476 1.389 .012 32.315 2.124 491.604
The
manager
age
Less than 40 years old 
(the reference)
.018
Between 41 -  50 years old 
(1)
-2.559 1.405 .068 .077 .005 1.214
Over than 51 years old (2) -5.010 1.772 .005 .007 .000 .215
The
Islamic
view
The derivative contracts 
(forward, future, option, and 
swap contracts) are 
prohibited from Islamic 
“Shariah” and this affect our 
strategy against currency 
exposure.
1.953 .625 .002 7.053 2.073 23.990
The
Constant
-8.842 2.935 .003 .000 - -
The first category of a firm’s structure is a shareholder firm, and this has been used as 
the reference group. The first coefficient (structure (1) in Table 8.20) therefore reports 
the log odds difference between the reference group (shareholder firms) and those who 
are individual firms, the family firms were nearly 6 times more likely to hedge 
(indicated by the odds ratio of 5.997) than were the shareholder firms. However, while 
the univariate analysis reported that there was a statistically significant difference
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between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the firm’s structure, the logistic 
regression shows that this difference is not statistically significant. Consistent with 
univariate analysis, Table 8.20 shows that the coefficient for the manager-controlled 
firms was negative and high, indicating that manager-controlled firms were less likely 
to hedge, and this was statistically significant at the 5% confidence level.
A surprising result is observed between manager shareholding in the firm and the 
hedging decision. While the univariate analysis showed that there are statistically 
significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding managers’ 
shareholding level in firms, the results in Table 8.20, show little support for the 
argument that a firm which its manager owned more than 10% of the firm’s shares will 
be more likely to hedge. The odds ratio tells us that in the sample firms where a 
manager owned more than 10% of a firm’s shares, they are 2.343 times as likely as 
firms where managers owned less than 10% of the firm’s shares to hedge. Also the 95% 
Cl’s indicates a 95% certainly that in the population, firms whose managers owned 
more than 10% of the firm’s shares, are between .205 times to 26.749 times as likely as 
firms whose managers owned less than 10% of the firm’s shares to hedge. However, the 
Table reports that the difference between firms which managers owned more than 10% 
of the firms’ shares and those where managers owned less than 10% of the firms’ shares 
regarding the hedging decision is not statistically significant.
Consistent with univariate analysis, Table 8.20 shows that firms with low managerial 
performance related monetary compensation arrangements are more likely to hedge 
(indicated by the high odds ratios), and this result is significant at the 5% confidence 
level. The findings in the Table support the hypothesis that hedging and non-hedging 
firms are different regarding the managerial equity compensation system, in that the 
coefficient for the firms with managerial equity compensation system is positively and 
significant compared to the reference group (firms which do not have managerial equity 
compensation system) and this difference is statistically significant with p value less 
that the critical p value (0.05). The odds ratio indicates that firms with management 
equity compensation system are 32.315 times as likely as firms without managerial 
equity compensation system to hedge currency exposure. Similar to the findings in the 
univariate analysis, the logistic regression does not find any significant effect for the 
managerial fixed annual income on the hedging decision.
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The negative unstandardized coefficients for the managers age over 41 years old, 
indicates that a manager’s age may play a role in the management attitude against 
currency risk. The logistic regression evidence accepts the hypothesis that younger 
managers are more likely to hedge, and this finding is statistically significantly. One of 
the main important findings in Table 8.20, which appears to have a significant affect on 
the firm’s hedging decision is the effect of the Islamic view. As a high percentage of the 
•respondents in the sample believe that derivative contracts are prohibited from Islamic 
“Shariah”, this affects their decision to hedge the currency exposure.
Table 8.21: The logistic regression model (model 3a) analysis of 
_________________ the managerial risk aversion model output.__________________
_______________________________Panel A: The classification Table______________________________________
The Step Observed Predicted
Hedging or non-hedging Percentage Correct
company
Non-hedging Hedging
_______________________________________________ company______company______________________________________
Step 0 Non-hedging 48 0 100.0
The model includes company
only the constant Hedging company 35 0 0.0
Overall percentage 57.8
Step 1 Non-hedging 43 5 89.6
companyThe model includes
all the independent Hedging company 5 30 85.7
variables Overall percentage 88.0
Panel B: Model Summary
Step Initial -2 Log likelihood Ending -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell Nagelkerke
" D m  " r  Square R Square
1 113.018 36.436 .603 .81
Panel C: Association / Predictive Efficiency
G m Rl o T  p2  The model improve our efficient choice to p -K hedge or not to hedge by
76.582 0.678 0.714 0.753 0.711 %66.9
(p = .000)
Panel D: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-Square df Sig.
1 7.142 8 .52
Table 8.21, reported the managerial risk aversion model output. Overall, the model 
shows a high percentage of accuracies in classifying the firms in the sample as hedging 
and non-hedging firms. The model classified 88 per cent of the firms in the sample 
correctly. The Table, Panel C, shows that we can reject the null hypothesis that
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managerial risk aversion variables are unrelated to hedging decision, based on a high 
Gm = 76.582 and is statistically significant (p = 0.000). Also Rl = 0.678, and R 2 = 
0.711, suggesting a high association between the managerial risk aversion variables and 
the hedging decision. Both /Ip = 0.714, and t p = 0.753 are high, indicating that the 
managerial risk aversion variables allows us to classify the firms into hedging and non­
hedging firms with a very high degree of accuracy. Table 8.22, presents a reduced 
model (model 3b) from the managerial risk aversion model (model 3a) with all variables 
for which p > .10 were eliminated. Table 8.22, shows that the odds ratio for most of the 
variables is increased, and the reduced model correctly classified 88% of the firms in 
the sample as hedging and non-hedging firms, the same as the full model. Table 8.22 
shows that in the reduced model the GM = 73.978, R2 = .655, and R 2 = .702, indicates 
that the reduced model (model 3b) is better than the full model (model 3a) in generating 
a strong relationship between the managerial risk aversion variables and hedging 
decision. Both the reduced model and the full model show the same ability in 
classifying the sample into hedging and non-hedging firms. Overall, the reduced model 
looks to be more effective than the full model.
Table 8.22: Model 3b: Logistic regression analysis results for the 
managerial risk aversion variables and hedging decision, 
variables with maximum p = 0.10 included .
Dependent
Variable
Association/
Predictive
Efficiency
Variables Unstandardized 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient (b)
Sig. Odds
ratio
Exp(B)
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)
Lower
Hedging
Decision G m  = 73.978
The manager- 
controlled firms (1)
-4.673 .013 .009 .000 .375
The model 
improve 
our 
efficient 
choice to 
hedge or 
not to 
hedge by
%65.5
(P = 0.000) 
R2 = 0.655
R 2 = 0.702
A p = 0.714
T? = 0.753
The percentage 
of firms correctly 
classified by the 
model = 88%
No monetary 
compensation system 
(the reference)
Low monetary 7.313
compensation system 
(1)
High monetary 4.299
compensation system 
(2)
The manager annual 
income less than 
50000 pounds (the 
reference)
The manager annual -.350
income between 
50000-150000  
pounds (1)
.012
.021 1500.39 2.997 751096
5 .596
.132 73.613 .275 19730.
766
.119
.740 .705 .089 5.594
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Dependent
Variable
Association/
Predictive
Efficiency
Variables Unstandardized 
Logistic 
Regression 
Coefficient (b)
Sig. Odds
ratio
Exp(B)
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)
Low er
The manager annual 
income more than 
150000 pounds (1)
-2.467 .051 .085 .007 1.010
There is an equity 
managerial 
compensation system 
(1)
3.636 .003 37.928 3.401 422.95
5
Less than 40 years 
old
.009
Between 41 -  50 
years old (1)
-2.789 .043 .061 .004 .916
Over than 51 years 
old (2)
-5.370 .002 .005 .000 .141
The derivative 
contracts (forward, 
future, option, and 
swap contracts) are 
prohibited from 
Islamic “Shariah" and 
this affect our strategy 
against currency 
exposure.
2.036 .000 7.662 2.457 23.894
The Constant -9.728 .001 .000
Table 8.23, shows the effect of each variable in the reduced model (model 3b) if the 
variable is removed. The Table reports the amount that each exploratory variable 
contributes to the reduced model. The Table shows that the Islamic view has the highest 
effect on the reduced model (28.1%).
Table 8.23: The effect on the reduced model (model 3b) if 
variable removed.
Independent Variable Model Log 
Likelihood
Change in -2 Log 
Likelihood
df Sig. of the 
ChangeD
The percentage of 
the contribution^
The firm control -23.830 8.619 1 .003 7.6%
Managerial monetary 
compensation system
-26.974 14.909 2 .001 13.2%
Managerial annual 
income
-22.102 5.164 2 .076 4.6%
Managerial equity 
compensation system
-26.342 13.645 1 .000 12.1%
Manager age -27.942 16.845 2 .000 14.9%
The Islamic view -35.378 31.716 1 .000 28.1%
Not: * Calculated as (2 Log Likelihood df Sig. of the C hange/the  initial -2 log likelihood).
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8.4 The Conclusion
This chapter has found little empirical support for the predicted power of FT factors 
which have been suggested in previous studies to view risk management as a means to 
maximize shareholder value. The results show moderate and mixed empirical support 
for the hypothesis that currency exposure management can be used to increase the 
firm’s value by reducing agency conflicts, increasing investment opportunities, reducing 
the financial distress costs. Also the findings in this chapter reveal no support for the 
predictive theory that currency risk management can be used as a means to decrease 
corporate finance costs using the indicators used to measure the firm’s corporate finance 
costs. We found strong support when using accounting ratios to measure the firm’s 
corporate finance costs. The results in this chapter have important implications for 
corporate hedging. The main finding is that all of the managerial risk aversion factors 
were found to be significantly affected the currency hedging decision. The surprising 
result is that the empirical evidence has shown little support for the predictive power of 
theory which views the currency exposure management as affected by the manager’s 
shareholding level. This finding provides little support to the suggestion that managerial 
shareholding may be an effective incentive mechanism to induce managers to make 
value-maximizing investment decisions. Within the hedging firms, we found that the 
levels of managerial equity ownership, the improvement in the firm, the level of the 
shareholders' participation, and the managerial equity compensation contract are 
interrelated in a manner consistent with systematic efforts to reduce agency costs.
The chapter has suggested that the high sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to 
shareholder’s wealth in hedging firms plays an important role in driving the hedging 
decision. We may conclude that while firms’ management risk aversion plays a role in 
driving the risk management decision, we are inclined to conclude that a firm’s control, 
the Islamic view, and the management stockholding reward programme in the firm are 
more significant related to the risk management decision.
The next chapter will examine the effect of the contingent theories in the currency 
exposure hedging decision. The chapter will examine the effect of the firm’s need and 
ability to hedge in the hedging decision.
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Chapter Nine
The Determinants of Hedging Decision: Empirical Evidence
(Part Two)
9.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the effect of the contingent factors found in the 
exploratory study on the currency exposure hedging decision. Chapter Six and Seven 
have shown that the contingent factors can be classified into two groups; the firm’s need 
to hedge and the firm’s ability to hedge. The chapter examines whether there is 
empirical support for the predictive power of contingency theory that view currency risk 
management as a contingent to the firm’s context.
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the effect of the firm’s needs and its ability to 
hedge in its risk management policy. For that purpose, the Chapter is divided into four 
sections. The aim of the next section is to examine the relationship between the foreign 
exchange risk hedging decision and the determinants of the need for that hedging 
decision. The third section analyses the effect of the firm’s ability to hedge. The final 
section outlines the main conclusions of the Chapter.
9.2 The Determinants of The Firm’s Need to hedge
9.2.1 Introduction
The theoretical framework, discussed in Chapter 7, suggested that there are nine 
determinants on the firm’s need to hedge, see Figure 7.4 (section, 7.3.2). As shown in 
the previous Chapter, to hedge or not to hedge decision can be determined by the 
managerial risk aversion level in the firm. This section examines new group of 
determinants which may affect the hedging decision. These variables are industry, 
markets, diversification, the magnitude of foreign exchange exposure, the relevance of 
the risks, competition, the firm's operational sensitivity to foreign exchange rate 
movements, accounting methods, and market and currency regulation.
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9.2.2 General descriptive statistics and correlation coefficient of proxy 
variables
This subsection generally describes some factors which can be used to measure the 
firm's need to hedge. The purpose is to describe the hedging needs variables and to see 
the degree of correlation between these variables and their proxies and to examine the 
rationale of using some proxies as a group to measure specific hedging need variables. 
The study uses eight variables to measure the effect of the firm's level of need to hedge, 
Table 9.1 provides a description of how this study measures the different variables.
Table 9.1: Classification of hedging need variables
. Classification Definition
Industry 1. Firms can be classified to different industries
Markets 1. Competitive market
2. Price regulated market
3. Oligopolistic market
The magnitude of 1. The magnitude of the currency exposure from the firm's foreign
Foreign exchange currencies denominated exports
2. The magnitude of the currency exposure from the firm's foreignexposure currencies denominated imports
3. The movements of the currencies used by the company
4. The firm's debt in foreign currencies
5. The firm's purchases in foreign currencies
6. The firm's sales in foreign currencies
The Competition 1. The sensitivity of the main products’ demand to changes in price
2. The difference between the firm's products and those of their 
competitors
3. Competitors with their costs on the sam e currencies as the firm
4. Number of competitors in the markets
Accounting approach 1. To what extent the firm tends to use an accounting approach 
which minimize the negative effect of the exchange rates 
movements on the data presented to shareholders and analysts
Market and Foreign 1. The extent to which market policy reduce the impact
exchange policys of the foreign exchange rates movements
2. The extent to which currency policy hinders foreign exchange 
risk management
3. The extent to which market policy hinders foreign exchange risk 
management
4. The extent to which currency policy reduce the impact of foreign 
exchange rate movements
The firm's operation 1. The sensitivity of sales volume to changes in exchange rates
sensitivity to foreign 2. The sensitivity of purchase volume to changes in exchange 
ratesexchange rate 3. The sensitivity of profit margin to changes in exchange rates
movements 4. The sensitivity of costs to changes in foreign exchange rates
5. The sensitivity of cash flows to changes in exchange rates
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Before examining the differences between hedging and non-hedging firms, Table 9.2 
presents descriptive data for the hedging need variables in the sample. The respondents 
were asked to indicate their view about the different measurements of the hedging need 
variables. The descriptive statistics in Table 9.2 shows that this study covered seven 
different industrial groups. From the Table, we can see that chemical and oil, electric 
and electronic, cement and building tools, and furniture industry present the highest 
proportion of participants in this study, 20.5%, 22.9%, and 18.1% respectively. The 
firms in the sample were divided into three different markets, competitive, price 
regulated, and oligololistic. As can be seen from the table, half of the firms in the 
sample appeared in the oligololistic market (50.6 per cent), 45.8 per cent of the firms in 
the sample were competitive markets, whereas only 3.6 per cent of the firms dealt with 
price regulated markets. In order to define the degree of the diversification in the firms 
in the sample, the respondents were asked to choose from the list of different currencies 
the ones that their firms used in exporting and importing (see questionnaire section 3 in 
Appendix B). This study further distinguishes firms in the sample on the basis of 
diversification: (1) firms which trade using one or two currencies are classed as less 
diversified; and (2) firms which trade using three or more currencies are classed as 
diversified firms. As can be seen from Table 9.2, most of the firms (57.8 per cent) were 
not diversified. Most of the firms in the sample were exporting and importing using 
only one or two currencies.
To measure the firm's foreign exchange exposure magnitude, six measurements were 
used, (a) the magnitude of the foreign denominated exports; (b) the magnitude of the 
foreign denominated imports; (d) the volatility of the currencies used by the company; 
(e) debt in foreign currencies; (f) purchases in foreign currencies; (i) the company's 
sales in foreign currencies.
In order to identify the magnitude of the firm’s foreign currency denominated exports, 
the respondents were asked to define using a scale (no, some, most, all) the level of their 
exports in Saudi riyal and U. S. dollar, and the level of their exports using other 
currencies. According to their answers, firms were classified into four groups; (i) no 
exposure if the firm export using only Saudi riyal or U. S. dollar; (ii) small exposure if 
the firm makes limited use of other currencies; (iii) medium exposure if the firm uses a 
mixture of Saudi riyal, US dollar and other currencies; and (iiii) large exposure if the 
exports using only other currencies. The same categories are used to classify the firm’s
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exposure to foreign currency denominated imports. According to the Table, we can see 
that 42.2 per cent of the firms did not have any exposure to foreign currency 
denominated exports, and that only 16.9 per cent of the firms in the sample had a high 
percentage of foreign currency denominated exports. This means that the foreign 
currency denominated exports do not have a high level of effect on the hedging 
decision. In contrast, most of the firms in the sample were affected by the amount of 
exposure to foreign denominated imports. About 55.4 per cent of the firms were heavily 
engaged in importing activity, and only 2.4 per cent of the firms in the sample were not 
exposed to foreign currency denominated imports. From the table we can see that 61.5 
per cent of the firms described foreign exchange rates used in international trading as 
very moderately vulnerable, with only 4.8 per cent of them describing their international 
trading as totally invulnerable to the movements in foreign exchange rates.
Table 9.2: Descriptive statistics of independent hedging needs variables For
the Sample
Panel A _____________________________________________________________
The variables The M easurem ent No. %
Industries Chemical & Oil 17 20.5
Food & Drink 9 10.8
Electric & Electronic 19 22.9
Cement and building tools & Furniture 15 18.1
Mining 6 07.2
Medical treatments & Tools 7 08.3
Cars & Equipment 10 12
Total 83 100
Markets Competition market 38 45.8
Price regulated market 3 03.6
Oligopolistic market 42 50.6
Diversification The number of foreign currencies used for international trade 
One foreign currency 10 12.0
Two foreign currencies 38 45.8
Three foreign currencies 24 28.9
Four or more foreign currencies 11 13.3
Non diversified firms 48 57.8
Diversified firms 35 42.2
The magnitude of 
Foreign exchange
The magnitude of the currency exposure from the firm's foreign 
denominated exports 14 16.9exposure Large exposure 10 12
Medium exposure 24 28.9
Small exposure 35 42.2
No exposure
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The variables The M easurem ent No. %
The magnitude of the currency exposure from the firm's foreign 
denominated imports
Large exposure
Medium exposure
Small exposure
No exposure
46 55.4 
32 38.6 
3 03.6 
2 02.4
The volatility of the foreign exchange rates that a firm uses in international 
trading
'
Very volatile 
Moderately volatile 
Slightly volatile 
Totally volatile
15 18.1 
36 43.4 
28 33.7 
4 04.8
T a b le  9.2, P a n e l B
V a ria b le s M easurem ent M ean S.D PR  1 o r2 PR  4 o r5
The magnitude 
of foreign 
exchange
The company's debt in foreign currencies 
The company's purchases in foreign currencies
2.53
3.67
079
0.98
38.6
6.0
4.8
54.2
Iexposure The company's sales in foreign currencies 2.43 1.23 45.8 20.5
The relevance of Debt risk 3.39 1.14 24.4 46.3
2the risks Interest risk 3.44 1.29 18.3 43.9
Commodity price risk 3.85 1.10 11.0 64.7
Political risk 3.24 1.28 28.0 37.8
Foreign exchange risk 3.35 1.21 22.0 47.5
Industry risk 3.26 1.33 26.8 48.8
Competition The sensitivity of the main products' demand to the 
changes in price3
3.04 1.61 50.6 47
The difference between the company's products 3.10 1.61 47.0 51.8
4and those of their competitors
Company's competitors who their costs on the 2.99 1.25 28.9 29
sam e currencies with your firm1
Number of competitors on the m arkets5 4.40 1.73 15.7 54.3
The firm's 
operational 
sensitivity to 
foreign 
exchange rates
movements 6
The sensitivity of purchase volumes to changes in 
foreign exchange rates
The sensitivity of sale volumes to changes in 
foreign exchange rates
The sensitivity of profit margins to changes in 
foreign exchange rates
3.32
3.22
3.37
1*08
1.12
1.06
21.4
27.7
19.3
51.4
45.7
54.2
The sensitivity of costs to changes in foreign 
exchange rates
3.90 1.03 14.5 71
The sensitivity of cash flows to changes in foreign 
exchange rates
3.71 0.98 15.7 68.7
Accounting 
approach7
The firm tends to use an accounting approach 
which minimizes the negative effect of the 
exchange rate movements on the data presented 
to shareholders and analysts
3.24 1.36 34.9 51.8
Market and 
Foreign
The market policy reduces the impact of the 
foreign exchange rate movements
2.72 1.29 34.9 47.0
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The variables The M easurem ent No. %
exchange
policy7
The currency policy hinders foreign exchange risk 
management
2.88 1.43 .39.8 36.1
The market policy hinders foreign exchange risk 
management
2.76 1.26 41 33.7
The currency policy reduces the impact of the 
foreign exchange rate movements
3.00 1.04 31.6 53.4
Not:
1. The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a score from a 5-po int scale  
where 1 =  N o, 3 =  21% - 50% , 5  =  81% -100% .
2. The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a score from a 5-point scale  
where 1 =  not relevant, 3 =  Natural, 5 =  H ighly relevant.
3. The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a score from a 5-point scale
where 1 =  Inelastic demand, 3 =  N o t sure, 5 =  elastic demand.
4. The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a score from a 5-po int scale
where 1 =  highly different, 3 =  Natural, 5 =  The same.
5. The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a score from a 5-po int scale
where 1 =  N o , 3 =  Two or three competitors, 5 =  M ore than four competitors.
6. The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a score from a 5-po int scale  
where 1 =  Highly insensitive, 3 =  Natural, 5 =  Highly sensitive.
7. The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a score from a 5-po int scale  
where 1 =  disagree, 3 =  not sure, 5 =  agree.
In order to see how relevant and important the foreign exchange risk is to the firms in 
the sample, the respondents were provided with six different risks (debt risk, interest 
risk, commodity price risk, political risk, foreign exchange risk, and industry risk) and 
asked to identify the degree of relevance of each risk to their firm. It can be seen from 
Table 9.2, that commodity price risk is the most relevant risk for the Saudi firms with a 
mean = 3.85 (1 = 'not relevant, and 5 = very relevant). The foreign exchange exposure 
comes in fourth place of the relevant risks with a mean = 3.35, which may explain why 
a small percentage of firms hedge foreign exchange exposure (35 firms out off 83 firms 
in the sample). The firm's competitive situation was measured using four indicators, (1) 
the sensitivity of the main products' demand to changes in price1 (2) the difference 
between the company's products and those of their competitors; (3) the percentage of 
the company's competitors with their costs in the same currencies with the firm; and (4) 
the number of competitors in the markets. In general, Table 9.2, shows that firms in the 
sample faced a high competition level, in that most of the firms in the sample described 
the number of the competitors in their markets as more than four competitors with a 
mean = 4.40 (1 = 'no competitor', and 5 = more than four competitors'). From the Table 
we can see that 51.8 per cent of the firms in the sample described their firm's products 
as different from those of their competitors. The results in Table show that 47 per cent
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of the firms in the sample described their demand sensitivity to price changes as elastic. 
From the findings about the sample firms’ competitive situation, it can be argued that 
the sample can be used as representative for the study population as it provides to some 
extent a balance between firms in competitive markets and those in less competitive 
markets.
It has been suggested in Chapter Six that if the competitors’ costs are denominated in 
foreign currencies it can be used as one of the competition proxies. To examine this 
suggestion, the respondents of the survey were asked to identify the percentage of their 
competitors who had their input costs denominated in the same foreign currencies they 
used. Five companies did not respond to this question. The reason is that respondents 
were unaware of the competitors' foreign exchange exposure. Table 9.2, shows that 28.9 
per cent of the firms in the sample indicates that only 1-20%, of their competitors had 
their costs in the same currencies as their firms, 29 per cent'of the firms in the sample 
indicating that more than 50 per cent of their competitors had their costs in the same 
currencies with their firms.
In order to measure the firm's operations sensitivity to the volatility of foreign exchange 
rates, the respondents were asked to identify the sensitivity of their purchase volumes, 
sale volumes, profit margin, costs, and cash flows to changers in foreign exchange rates. 
Table 9.2 shows that the firms’ costs were highly sensitive to foreign exchange rate 
volatility with a mean of = 3.90 and SD = 1.03 (1 = 'highly insensitive', and 5 = 'highly 
sensitive'). The firm's cash flows in the sample were also described as being more 
sensitive to the foreign exchange rates volatility (mean = 3.71, and SD = 0.98). This 
study also examined the extent to which firms used an accounting approach for 
minimizing the negative effect of exchange rate movements on the data which was 
presented to shareholders and analysts. The table shows that 51.8 per cent of the firms 
in that sample disagreed slightly with the view that they used an accounting approach in 
order to minimize the effect of exchange rate volatility on the data.
To measure the market and currency policy, the study used four indicators which are; 
(1) market policy reduces the impact of the foreign exchange rate movements; (2) 
currency policy hinders foreign exchange risk management; (3) market policy hinders 
foreign exchange risk management; (4) currency exchange policy reduces the impact of 
foreign exchange rate movements. As can be seen from Table 9.2, 53.4 per cent of the 
firms in the sample agreed that currency policy reduced the impact of foreign exchange
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rates movements, with 31.6 per cent of the firms disagreeing that currency policy 
reduced the impact of the foreign exchange rate movements. This finding can be 
explained by currency policy in Saudi Arabia which links the U. S. dollar to the Saudi 
riyal (IS = 3.75 SR). Also 47 per cent of the firms in the sample agreed that this market 
policy reduced the impact of foreign exchange rate movements.
The Spearman correlation coefficients (nonparametric correlations) in Table 9.3 reveal 
that the industry variable is significantly correlated to the markets. The foreign 
exchange exposure magnitude, and competition position. All the six indicators of the 
foreign exchange exposure magnitude, from X4 to X9 (see Table 9.3), were associated 
with each other except for the indicator (X6) 'the volatility of the company's foreign 
exchange rates'. This raises the question of the necessity of using all six indicators as a 
group to measure the firm's foreign exchange exposure magnitude.
From the Table we can see that the importance that firms give to the foreign exchange 
risk is associated with the effect of that risk on the firms' output and input (purchase 
volumes, sale volumes, profit margin, costs, and cash flows). These firms recognize the 
amount of effect that foreign exchange exposure has upon their operations, and that this 
may affect their risk management strategy. As can be seen from the Table the four 
indicators which measure the competition level of the firms were statistically, 
significantly, and positively associated with each other, which supports the validity of 
using them as a group of measurements to measure the competitive position of each 
firm in the sample. The competition variable measurements (X I6 to X I9) were also 
associated with the relevance that firms gave to foreign exchange risk and with the 
volatility of the firm's foreign exchange rates. This is consistent with the suggestion that 
competitive position has a positive relationship with the foreign exchange exposure 
(Bradley, 1998). Also competition variables are significantly associated with market 
and industry variables.
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Table 9.3 indicates that the correlation between the five indicators which measure the 
sensitivity of the firm's operations to the changes _ in foreign exchange rates, are 
significantly and positively correlated to each other at the 0.01 level. These findings 
indicate the correlation coefficients were relatively strong in the positive direction, and 
that the level of significance of each measure was sufficient to provide statistical 
support for the validity and reliability of these measures. This supports the rationale of 
using these indicators to measure the sensitivity of the firm's operations to the changes 
in foreign exchange rates. It also gives an indication that changes in foreign exchange 
risk are in general affecting the firm operational variable presented in table 9.1 in the 
same direction. It could be seen from the Table that the effect of changes in foreign 
exchange rates on the firm's purchase volumes, sale volumes, profit margin, costs, and 
cash flows are significantly and positively associated with the foreign exchange 
exposure magnitude caused by exporting and importing internationally. For the four 
indicators of currency and market policy, three of them were statistically significantly 
correlated. The only currency and market policy indicator not correlated to all the other 
indicators in the group is (X28) ' the market policy hinders foreign exchange risk 
management'. These findings show no correlation between indicators X28 and other 
measurement indicators (X26), (X27), and (X29) may affect the rationale of using these 
indicators as a group to describe the effect of market and currency policy on the hedging 
decision.
As mentioned in the beginning of the previous chapter, using a group of indicators to 
measure certain variables may raise the question as to whether indicators measure this 
variable. The correlation analysis shows that some of the chosen indicators to measure 
specific variables were not associated with each other to generate a group of 
measurements. In order to explain and examine the rationale of using these different 
groups of indicators to measure the different variables, we should test the internal 
reliability of each group of indicators. Table 9.4 shows the results of a test of the 
internal reliability of using these different indicators to measure the defined variables. 
The reliability of these measures refers to their consistency to measure the specific 
variable, and can answer the question of the possibility of using these indicators to 
measure specific variables. To estimate the internal reliability, Cronbach’s Alpha was 
used. The calculated values in table 9.4 show the average of all possible split-half 
reliability coefficients for the different groups of indicators.
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Table 9.4: Reliability analysis for different variables indicators
Indicators N o f ca se s N o f item s Alpha
The magnitude of foreign exchange exposure 
indicators
83 6 0.70
The competition position indicators 83 4 0.71
The firm's operations sensitivity to changes in 
foreign exchange rates indicators
83 5 0.84
The market and currency policy indicators 83 4 0.68
As can bee seen from table 9.4, the firm's operations sensitivity to changes in foreign 
exchange rate indicators are internally reliable since the coefficient is 0.84, and can be 
used to measure the firm's operations sensitivity to changes in foreign exchange rates in 
the sample. The table suggests also that the magnitude of the foreign exchange exposure 
indicators, the competition position indicators, and the market and currency policy 
indicators are not so internally reliable since the coefficients are 0.70, 0.71, and 0.68 
respectively. From the Table it can be seen that the coefficients for these indicators are 
less than the preferable correlation coefficient (at over 0.7), a strategy of dropping one 
or more indicators can be used in order to increase the internal reliability of the 
indicators. Table 9.5, shows the alpha reliability levels when each constituent indicator 
is deleted from different groups. From the table, in the case of the foreign exchange 
exposure magnitude indicators, if we delete indicator number 3 'the volatility of the 
company's foreign exchange rates', the internal reliability increases from 0.70 to 0.75 
and indicators 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 are more acceptable as measures for the foreign exchange 
exposure magnitude.
However, while the reliability test leads us to reject the volatility of the company's 
foreign exchange rates as one of the foreign exchange exposure magnitude indicators, 
the important effect of this indicator upon the markets and the firm's competitive 
position may indicate that this indicator can be used as a new separate variable that may 
affect the hedging decision. The Spearman correlations, Table 9.3, show a significant 
and positive correlation between the volatility of the company's foreign exchange rates 
and the level of competition that a firm experience. From Table 9.3 we see that the 
volatility of the exchange rates used by a company is positively associated with the 
foreign exchange rates movements’ effect on the firm's operation, but the correlation is 
not significant. For the competition position indicators, if we delete indicator number 3 
the internal reliability is increased from 0.71 to 0.78 and the indicators 1, 2, and 4 are 
more acceptable to measure each firm's competition position in the sample. Table 9.5
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also shows that if we delete indicator number 3 from the market and currency policy 
indicators list in table 9.1, will increase the internal reliability of these indicators as a 
measure of the financial distress cost on the sample from 0.68 to 0.74 and become more 
acceptable.
Table 9.5: The reliability of the different group 
of indicators if each constituent indicator is deleted.
Indicators Indicator
number
Alpha if item 
deleted
The magnitude of 1 0.70
foreign exchange 
exposure indicators 2 0.73
3 0.75
4 0.69
5 0.72
6 0.68
Indicators Indicator
number
Alpha if 
item 
deleted
The competition 
position indicators
1 0.68
2 0.71
3 0.78
4 0.73
The market and 
currency policy
1 0.69
indicators 2 0.67
3 0.74
4 0.70
9.2.3 Univariate analysis
In this subsection, as in the previous chapter, respondents were divided into two groups, 
hedging and non-hedging firms, they were described and compared regarding the 
factors influencing the two groups’ need to hedge foreign exchange exposure. A 
concentration on the effect of industries, markets, diversification, the magnitude of 
foreign exchange exposure, the relevance of the foreign exchange risk, the competition, 
the accounting methods, and the market and currency policy, on the firm's need to 
hedge. The specific objective of this subsection is to investigate if there are any 
differences between hedging and non-hedging firms on the degree of their need to 
hedge foreign exchange exposure.
The Industry
It has been suggested in section (7.3) that hedging firms and non-hedging firms are 
different in their need to hedge their exposure. One of the main purpose of this section 
is to establish if there are any notable industrial sector differences regarding foreign 
exchange risk hedging decision in Saudi Arabia. Table 9.6, uses the questionnaire
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results to compare the industrial membership profile for both groups of hedging and 
non-hedging companies.
Table 9.6: The firm’s industry and hedging decision
The
variables
The m easurem ent Hedging 
Firms 
No. %
Non-Hedging 
firms 
No. % No.
Total
%
Chi-
Square
Test
Industries Chemical & Oil 3 17.6 14 82.4 17 100
Food & Drink 8 88.9 1 11.1 9 100
Electric & Electronic 7 36.8 12 63.2 19 100 0.00
Cement and building tools & 
Furniture
4 26.7 11 73.3 15 100
Mining 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 100
Medical treatments & Tools 3 42.9 4 57.1 7 100
Cars & Equipment 8 80 2 20 10 100
Total 35 42.2 48 57.8 83 100
In Table 9.6 some of the evidence shows that there are possible relationships between 
the food and drink, and cars and equipment sectors and the hedging of foreign exchange 
risk. In that, 8 out of 9 food and drink companies and 8 of 10 cars & equipment 
companies in the sample were hedging their foreign exchange risk. Geczy et al., (1997) 
found that firms in the electric and electronic and consumer goods sector are the most 
frequent users of hedging activities. However, in contrast with their findings the 
situation in the electric and electronic for Saudi firms is that only 36 per cent of the 
Saudi electronic firms were hedging their foreign exchange exposure. From the same 
table, we can see that there are possible relationships between the chemical and oil, and 
cement, building tools and furniture in non hedging decision, in that 82.4% of the 
chemical and oil respondents and 73.3% of the cement, building tools and furniture 
chose not to hedge their foreign exchange risk.
The fact that oil and chemical firms are less likely to hedge, can be explained by the fact 
that crude oil was priced 100% US dollar. However, these firms still have some 
currency exposure as they are heavily dependent upon the import of technology and 
many manufactured components from developed economies. In order to find whether 
the differences in the responses of the two participating groups regarding the form of 
industry are statistically significant, the Chi-Square test was used. The Chi-Square test 
shows that there is a significant industrial difference between the hedging firms and
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non-hedging firms. In that the calculated p value (0.00) is less than the critical p value 
(0.05). It is widely agreed that industry characteristics affect firms strategy differently as 
industry contexts differ, and that there are substantial industry effects in strategic 
management in general (e.g. Johnson and Thomas, 1987). The hypothesis (H I3) that 
there is a significant difference between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the 
industry can be accepted.
The magnitude o f  foreign exchange exposure
The larger the firm's activities in foreign markets, the larger its transaction currency 
exposure is .expected to be. This predicts a positive relationship between the hedging 
decision and the magnitude of a firm's transaction exposure. In order to examine the 
effect of the magnitude of foreign exchange exposure on the hedging decision, the 
respondents were asked to identify their company's foreign sales as a percentage of total 
sales, foreign purchases as a percentage of total purchases and the foreign debt as a 
percentage of their total debt (where 1= nothing and 5= 81-100%). As can be seen from 
Table 9.7 Panel B, the mean of the foreign debt in hedging firms (mean = 2.66, S.D = 
0.84) was higher than that in non hedging firms (mean = 2.44, S. D = 0.74). This is 
consistent with the findings in section 8.2 in the previous chapter that hedging firms 
have higher financial distress costs than non-hedging firms. It could be that hedging 
firms minimise the effect of foreign exchange rate movements on their cash flows in 
order to protect their ability to repay their foreign debt.
The foreign exchange exposure of the firm should be positively related to the ratio of 
foreign sales to total sales and the ratio of foreign purchases to total purchases. While 
the table shows that hedging firms have higher foreign purchases than non-hedging 
firms (mean = 3.77 in hedging firms versus mean = 3.60 in non-hedging firms), it also 
shows that non-hedging firms have higher foreign sales than hedging firms (mean =2.50 
versus Mean = 2.34).
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Table 9.7: The foreign exchange exposure magnitude and hedging decision 
Panel A
- The variables The measurement Hedging Firms Non-Hedging
firms
Total Chi-Square
Test
No. % No. % No. %
The magnitude 
of the currency 
exposure from 
the firm's 
foreign 
denominated
Large exposure 
Medium exposure 
Small exposure
5
7
10
35.7 
70
41.7
9
3
14
64.3 
30
58.3
14
10
24
100
100
100
0.48
exports No exposure 13 37.1 22 62.9 35 100
The magnitude 
of the currency 
? exposure from 
the firm's 
foreign 
denominated 
imports
Large exposure 
Medium exposure 
Small exposure 
No exposure
22
11
0
2
47.8
34.4
00
100
24
21
3
0
52.2
65.6
100
00
46
32
3
2
100
100
100
100
0.29
Panel B
Hedging Firms Non-hedging Firms Mann- 
* WhitneyIndicator
Sn>u3
COb
PR
1or2
%
PR
4or5
% 2n>CD3
COb
PR
1or2
%
PR
4or5
%
Test
The company's debt in foreign 2.66 
currencies
0.84 28.6 8.6 2.44 0.74 45.8 2.1 0.13
The company’s purchases in foreign 3.77 
currencies
1.1 8.6 62.9 3.60 0.9 4.2 48 0.26
~ The company's sales in foreign 2.34 
currencies
1.14 45.7 11.5 2.50 1.31 45.8 27.1 0.54
Average 2.92 2.85
However, a high level of foreign sales or purchases does not necessarily mean that firms 
face a high level of exposure. For example, Saudi firms which purchase from foreign 
markets using the Saudi riyal or U. S. dollar face little exposure. For that reason, the 
respondents were asked to identify the proportion of their foreign exports and imports 
which were priced using Saudi riyal, U. S. dollar, and other foreign currencies.
Table 9.7 on panel A, shows the magnitude of the currency exposure from the firm's 
foreign exports and imports where, (1) firms with all of their exports or imports priced 
in.foreign currencies other than U. S. dollar described as having a large exposure, (2) 
firms with most of their exports or imports priced in foreign currencies other than U. S. 
dollar described as having a medium exposure, (3) firms with some of their exports or 
imports priced in foreign currencies other than U. S. dollar are described as having a 
small exposure, and (4) firms which none of their exports or imports priced in foreign 
currency other than Saudi riyal, or U. S. dollar are described as having no exposure. It
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can be seen from Table 9.7 Panel A, that only 5 out of 14 firms who described 
themselves as having a large exposure to foreign exports were hedging this exposure. In 
addition, the same table shows that 52 per cent of firms with large exposure on foreign 
imports and 65 per cent of firms with medium exposure on foreign imports did not 
hedge. From this it can be concluded that, there are only small differences between 
hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding the magnitude of the exposure that they 
experience. The Mann-Whitney test (see table 9.7) revealed that there are no significant 
differences between hedging and non hedging firms with respect to the level of the 
firm's foreign exchange exposure. The calculated p  value for the magnitude of a firm's 
foreign exports (0.48) and the calculated p  value for the magnitude of a firm's foreign 
imports (0.29) are both higher than the critical p  value (0.05). This means that both 
hedging and non-hedging firms have small differences of exposure level from foreign 
sales and foreign purchases. In addition, foreign exchange exposure associated with 
foreign currency denominated debt is not a significant determinant of a firm’s decision 
to hedge, the calculated p  value of the company's debt in foreign currencies (0.13) is 
higher than the critical p  value (0.05). The hypothesis (HI4) that there are significant 
differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the magnitude of the 
firm's foreign exchange exposure can be rejected.
The Market
One of the main hypotheses that this study seeks to examine is the effect of foreign 
exchange exposure upon the firm which may be affected by the type of markets that the 
firm trades in. The degree of competition faced in the market may become an important 
determinant in the manager's choice to hedge or not to hedge. To test this hypothesis, 
the respondents were asked to choose the market classification that their firms operated 
in. The market classifications are competitive markets, price regulated markets, and 
oligolpostic markets. As can be seen from Table 9.8, 68.6% of all the hedging firms (24 
firms out of 35 firms) traded in competitive markets, and 63.2 per cent of the firms 
trading in competitive markets hedged their foreign exchange risk. On the other hand 
only 23.8 per cent of the respondents who described their markets as oligopolistic 
markets hedged their foreign exchange exposure. Supporting the hypothesis on the 
relationship between markets and the hedging decision, the evidence in the Table shows 
that most of the non-hedging firms traded in oligopolistic markets and that 76.2 per cent 
of these firms did not hedge their foreign exchange exposure.
277
Table 9.8: The market and hedging decision
The variables The measurement Hedging Firms 
No. %
Non-Hedging
firms
No. % No.
Total
% '
Chi-Square
Test
The Market Competition market 24 63.2 14 36.8 38 100
Price regulated market 1 33.3 2 66.7 3 100 0.000
Oligopolistic market 10 23.8 32 76.2 42 100
The Chi-Square test in table 9.8 reveals that there are statistically significant differences 
in the trading markets between hedging and non-hedging firms, the calculated p value 
(0.00) is less that the critical p  value (0.05). The hypothesis (HI 5) that there are 
significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding their trading 
markets can be accepted.
The Competition
Since little theoretical attention and even less empirical research has focused on the 
effects of competition on the hedging decision, the present study explores further this 
potentially important source of influence. To understand how the industry competition 
level affects the hedging decision, and particularly the competitive level across firms 
and industries, this research seeks to identify a particular firm's competitive 
characteristics that may influence the exposure level and the tendency to hedge. This 
study focused on the influence of three important competition characteristic 
measurements. The three measures used as independent variables are; product 
differences, the relationship between price and the demand in the firm's market, and the 
number of competitors in the firm's main markets. This section simply uses the 
measures that are suggested by the interviewees to explain the firm's competition level. 
Taking into account that foreign exchange rate movements might affect the firm's 
competitive power in the market and this effect is different from one firm to another, 
this study suggests that the firm's sensitivity to that movement may depend on the firm's 
competitive advantages. For example, a firm with inelastic demand for its products may 
have an advantage in transferring the unfavourable effect of foreign exchange rate 
movement to the customer than a firm with elastic demand.
In Chapter 7 it was suggested that a firm in a highly competitive position will be more 
likely to hedge than a firm facing low competition. The competitive level for each firm
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was measured using three proxies (see section 9.2.2). As can be seen from Table 9.9, the 
main products' demand sensitivity to changes in the prices in hedging firms is higher 
than in non-hedging firms (Mean = 3.46 versus Mean = 2.73). Non-hedging firms have 
more inelastic demand than hedging firms, which gives them the flexibility to change 
the product prices in order to offset the unfavourable effect of exchange rate variations.
Table 9.9: Competition and the hedging decision.
Variables Indicator Hedging Firms Non-hedging Firms
PR PR  PR PR
1or2 4or5 1or2 4or5
ro % % ro ® % %t u o  ro o
The sensitivity of the 3.46 1.48 37.1 60 2.73 1.65 60.5 37.5 0.04
The main products'
Competition demand to the
changes in price
The difference 3.66 1.47 31.4 68.6 2.69 1.6 58.3 39.6 0.00
between the 
company’s products 
and those of their 
competitors
Number of 4.83
competitors on the 
markets
Average 3.98
While managers in non-hedging firms can transfer the cost effect of exchange rate 
movements to the customers, managers in hedging firms may not have the same 
opportunity as any change in product prices may affect the level of demand for their 
products. The firm's ability to minimize the effect of movements in the foreign 
exchange rate on its prices depends on both the firm's hedging activity and the elasticity 
of demand for its products, which in turn depends on the degree of product 
differentiation (Sundaram and Black, 1991). The reason behind the hedging behaviour 
in a firm with sensitive demand is as explained by Bradley (1998). She found a 
significant relationship between the firm's product sensitivity to changes in price and 
economic currency exposure. From the Table , we can see that 60.5 per cent of the 
hedging firms described demand as being price elastic or slightly price elastic, whereas, 
on the other hand, 60 per cent of the non-hedging firms described demand as being price 
inelastic or slightly inelastic. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction 
that a firm's exchange rate exposure depends on its demand elasticity.
1.74 22.8 68.6 4.1 1.67 31.3 43.8 0.02
3.17
Mann-
Whitney
Test
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After demonstrating that the level of demand and price sensitivity affects the hedging 
decision, we examined whether the difference of the firm's product from that sold by its 
competitors is associated with the hedging decision. When asking the respondents of the 
survey about the differences between their products and those presented by their 
competitors, 68.6 per cent of the hedging firms confirmed that their products appear 
close or exactly the same as their competitors sell in markets. In contrast, nearly 60 per 
cent of the non-hedging firms have products different from those of their competitors. 
These differences may give these firms the opportunities to transfer the unexpected 
movements in exchange rates to the customers, whereas, this may not be the situation 
for hedging firms.
The above results are confirmed by the next measure of competition: firms with more 
competitors in the markets tend to be more likely to hedge. We observe a positive 
relationship between firms with more competitors in the markets and hedging decision. 
As shown in Table 9.9, 68.6 per cent of the hedging firms have four or more 
competitors in the market, in contrast to only 43.8 per cent of the non-hedging firms in 
relation to their competitors in the market. The increasing number of competitors in the 
market will increase the market competition situation. The level of competition in the 
market sometimes encourages a firm to practice new ideas to improve its competitive 
position in the market even if this new idea has its own risk. In a competitive market, 
any unexpected movements in foreign exchange rates may affect the firm's operations in 
the market. Managers in a competitive market may decide to hedge their firm’s 
exposure in order to protect their firm’s position in the market and this may provide 
them with a competitive advantage from those who did not hedge. In order to test 
whether the differences in the hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the competitive 
positions is significant, the Mann-Whitney test was used. The Mann-Whitney test in 
table 9.9, reveals that there is statistically significant difference in the competitive level 
between the two groups (p < 0.05). The hypothesis (HI6) that there are significant 
differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding their competitive 
positions can be accepted.
The effect o f the foreign exchange rate movements
One of the main determinants of the hedging decision specified in this subsection is to 
analyse whether there is any relationship between the hedging decision and the effect of
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fluctuations in foreign exchange rates on the firms' cost, profit, sale volume, purchase 
volume, and cash flows volatility. The respondents of the survey were asked to specify 
the effect of exchange rate movements on their firm's costs, profit margin, sales volume, 
purchase volume, and cash flows. From Table 9.10, we can see that there is little 
difference between hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding the firm's sales 
volume sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations (Mean = 3.1 versus Mean = 3.3).
Table 9.10: The firm's operation sensitivity to foreign exchange rates 
movements and hedging decision.
where 1 = Highly insensitive, 3 = Natural, 5 = Highly sensitive
Variables
Mean
Hedging Firms
PR
1or2
%o
PR  
- 4or5
%
Mean
Non-hedging Firms
PR
1or2
%a
PR
4or5
%
Mann- 
‘ Whitney 
Test -
The sensitivity of purchase volumes 
to changes in foreign exchange rates
3.31 1.28 22.9 60 3.54 1.01 16.7 62.5 0.58
The sensitivity of sales volume to 
changes in foreign exchange rates
3.1 1.21 37.1 45.7 3.3 1.04 20.9 35.8 0.35
The sensitivity of profit margins to 
changes in foreign exchange rates
3.26 1.2 22.9 54.3 3.46 0.94 16.7 54.2 0.64
The sensitivity of cost to changes in 
foreign exchange rates
3.80 1.1 20 74.3 3.98 1.02 10.4 68.8 0.43
The sensitivity of cash flows to 
changes in foreign exchange rates
3.43 1.01 22.9 60.1 3.92 0.92 10.4 75 0.03
The main difference found here is that while 45.7 per cent of the hedging firms agreed 
that foreign exchange rate movements affected their firms' sales volume, only 35.8 per 
cent of the non-hedging firms agreed that their firms' sales volume were affected by 
foreign exchange rate movements. As can be seen from Table 9.10 there are small 
differences between hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding the sensitivity of 
their purchase volumes to changes in foreign exchange rates, in that the Mean = 3.31 in 
hedging firms is slightly smaller than those in non-hedging firms (Mean = 3.54). A high 
percentage of hedging and non-hedging firms agreed that their purchase volumes were 
sensitive to the changes in foreign exchange rates (60%, 62.5%, respectively). Only
16.7 per cent of non-hedging firms and 22.9 per cent of hedging firms disagreed that 
their purchase volumes were not affected by foreign exchange rate movements.
A large percentage of non-hedging firms indicated that their purchase volumes were 
affected by changes in foreign exchange rates, but they still did not hedge their 
exposure. This means that there are reasons other than the effect of foreign exchange
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exposure on the purchase volume which may affect the firm's decision to hedge or not 
to hedge. Only 45.7 per cent of Saudi firms indicated that their sales volume was 
affected by changes in foreign exchange rates. This may lead to the assumption which 
supports the argument that different firms in different countries may be differently 
affected by changes in exchange rates. Bradley and Moles (2001) found that a 
substantial majority (64 per cent) of the UK firms in their sample indicated that 
companies' sales were relatively or highly insensitive to foreign exchange movements. 
Within Saudi firms only a small proportion of respondents rated their sales volume as 
being highly sensitive to foreign exchange rates. The table also shows that the 
sensitivity of profit margins to changes in foreign exchange rates were similar in both 
hedging and non hedging firms (Mean = 3.26, and S.D =1.2 versus Mean = 3.46 and 
S.D = 0.94). There is similar percentage of the hedging firms and non-hedging firms 
who agreed that their profit margin is sensitive to foreign exchange rate movements 
(54.3 per cent versus 54.2 per cent). As can be seen from Table 9.10, there is no 
statistically significant difference between hedging firms and non-hedging firms 
regarding the sensitivity of their costs to the changes in foreign exchange rates, the 
calculated p  value (0.43) is larger than the critical p  value (0.05). There is some 
difference between the hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding the sensitivity of 
their firms' cash flows to changes in foreign exchange rates (mean = 3.43 versus mean = 
3.92). In order to explore the extent to which the differences between the two groups of 
respondent firms’ cash flows are statistically significant, the Mann-Whitney test is 
presented in table 9.10. There is a statistically significant difference in the firm's cash 
flows sensitivity to the changes in foreign exchange rates between the respondents of 
the hedging and non-hedging firms, the p  value (0.03) is less than the critical p  value 
(0.05). This result is consistent with Hekman (1985) findings that currency fluctuations 
affect the firm's cash flows and value.
From these findings, it seems that the amount of exposure and its negative effects on the 
firms' costs, sale volumes, and profit margin was not enough to force non-hedging firms 
to adopt hedging activity. It could be that besides the effect of the changes in foreign 
exchange rates on the firm's operations, there are other important reasons which direct 
the decision to hedge or not to hedge, such as industry, competitive position, and 
markets, as found in this subsection. The Mann-Whitney test results, in table 9.10, show 
that with the exception of the sensitivity of the firm's cash flows to the changes in 
exchange rates, there are no significant differences between the sensitivity of both
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groups' costs, sales volume and profit margin to the changes in exchange rates (p > 
0.05). For the sensitivity of both groups' cash flows to the changes in exchange rates, 
table 9.10 shows that there is statistically significant difference between the two groups, 
the calculated p  value (0.03) is less than the critical p  value (0.05). However, the non­
hedging firms agreed more that their cash flows were more sensitive to changes in the 
exchange rates (75 per cent selected number 1 'agree' and 2 'slightly agree') than those 
of hedging firms (60.1 per cent). While more non-hedging firms agreed that changes in 
exchange rates affected their cash flows than hedging firms, this reason alone can not 
affect their risk management strategy. In general, the hypothesis (HI7) that hedging and 
non-hedging firms are significantly different regarding the sensitivity of their operations 
to the changes in exchange rates can not be accepted.
Currency and market policy
In this section the effect of the exchange control and market policy on the hedging 
decision are discussed. The respondents to the survey were asked to what extent they 
agreed that currency and market policy were affecting their choice to hedge or not to 
hedge their foreign exchange exposure. The hedging and non-hedging firms' perceptions 
to this policy are presented in Table 9.11. The Table shows that the market policy plays 
a significant role in reducing the impact of foreign exchange rate movements on non­
hedging firms’ point of view, 60.4 per cent of them agreed that the market policy 
reduced the impact of foreign exchange rates movements on their firms' operations. 
With, only 28.5 per cent of the respondents in hedging firms agreeing that the market 
policy reduced the impact of the foreign exchange rate movements. The foreign 
exchange rate and market policy decreased the effect of the foreign exchange rate 
movements on the firm. These 'primary' effects of policy should reduce the firm's need 
for risk management activity. While a high percentage (54.2 per cent) of non-hedging 
firms saw that currency policy reduced the impact of foreign exchange rate movements, 
only 20 per cent of the hedging firms stated that currency policy reduced the foreign 
exchange exposure management.
While the percentage of non-hedging. firms who see currency policy as one of the 
reasons that reduced their foreign exchange exposure and minimized the need for 
hedging decision, 57.2 per cent of the respondents in hedging firms saw currency policy 
as not playing an important role in reducing the effect of the changes in the foreign 
exchange rates on their exposure.
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Table 9.11: Exchange and market policy and hedging decision. 
From 1 ‘disagree’ to 5 ‘agree’
Variables . . 
Mean
Hedging Firms
PR4or5
%o
PR
1or2
i i l i
Mean
Non-hedging Firms
PR PR 4or5 1or2
•w  % % D
Mann- ■ 
: Whitney 
Test
Market policy reduce the impact of 2.89 1.26 28.5 48.6 3.56 1.25 60.4 25.1 0.02
the foreign exchange rates
movements •
Currency policy hinders foreign 3.20 1.39 37.2 34.3 3.06 1.47 35.5 42.8 0.61
exchange risk management
Currency policy reduce the impact of 2.63 1.09 20 57.2 3.27 1.40 54.2 37.5 0.04
the foreign exchange rates
movements
As can been seen also from Table 9.11, only a small percentage of hedging firms 37.2 
per cent and non-hedging firms 35.5 agreed that currency policy hinders foreign 
exchange exposure management. It can be argued that, while there is 37.2 per cent of 
hedging firms who agreed that currency policy hindered their activity to manage their 
foreign exchange exposure, a higher percentage than non-hedging firms (35.5 per cent), 
the respondents in hedging firms stated that currency policy did not prevent them from 
hedging their exposure and that only 34.3 per cent of the respondents in hedging firms 
agreed that currency policy was not to be a reason to prevent them from managing their 
foreign exchange risk.
However, while US markets are one of the main destinations for Saudi exports and 
sources of imports and that the Saudi riyal is fixed against US dollar (1$ = 3.75 Riyals), 
the results show that most of the respondents in the survey did not believe that they 
benefited from currency policy. The main explanation is that one of the main conditions 
in choosing the study sample is that respondents should not only trade using US dollar 
as firms which only export and import using US dollars have little or no currency 
exposure. Although it is obvious that there must be some differences between hedging 
and non-hedging firms in the perception against the market and currency policy, the 
idea is to find whether these differences are statistically significant. The Mann-Whitney 
test results shown in Table 9.11, reveal that, there are statistically significant differences 
between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the impact of the currency and 
market policy to reduce the foreign exchange exposure, the calculatedp  value (0.02 and 
0.04, respectively) is less than the critical p  value (0.05). In general, the hypothesis
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(HI 8) that there is a significant difference between hedging and non-hedging firms in 
their perception of the effect of market and currency policy on the foreign exchange 
exposure and management can be accepted.
Accounting method
Do managers expect their treasury and accountant departments to manage the foreign 
exchange losses in their financial statements to avoid reporting losses or large swings 
that would have to be explained to shareholders and investors? To examine this 
hypothesis, the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that 
one of the main reasons of using specific accounting approaches were to affect the 
presentation of their financial statements regarding any bad effect from foreign 
exchange rate exposure. Table 9.12, shows that there is no big difference between the 
mean in hedging firms (mean = 2.74) and the mean in non-hedging firms (mean = 2.77). 
It can be seen that 54.2 per cent of the respondents in hedging firms and 50 per cent of 
respondents in non-hedging firms disagreed that their firms tended to use an accounting 
approach to minimize the negative effect of exchange rate movements in the data that 
was presented to shareholders and analysts.
Table 9.12: The effect of accounting method in the hedging decision.
From 1 ‘disagree’ to 5 ‘agree’
Variables Hedging Firms Non-hedging Firms Mann-
Whitney
PR  PR PR PR  T e s t
4or5 1or2 4or5 1or2% IF m % %
The firm tends to use an accounting 
approach which minimize the
negative effect of the exchange rates 2.74 1.34 31.4 54.2 2.77 1.39 37.5 50 0.97
movements on the data which was 
presented to shareholders and 
analysts
In order to examine whether the hedging and non-hedging firms are different regarding 
their opinion about the use of an accounting approach to minimize the effect of 
exchange rate exposure on the data presented to shareholders and analysts, the Mann- 
Whitney test was used. The Mann-Whitney test, on table 9.12, reveals that the 
respondents of the two groups were not statistically significantly different with respect 
to their tendency to use an accounting method which minimizes the negative effect of
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exchange rate movements on the data presented to shareholders and analysts (p = 0.97), 
the hypothesis (HI9) can be rejected.
Diversification
The benefits of international currency diversification have received considerable 
attention in the corporate hedging literature. This study distinguishes firms in the 
sample on the basis of their currency diversification: (1) firms which trade using one or 
two currencies will be less diversified; and (2) firms which trade using three or more 
currencies will be presented as diversified firms. For each firm, currency diversification 
was measured by the level of the firm's import or export diversification. The 
respondents were asked to specify the different currencies that their firms used in 
international trading. The result of this question is presented in Table 9.13. The 
diversification currency theory predicts that in a firm which exports in many different 
currencies, the effect of the foreign exchange risk on the firm’s operating income will 
be small, and it will have little benefit from hedging. Rahgozar and Najafi (2003) found 
that diversification has a stronger effect on risk reduction.
Table 9.13: The currency diversification and hedging decision
The variables 
The measurement
Hedging Firms 
No. %
Non-Hedging
firms
No. % No.
Total
%
Chi-Square
Test
One foreign currency 4 40 6 60 10 100
Two foreign currencies 14 36.8 24 63.2 38 100
Three foreign currencies 11 45.8 13 54.2 24 100 0.54
Four or more foreign currencies 6 54.5 5 45.5 11 100
Non diversified firms 18 37.5 30 62.5 48 100
Diversified firms 17 48.6 18 51.4 35 100
The results in Table 9.13, is somewhat surprising and inconsistent with the theoretical 
prediction which was presented in detail in Chapter Three, in that only 37.5 percent of 
the undiversified firms were hedging their exposure. The Table also shows that the 
hedging decision in the Saudi sample is unrelated to the hypothesis of diversification 
and hedging decision relationship, in that 48.6 per cent of the diversified firms were 
hedging their foreign exchange exposure, with non hedging firms representing 51.4 per 
cent of the diversified firms in the sample. There is little difference between the average 
numbers of currencies used by firms in both groups. The Mann-Whitney test result 
shows that there is no significant difference in the international currency diversification
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between the hedging firms and non-hedging firms. The calculated p  value (0.54) is 
larger than the critical p  value (0.05). The hypothesis (H20) that there is a significant 
difference between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the international currency 
diversification can therefore be rejected. However, since the extent of exposure in any 
used currency is not identified, the measure adopted to measure diversification may be 
inappropriate.
The relevance o f  the foreign exchange risk
Firms may face too many risks to hedge all of their costs effectively. In this case firms 
may compare the risks and their effects on the firm's operation and choose from them 
the ones that should be hedged. In order to find out if this strategy was adopted by Saudi 
firms, the respondents were presented with some of the important risks that firms may 
experience and were asked to indicate their perception on the relevance of the different 
kind of risk to their firms. Table 9.14 presents the degree of relevance of different risks 
for both groups hedging and non-hedging firms. From the table we can see that hedging 
firms describe commodity price risk as the main risk they faced (mean = 3.76), interest 
rate risk as the second important risk (mean =3.68), the foreign exchange risk is in third 
place of the most relevant risks for the hedging firms (Mean = 3.56).
Table 9.14: The relevance of foreign exchange risk and hedging decision.
From 1 ‘not relevant’ to 5 ‘very relevant’
Variables
Mean
Hedging Firms
PR
"4or5
P» % o
PR
1or2
%
Mean
Non-hedging Firms
PR
4or5
P* %D
PR
1or2
%
Mann-
Whitney
Test
Debt risk 3.41 1.01 22.9 48.6 3.38 1.23 25.1 43.8 0.94
Interest risk 3.68 1.12 8.6 42.9 3.27 1.38 25 43.8 0.24
Commodity price risk 3.76 1.18 11.4 57.2 3.92 1.05 10.4 68.7 0.62
Political risk 3.24 1.37 28.5 34.3 3.25 1.23 27.1 39.6 0.94
Foreign exchange risk 3.56 1.05 10.7 51 3.33 1.2 27.1 39.6 0.34
Industry risk 3.06 1.15 25.7 40 3.40 1.44 27.1 54.2 0.17
On the other hand, non-hedging firms have the same worries about commodity price 
risk and choose it as the main risk which their companies suffered from (mean = 3.92), 
the second relevant risk is Industry risk (mean = 3.40), and the third relevant risk is debt 
risk (Mean = 3.38), with foreign exchange risk came fourth for their firms (Mean = 
3.33). From the Table it can be seen that 51 per cent of the hedging firms and 39.6 per 
cent of non-hedging firms agreed that foreign exchange risk is relevant to their firms.
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However, only 19 out of 48 non-hedging firms agreed that their firms were facing 
problems with foreign exchange risk but they did not take any action to minimize that 
risk. The possible explanation for that result is that the currency hedging decision is not 
solely related to currency risk and that there are other reasons behind the hedging 
decision. A company with uncontrollable non-financial risks may be highly risk averse 
with regard to currency exposure simply because this is one area that can be controlled. 
It should be mentioned that the way that the study used to present the question on the 
survey may have affected the result. While the purpose of the question was to identify 
the degree of the foreign exchange exposure faced by the respondent firms, the 
respondents may have understood the question’s purpose as to rank these risks from the 
highest relevant one to the lowest. The Mann-Whitney Test shows that there is no 
significant difference in the level of relevance of foreign exchange risk to their firms 
between the hedging firms and non-hedging firms. The calculated p  value (0.34) is 
larger than the critical p  value (0.05), which means that we can reject the hypothesis 
(21) that there is a significant difference between hedging and non-hedging firms 
regarding the relevance of foreign exchange risk to their firms.
The Volatility o f  foreign exchange rates
The decision to hedge or not to hedge may also be related to the degree of volatility of 
foreign exchange rates. In order to recognize the effect of the foreign exchange rate 
volatility in hedging decisions, the respondents were asked to identify the volatility 
level of their foreign exchange rate. Using a scale of four measures (1 = 'totally not 
volatile', and 4 = 'very volatile'), the respondents described the volatility of their foreign 
exchange rates in international trading. Table 9.15 shows that there is a difference 
between the description of the respondents about their firm's foreign exchange rate 
volatility between hedging and non-hedging firms. The respondents in non-hedging 
firms saw their foreign exchange rates as less volatile than the foreign exchange rates in 
hedging firms, in that 45.8 percent of the non-hedging firms (22 firms out of 48 firms) 
described their foreign exchange rates as totally or slightly not volatile in contrast to 
only 14.3 per cent in hedging firms. However, 54.2 per cent of the non-hedging firms 
(26 firms out of 48 firms) described their foreign exchange rate to be moderate or very 
volatile, but these firms still did not hedge their exposure. Since these non-hedging 
firms agreed that their foreign exchange rates were volatile but still they did not take 
any action there are other reasons, in addition to volatility, affecting the hedging
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decision. In order to find if the differences between hedging and non-hedging firms 
regard foreign exchange rate volatility, the Mann-Whitney Test was used.
Table 9.15: The volatility o f the firm's foreign exchange rates and hedging
decision
The variables 
; The measurement
Hedging Firms Non-Hedging
firms
Total . Chi-Square
Test
No. % No. % No. %
Totally not volatile 0 00 3 100 3 100
Slightly volatile 5 20.8 19 79.2 24 100
Moderately volatile 21 52.5 19 47.5 40 100
0.01
Very volatile 9 56.3 7 43.7 16 100
The Mann-Whitney Test results in table 9.15 show that there is a statistically significant 
difference in trading the foreign exchange rates volatility between hedging and non­
hedging firms, the calculated p  value (0.01) is less than the critical p  value (0.05). The 
hypothesis that there are significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms 
regarding foreign exchange rate volatility is accepted.
9.2.4 Multivariate Analysis
Although the above results did not provide any indication of the relative importance of 
the different factors, in this section, the determinants of the firm’s needs to hedge 
variables are examined simultaneously in a multivariate logic analysis. To examine the 
effect of the firm’s needs to hedge variables on the hedging decision the logic model is 
reported in the same way that has been used with the firm’s incentive variables model
presented in section (8.2) equation [8.11]. The logic model for the firm’s need to hedge
\variable is presented in the next equation:
PiI n ( — - ) -  A  + Px Diversification + Magnitude 1 + Magnitude2 + J3A Foreign 11 - P i
+ J35 Foreign2 + fi6 Foreign3 + (31 Relevant + /?8 Salesens +/?9 Purchasens + j3]0 
Costsens •+/?,, Cashsens+ J3n Industry + fil3 Market . + /?14 Vulnerability +/?15 
Cpmpetitionl + Cpmpetition2 +/?J7 competitor +/?)8 Acconmethod + J3]9 
Curpolicyl + fi20 Curpolicy2 +/?21 Markpolicy+£ [9.1]
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Where as
A> Constant term
Diversification The number of foreign currencies used for international trade
Magnitudel The magnitude of the currency exposure from the firm’s foreign denominated exports
Magnitude2 The magnitude of the currency exposure from the firm’s foreign denominated imports
Foreignl The company’s sales in the foreign markets
Foreign2 The company’s purchases from the foreign markets
Foreign3 The company’s debt in the foreign currencies
Relevant The relevant of the currency risk
Salesens The sensitivity of the sales volume to changes in foreign exchange rates
Purchasens The sensitivity of the purchase volume to changes in foreign exchange rates
Costsens The sensitivity of the costs to changes in foreign exchange rates
Cashsens The sensitivity of the cash flow to changes in foreign exchange rates
Industry The firm industry
Market The description of the markets that firms trade in
Volatility The volatility of the firm’s foreign exchange rates
Cpmpetitionl The sensitivity of the firm’s products demand to the changes in prices
Competition2 The difference between the firm’s products and those of their competitors.
competitor The number of competitors in the markets
Acconmethod The probability of using the accounting to minimize the effect of the currency exposure
Curpolicyl The effect of the currency policy in reducing the impact of foreign exchange rates movements
Curpolicy2 The effect of the currency policy in hindering the currency exposure management
Markpolicy The effect of the market policy in reducing the impact of foreign exchange rates movements
*° Pi\ Coefficients for each firm-specific variable
£ Residual term
Using all the hedging needs variables presented in the univariate analysis, the study 
examined whether any collinearity problem exists between the independent variables. 
Table C3, in Appendix C, shows that collinearity problems exist between two 
independent variables, ‘The sensitivity of the purchase volume to changes in foreign 
exchange rates’ and ‘The sensitivity of the profit margin to changes in foreign exchange 
rates’. In Table C3, the variable ‘The sensitivity of the purchase volume to changes in 
foreign exchange rates’ has a tolerance value of .135, which is less than the excepted 
level of more than .20. In order to minimize the effect of the collinearity problem, this 
variable was excluded from the model: The linear regression model was run again and 
the tolerances for the independent variables were checked again and this time no 
linearity problem was found, see Table C3, Appendix C. Also after running the logistic 
regression, the standardized residuals were saved and checked, the Figure C3, on 
Appendix C, shows that all the residuals lie within 2 standard deviations from the mean.
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The result of the logistic regression analysis is presented in Table 9.16. The Table 
shows that firms in the chemical and oil industry are less likely to hedge than firms in 
other industrial sectors in Saudi Arabia. As found in the univariate analysis, the logistic 
analysis reveals that firms in the food and drink, and cars and equipment industries, are 
more likely to hedge than firms in other industries, this result is statistically significant. 
Consistent with univariate analysis, the logistic regression also shows that firms in 
competitive markets are more likely to hedge. The negative sign on the coefficients of 
the price regulated market and oligopolistic market, therefore, for the log odds 
differences between them and competitive markets (the reference), indicate that the 
priced regulated market and oligopolistic market were significantly less likely to hedge. 
The 95% confidence internal results show a 95% certainty that in the population, firms 
in oligopolistic markets are between 0.3% and 48% as likely as firms in competitive 
markets to hedge. Consistent with the univariate analysis, the difference between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the currency diversification is not statistically 
significant.
While, the univariate analysis found a statistically significant difference between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the degree of volatility of the firms’ foreign 
exchange rates, results in Table 9.16 imply that firms were more likely to hedge when 
their foreign exchange rate movements increased. Firms with very volatile foreign 
exchange rates were 577 times as likely to hedge as firms with totally stable foreign 
exchange rates. However, this result is not statistically significant. Overall, the Table 
shows that firms with more foreign exchange exposure are more likely to hedge, but this 
result is not statistically significant. This replicates the same result as found in the 
univariate analysis.
The coefficients for the competition indicators have positive signs, providing support 
for the hypothesis that firms in competitive markets are more likely to hedge, but this 
support is also not statistically significant. Table 9.16, shows that firms with purchase 
volume, and costs which are highly sensitive to changes in exchange rates are more 
likely to hedge. Inconsistent with univariate analysis, the logistic regression results 
show that firms with sales volume and cash flow highly sensitive to changes in 
exchange rates are more likely not to hedge. Also inconsistent with the univariate 
analysis, currency and market policy do not have any significant effect on the hedging 
decision.
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Table 9.16: The logistic regression for the hedging needs variables
model (model 4a).
The
variable
The Indicator
Unstandar
dized
Coefficient
(B)
Sig.
Standard
ized
Coeffici
ent
Odds
ratio
Exp(B)
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)
Lower Upper
The
Industry
Chemical & Oil (the 
reference)
.204
Food & Drink (1) 7.305 .012 6.356 1487.444 5.052 437956
Electric & Electronic (2) 1.503 .204 1.308 4.494 .152 132.8
Cement, building tools, and 
furniture (3)
.002 .999 0.002 1.002 .026 38.3
Mining (4) 2.618 .277 2.278 13.708 .123 1532.4
Medical treatments & Tools 
(5)
2.134 .324 1.857 8.449 .121 588.5
Cars dealer & Equipments (6) 5.732 .018 4.988 308.715 2.704 35249
The
Markets
Competitive market (the 
reference)
.038
Price regulated market (1) -7.511 .381 -2.876 .001 .000 10798
Oligopolistic market (2) -3.295 .011 -1.261 .037 .003 .476
Diversification, (from 1 ‘one currency’ to  4 fo u r  
currencies o r m ore’)
-.832 .149 -0.283 .435 .140 1.348D
The 
volatility 
of the 
firm’s  
foreign 
exchange 
rates
Totally not volatile (the 
reference)
.329
Slightly volatile (1) 4.711 .885 1.421 111.177 .000 4969067
Moderately volatile (2) 7.673 .813 2.314 2148.626 .000 8974396
Very volatile (3) 6.359 .845 1.918 577.799 . .000 24257
The magnitude of the currency exposure 
from the firm’s  foreign denominated 
exports. (From 1 ‘no exposure’ to 4 ‘large 
ex posu re’)
1.023 .148 0.443 2.782 .695 11.136
The magnitude of the currency exposure 
from the firm’s  foreign denominated
imports. (From 1 ‘no exposure ' to  4 ‘large exposure’
1.087 .209 0.290 2.966 .545 16.144
Foreign sales. (From 1 ’no’ to 5 ’bi-ioo% ') -.835 .249 -0.400 .434 .105 1.791
Foreign purchase. (From 1 'no' to 5 *si-ioo% ’) -.454 .508 -0.170 .635 .166 2.430
Foreign debt (From 1 'no' to 5 ’8i-ioo% ') .511 .485 0.156 1.668 .397 7.007
The degree of relevance for Foreign 
exchange risk. (From 1 'Not relevant’ to 5 ‘Very 
relevant')
-.769 .188 -0.360 .463 .147 1.457
The
Competiti
on
The sensitivity of the firm’s  
product demand to the 
changes in prices
From 1 'Inelastic demand’ to 5 'Elastic 
demand’
.211 .547 0.132 .810 1.609
The difference between the 
company’s  products and 
those of their competitors
From 1 'Highly differentiated’ to 5 The 
same’
.750. .031 0.470 2.117 4.184
Sales volume sensitivity
From 1 ‘highly insensitive’ to 5 ‘highly sensitive’
-.158 .816 -0.068 .853 .225 3.233
Purchase volume sensitivity
From 1 'highly insensitive’ to 5 ‘highly sensitive'
.084 .902 .0.036 1.087 .288 4.100
Cost sensitivity .784 .431 0.312 2.189 .311 15.415
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The
variable
The Indicator
Unstandar
dized
Coefficient
(B)
Sig.
Standard
ized
Coeffici
ent
Odds
ratio
Exp(B)
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)
Lower Upper
From 1 'highly insensitive’ to 5 ‘highly sensitive’
Cash flow sensitivity
From 1 ’highly insensitive' to 5 'highly sensitive'
-1.385 .141 -0.530 .250 .040 1.580
The probability of using the accounting 
to minimize the effect of the currency 
exposure. (From 1 'disagree' to 5 'agree')
-.089 .836 -0.046 1.093 .470 2.545
The effect of the currency policy in 
reducing the impact of foreign exchange 
rate movements. (From 1 ‘disagree’ to 5 ‘agree’)
.083 .837 0.046 .921 .419 2.024
The effect of the currency policy in 
hindering the currency exposure 
management. (From 1 'disagree' to 5 ‘agree’)
-.754 .133 -0.382 2.125 .795 5.684
The effect of the market policy in 
reducing the impact o f foreign exchange 
rate movements. (From 1 'd isagree'to  5 'agree')
.468 .411 0.233 .627 .205 1.912
The Constant -2.215 .818 .109 □
Table 9.17, reports the hedging needs model (model 4a). Overall, the model can 
correctly classify 87.8% of the firms in the sample as hedging and non-hedging firms.
Table 9.17: The logistic regression analysis for the hedging needs model
(model 4a) output.
Panel A: The classification Table
The Step Observed Predicted
Hedging or non-hedging company
Non-hedging company Hedging 
company
Percentage Correct
Step 0
The model includes 
only the constant
Non-hedging
company
Hedging
company
Overall
percentage
48 0 
35 0
100.0
0.0
57.8
Step 1
The model includes 
all the independent 
variables
Non-hedging
company
Hedging
company
Overall
percentage
44 4 
6 28
91.7 
82.4
87.8
Panel B: Model Summary
Step Initial -2 Log likelihood Ending -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell Nagelkerke
“ " r  Square R Square
1 111.27 49.178 .531 •71
Panel C: Association / Predictive Efficiency
R l /Ip T r R 2 The model improve our efficient choice to hedge or 
not to hedge by
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62.097
(p = .000)
0.558 0.714 0.753 0.495 %54.9
Panel D: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-Square df Sig.
1 7.524 8 .48
This result is confirmed by a high value for the measures of the goodness-of-fit of the 
model, Gm = 62.097, and R2L = 0.558, which indicate a high relationship between 
hedging needs variables and the hedging decision. The predictive efficiency measures 
indicate that the percentage of the firms predicted incorrectly with the model differs 
significantly from the percentage of firms incorrectly predicted without the model. Ap = 
0.714, and rp = 0.753, indicating that the number of errors without the model will be 
large, and that the model significantly reduces the error of classification of firms as 
hedging and non-hedging firms. To restrict the independent variables in the model to 
those that have p  value of .10 or less, we used the stepwise logistic regression method. 
Backward elimination rather than forward inclusion was selected as the method of 
stepwise regression. Table 9.18, presents the reduced model with all hedging needs 
variables for which p  > .10 eliminated. The reduced model has only three independent 
variables, which are the industry, the competitive position, and the cost sensitivity to 
changes in foreign exchange rates.
The reduced model can correctly classify 76% of the firms in the sample as hedging and 
non-hedging firms, and this percentage is less than the one that the full model can
yn n 2  2achieve. The measures of goodness-of-fit, m = 41.114,  ^ = .364, and R = .433,
indicate a moderately strong relationship between the dependent variable and 
independent variables. The independent variables in a reduced model can be used to 
classify the firms into hedging and non-hedging firms with a moderately high degree of
accuracy, ^  = .429, and = .506. The results show that the full model (model 4a) 
works better than the reduced model (model 4b). It seems that the predicted power of 
some deleted variables affected the new model goodness-of-fit and the degree of 
accuracy.
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Table 9.18: Model 4b: Logistic regression analysis results for the hedging 
needs variables and hedging decision, variables with maximum p = 0.10
included.
Dependent
Variable
Association/
Predictive
Efficiency
Variables Unstandardized
Logistic
Regression
Sig. Odds
ratio
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)
Coefficient (b) Exp(B) Lower Upper
Hedging
Decision Gm-  41.114 
(P = 0.000)
Chemical & Oil (the 
reference)
.062
The model
Rj = 0.364 Food & Drink (1) 3.678 .010 39.571 2.397 653.18
improve 
our 
efficient 
choice to 
hedge or
R 2 = 0.433 Electric & Electronic (2 ) .737 .410 2.089 .361 12.070
Tp = 0.429 Cement, building tools, and furniture (3) .295 .764 1.343 .197 9.167
not to 
hedge by Tp = 0.506 Mining (4) .304 .804 1.355 .122 15.051
%36.4 The percentage 
of firms correctly 
classified by the 
model = 75.9 %
Medical treatments & 
Tools (5)
1.154 .335 3.172 .304 33.114
Cars dealer & 
Equipments (6)
2.813 .011 16.665 1.881 147.62
Competitive market 
(the reference)
.046
Price regulated 
market (1)
-3.339 .299 .035 .000 19.394
Oligopolistic market 
(2)
-1.227 .042 .293 .090 .956
The difference 
between the 
company’s products 
and those of their 
competitors.
.566 .009 1.761 1.154 2.687
Cost sensitivity to the 
changes in foreign 
exchange rates
-.803 .023 .448 .224 .897
The Constant .212 .892 1.236
9.3 The Determinants of the Firm’s Ability to Hedge.
9.3.1 Introduction
The firm’s ability to engage in risk management activities affects the firm's attitude to 
different kinds of financial risk. As predicted in the study framework, the increase in 
management ability and financial resources may cause firms to undertake a risk 
management strategy. High quality management may help the firm to practice risk 
management activities with less costs, low level of risk, and high level of output. This 
section's objective is to examine the effect of the determinants of the firm’s ability to 
engage in risk management practice in the foreign exchange exposure management
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decision. The layout of this section is as follows. The following section describes the 
proxies of the firm’s ability variables and presenting a general description for these 
variables. The sub-section also describes the correlations between these variables’ 
proxies and the reliability of using some of them as a group to measure some variables. 
Section 9.3.3 analyses the relationship between the firm's ability to hedge variables and 
the hedging decision using the univariate analysis. The last sub-section 9.3.4 presents 
the logistic regression analysis of the effect of the determinants of the firm’s ability to 
engage in risk management practice in the foreign exchange exposure management 
decision.
9.3.2 General description and the correlation coefficient o f proxy variables
Before presenting a general description for the determinants of the firm’s ability 
variables to hedge, Table 9.19, presents a descriptive schedule to explain how the 
different variables can be measured. For more information on how these proxies are 
generated see section 7.3.
Table 9.19: Classification o f hedging needs variables
Classification Indicator or Measurement
The c o s t  o f implementing 1. The cost of implementing the currency exposure management
hedg ing strategy 2. The distinction between hedging costs and benefit
3. The financial derivative costs
The availability o f qualified 1. The availability of qualified people in risk management
staff to deal with risk 2. The availability of qualified people to use hedging tools
m anagem ent 3. The degree of understanding the importance of currency 
exposure management
4. The ability to measure the currency exposure
The firm size 1. The total sales
2. The total assets
3. The capital
M anagem ent Qualification 1. The respondent qualification
2. The respondent qualification area
3. The length of time of working at the company
4. The length of time of experience in the current job
5. The length of time of experience in risk management
M anagem ent performance 1. The extent that the bank evaluates the firm’s financial 
performance
2. The dividend payment
3. The availability of managerial performance criteria and 
standards
4. The degree of increasing the profit
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Classification indicator or Measurement
Bank relationship 1. The number of the banks that companies deal with
2. The strong relationship with banks
3. The length of time of the relationship with bank
The availability o f local 1. The absence of forward, future, and option markets
future, forward and option 2. The financial contracts available is risky
m arkets
The availability o f risk 1. The availability of risk management policy
m anagem ent policy 2. The availability of derivatives use policy
The ability to forecast 1. The forecast of foreign exchange rates
exposure 2. The period of the forecast
The role o f operating 1. The participation in the currency risk management strategy
departm ents in risk 2. The degree of coordination between different departments
m anagem ent regarding the risk management problems
3. The degree of help in currency risk management
Risk m anagem ent Training 1. The availability of training program in risk management
program 2. The bank's recommendation about hedging currency exposure
3. Receiving leaflets from the bank on currency exposure hedging
The risk m anagem ent • Saudi, American, European, East Asian, other Arabic, and
m anager Nationality others
As can be seen from Table 9.19, there are thirteen variables which can be used to
determine the firm’s ability to hedge. Most of these variables examine the firm’s
managerial and financial ability to engage in hedging activities. It is important to give a
general statistical description for these variables regarding the whole of the study
sample. Table 9.20, presents a general description for the determinants of the firms’ 
ability to hedge foreign exchange exposure.
Table 9.20: The general statistical description of the firm’s ability to hedge
variables, Part One,
The variables The indicator_______________The M easurem ent   No. %
7  8.4
29 34.9
47 56.6
41 49.4
25 30.1
17 20.5
23 27.7
53 63.9
7 8.4
20 24.1
The risk m anager 
qualification
1. The risk manager's 
qualification level
2. The risk manager's 
qualification area
3. Length of working in 
the firm
PhD
Master
Bachelor
Management & Business 
Finance & Economic 
Accounting 
More than 10 years 
From 4 to 10 years 
Less than 3 years 
More than 10 years
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The variables The indicator The Measurement No. %
The risk 
m anagem ent 
m anager's 
nationality
Firm s ize
Bank relationship
The forecast of 
foreign exchan ge  
rates
4. Length of 
experience in current From 4 to 10 years 44 53
job Less than 3 years 19 22.9
5. Length of 
experience in risk
More than 3 years 8 9.6
management activity Less than 3 years 43 51.8
No experience 32 38.6
Saudi 27 32.5
American 4 4.8
European 8 9.6
East Asian 18 21.7
other Arabic. 25 30.1
Other nationality 1 1.2
1. Total sales Small size (between 30 m -  200 m) 26 31.3
Medium size (between 210 m -  600 m) 29 34.9
Large size (more than 610 million) 28 33.7
2. Total assets Small size (between 50m -  400 m) 19 22.9
Medium size (between 410 m -  800 m) 22 26.5
Large size (More than 810 m) 42 50.6
3. The capital Small size (between 5 m -  80 m) 30 36.1
Medium size (Between 81 m -  300 m) 27 32.5
Large size (More than 310 m) 26 31.3
1. Number of the 
banks that firms deal
More than 3 banks 37 44.6
with Between 2 to 3 banks 31 37.3
One bank 15 18.1
2. The description of 
the relationship with
Strong relationship with many banks 47 56.6
bank Good relationship with one bank 26 31.3
No special relationship with banks 10 12.0
3. The length of the 
relationship with bank
More than 7 years 54 65.1
Between 4 years to 7 years 27 32.5
Less than 3 years 2 2.4
1. Forecasting the Yes 31 37.3
foreign exchange rates No 52 62.7
2. The period of 
forecasting the future
Forecast for one year 7 22.6
exchange rates Forecast for three months 19 61.3
Forecast for one month 5 16.1
Table 9.20 part one shows that 43.3 per cent of the respondents responsible for risk 
management in the firms had qualifications above first degree (Bachelor). The 
importance of the risk management job in the firms’ business may drive firms to 
employ high qualified people. Also the Table shows that nearly half of the respondents 
of the questionnaire had management or business degrees. While, it seems that the most 
appropriate person to deal with financial risk is the one who had a finance degree, only
30.1 percent of the respondents with responsibility for risk management activity a
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finance background, and that 20.5 per cent of the respondents were accountants. As can 
be seen from the Table 9.20, part one, most of the respondents (91.6 per cent) had 
worked in their firms, for more than four years and 77.1 per cent of the respondents had 
worked in their current jobs for more than four years. However, only 24.1 per cent of 
the respondents who had experience in risk management practice for more than three 
years. Also there were 33.7 per cent of the respondents who did not have any experience 
in risk management practice.
Using total sales of the firms sample as one of the proxies for firm size, the table reports 
that the respondents were approximately split into equal groups of small, medium, and 
large firms,. Whereas using total assets as a proxy of a firm's size, the table shows that 
nearly more than half of the respondents were categorised as large size firms. As can be 
seen from the Table nearly half of the respondent firms (44.6 per cent) have a 
relationship with more than three banks, and that 56.6 per cent of the respondents 
described their relationship with banks as a strong one, and that 65.1 per cent of the 
respondents also indicated that they had relationships with banks for more than seven 
years. An unexpected result was that only 37.3 per cent of the firms in the study were 
interested in the idea of forecasting foreign exchange rates and that only 29 per cent of 
the respondents were interested in forecasting foreign exchange rates for a period of 
three months and more1.
Table 9.21, presents the second part of the general description about the firm’s ability to 
hedge variables. The Table shows that nearly half of the respondents indicated that their 
firms have risk management strategies and policy for the use of derivatives (48.2%, 
49.4, respectively). Also 39.8 per cent of the firms in the sample had run some training 
programs in risk management. 61.4 per cent of the respondents who indicated that they 
had received some leaflets and documents from their banks on how to hedge foreign 
exchange exposure, and 65.1 per cent of the respondents stated that the treasury staff in 
their banks visited their firms and given seminars on how to manage currency risk and 
the tools available, however, there were only 42.2 per cent of the firms in the sample
1 We should mention that rather that forecasting the foreign exchange rates, Saudi firms can use the 
forward market for the US dollar future exchange rates to define the magnitude o f the foreign exchange 
risk.
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who were hedging their currency risk. It may be that one possible reason for this is 
presented in the same Table. Nearly 57.8 per cent of the respondents agreed that 
implementing foreign exchange exposure management is very costly, and that 54.2% of 
the firms saw the cost of hedging foreign exchange exposure as exceeding the benefits 
that can be generated from hedging activities. In addition, 60.2% of the respondents in 
the sample saw the use of derivative instruments contracts as very costly hedging tools. 
In addition, 45.8 per cent of the respondents stated that there were no qualified staff in 
their firms to deal with currency exposure, and that nearly half (47%) of the firms 
described the financial contracts for hedging purpose as very complicated.
Table 9.21: The general statistical description of the firm’s ability to hedge
variables, part two,
The summary statistics relate to the scores obtained where respondents were asked to select a 
___________score from a 5-point scale where 1 =  d isagree, 3 = not sure, 5 =  agree.___________
Variables The Indicators Mean S.D PR
4or5
PR
1or2
The risk The firm has a policy in the derivative use 3.04 1.41 49.4 45.8
management
policy The firm has risk management strategies 3.11 1.47 48.2 45.8
Training program 
in risk
The firms run some training programs in risk 
management
2.92 1.41 39.8 48.2
management The bank’s treasury staff visit the firm to give advice on 
how to manage the currency exposure
3.60 1.60 65.1 28.9
The bank provide the firm with leaflets and documents on 
how to manage currency exposure
3.47 1.60 61.4 31.3
The foreign 
exchange
Implementing the foreign exchange exposure 
management is not costly
2.61 1.35 32.5 57.8
exposure
management
cost
We feel the benefit of hedging currency exposure is 
exceeding the cost
2.77 1.38 36.1 54.2
Using derivatives contracts in hedging are not costly 2.57 1.42 33.7 60.2
The availability 
of qualified stuff 
to deal with
We have qualified staff to deal with currency exposure 
We have qualified staff to deal with derivative contracts
3.07
3.04
1.39
1.45
47
42.2
45.8
47
currency risk We understand the relevance and importance of our 
currency exposure
2.70 1.44 38.6 55.4
We are able to measure and evaluate our currency 
exposure
2.75 1.43 39.8 53
The availability 
of risk
The absent of forward, future, and option markets do not 
affect our ability to hedge currency exposure
2.05 1.09 14.5 74.6
management
tools The financial contracts available in the markets for hedging have small amount of risk
2.46 1.26 27.7 61.4
Managerial We always pay dividend to our shareholders 3.25 1.37 55.4 38.5
Performance We have some criteria and standards to evaluate the 
management performance
3.22 1.44 49.4 41
our company’s financial performance is usually evaluated 
by banks in order to receive external finance
3.08 1.47 44.1 45.9
Our profit has been increased during the last years 3.18 1.47 48.2 41
The role of 
operating
In the company the operation departments such as sales, 
operation, marketing department have participated in the 
preparation of risk management strategies
2.73 1.35 38.6 55.4
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Variables The Indicators Mean S.D PR
4or5
PR
1or2
department in 
risk 
management 
practice
There is a high level of coordination between the different 
departments in the company regarding the risk 
management problems
2.72 1.41 36.1 55.4
Other departments usually provide us with information 
regarding the company’s currency exposure
2.61 1.31 33.7 59
Further, it can be seen from the table that 55.4 per cent of the firms in the sample 
confirmed that they have difficulty in understanding the relevance and importance of 
their currency exposure and that 53 per cent of the firms agreed that they did not have 
the ability to measure their currency , exposure with necessary accuracy. An important 
finding from Table 9.21 was that, 74.6 per cent of the respondents agreed that the 
absence of local forward, future, and option markets affected their ability to engage in 
hedging activities. The Table also shows that 49.4 per cent of the firms in the sample 
stated that they employ criteria and standards to evaluate management performance. 
Finally Table 9.21 shows that 55.4 per cent of respondents agreed that the operating 
department in their firms did not participate in the preparation of the firms’ risk 
management strategy.
The Spearman correlation coefficients between all the firms’ ability to hedge variables 
are next calculated. Table 9.22 shows that there is a positive and significant correlation 
between the proxies of the hedging costs which may give a rationale of using them as a 
group to measure the hedging cost. The hedging cost indicators are significantly 
correlated to the availability of qualified staff in risk management, the managerial 
performance and the ability to measure the currency exposure. As can be seen from the 
correlation Table, there is a positive and significant correlation between the risk 
management staff quality, the qualified staff to use derivative contracts, the 
understanding of the currency risk problem, and the ability to measure currency 
exposure. There are positive and significant associations between the firm size proxies, 
total sales, total assets, and the capital. Unexpected results are the associations between 
the management qualification proxies, in that, the Table shows that the correlations 
between the management qualification proxies are not significant with mixed signs. The 
only exception is that there is a positive and significant correlations between the 
managers’ period of work in the company and the period of work in the current job 
(significant at the 0.01 level).
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While, there are four measures of managerial performance in the table, three of these 
measures were positively and significantly correlated. There are positive and 
significant correlation between both the extent of the dividend payment, the 
availability of managerial performance criteria and standards, and the profit 
improvement during the last few years. The correlation Table shows that the 
correlations between the three measures of the bank's relationship are mixed. While 
there is a positive and significant correlation between the numbers of banks that firms 
deal with, the strongest the relationship, and between the level of the relationship and 
the period of this relationship, there is a positive but insignificant correlation between 
the number of banks firms and the period of the relationship with these banks. This 
finding may affect the rationality of using these three measures as a group to measure 
the bank relationship. As expected, the two measures of the availability of risk 
management tools are significantly and positively correlated (at the 0.01 level). Also 
the three measures of the role of the operating department in risk management are 
positively correlated at the 1% significance level. Finally, it can be seen from the 
Table that the correlation between the indicators of the risk management training 
program is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
While the findings from the correlation Table gave some indication about using the 
expected proxies or indicators as a measurement for the firm's hedging ability 
variables, the study goes further and examines the internal reliability of using these 
different indicators and proxies to measure specific variables. To estimate the internal 
reliability, Cronbach’s alpha is used and table 9.23 presents the average of all possible 
split-half reliability coefficients for the different groups of indicators. As can bee seen 
from table 9.23, the firm size proxies, the risk management policy indicators, the risk 
management training program indicators, the foreign exchange exposure management 
costs indicators, the availability of qualified staff to deal with currency exposure 
indicators, the availability of risk management tools indicators, and the role of 
operating department in risk management practice indicators are internally reliable 
since the coefficient is 0.79, 0.96, 0.82, 0.96, 0.92, 0.77, 0.93 respectively, can be 
used to measure these variables in the sample. The Table also shows that the risk 
manager's qualification proxies, the bank's relationship indicators, and the managerial
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performance indicators are not internally reliable since the coefficients are 0.17, 0.64, 
and 0.73 respectively.
Table 9.23: Reliability analysis of the proxies and indicators o f a firm’s
ability to hedge.
The variables N of N o f Alpha
c a s e s item s
The risk m anager's qualification 83 5 .17
Firm s ize 83 3 .79
Bank relationship 83 3 .64
The risk m anagem ent policy 83 2 .96
Training program in risk m anagem ent 83 3 .82
The foreign exch an ge exposure m anagem ent co s t 83 3 .96
The availability o f qualified staff to deal with currency risk 83 4 .92
The availability o f risk m anagem ent too ls 83 2 .77
Managerial Performance 83 4 .73
The role of operating department in risk m anagem ent practice 83 3 .93
In order to use these group of proxies or indicators to measure specific variables the 
internal reliability should be examined, and to do that, Table 9.24, shows the alpha 
reliability levels when each constituent indicator or proxy is deleted for each group. 
From the table, in the case of the risk management qualification, we can see that 
deleting any of the proxies does not increase the internal reliability to the accepted 
level. We can say that these proxies can not be used as a group to measure the 
manager's qualification. In that case these proxies will be used separately to measure 
specific variables except for the proxy number 3, and 4 (the length of time of working 
at the company, and the length of experience in the current job, respectively) which 
can be used as proxies for one variable since the internal reliability for them is 0.75. 
In that case the risk manager's qualification variable proxies can be divided into four 
variables, The risk manager's qualification level, the risk manager's qualification area, 
the work experience (the length of time of working at the company, and the length of 
experience in the current job), and the risk management experience. For the bank 
relationship indicators, if  we delete the indicator number 3 'the length period and 
relationship with the bank', the internal reliability is increased from 0.64 to 0.84 and
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indicators 1, and 2 become more acceptable as a measurement of the bank's 
relationship.
Table 9.24: The reliability of the different group o f indicators in the 
firm’s ability variables of each constituent indicator is deleted.
The variables Indicator Alpha if
number item
deleted
The risk 1 .06
manager's 2 .35
qualification 3 -.04
4 -.02
5 .30
The variables Indicator Alpha if
number item
deleted
The bank 1 .31
relationship . 2 .22
3 .84
The managerial 1 .95
performance 2 .57
3 .49
4 .51
Table 9.24 also shows that if we delete indicator number 1 ‘the extent that the bank 
evaluates the firm’s financial performance’ from the managerial performance 
indicator list in table 9.24, will increase the internal reliability of indicator numbers 2, 
3, and 4 as group to measure the managerial performance on the sample from 0.73 to 
0.95 and will be more acceptable.
9.3.3 Univariate analysis
This section presents an analysis for the difference between hedging firms and non­
hedging firms regarding their ability to engage in foreign exchange exposure 
management practice. This analysis will be presented next.
The risk manager's qualification degree and subject area
This study examines the effect of managerial knowledge as a measure of managerial 
ability in the hedging decision. The tests conducted used four variables: the manager's 
qualification level, the manager's subject of qualification, the manager's current job 
experience, and the risk management experience. First, this sub-section examines 
whether there is a difference between hedging managers and non-hedging managers 
regarding their qualification area and level. Table 9.25 shows that 85.7 per cent of the 
respondents who had PhDs were hedging currency exposure and that 65.5 per cent of 
the respondents who had masters degrees were hedging currency exposure. The
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Bachelor degree holders represented the lowest qualification in the Table, and that
78.7 per cent of the respondent who have this degree were not hedging currency 
exposure. The Chi-Square test for difference in qualification level indicates that the 
hedging firms and non-hedging firms are significantly different.
Table 9.25: Management qualification area and level and the hedging
decision.
The variables The measurement Hedging Firms Non-Hedging
firms
Total Chi-Square
Test
No. % No. % No. %
The
qualification
degree
PhD
Master
6
19
85.7
65.5
1
10
14.3
34.5
7
29
100
100 0.000
Bachelor 10 21.3 37 78.7 47 100
Total 35 42.2 48 57.8 83 100
The 
qualification - 
area
Management & Business 
Accounting
15
11
36.6
44
26
14
63.4
56
41
25
100
100 0.506
Finance & Economic 9 52.9 8 47.1 17 100
Total 35 42.2 48 57.8 83 100
According to the Table 9.25, there is no significant difference between hedging and 
non-hedging firms regarding the qualification area, the calculated p  value for the 
qualification area (0.506) is higher than the critical p  value (0.05).
The work and risk management experience
The management experience is an important strategic concept, and can provide a 
company with lasting competitive advantage in the market. The manager's experience 
in both his company and risk management practice would be expected to affect the 
risk management behaviour in the firm. Table 9.26 presents the relationship between 
hedging and non-hedging decision and managerial experience. As can be seen from 
the Table, 72.4 percent of the respondents who had worked in the company for less 
than 3 years were less likely to hedge currency exposure. However, the Chi-Square 
test in the Table show that there are no significant differences between hedging and 
non-hedging firms regarding the risk manager working period in the firms and their 
period of experience in their current job. One of the main important findings in the 
Table is that there is a significant difference between hedging and non-hedging firms 
regarding the period of risk management experience that the person who is 
responsible for risk management in the firms have. In that 65 per cent of the 
respondents who have more than 10 years of experience in risk management practice
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were hedging their currency exposure, and that 85.7 per cent of the respondents who 
had less than 3 years of experience in risk management practice tended to avoid 
engaging in a risky decision making, such as currency exposure management.
Table 9.26: Management experience and hedging decision.
The variables The measurement Hedging Non-Hedging Total Chi-Square
Firms firms Test
No. % No. % No. %
The length of More than 10 years 11 47.8 12 52.2 23 100
working on 
the company Between 4 to 10 years 22 41.5 31 58.5 53 100 .650
Less than 3 years 2 28.6 5 71.4 7 100
Total 35 42.2 48 57.8 83 100
The length of More than 10 years 9 45 11 55 20 100
working in 
current job Between 4 to 10 years 18 40.9 26 59.1 44 100 .954
Less than 3 years 8 42.1 11 57.9 19 100
Total 35 42.2 48 57.8 83 100
The More than 10 years 13 65 7 35 20 100
experience in 
risk Between 4 to 10 years 18 51.4 17 48.6 35 100 .000
management
practice
Less than 3 years 4 14.3 24 85.7 28 100
Total 35 42.2 48 57.8 83 100
In order to find out whether the differences in response of the two participating groups 
regarding the managerial qualification are statistically significant, the Chi-Square test 
was used. The results about the difference between hedging and non-hedging firms in 
managerial qualification are mixed. While there is significant difference between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the manager's qualification level and the 
experience in risk management practice, the previous results showed no significant 
differences between hedging and non-hedging firms in the manager's qualification 
area, the period of work in the company, and the period of work in their current job. 
The respondents were asked to identify their level of agreement on the availability of 
qualified staff in their firms to deal with financial risk problems. In addition, the 
respondents were also asked to identify their agreement regarding their staffs’ ability 
to asses the currency exposure problem. Table 9.27, shows the results of these 
inquiries.
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Table 9.27: The availability o f qualified staff to deal with financial risk
and hedging decision
(1 = ‘disagree’, 5 = ‘agree’)
Variables Indicator
Mean
Hedg
cn
, b
ing,Firms
PR
4or5
%
PR
1or2
%
Mean
Non-hedging Firms
PR
4or5cn
b  %
PR
1or2
%
Mann-
Whitney
Test
The
availability 
of qualified
We have qualified 
staff to deal with 
currency exposure
3.54 1.15 60 28.6 2.73 1.45 37.5 58.3 .008
staff to 
deal with 
Financial 
risk
We have qualified 
staff to deal with 
derivative contracts
3.37 1.14 48.6 31.4 2.79 1.61 36.5 56.4 .053
We understand the 
relevance and 
importance of our 
currency exposure
3.17 1.40 54.2 35.1 2.35 1.38 27.1 68.7 .013
We are able to 
measure and evaluate 
our currency 
exposure
3.29 1.34 57.1 31.4 2.35 1.38 25.1 70.2 .004
Average 3.34 I 2.56 i
The Table 9.27, shows that 60 per cent of the hedging respondents agreed that their 
firms had qualified staff to deal with currency exposure, whereas, only 37.5 per cent 
of the non-hedging respondents agreed that their firms had qualified staff to deal with 
currency exposure. Also the Table shows that 56.4 per cent of the non-hedging 
respondents agreed that their firms do not have qualified staff in the use of derivative 
contracts. While nearly half of the hedging respondents (48.6%) who agreed that their 
firms had qualified staff in the use of derivative contracts, however, this reason does 
not affect these firms’ decision to hedge their currency exposure. In that these firms 
may hedge using other hedging methods rather than derivative contracts or they may 
get a full support from the treasury department staff in their banks. As can be seen. 
from the Table there are 68.7 per cent of the non-hedging respondents (the mean = 
2.35) who confirm that their firms have difficulty in understanding the relevance and 
importance of their currency exposure. On the other hand, there are only 35.1 per cent 
of the hedging firms (the mean = 3.17) who have some difficulty in understanding the 
importance and relevance of their currency exposure. The Table shows that there are
70.2 per cent of the non-hedging firms who agreed that they are unable to measure 
and evaluate accurately their currency exposure but only 31.4 per cent of the hedging 
firms had the same difficulty. The Chi-Square test in Table 9.25, and 9.26, and The 
Mann-Whitney test in Table 9.27, reveal that there are significant differences between
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hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the qualification and quality of managers 
who are responsible for currency exposure problems. To some extent the hypothesis 
(H22) that there are significant differences between the two groups in having a 
qualified staff to engage in risk management activities, can be accepted.
Managerial Performance
Increasing the managerial performance in a corporation may affect the manager's 
attitude toward financial risk. This sub-section examines the effect of high managerial 
performance on the hedging decision and how the existence of managerial 
performance criteria and standards affect the manager risk behaviour. The respondents 
were asked to identify their agreement with some managerial performance indicators. 
Table 9.28 shows that there is small difference in the dividend strategy between 
hedging firms and non-hedging firms.
Table 9.28: The managerial performance and hedging decision
  _____________________________(1 = ‘disagree’, 5 = ‘agree’)________________________________
Variables Indicator I Hedging Firms Non-hedging Firms s Mann-
■ WhitneyPR PR PR PR
: ?  4or5 1or2 ^  4or5 1or2
• ©  “  nT  “
= 03 o  %  % ' S  o  %  %
Test
Managerial
performan
ce
We always pay 
dividend to our 
shareholders
3.49 1.15 60 31.4 3.08 1.50 52.1 43.7 .233
We have some 
criteria and standards 
to evaluate the 
management 
performance
3.54 1.20 54.3 28.6 2.98 1.56 45.8 50 .081
Our profit has been 
increased during the 
last years
3.57 1.17 54.3 25.7 2.90 1.60 43.8 52.1 .041
Average 3.53 i 2.99 !
An important finding from Table 9.28, is that while 50 per cent of the non-hedging 
firms’ respondents (the mean = 2.98) indicated that there were no specific criteria and 
standards which can be used to evaluate management performance, only 28.6 per cent 
of hedging firms’ respondents (the mean = 3.54) indicated that there were no specific 
criteria and standards that can be used to evaluate management performance in their 
firms.
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Figure 9.1, shows that the managerial performance criteria and standards in corporate 
risk management have a small effect on the hedging decision since only 46.3 percent 
(19 managers of 41 managers) of the firms which have criteria and standards to 
evaluate management performance were hedging their foreign exchange risk. Another 
finding which may support the argument that hedging firms have more managerial 
performance criteria than non-hedging firms is that 52.1 per cent of the non-hedging 
firms’ respondents stated that their firms’ profit had not increased during the last 
years, with, only 25.7 per cent of hedging firms respondents stating that their firms’ 
profit had not increased during the last years.
Figure 9.1: The managerial performance criteria and standards and
hedging decision
■ Hedging Manager □ Non-hedging Manager
• • 'UlliHll
Agree or rather agree Not sure Disagree or rather 
disagree
T h e  l e v e l  o f  a g r e e m e n t
In order to find out whether there are significant differences between hedging firms 
and non-hedging firms regarding the managerial performance indicators (Hypothesis, 
23), the Mann-Whitney test result is mixed. The test result revealed that there are 
significant differences between hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding profit 
improvement during the previous years (p < 0.05). Although the test showed that 
there are differences between hedging firms and non-hedging firms regarding the 
availability criteria and standards used to evaluate management performance, the 
difference is not statistically significant. The test also revealed that there were no 
significant differences between the two groups in their dividend payment to the 
shareholders.
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Risk Management Training Programs
This subsection examines the hypothesis which focuses on the impact that risk 
management training has. on the foreign exchange exposure management policy in a 
firm. The trainees learn new theories and methods about risk management. Regarding 
this simple idea, the trainees are challenged to apply the risk management theories and 
methods to real situations in their firms. The training programs invited the trainees to 
think about their risk management attitudes and to assess their firms' foreign exchange 
risk. The respondents were asked to identify whether their firms had any risk 
management training programs and to point out to what extent their banks helped in 
risk management practice, the results are presented in Table 9.29. The Table shows 
that 60 per cent of the hedging firms (the mean = 3.40) had run risk management 
training programs, while only 25 percent of the non-hedging firms (the mean = 2.56) 
had run risk management training programs.
Table 9.29: The risk management training program and the hedging
decision.
________________________________(1 = ‘disagree’, 5 = ‘agree’)________________________________
>Variables Indicator > Hedging Firms Non-hedging Firms Mann-
i   ; Whitney: PR PR PR PR  T(a, t
‘ 4or5 1or2 ^  4or5 1or2 °f © « ® ;§> o % % » o % % ;
We run some training 3.40 1.40 60 34.1 2.56 1.32 25 58.1 .009
program in risk 
management practice
Bank’s staff visit us 4.20 1.41 82.9 14.3 3.17 1.60 52.1 39.6 .002
and tell us how to 
hedge currency 
exposure
We receive some 3.94 1.51 77.1 20 3.13 1.58 50 39.6 .013
leaflets, document,
and recommendation
from the bank
regarding the
currency exposure
management _ „ ___ _ __
3.85 ' 2.93 !
Figure 9.2, shows that training programs in corporate risk management give managers 
a positive experience since 63.6 percent (21 managers out of 33 managers) of the 
managers who have had training programs were hedging their foreign exchange risk. 
An important finding from the table is that 82.9 percent of the respondents in hedging 
firms agreed that the bank’s staff visited them and gave them advice on how to 
manage their currency exposure. In addition, 77.1 per cent of the respondents in
Risk
manageme 
nt training 
program
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hedging firms agreed that they received leaflets, documents, and recommendations 
from their bank on how to manage currency exposure. As seen in the above analysis, 
differences between hedging and non-hedging firms do exist regarding the extent of 
the risk management training program in each group. However, the question is 
whether these differences are statistically significant?
Figure 9.2: The risk management training program and hedging decision
£203znCO
c5
(A
03S2
3D
25
20
15
10
5
0
El Hedging Manager s  Non-hedging Manager
21
Agree or rather agree
-23.
42-
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’ •Xjjj*' Jffrb 4
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ *
xM »+-4■♦♦♦♦x
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ x♦♦♦♦x♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ x
♦ X**-+'
Not sure Disagree or rather 
disagree
T h e d e g r e e  o f  a g r e e m e n t
The Mann-Whitney test results show that there are significant differences between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the extent of the risk management training 
programme and the advice from the bank. For the risk management training program 
indicators were presented in Table 9.29, the null hypothesis (H24, see Chapter 7) was 
accepted (p < 0.05).
The Banking Relationship
As found in the previous subsection, there was a significant relationship between the 
hedging decision and the help that firms receive a from their banks. In this subsection, 
the analysis will examine more deeply the effect that the relationship with banks may 
have on the firms’ attitude towards currency risks. The respondents were asked to 
describe the number of banks they deal with and the level of their relationship with 
the banks. As seen from Table 9.30, hedging increased when firms dealt with more 
than one bank. However, this does not mean that firms which deal with more than 
three banks are more likely to be hedging firms. While 86.7% of the firms which dealt
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with only one bank were non-hedging firms, 54.1% of the firms that dealt with more 
than three banks were also non-hedging firms.
Table 9.30: The bank relationship and hedging decision
The variables The measurement Hedging Non-Hedging Total Chi-Square
Firms firms Test
No. % No. % No. . %
The number of More than three banks 17 45.9 20 54.1 37 100
the banks that Two to three banks 16 51.6 15 48.4 31 100 .027
company deal 
with
One bank 2 13.3 13 86.7 15 100
The strength 
of the
Strong relationship with many 
banks
25 53.2 22 46.8 47 100
.039
relationship 
with bank
Good relationship with one 
bank
6 23.1 20 76.9 26 100
No special relationship 4 40 6 60 10 100
One of the important advantages for hedging firms in contrast with non-hedging firms 
is that 71.4 percent of the hedging firms described their relationship with banks to be 
strong. Since the Chi-Square test reveals that there are significant differences between 
hedging and non-hedging firms in their level of relationship with banks, the null 
hypothesis (H25, there are significant differences in the banks relationship between 
hedging and non-hedging firms) can be accepted.
Firm Size
The size of companies is measured using three different proxies which are total sales, 
total assets, and capital. According to the total sales, responding companies are 
classified into three categories; Small (from SR30m to less than SR200m), Medium 
(from SR210 to less than SR 600m), and Large (more than SR 610m). Using total 
assets as a measure of size, the firms in the sample are also divided into, Small (from 
SR50m to less than SR400m), Medium (from SR410 to less than SR 780m), and 
Large (more than SR 790m). Regarding capital, the firms in the sample are divided 
into three categories, Small (from SR5m to less than SR70m), Medium (from SR80m 
to less than SR 300m), and Large (more than SR 310m).
Table 9.31, shows that 64.3% of large sales respondent companies (more than SR 
610m) were hedging their currency exposure, with only 35.7% of the large size firms 
not hedging. However, using the total assets as a measure for size, we can see that
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52.4 percent of the large size firms were hedging their exposure but, consistent with 
theoretical expectation, the table shows that 78.9 percent of the small firms were not 
hedging. In the same vein, this argument uses capital as a measure of size. The table 
shows that only 36.7% of the small size firms were hedging their currency exposure, 
with this percentage increasing to 53.8% for large firms.
Table 9.31: The firms’ size and hedging decision.
The variables The measurement Hedging Non-Hedging Total Chi-Square
Firms firms Test
No. % No. % No. %
The Total Large (more than SR 610m) 18 64.3 10 35.7 28 100
sa les Medium (from SR210 to less 
than SR 600m)
11 37.9 18 62.1 29 100 .007
Small (from SR30m to less 
than SR200m)
6 23.1 20 76.9 26 100
The Total Large (more than SR 790m) 22 52.4 20 47.6 42 100
a ssets Medium (from SR410 to less 
than SR 780m)
9 40.9 13 59.1 22 100 .062
Small (from SR50m to less 
than SR400m)
4 21.1 15 78.9 19 100
The Capital Large (more than SR 310m) 14 53.8 12 46.2 26 100
Medium (from SR80m to less 
than SR 300m)
10 37 17 63 27 100 .349
Small (from SR5m to less 
than SR70m)
11 36.7 19 63.3 30 100
While the Table shows that there are differences between hedging firms and non­
hedging firms size-wise using total sales, total assets, or capital as measures for firm 
size, the question still remains as to whether these differences are statistically 
significant. The Chi-Square test results are mixed, in that, when the total sales are 
used as a size proxy, the test reveals that the two groups are significantly different in 
size. The calculated p  value (0.007) is smaller than the critical p  value (0.05). 
Whereas, the capital used as a size proxy, the test reveals that the two groups are not 
significantly different in size. The calculated p  value (0.349) is larger than the critical 
p  value (0.05). The Chi-square test also reveals that, when the total assets are used as 
a measure of a firm's size, the two groups are just significantly different in size, with 
the calculated p  value (0.062) just over the critical p  value (0.05). It can be concluded 
that using only the total sales as a measure of firm size, the hypothesis (H26, hedging 
decision is positively correlated with firm size) can be rejected.
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The availability o f risk management policy and local market for risk 
management tools
As predicted in the theoretical framework chapter 7, a firm with a risk management 
strategy is more likely to hedge its currency exposure. For firms to hedge they should 
have easy access to the local market for risk management financial tools. Having 
difficulty in obtaining an appropriate instrument contract to hedge, may affect the 
firm’s attitude towards currency exposure management. In order to examine these 
predictions, the respondents were asked to point out the availability of risk 
management policies in their firms and the availability of local markets for risk 
management financial contracts in Saudi Arabia. Table 9.32 presents the results of the 
respondents’ perceptions.
Table 9.32: The availability of risk management policy and local market 
for risk management instrument contracts and hedging decision.
____________________________ (from 1 = ‘disagree’ to 5 = ‘agree’)_____________________________
Variables Indicator Hedging Firms Non-hedging Firms Mann-
PR PR PR
4or5 1or2 4or5w ^ m .»w o % % m ■ a %
2.79 1.53 39.6 56.3 .021
2.69 1.45 34.3 60 .008
1.94 1.04 10.4 77.1
.299
2.27 1.22 22.9 68.8 .112
According to Table 9.32, most of the respondents in hedging firms (60%) agreed that 
their firms have risk management policy, and that 61.9 per cent of the respondents in 
hedging firms (the mean = 3.51) point out that their firms have a policy for derivatives 
use. While the Table shows that there are 39.6% of the respondents in non-hedging 
firms who confirmed that their firms have risk management strategy. While most of 
these firms suffered from currency exposure it seems that these firms could be
The
availability 
of risk 
manageme 
nt policy
The
availability 
of local 
future, 
forward and 
option 
markets
The firm has risk 
management policies
The firm has a policy 
in the derivative use
The absence of 
forward, future, and 
option markets do not 
affect the firm’s ability 
to hedge currency , 
exposure
3.54 1.27 60 31.5
3.51 1.22 61.9 27.5
2.20  1.16 20 71 4
The financial 
contracts available in 
the markets for 
hedging have small 
amount of risk
2.71 1.30 34.3 51.4
PR
1or2
%
Test
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classified as adopting a risk ignorance strategy (see the exploratory chapter). Figure 
9.3, shows that 52.5% (21 out of 40 firms) of the respondents who agreed or rather 
agreed that their firms had a risk management policy, were hedging their currency 
exposure, while a high percentage of 47.5% of the respondent who agreed or rather 
agreed that their firms had risk management policy but did not hedge their currency 
exposure. This result may weaken the argument that the availability of risk 
management policy should encourage the firm to hedge. While the results presented 
above from Table 9.32 and Figure 9.3 do not give a clear picture about the effect of 
the availability of risk management policy on the currency exposure management 
decision, the Mann-Whitney test result, as shown in Table 9.32, reveals that the 
hedging and non-hedging firms are significantly different regarding the availability of 
risk management policy, thus the hypothesis (H27) is acceptable.
Figure 9.3: The risk management policy and hedging decision
□  Hedging Manager El Non-hedging M anager
40 
35 
30 
25The number
offirms 2015
10 
5 
0
Agree or rather Not sure  D isagree  or 
ag ree  rather d isagree
The agreement level
Regarding the availability of a local market for risk management instrument contracts, 
Table 9.32 shows that both the hedging and non-hedging respondents agreed that the 
absence of forward, future, and option markets in Saudi Arabia affected their firms 
choice to hedge or not to hedge. In addition, an important reason that may drive some 
firms to choose not to hedge is that, the Table shows that 68.8 per cent of non-hedging
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firms (mean = 2.27) saw the financial contracts which are available as very risky 
contracts. In order to find whether there are any significant differences between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the availability of the risk management 
instrument contracts, the Mann-Whitney test was adopted. The test shows that there 
are no significant differences between the two groups. The null hypothesis (H28) that 
there are no significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding 
the availability of local markets for risk management instrument contracts is accepted.
The cost o f implementing hedging strategy
While, it was found earlier that risk management activities can lead to the 
enhancement of value for shareholders (see section, 8.2), it also has costs to be offset 
against this benefit. Hedging costs are an important factor in a decision making of 
whether or not to hedge foreign exchange rate exposure. As predicted in section 
(7.3.2.4), the costs associated with hedging strategy plays a role in a firm’s decision to 
hedge its foreign exchange risk. It expected that the firm is more likely to hedge, if the 
manager feels that the costs of hedging are at an acceptable level. The cost associated 
with particular hedging tools is important when a firm chooses to adopt its risk 
management strategy. In order to examine the effect of hedging cost in the hedging 
decision, this study uses direct measures by directly asking the respondents to identify 
their perceptions about the cost of implementing hedging activities. According to the 
results in Table 9.33, 57.1 per cent of the hedging respondents (the mean = 3.37) 
agreed with the statement that implementing the foreign exchange exposure 
management is not costly, while only 14.6 per cent of the non-hedging respondents 
(the mean = 2.06) held the same view. The Table also shows that a high percentage of 
the hedging firms (60%) agreed that the benefit of the hedging activity exceeded the 
cost of hedging. This finding can be more clearly seen in Figure 9.4, in that 71.1 per 
cent of the firms (32 firms out of 45 firms) in the sample which disagreed that the 
benefit of the hedging activity exceeded their cost, were not hedging their currency 
exposure and that 67.7% of the firms (21 firms out of 31 firms) in the sample who 
agreed that the benefit from the hedging activity exceeded their costs, were hedging 
their currency exposure.
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Table 9.33: The cost of implementing hedging strategy and hedging
decision.
 (From 1 = ‘disagree’ to 5 = ‘agree’)__________________
Variables Indicator Hedging Firms
PR
4or5
%
PR
1or2
Non-hedging Firms
PR
4or5
%
PR
1or2
%
Mann-
Whitney
Test
The co st of Implementing the 3.37 1.40 57.1 34.3 2.06 1.02 14.6
implementi foreign exchange
ng hedging exposure
strategy management is not
costly ......... ......... ........... ....................... .................
We feel the benefit of 3.43 1.40 60 37.2 2.29 1.18 20.8
hedging currency 
exposure is
exceeding the cost _ . . .
Using derivatives 3.11 1.55 51.4 45.7 2.17 1.17 20.8
contracts in hedging 
are not costly
75 .000
66.7 .000
70.8 .005
While, most of the companies in Western countries were hedging using mainly 
derivative contracts (Mian, 1996; Tufano, 1996), the cost of hedging contracts may 
exceed the ability of the Saudi firms to finance the use of these contracts since most of 
the non-hedging firms (70.8%) thought that using derivative contracts is very costly, 
and this may affect their choice to engage in hedging activity. However, this reason 
seems to be less important for the hedging decision since 45.7 per cent of the hedging 
firms disagreed with the statement that the use of derivatives was not costly. In order 
to examine whether there are significant differences between hedging firms and non­
hedging firms regarding their perception towards the cost of implementing a hedging 
strategy, the Mann-Whitney test was adopted. The test results show that there are 
statistically significant differences between hedging firms and non-hedging firms 
regarding their perception towards the cost of implementing a hedging strategy, and 
we can accept this hypothesis (H29).
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Figure 9.4: The effect of the feeling that the benefit from hedging is
exceeding the cost
B  Hedging Manager B  Non-hedging Manager
Disagree Dr rather disagree
___;Not sure
l- or rather agree
The number of the firms
The ability to forecast foreign exchange rate
One of the main skills which can help firms to measure currency exposure is their 
ability to forecast expected foreign exchange rate future movements. Firms can not 
decide whether to hedge or not unless to some extent they can have some view 
regarding the future movements of the exchange rate. In order to examine the effect of 
the forecasting ability on the hedging decision, the respondents were asked to point 
out if they forecast the foreign exchange rate and the period that their forecast 
covered. As can be seen from Table 9.34, all of the hedging firms forecast the foreign 
exchange rate they were exposed to, and 67.3 per cent of the firms which forecast 
their foreign exchange rates hedged their currency risk. The Table shows that there 
are statistically significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms in 
their ability to forecast the foreign exchange rate movements and in the period that the 
forecast covered. The hypothesis (H30) can be accepted.
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Table 9.34: The foreign exchange rates forecast and hedging decision
The variables The measurement Hedging Non-Hedging Total Chi-Square
Firms firms Test
No. % No. % No. %
Forecasting
the foreign Yes 35 67.3 17 32.7 52 100 .000
exchange No 0 00 31 100 31 100
rates
movements
The forecast Up to One year 14 82.4 3 17.6 17 100
covering Up to three months . 21 84 4 16 25 100 .029period
Up to one month 0 00 10 100 10 100
The role o f the operating departments in risk management
As found in the exploratory study, the high level of inter relationship between 
departments in the firm may help, to some extent, to asses the currency exposure and 
to take action against currency exposure. Providing the risk manager with enough 
information about the firm's exports and imports before and after the process and how 
changes in prices may affect demand, will help the risk manager to choose an 
appropriate decision to hedge or not to hedge. The respondents of the survey were 
asked to describe the role of their operating departments in the risk management 
process. A summary of the respondents’ perceptions is presented in Table 9.35. As 
expected, Table 9.35 shows that, 73 per cent of the non-hedging respondents agreed 
that there is a low level of coordination between the different department in the 
company. This result can be confirmed in Figure 9.5, in that 76.1% (35 firms out of 
46 firms) of the respondents who suffer from the limitation in participation in 
operating departments in the preparation of the risk management strategy decided not 
to hedge their currency exposure. The Figure also shows that 66.7% of the 
respondents who confirmed the participation of their operating departments in the 
preparation of the risk management strategy did hedge their currency exposure. As 
mentioned by one of the interviewees, he usually received limited information from 
other departments, such as the purchasing and marketing departments, which made it 
difficult to estimate the severity of the currency exposure which affected his decision 
to hedge.
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Table 9.35: The role of the operating departments in risk management 
process and hedging decision.
(From 1 = ‘disagree’ to 5 = ‘agree’)
Indicator Hedging Firms Non-hedging Firms Mann-
PR PR PR 4or5 PR WhitneyTestMean COb  %
1or2
%
Mean CO %b
1or2
%
There is a high level of 
coordination between the 
different departments in 
the company
3.43 1.22 54.3 31.5 2.21 1.32 22.9 72.9 .000
Other departments usually 
provide us with information 
regarding the company’s 
currency exposure
3.23 1.21 51.4 37.1 2.17 1.19 20.8 75 .000
The same result can be summarized from Table 9.35, in that 75 per cent of the non­
hedging firms’ respondents were affected by the limitation of the information from 
the operating departments regarding the currency exposure problem.
Figure 9.5: The role of operating departments in the preparation of risk
management strategy
El Hedging Manager ■  Non-hedging M anager
Agree or rather 
agree
Not sure
The number 2D
of the firms
D isagree  or 
rather d isag ree
The level of agreement
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The hypothesis (H31) is accepted, since the Mann-Whitney test result reveals that the 
differences, between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the role of the 
operating departments in the risk management strategy, are statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level.
The risk manager's nationality
The exploratory study gave some indication that the risk manager's nationality may 
play a role in the hedging decision. The exploratory study showed that of the six risk 
managers who hedged four of them were from Asia and European countries. This 
subsection examines the effect of the risk manager's nationality on the hedging 
decision. The respondents were asked to identify their nationality. Table 9.36 presents 
a summary of the risk manager's nationality in the sample.
Table 9.36: The nationality of the risk manager and hedging decision
The variables The measurement Hedging
Firms
No. %
Non-Hedging
firms
No. % No.
Total
%
Chi-Square
Test
The risk Saudi 8 29.6 19 70.3 27 100
manager Other Arabic nationality 7 28 18 72 25 100
nationality American 2 50 2 50 4 100 .011
European 4 50 4 50 8 100
East Asian (Japan, India, and 14 77.8 4 22.2 18 100
Pakistan)
Other nationality 0 00 1 100 1 100
The Table shows that, when risk managers come from foreign countries the 
probability of hedging increased. The possible reason for this is the experience that 
these managers may have through their work in their countries, since most studies in 
Western Europe, America, and Japan found that most of the MNCs in these countries 
were hedging their currency exposure. Also most of these countries have an easy 
access to the forward, future, or option contracts markets. The Chi-Square test result 
in the Table reveals that the differences in a risk manager's nationality between 
hedging and non-hedging firms are statistically significant. This leads us to accept the 
hypothesis (H32, see section 7.3.2.4).
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9.3.4 Multivariate Analysis
The aim of this section is to examine the influence of the firm’s ability to hedge in 
the hedging decision using a multivariate logic analysis. The logic model which will 
be used in this section, is derived from the equation [8.11] and given by equation 
[9.2].
PiIn (-— —) = A> + /?, Qdegree +j32 Qsubject + Jobexperiencel + p A 1 -  Pi
Jobexperience2 + J35 riskexperience + J36 Quality + p1 Training +/?8 
Bankl + J3g Bank2 +/?10 Bank3 + J3U Perform + J3n Forecast + /?13 
Nationality + J3U Sales + /?15 Assets +j3]6 Policy + /?I7 Tools + /?I8 Cost 
+ J3]9 Department + £
[9.2]
Constant term
The manager qualification degree 
The manager qualification subject 
The length period of working at the company 
The length of experience in the current job 
The length experience in risk management 
The availability of qualified staff in risk management 
The risk management training program 
The bank's contribution to the risk management strategy 
The number of banks that the firm deals with 
The relationship with the bank 
The Total Sales 
The Total Assets
The availability of risk management policy 
The availability of financial hedging contracts 
The cost of implementing hedging strategy 
The manager's nationality 
The management performance 
The forecast of foreign exchange rates
The operating department participation in risk management strategy
Coefficients for each firm-specific variables 
Residual term
Where
A
Qdegree
Qsubject
Jobexperiencel
Jobexperience2
riskexperience
Qualityl
Training
Bankl
Bank2
Bank3
Sales
Assets
Policy
Tools
Cost
Nationality
Perform
Forecast
Department
P\ t0 P\ 9 
£
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Before running the logistic regression analysis, we checked to see if  any collinearity 
problems exist between the independent variables. Table 9.37, shows that a 
collinearity problem exists between some of the independent variable proxies. The 
Table shows that the collinearity problem exists between the proxies of the 
availability of qualified staff to deal with currency risk, the cost of implementing 
hedging strategy, the management performance, the availability of risk management 
tools, the manager's length of work in the company, and the capital, the availability of 
a risk management policy, the role of the operating department in risk management 
activity, and the bank's contribution in the currency risk management.
Table 9.37: Testing the collinearity in the hedging ability determinants
model.
The independent variable . Tolerance The independent variable Tolerance
the respondent qualification .649 The relationship with bank .273
The respondent qualification area .534 The total sales .295
Length of working in a company .202 The total assets .356
The length of experience in your current 
job
.174 The capital .174
The length or period of experience in 
risk management practice
.550 In the company we have risk 
management strategies .062
in the company we have a qualified 
people to deal with risk management .047
In the company we have a policy of the 
use of financial derivatives .056
In the company we have qualified 
people on how to use the risk 
management tools
.054 The absence of the forward, future, and option markets do not affect our ability to 
hedge the foreign exchange exposure
.610
We do not have any difficult in 
understanding the relevance and 
importance of our currency exposure
.062 The risk management tools available in the markets to hedge the foreign 
exchange exposure are not that risky
.116
It is not that difficult to measure our 
currency exposure with the necessary 
accuracy
.067 Implementing the foreign exchange risk is not costly .132
We always pay dividend to our 
shareholders .133
We feel the benefit of hedging is 
exceeding the cost from it .102
We have some criteria and standards to 
measure the managerial performance .080
Using derivatives for hedging is not costly .120
Our profit has increased during the last 
yearsD .091
Forecasting the future foreign currency 
cash flow
.419
we run some training program in 
hedging FXR
.429 In the company, the operating 
departments such as sales department 
and purchase departments are 
participating in the preparation of the risk 
management strategy
.112
banks visit us and tell us how to hedge 
FXR .185
There is a high level of coordination 
between the different departments in our 
company
.113
receive some leaflets and 
recommendations on how to manage 
FXR
.206 Other department usually provides me with relevant information about the foreign 
exchange exposure in the company
.239  ‘
Banks dealing .280 The nationality of the one who is 
responsible for risk management
.608
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In order to solve the collinearity problem, the proxies for each independent variable 
(exhibiting a collinearity problem) were combined with each other to generate a union 
tied measure for each variable. After that was done, the collinearity test was run again 
and the results in Table 9.38 show that the collinearity problem has been reduced 
using the new organisation for the independent variables.
Table 9.38: Re-testing the collinearity in the hedging ability determinants
model.
The independent variable Tolerance The independent variable Tolerance
the respondent qualification .773 The relationship with bank .369
The respondent qualification area .714 The total sales .334
Length of working in a company .507 The total assets .404
The length or period of experience in 
risk management practices
.718 The availability of risk management 
strategy
.609
The availability of qualified staff to deal 
with currency risk
.593 The availability of the currency risk 
management tools (Derivative contracts)
.715
The management Performance .649 The cost of implementing the foreign 
exchange risk management
.539
we run some training program in 
hedging FXR
.525 Forecasting the future foreign currency 
cash flow
.526
The banks contribution on the currency 
risk management strategy
.506 The participation of the operating 
departments in currency risk management 
strategy
.496
Banks dealing .325 The nationality of the one who is 
responsible for risk management
.755
Also Figure C4, in Appendix C, shows that all the residuals lie within 3 standard 
deviations from the mean. The coefficients for the firm’s ability variables estimated 
by the logistic regression model are summarised in Table 9.39. Consistent with the 
univariate analysis, managers with a higher degree, such as a PhD or Masters, were 
significantly more likely to hedge. The Table shows that the manager's qualification 
subject does not significantly affect the hedging decision. While, it can be suggested 
from the positive coefficient that managers who have more experience in their current 
jobs, more than 10 years, were more likely to hedge, this is not statistically 
significant. As found in the univariate analysis, managers with more experience in 
risk management activities were more likely to hedge and this is statistically 
significant at the .10 (90% confidence) level. The positive coefficient for the effect of 
the availability of qualified staff in risk management activity supports its effect on the 
hedging decision, but this effect is not statistically significant. This clearly contradicts 
the hypothesis that hedging firms have more qualified staff in risk management 
practice. The Table shows that the firms with a managerial performance evaluation
327
Chapter Nine The Determinants o f Hedging Decision: Empirical Evidence Two
and reward system were not significantly more likely to hedge. It can be seen from the 
Table that firms with a strong relationship with banks were more likely to hedge, and 
this is statistically significant in the 0.10 (90% confidence) level.
Table 9.39: The logistic regression for the hedging ability variables model
(model 5a).
The variable
Unstandardized
Coefficient
(B)
S.E. Wald Sig.
Standardize
d
Coefficient
the respondent qualification 
degree
5.011 2.009 6.223 .013 1.174
The respondent qualification area 1.735 1.686 1.059 .303 0.494
Length of working in a company .180 1.261 .020 .886 0.037
The length or period of 
experience in risk management 
practice
3.617 2.214 2.668 .102 0.991
The availability of qualified staff to 
deal with currency risk
.436 .545 .640 .424 0.225
The management Performance .289 .587 .242 .623 0.153
we run some training program in 
hedging FXR
.663 .468 2.006 .157 0.337
The banks contribution on the 
currency risk management 
strategy
.748 .707 1.119 .290 0.431
Banks dealing -2.539 2.482 1.047 .306 -0.686
The relationship with bank 3.462 2.115 2.680 .102 0.874
The total sales .442 1.677 .070 .792 0.129
The total assets 2.115 2.057 1.058 .304 0.625
The availability of risk 
management strategy
.137 .526 .068 .794 0.070
The availability of the local market 
for currency risk management 
tools
-.796 .604 1.733 .188 -0.249
The cost of implementing the 
foreign exchange risk 
management
2.877 1.437 4.006 .045 1.400
The participation of the operating 
departments in currency risk 
management strategy
.911 .645 1.994 .158 0.443
The nationality of the one who is 
responsible for risk management
1.501 .819 3.357 .067 0.866
Forecasting the future foreign 
currency cash flow
3.020 1.939 1.778 .030 0.533
The constant 5.011 2.009 6.223 .013
There is a positive relationship between a firm's size and the hedging decision, and the 
standardized coefficient for a firm's total assets indicates that the total assets would 
work better as a predictor for the hedging decision than total sales. However, both 
total sales and total assets were not statistically significantly. Inconsistent with
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univariate analysis, the logistic regression analysis shows that the effect of the 
availability of the risk management policy on the hedging decision was not 
statistically significant. An unexpected result in terms of the respondents’ opinion is 
the negative coefficient for the effect of the availability of the local market for 
financial hedging tools on the hedging decision. However, this can be explained by 
the relationship between hedging and the strength of the banking relationship and the 
fact that local banks can still access international financial markets. As found in the 
univariate analysis, the logistic regression significantly supports the hypothesis that 
the cost of implementing the hedging strategy affects the hedging decision. Regarding 
the nationality of the risk managers, the Table reported that risk managers who hedge 
and those who did not, were significantly different in their nationalities. Table 9.40, 
reports the description of the determinants of the hedging ability full model (5a). 
Overall, compared to the previous models discussed in this chapter and previous 
chapters, the determinants of the hedging ability model looks to be the best model to 
fit the hedging decision. As demonstrated by Table 9.40, the model can correctly 
classify 92.8% of the firms in the sample as hedging and non-hedging firms. This 
result is confirmed by the goodness-of -fit measures, in that both GM = 85.315, and
RI = .755, were high, indicating that the determinants of the hedging ability variables 
contributed significantly in explaining the hedging decision.
As can be seen from Table 9.40, both Ap = .826, and r p = .852, were very high, 
indicating that the determinants of the hedging ability allow us to classify the firms in 
the sample into hedging and non-hedging firms with very high degree of accuracy. In 
order to contribute to the final model of the study, the reduced model only contains 
variables that have p  < .10. Table 9.41, presents the reduced model (model 5b) with 
all variables for which P > .10 was eliminated. The variables included in this model 
are, the manager's qualification level, the risk management experience, the risk 
management training program, the bank relationship, the cost of implementing the 
risk management strategy, the contribution of the operating department to the hedging 
decision, and the risk manager's nationality.
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Table 9.40: The logistic regression analysis for the determinants of the 
hedging ability model (model 4a) output.
Panel A: The classification Table
The Step Observed Predicted
Hedging or non-hedging Percentage Correct
company
Non-hedging Hedging 
company company
Step 0
The model includes 
only the constant
Non-hedging 48 
company
Hedging company 35
Overall percentage
0
0
100.0
0.0
57.8
Step 1
The model includes 
all the independent 
variables
Non-hedging . 45 
company
Hedging company 3
Overall percentage
3
32
93.8
91.4
92.8
Panel B: Model Summary
Step Initial -2 Log Ending -2 Log 
likelihood likelihood “ DM ”
Cox & Snell 
R Square
Nagelkerke 
R Square
1 113.018 27.702 .642 .86
Panel C: Association / Predictive Efficiency
Gu R J  ■^ p Tp d 2 The model improve our efficient choice ^  to hedge or not to hedge by
85.315 0.755 0.826 0.852 0.743 %75.5
(p = .000)
Panel D: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-Square df Sig.
1 1.185 8 .99
Table 9.41 shows that the reduced model can be used more accurately to classify the 
firms into hedging and non-hedging firms. The model can classify 96.4% of the firms 
in the sample correctly, and this is a high percentage. The high percentage of R) = 
.81, indicates that the inclusion of the independent variables in the model reduces 
significantly the variation (as measure by the initial -2 log likelihood, 113,018). The 
Table shows that the relationship between the hedging decision and the reduced
s~>model independent variables is highly and statistically significant, m = 91.526 with
8 degrees of freedom, p  = .000. The indices of the predictive efficiency, ^  = .914,
and rp = .926, indicate a model that highly predicts the correct classification of the 
firms in the sample as hedging and non-hedging firms.
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Table 9.41: Model 5b: Logistic regression analysis results for the 
determinants of the firms’ ability to hedge reduced model, variables with 
maximum p = 0.10 included.
Dependen 
t Variable
Association/
Predictive
Efficiency
Variables* Unstandardized
Logistic
Regression
Sig. Odds
ratio
95.0% C.I. for 
EXP(B)
Coefficient (b) Exp(B) Lower Higher
Hedging
Decision Gm = 91 .526  
(P = 0.000)
Postgraduate 
qualification (1)
7.816 .006 2480.36 9.347 658179
R*=. 81 Risk management training program -2.269 .010 .103 .019 .576
The model 
improve 
our 
efficient 
choice to
R 2 = .8 4 6  
A p = .914
Strong relationship 
with banks (the 
reference)
Good relationship with 
banks
-8.313
.034
.011 .000 .000 .154
hedge or 
not to 
hedge by
Tp = .926 No special relationship with 
banks
-6.330 .018 .002 .000 .335
%81 The percentage 
of firms correctly 
classified by the 
model = 96.4%
The cost of 
implementing the risk 
management strategy
The participation of 
the operating 
department in 
currency exposure 
management
-2.783
-2.351
.009
.003
.062
.095
.008
.020
.499
.457
The length or period 
of experience in risk 
management 
practices
1.543 .043 .256 .023 .511
Arabic Nationality (the 
reference)
.046
Western Country (1) .748 .693 2.113 .052 86.622
East Asian (2) 7.334 .013 1531.09 4.711 497569
The constant 21.499 .003 21729D - -
* For the reason o f  the collapse when running the logistic  regression analysis, the qualification variable was divided into two  
proxies, undergraduate and postgraduate qualification. A lso  the nationality variable was divided in to three categories, Arabic 
nationality, Western country, and W est Asian.
9.4 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the effect of the contingent theory on the currency 
management decision. This chapter has stressed the importance of the firm’s context 
in the hedging decision. It highlights the effect of the firm's internal and external 
environment under two headings; the firm's ability to hedge and the firm's need to 
hedge. In this chapter we have examined the evidence on the main differences 
between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the industries that these firms work 
in, the market where these firms trade, the level of competition that these firms face,
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the currency and market policies that these firms face, the degree of volatility in these 
firm's foreign exchange rates, and the effect of changes in the exchange rates in the 
firm's operation. The findings suggest that hedging firms in Saudi Arabia possess a 
strong hedging need in the risk management decision. The hedging decision in the 
Saudi firms has a strong relationship to those of their main competitors, strong enough 
to encourage these firms to engage in hedging activity. This scenario corresponds to 
the situation described earlier in this chapter, in which the low competition level in an 
industry may provide the non-hedging firms with little incentive for hedging their 
exposure, at the same time, enabling them to operate successfully in the markets.
The evidence in this chapter is weaker on the predicted link between foreign exchange 
exposure magnitude and the hedging decision, which tends to be strong when firms 
operate only or mainly using foreign currencies other than the U.S. dollar. The 
findings suggest that the foreign exchange exposure magnitude by itself does not 
significantly influence the hedging decision. Rather, this impact is exercised via the 
influence of foreign exchange exposure magnitude on the competitive advantage of 
the firm and on the power that a firm may have in the markets, and also on the 
volatility of the firm's foreign exchange rates. Williamson (2001) found that there are 
significant differences in exposure to exchange rate movements across firms from the 
same country. He argued that the currency exposure of a firm is a function of its 
foreign sales, the cost structure of the foreign competition as well as the degree of 
competition. The interpretation of these findings should be made in the light of the 
nature of the foreign exchange exposure magnitude in different industries, which is 
likely to affect the firm’s position in industry depending on the strength of the 
competition in industry and the degree of foreign exchange rate movements and 
consequently the extent of the foreign exchange exposure magnitude on the riskness 
of the firm. This chapter has examined the evidence on the main differences between 
hedging and non-hedging firms regarding the manager's qualification, risk 
management experience, bank relationship, firm size, the hedging costs, the 
availability of risk management policy, the risk management training, the manager 
nationality, and the participation of the operating departments in risk management 
policy. This chapter has showed the significant effect of the management factors 
(qualification, experience and nationality) in the hedging decision. It has stressed the 
important effect of the hedging costs in the hedging decision. It found that the firm’s
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participation of the operating departments in the risk management decision making is 
of significant importance. This chapter has argued that the contingency theory 
approach has the potential to provide a useful theory framework for understanding 
currency risk management decision.
The next chapter will discus the study's findings in relation to previous corporate 
hedging literature. The chapter will present the final model of the study and compare 
the effect of the finance theory and contingency theory in currency exposure 
management decision.
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Discussion
10.1 Introduction
Chapters 8 and 9 analysed to what extent the firm’s hedging incentives, managerial risk 
aversion, ability to hedge, and need to hedge affected the currency exposure 
management policy in Saudi firms. This chapter will discuss the study’s findings in 
relation to previous corporate hedging literature. The chapter will present the final 
model of the study and explain the effect of the financial factors and contingency factors 
in the currency exposure management decision.
This study points out that to allow for independence in risk management policy choice, 
one would require specification of the determinants model of the decision. The aim of 
this research is to explore and analyse the determinants of currency risk management 
policy within Saudi exporting and importing firms. In order to achieve the research aim, 
the triangulation approach is employed in the study uses a multiple stage, multiple 
theoretical perspectives, multiple method, and analysis approaches. This study has 
reported the results of the two stages that were conducted with different methodologies, 
methods and analytical processes. The literature suggests that triangulation, or the use 
of multiple stages, multiple theories, multiple methodologies, and multiple data sources, 
would produce more valid and reliable data (Cunningham et al, 2000). Data has been 
collected using qualitative and quantitative methods through surveys, documents, and 
semi-structured interviews. Both finance theory and contingency theory have been used 
in this study to improve our understanding of the corporate hedging policy. While 
finance theory concentrates on the financial side (value maximization theories) and 
managerial risk aversion arguments, the contingency theory adds management 
perception and the firm’s external environment as determinants which are typically 
absent or de-emphasised in the more usual maximizing shareholders’ wealth 
approaches. The use of the combined theories provides the research with a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to analyse the corporate hedging determinants. 
This chapter is divided into five sections.
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The next section evaluates the theories used to explain why firms hedge currency 
exposure. It is argued that the existing theories regarding the determinants of currency 
risk policy are incomplete. The third section presents the main findings regarding the 
determinants of corporate hedging decision. Section four gives overall view for the 
research findings. The final section outlines the main conclusion from the previous 
section.
10.2 The Determinants of Corporate Hedging
Most of the previous studies presented in Chapter Four were presented within the 
framework of finance theory based on firm value maximization and managerial risk 
aversion arguments. Finance theory assumes that the economic behaviour of individuals 
and firms aim at maximizing economic utility. The financial approach concentrates on 
two factors, the effect of the hedging decision in increasing shareholder value, and its 
effect in reducing the likelihood that managers will suffer adverse consequences, 
including loss of their jobs, from fluctuations in the price of major input or output 
(Haushalter, 2000). Finance theory offers explanations that relate a firm’s hedging 
decision to factors such as reducing financial distress, reducing agency costs, reducing 
expected tax, reducing underinvestment problem, reducing the cost of external 
financing, and to managerial wealth incentive (Smith & Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996; Fok 
et al, 1997; Gay and Nam 1998). The behaviour of the decision maker is facilitated by 
the predicted return as a rationale for the decision. Many of the previous studies only 
concentrate on evaluating the outcome from the hedging activity and its role in the 
hedging decision. Geczy et al., (1997) developed a general framework to analyse the 
determinants of corporate hedging decision (see section, 7.3.1). Other studies, including 
Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot et al, (1993), Tufano (1996), Mian (1996), Francis and 
Stephen (1990), Joseph (1999), and Haushalter (2000) developed rationales for hedging 
similar to those considered by Geczy et al., to offer an explanation for the question why 
firms hedge.
This research differs from past efforts in that prior research on corporate hedging 
determinants has typically concentrated mainly on how best to extend or utilize the 
hedging benefits arguments. This view has been extended to cover another aspect of the 
FT effect in the hedging decision, such as the effect of the managerial risk aversion 
(Geczy et al, 1997; Gay and Nam 1998; Fok et al, 1997), firm size (Nance et al, 1993;
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Howton and Perfect 1998), exposure size and hedging costs (Geczy et al, 1997). Most 
of the previous studies examined the determinants of corporate hedging in general or the 
use of derivatives, only the studies by Tufano (1996), Geczy et al., (1997) and Joseph 
(1999) considered the determinants of the currency hedging decision. The important 
distinction between the existence and the use of derivatives for hedging purposes was 
not acknowledged in many research studies in the corporate hedging decision. 
Derivative contracts do not exist only for the purpose of hedging, and it could be argued 
that in addition to the use and importance of derivative contracts for hedging activity, 
they can also be used for speculative purposes. It is clear from earlier discussions in 
chapter three that corporate risk can be managed using internal methods and external 
methods (such as derivative contracts). However, none of the studies reviewed (in 
chapter four) acknowledged all the available methods for hedging corporate risk. 
Restricting hedging activity only to the use of external methods can potentially result in 
a circular research design. Thus, collecting data on the firm’s hedging strategy only 
from its reports or published data, researchers may design the research according to the 
realised hedging strategy rather than intended hedging strategy, which can mainly be 
defined by a manager responding to a survey. The risk management decision model that 
were used in the existed literature only provide a single comprehensive measure of 
external hedging methods, and cannot measure the internal hedging methods. In other 
words, a major limitation of the corporate hedging determinants literature may be the 
selection of derivative contracts index to capture the extent of hedging decision. Using 
the publicly available data divorces the currency exposure problem from its context so 
that attention can be focused on a few variables.
While there are some studies about the potential rationale for hedging, it seems fair to 
say that there is not yet a single, accepted framework which can be used to guide 
hedging decisions. The predicted determinants of hedging decisions did not fully 
recognize the relative aspects around the hedging decision, which may have led to 
incomplete classification of the hedging decision determinants. The suggested 
contribution of financial theory in the hedging decision has not developed adequately 
the structure of this determinants model, hence the field opens for new contributions in 
this area. Analysing the corporate hedging determinants under the assumption that 
managers view their risk management decision using the risk versus return strategy, can 
be accepted but may give incomplete guidance for efficient hedging decision making.
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The conceptualization of the hedging decision as a comparison strategy of risk and 
return may be useful from a researcher’s viewpoint, but may only have partial relevance 
to managers who formulate and implement risk management strategy. It is difficult for 
the decision makers in the firm to decide to hedge or not without understanding the 
firm’s needs and ability to do so and the possible limitations of this decision. This 
conflict may affect the validity and reliability of the data collected. In most of the 
previous studies methodologies, to predict hedging determinants, the methodologies did 
not recognize the relative nature of the hedging decision, which may lead to inaccurate 
classifications of hedging determinants.
Considering that the hedging decision is a problematic aspect in the management of 
business firms, it is important to understand the determinants that lead firms to engage 
in hedging currency risk. This thesis attempts to at least partially contribute to the Froot 
et a l (1993) statement of the problem by developing an economic and contingency 
framework for the determinants of the hedging decision. Instead of using the standard 
finance theory alone as framework for corporate hedging policy, this study adopts a 
combined approach between finance theory and contingency theory as a framework for 
corporate hedging policy. The contingency approach was adopted to improve our 
understanding of the corporate hedging policy, and to open new dimensions for the 
study. These new dimensions were evaluated and improved using the exploratory study 
interviews and tested by the findings from the questionnaires in order to deal with both 
the problem and its context. Adopting an interview method for collecting data may help 
in investigating the problem within its real-life context. The trend towards the adoption 
of the foreign exchange exposure management strategy is usually attributed to a 
combination of external and internal factors.
While, most of the previous studies have ignored some indirect determinants such as, 
competitive position, markets, and bank relationship, however, the use of the survey 
method in this study gives an opportunity to include and measure these indirect 
determinants. The new approach adopted in this study allows the standard variables 
such as value maximization, managerial risk aversion, as well as the additional roles of 
management quality and qualification, competition, industry, the magnitude of the 
exposure, the cost of the exposure, management performance, the hedging limitation, 
and the bank relationship to be addressed. Finally, most of the previous studies 
concentrated on MNCs. MNCs have various exchange rate exposures that
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might offset one another, causing the film’s exposure as a whole to vary with time (e.g. 
Chow, Lee, Solt, 1997; Choi and Prasad, 1995; Gao, 2000). In contrast to previous 
studies this study uses questionnaires and interview with exporting and importing firms 
to test for the determinants of corporate hedging decision using a model linking these 
detenninants to a hedging decision.
10.3 Explanation of the Findings in the Determinants Groups
10.3.1 The determinants of hedging incentives
Table 10.1, presents a comparison of results for six empirical analyses of corporate 
hedging policies regarding the effect of the hedging incentives in the hedging decision. 
Previous empirical studies provide mixed support for the leverage hypothesis. Berkman 
and Bradbury (1996), and Fok et al, (1997) found that derivatives use increases with 
leverage. Haushalter (2000) examined the hedging activities of oil and gas producers. 
He found that the percentage of production hedge increased in line with increases in the 
total debt ratio of the firm, evidence consistent with theories of transaction costs of 
financial distress (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Our study found a small difference on the 
leverage and debt service coverage between hedging firms and non-hedging firms. 
While these findings supports the hypothesis predicting that hedging is higher in firms 
with higher expected costs of financial distress, the differences are not statistically 
significant. The finding of this study is consistent with Tufano (1996), and Mian (1996) 
who found theories that explain risk management as a means of reducing the costs of 
financial distress are not supported strongly using accounting ratio analysis. In addition, 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found that leverage was negatively associated with the 
hedging decision, which is the opposite of what theories of optimal hedging would 
predict. Our results regarding the indicators of the financial distress costs suggest that 
firms in less risky businesses tend to ignore the foreign exchange risk, and this appears 
to be consistent with the risk averse explanation that suggests a positive association 
between the size of different risks and hedging activities. The results of this study 
support the idea that firms which face more different kind of risks are more likely to 
adopt hedging activity.
The findings of this study in both the univariate and multivariate analysis for both the 
accounting ratio and indicator measurement present some support for the effect of the
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hedging decision on the reduction of the agency conflicts. The study found that the total 
sales to the total assets ratio in hedging firms on average were higher than that in non­
hedging firms, and this result was statistically supported by both the univariate analysis 
and the logistic regression. Increasing the firm’s total sales may reduce the agency 
conflicts in the firm. This result seems to support the suggestion that hedging could be 
used to reduce the volatility of the firm’s total sales and profits, and hence to reduce the 
agency conflict.
Table 10.1: Comparison of results across six empirical analysis of the
effect of hedging incentives in hedging decision.
‘Yes’ (‘No’) indicates the empirical result of the theory, while a dash (-) indicates that the hypothesis was
not examined.
Received Theory Suggests 
That a Firm is More Likely 
to Hedge
Nance, Smith, 
and Smithson 
(1993)
Tufano
(1996)
Berkman
&
Bradbury
(1996)
Geczy,
Minton,
and
Haushalter
(2000)
Al-Mohaimeed
(2004)
Schrand
(1997) Accounting Indicators ratio
To reduce expected 
financial distress costs
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No
To reduce agency costs Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No
To increase investment 
opportunities
Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No
To reduce corporate finance 
costs
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
The positive correlation between the decision to hedge and total sales is consistent with 
the notion that companies benefit from significant economies of scale in hedging, 
particularly in setting up a hedging program. This result is consistent with the Fok, 
Carroll, and Chiou (1997) findings that hedging reduces the agency costs of debt, and 
reduces some agency costs of equity. Smith and Stulz (1985) Mayers and Smith (1987) 
argue that hedging can be used to reduce the agency costs associated with outside 
finance. The univariate and multivariate analysis found a statistically significant 
difference between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding dividend payments, and 
raises the argument that dividend policy can be used as alternative for hedging decision 
(Berkman and Bradbury 1996; Nance et al, 1993; Wysocki, 1996). Non-hedging firms 
in the sample appear to pay most of their profit as dividend to the shareholders. It can be 
•concluded that this present study found moderate evidence consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that hedging can increase a firm’s value by reducing the agency 
conflicts.
The study found a negative relationship between the hedging decision and the firm’s 
R&D. In contrast with this result, Geczy et al, (1997) who examined derivatives
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use for a sample of Fortune 500 firms, found that firms with high R&D expenditures are 
more likely to use currency derivatives. Also, Nance et al, (1993) and Dolde (1995) 
found that firms with high levels of R&D expenditures are more likely to use some form 
of derivatives instrument. Firms with higher R&D expenditures benefit more from the 
use of derivatives. The weak empirical support found in this study that risk management 
can be used to minimize the underinvestment problem is inconsistent with the findings 
of most of the previous studies, Gay and Nam (1998); Geczy et al., (1997): and Fok et 
al., (1997). Fok et al, (1997) found that firms with a large percentage of value derived 
from growth opportunities are more likely to hedge.
The univariate and logistic analysis of the hedging incentive indicators in chapter eight 
provides limited support to the role of corporate finance factors in the hedging decision. 
The results presented in the chapter 8 were contradictory, in that firms with more cash 
flow hedged less, but firms with more tangible assets hedged more. It appears that the 
firm’s hedging decision is primarily influenced by short-term financial strategy 
consistent with the short-term focus of many managers. The relationships between firms 
and financial strategies are more closely linked, suggesting that product short-term 
financing strategies have direct influence on the firm’s hedging decision. At first glance, 
the theory that firms may use risk management to protect themselves from shortage in 
operating cash flow seems to be supported when the study used an accounting ratio as a 
measurement for corporate finance costs. The result showed that firms with small cash 
flows are more likely to hedge. This result may suggest that cash flow can be used as 
substitute for hedging currency exposure. It has been argued that firms would have less 
need to undertake hedging activities if they have large cash flow as substitute available 
to the firm. Tufano (1996, p. 1111- 1112) stated that ‘instead of managing risk with the 
financial contracts, firms could pursue alternative activities that substitute for financial 
risk management strategies. They can carry large cash balances to protect themselves 
against potential hardship ’.
The findings in this study provide some support for the views expressed in previous 
empirical studies that firms were using liquidity as a hedging alternative (Nance et al, 
1993; Mian, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998). Froot et al, (1993) argued that hedging 
activities can be used to reduce the underinvestment problem that would result when 
cash flows are volatile and access to external financing is costly. Geczy et al, (1997) 
argued that hedging can be used to minimize the corporate finance costs by
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reducing not only the costs of obtaining external funds, but also a firm’s dependence on 
external financing. They predicted a positive association between potential 
underinvestment costs and the benefits of hedging. It can be suggested that firms with 
positive relationship between cash flows and investment opportunities have less 
incentive to hedge, because they have fewer (greater) attractive investment 
opportunities in states with lower (higher) cash realizations. From previous analysis, a 
link hypothesis may predict that firms with enhanced investment opportunities 
concurrent with low levels of cash flows will make greater use of derivatives than 
similar firms with large cash flows. It seems that firms with a higher correlation 
between small (large) cash flows and small (large) sales or investment expenditures 
have less incentive to hedge. While both hedging and non-hedging firms have nearly the 
same investment opportunities, the low cash flow in hedging firms may lead them to 
hedge. Support for this suggestion appears in Gay and Nam (1998) study, who found 
that non-users of derivatives have higher levels of correlation between cash flow and 
investment expenses than do users of derivatives. This result is also consistent with the 
theoretical idea that hedging can be used to protect the future cash flow and earnings 
from the effect of exchange rate movements which might help the firms to invest in 
valuable investment opportunities (Lessard, 1990; and Froot et al, 1993).
Our finding is also consistent with Berkman and Bradbury (1996) who report a negative 
association between a firm’s decision to use derivatives and short-term liquidity. Joseph 
(2001) examined UK’s MNCs motivations to corporate hedging, and found that the 
main hedging motive is to reduce the impact of foreign exchange rate fluctuations on 
the firm’s future cash flows and net financial asset. Haushalter (2000, p. 110) argued 
that ‘all being equal, the more difficulty a company has in obtaining outside financing, 
the more costly a shortfall in cash flow will be, and the greater the value hedging 
provides”.
It can be concluded from the univariate accounting ratios and indicator analysis that 
there is mixed evidence to support the financial distress cost, investment opportunities, 
agency costs, and corporate finance cost arguments. The results of the accounting ratio 
analysis as a measure for hedging incentive are not in line established with theoretical 
models of corporate risk management. It was expected that using accounting ratio 
analysis to examine the determinants of hedging incentive at the micro level might 
generate contradictory results and fail to distinguish between hedging incentives
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and the success of hedging strategies. In that, hedging incentives can be used by 
manager as determinants for hedging decision but may be inappropriate to be used as 
determinants to stop the hedging activity. For example, while existing theories of 
hedging behaviour suggests that firms with high financial distress costs are more likely 
to hedge (Smith and Stulz, 1985), using the accounting ratio analysis model, we found 
that the financial distress costs did not have a significant effect on the hedging decision. 
The possible explanation is that if hedging was successful, then the firm will not appear 
to have financial distress cost problems in the year in which they hedged. The 
accounting ratio analysis of the determinants of hedging incentive results for Saudi 
firms differs considerably from previous studies. The hedging decision in the Saudi 
firms sample appears to be unrelated to some of the proxies for the theoretical hedging 
incentive determinants. These results are most apparent in the differences between the 
means for the R&D ratio, the expenses to total sales ratio, and the tangible assets ratio 
which are inconsistent with prior expectations.
Francis and Stephen (1990) argued that the absence of empirical evidence supporting 
the hedging incentives arguments might imply either that the sample firms were 
successful hedgers, or that the sample firms did not hedge for the motivations examined. 
In order to distinguish between these two alternatives, the study used indicator 
measurements for the hedging incentives to test for hedging and non-hedging firms’ 
motivations (See section, 8.3.2). In the analysis, the financial managers were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they agreed with each of the indicators that would be used 
as proxies for hedging incentive variables. For example, if the financial manager 
decided to hedge, three years ago* in order to reduce the financial distress costs and he 
continues hedging this could mean that the firm still faces financial distress costs and 
hedges to reduce these costs. On the hedging decision, the findings for the indicators of 
hedging incentive effects are more convincing than those from ratio analysis. This may 
raise the concern that using a different method to measure the determinants of hedging 
incentives may provide us with different results. This difference arises from the nature 
of the data in that the indicators describe the hedging incentive from respondents’ 
perceptions about their firms' characteristics. To the extent that hedging incentive 
indicators are easily observable and explain a direct effect on the hedging decision, 
respondents’ perceptions are more heavily weighted in favour of the indicator 
measurements. Another possible reason is that the accounting ratios proxies are
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somewhat weakly represented in the hedging incentive determinants of this study. 
However, the overall indicator analysis provides little empirical support for the 
predictive power of theories that currency risk management can be simply explained in 
terms of factors related directly to the objective of maximizing shareholder value.
The findings gave limited support to what previous studies considered as determinants 
o f corporate hedging incentives and as a means o f maximizing the firm ’s value. There 
are some possible reasons for the difference in this study’s findings and previous studies 
regarding the effect of the determinants which have been described as indicators for 
maximizing the shareholder value. The methods and methodology used in this study 
may explain the discrepancies. It can be argued that the previous empirical studies only 
address the decision to use derivatives using published data and a narrow hedging 
definition. This study attempts to explain corporate currency risk behaviour at a micro 
level and in a developing country (Saudi Arabia), and pushes the theory of foreign 
exchange risk management beyond the large open economic model that prevails in the 
academic literature. A developing country differs from a developed one in many 
aspects, such as the technology, management, and production frontier. Firms in 
developing countries face different environmental factors from those in developed 
counties. Also, most of the risk management theories discussed previously have been 
concerned with corporate risk management in general, or derivatives use in particular, 
while this study concentrates on foreign exchange risk management.
10.3.2 The determinant of managerial risk aversion
Table 10.2, presents a comparison of results across six empirical analyses of corporate 
hedging policies regarding the effect of managerial risk aversion factors on the hedging 
decision. The Table 10.2 shows, using both univariate and multivariate analysis and the 
findings in the exploratory study that in a developing country owner- controlled firms 
are more likely than manager- controlled firms to hedge their foreign exchange risk. It 
would seem that the hedging decision is in the interest of shareholders when they have 
the ability to affect the firm’s strategy. This result may be inconsistent with the 
argument that risk management may be used to facilitate the protection of managers’ 
activities that enhances their welfare, but reduces shareholder value. Most of 
shareholders in manager-controlled firms with only a small proportion of stocks are 
usually removed from the firm’s actual decision making. The dispersion of ownership
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reduces the ability of the shareholders to remove bad managers or to effectively monitor 
the firm’s activities. Managers in a firm with a wide dispersion.of ownership may have 
the power to act to protect their position and to participate heavily in designing the 
managerial compensation which is not basically reflecting the managerial performance. 
Smith (1976, p. 710) stated that “being removed from the decision- making process, not 
possessing a thorough knowledge of available alternatives and having only limited 
access to corporate records, the small stockholder is forced to act as a satisfier. He or 
she has little basis for determining whether management is pursuing a maximizing 
strategy. Since large owners have both the ability and the resources to be relatively well 
informed, their more complete access to information should retard both the diversion of 
resources to managers any type of artificial alteration (accounting change, exercise to 
expense performances, organization slack) of earnings”.
Table 10.2: Comparison of results across six empirical analysis of the 
effect of the managerial risk aversion in hedging decision.
‘Y e s’ ( ‘N o ’) indicates the empirical result o f  the theory, while a dash (-) indicates that the hypothesis was not exam ined.
Received Theory Suggests 
That Firm is More Likely to 
Hedge
Nance, 
Smith, and 
Smithson 
(1993)
Tufano
(1996)
Berkman
&
Bradbury
(1996)
Geczy,
Minton,
and
Schrand
(1997)
Haushalter
(2000)
Al-Mohaimeed
(2004)
Univariate Multivariate 
Analysis Analysis
Due to the firm structure - - - - - Yes No
If the firm is owner- 
controlled firm
- - - - - Yes Yes
If manager owned more 
than 10% of the firm’s 
equity
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
If the firm has high 
management monetary 
compensation system
No No No
If the firm has manager 
equity compensation 
system
Yes Yes
If the manager annual 
income is high
- - - - No No No
If the manager is young 
(less than 40 years old)
- No - - - Yes Yes
Due to the Islamic view - - - - - Yes Yes
The findings from the interviews showed that the owners in shareholder firms appear to 
have little power to avoid fluctuations in a firm's cash flow and profit. Owners with a 
high stockholding percentage, in a private or family firm (where most of the family are 
in control), have more access to internal information and knowledge of the decision­
making process. Then their management advice would appear to place a constraint upon 
the amount of artificial manipulation that owners would allow or the management might
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attempt. The ownership in most of the shareholder firms is very diffuse, and managers 
in these firms have the opportunity to avoid making decisions that might benefit the 
owners most. Managerial theorists have long recognized the differences between 
business firms that are controlled by their owners and firms that are controlled by 
management. It has been suggested that in shareholder firms, management interest does 
not necessarily go with the owners’ preference (Monsen and Downs, 1963). As most of 
the stock owners in manager-controlled firms become more widely and thinly held, one 
of the consequences is that these small shareholders are removed from the firm’s 
decision making and have access only to the firm’s published financial statements. This 
finding raises fundamental questions concerning the role of a board of directors as 
representative of a company’s stockholders. At worst, our results suggest that boards 
might ignore their responsibility to shareholders and fail to reduce the firm’s financial 
risk through hedging currency exposure.
It was suggested that the managers’ behaviour in manager-controlled firms are 
systematically different from that of managers’ behaviour in owner-controlled firms 
(Boundreaux, 1973; and Amihud and Lev, 1981). For example, Palmer (1973) has 
shown that owner- controlled firms differ from manager-controlled firms in terms of 
risk aversion. The results in chapter 8 show that 85 per cent of the Saudi manager- 
controlled firms did not hedge their currency exposure. Katz and Niehoff (1998) and 
Fama and Jeensen(1983) found that owners are more likely to encourage risk taking 
because they directly receive profits, while managers cannot easily diversify their risk 
because their wealth is linked to future employment opportunities of the company 
employing them. Tufano (1996) expected that outside stock holders, which include 
mutual funds, hedge funds, and private investors, would be better diversified than 
managers, and thus a large stock ownership would be less positively associated with 
risk management, (if at all), than would managerial stock ownership. However, 
evidence in this study shows that half of the owner- controlled firms tend to engage in 
hedging. It can be suggested that when agency conflicts become small both shareholders 
and managers would prefer that firms hedge.
In Saudi Arabia in the year 2001, Alpha firm, generated nearly 120 million Saudi Riyal 
from its own business while Beta firm generated a loss of nearly 26 million Saudi Riyal. 
These firms are in the same industry and are both exporting and importing in foreign 
markets, so, what might explain why these two firms produce such different
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results from their own activities? Through the field work carried by the researcher, both 
firms were in the study's sample and four main reasons can be recognized to explain the 
difference. First, Alpha firm is owned by one family, whereas Beta firm is a firm owned 
by a wide diversity of shareholders. Second, the director of Alpha firm has a large 
proportion of stocks, whereas Beta firm is run by an appointed director. Third, while 
Beta firm has more than hundred shareholders only two of them attend the board of 
directors meeting, whereas in Alpha firm all its owners can attend the board directors 
meeting. Finally, the Alpha firm has chosen to manage foreign exchange risk while Beta 
firm has ignored its foreign exchange risk. It may be conclude that, the main difference 
between these two firms is the level of control exercised by the owners of each firm, 
that is, the ownership structure, affects the decision to hedge the foreign exchange risk. 
Management research has suggested that ownership structure is a useful framework for 
understanding why firms like Alpha and Beta differ in their strategies toward business, 
even if they are in the same industry. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308), stated that 
“there is a good reason to believe that the manager will not always act in the best 
interest of the principal”.
Han and Suk (1998) suggested that as management's equity ownership increases their 
interest coincided more closely with those of outside shareholders and consequently 
agency problems are resolved. The univariate analysis shows that the level of managers’ 
stockholding in the firms have a significant influence on the hedging decision. This 
result is consistent with Fok et a/.,’s (1997) argument that managers with high insider 
ownership have a strong incentive to hedge because it is in their own best interest to do 
so, as well as in the their shareholders’ best interest. Similar results were found by 
Tufano (1996) who examined commodity hedging activities in the gold mining 
industry, and found that firms’ use of commodity derivatives is likely to increase when 
the value of stocks their managers and directors hold increase. This result is in line with 
theoretical prediction that firms whose managers hold greater equity stakes as a fraction 
of their private wealth are more inclined to manage corporate risk. As insider ownership 
is often considered as a proxy for the agency costs of equity (Fok, et al, 1997), this 
study found that firms with higher insider ownership should have lower agency costs of 
equity and have a tendency to hedge. Also, Berkman and Bradbury (1996) found that 
derivatives use increases with the proportion of shares held by directors. It seems that 
the main reason for this result is that managerial stocks have less diversified wealth than
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the outside stocks.
Consistently with interviews and the univariate findings, the logistic regression analysis 
showed that the level of managers’ stockholding in the firms did not significantly affect 
the hedging decision which is the opposite of that predicted by theory. This result is 
consistent with Haushalter's (2000) result that found no evidence that the extent of 
hedging increases with the degree of managerial stock ownership. He found that the 
fraction of oil and gas price hedged is not positively in relation to the fraction of shares 
held by insiders or the market value of the common shares held by insiders. The 
imperfect positive relationship between the hedging decision and managerial ownership 
level can be explained by a paper by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) who found that the 
average stock-price reaction to the currency exposure is significantly negative when 
inside directors own less than 5% of the firm's common stock, significantly positive 
when the inside ownership level is between 5% and 25%, and insignificantly different 
from zero when inside ownership exceeds 25%. However, a different way of classifying 
the fraction of shares owned by managers used in this study from those of previous 
studies may generate this conflict. For example, most of the previous studies classify 
managers as one of the firms’ main owners who have the right to vote in a firm’s 
decision making process if they have 5% or more of the firm’s stock, while in this study 
the managers should have 10% or more of the firm’s shares.
The results for both the univariate and multivariate analysis showed that firms with 
performance related monetary compensation systems are less likely to hedge. The 
results in Chapter 8 shows that 71.8 percent of the firms with high level of performance 
related manager compensation arrangements were not hedging their foreign exchange 
risk. 65.7 percent of the respondents argued that their firms' monetary compensation 
system was not an appropriate tool to measure the management performance.
Benston (1985) found no relationship between company performance and 
management’s compensation in a longitudinal study of 29 conglomerates. He explained 
the lack of correlation on the basis that top managers’ wealth is generally heavily 
dependent on their stock holdings. One of the main explanations for a high managerial 
related monetary compensation in non-hedging firms can be found in Table 8.18, and is 
consistent with Elston and Goldberg (2003) who found that German firms have agency 
problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership
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dispersion leading to higher compensation. When ownership is dispersed management 
can obtain greater monetary compensation. Smith (1976) argued that if managers in 
manager- controlled firms sought to minimize the intervention of shareholders, they 
might seek to eliminate fluctuation in their performance measures. Another possible 
explanation for a negative relationship between the hedging decision and managerial 
monetary compensation policy inconsistent with previous studies (e.g., Haushalter, 
2000) is that Saudi firms have considerably lower levels of compensation than the US 
or UK firms. In addition, while Haushalter’s (2000) sample of firms contains only 
shareholder owned firms, this study’s sample consists of different forms of ownership 
structure. The monetary compensation finding in non-hedging firms suggests that 
managers can reduce the risk associated with their firm’s income (and consequently 
with their own income) by various means other than hedging activities. This suggestion 
explaine the positive relationship between monetary reward system and non-hedging 
activity as evidence that managers can indulge in non-value-maximizing activities 
without being disciplined by shareholders.
In addition, the results suggest that managers’ high annual incomes (salaries) are not an 
important source of managerial incentive against risk since 69.3 percent of the high 
annual income managers were not hedging their firms’ foreign exchange risk. Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) analysed the performance pay and top-management incentives for 
over 2,000 CEOs, and found that bonuse represent 50 percent of CEO salary was 
awarded in ways that were not highly sensitive to performance. A possible explanation 
for a manager’s high salary in non-hedging firms can be pointed out as an increasing 
function of age, in that managers in non-hedging firms are likely to be older than 
managers in hedging firms (72 percent of the managers in the sample who are over 50 
years old do not hedge their firms’ exposure). It would appear that an unpredictable 
effect of a salary reward system on hedging decision, which has been found, can come 
from two other potential limitations. First, the range of managers in the study may be 
too small to reveal adjustments in compensation. However, the small number of firms in 
the population of the study and the lack of publicly available information about 
managers’ salary, may remove the limitation of small range of managers in the study. A 
second limitation is that the nature of the relationship between performance and changes 
in salary may be discontinuous (Kerr and Bettis, 1987).
There is another possible explanation for the lack of performance related monetary
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reward system in hedging firms. Most hedging managers have extensive stock holdings 
in their firms hence the need for consistency and congruency in the design of a reward 
system and the administration of reward is reduced. Managers’ personal wealth in 
hedging firms is generally heavily dependent on their equity holdings and thus on the 
value of their firm’s equity. In hedging firms, the weak relationship between hedging 
decision making and monetary compensation and high annual salaries can be explained 
by the fact that such a relationship is not important as the managers in these firms have 
stock holdings. Dyl (1988) and Santerre and Neun (1989) examined the relationship 
between shareholder control and executive compensation, and found a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and CEO compensation. FitzRoy and 
Schwalbach (1990), using annual data for 95 firms from 1967-1985, found a negative 
effect of concentrated ownership on the average annual salary of the management 
board. Also Elston and Goldberg (2003) found that the greater the ownership 
concentration the less the ability of executives to extract higher levels of compensation. 
In addition, Benston (1985) found no relationship between company performance and 
the management monetary compensation system. He explained the lack of correlation 
on the basis that a top executive’s wealth is generally and heavily dependent on equity 
holdings and thus on the value of the firm’s equity. Also the findings in chapter 8 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between hedging firms and leverage, and this 
may also explain the finding of less managerial monetary compensation contracts in a 
hedging firm. Gilson and Vetsupens (1993) found that when firms financial distress 
costs increase, the pay-to-manager performance declines dramatically and becomes 
insignificantly different from zero. Han and Suk (1998) examined the effect of 
ownership structure on corporate performance, using stock returns as a measure of 
performance, and found that the level of insider ownership is positively related to stock 
returns. Accordingly, it seems that the design of the performance related monetary 
reward system in non-hedging firms is to provide managers with income security rather 
than enhance their wealth through their stockholding. Kerr and Bettis (1987) argued that 
a strong relationship between monetary compensation and management performance is 
unnecessary because stock rewards to managers provide the necessary connection 
between compensation and stock performance. Elston and Goldberg (2003) found that 
German firms have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from 
control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. The managerial 
compensation can be used to minimize the conflicts which arise from the agency
349
Chapter Ten I. lit'
relationship between shareholders and managers. It seems that boards of directors in 
non-hedging finns did not attach priority to the performance of a firm’s risk 
management when determining managers’ salaries. This discussion presents a basic idea 
that monetary compensation systems do not reflect managerial performance.
The univariate, multivariate analysis, and the interviews results suggest that the 
managerial equity compensation system statistically and significantly affects the 
hedging decision. Managerial actions and hedging decisions are not, however, perfectly 
observable by shareholders in manager-controlled firms. As found in the interviews, the 
survey results demonstrate that managers who are not adequately monitored will have a 
negative impact on reducing the effect of foreign exchange risk through their choice not 
to hedge. In manager-controlled firms it seems that shareholders do not participate, or 
even know, what actions managers should take or which of these actions will increase 
shareholder wealth. In that situation, agency theory predicts that compensation policy 
should be designed to give the manager incentives to select and implement actions that 
increase shareholder wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Consistent with this, the 
findings in Chapter 8 indicated that firms paying high salaries unrelated to performance 
were more likely to ignore foreign exchange risk. Accordingly, this study shows that the 
best way to encourage managers to actively work on the shareholder interest is to design 
a compensation system that ties the manager’s wealth to shareholder wealth. Most of 
the hedging firms, (63%), had an equity compensation system in order to make the 
payment for managers consistent with shareholder wealth and interests, since the 
compensation system made a link between the objective of managers and shareholders 
wealth.
It may be concluded that the fact that most of the owners who manage their firms, and 
most of the managers who owned some of the firm's shares, are hedging, illustrates the 
rather intuitive result that both managers and shareholders would prefer their firm to 
hedge since the agency conflicts in these firms are small. To increase managerial 
performance, hedging companies built a reward system which tied managers’ interest to 
that of shareholders. Most of the hedging companies choose to use a managerial 
stockholding reward system as powerful influence on managers’ behaviour. In this case, 
the management shareholding compensation contract may play an important role in 
changing management attitude for being risk neutral to risk averse. Any unfavourable 
movements in the foreign exchange rate will affect the firm’s cash flows with a
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managerial stockholding reward system and would also affect the personal wealth of 
managers holding shares of the companies they manage. The greater the effect of 
foreign exchange risk on the firm’s cash flow, and the greater the managers’ 
stockholdings, the more their personal wealth would be affected, thus the more likely 
they would be interest to adopt a corporate hedging activity. It seems that the reason in 
using this reward system is that the variation in a company’s share price would 
dramatically affect the personal wealth of managers’ stockholding in the companies 
they manage. Managers who have greater stockholdings in firms are more affected by 
the variation in its share price. Park and Song (1995) found that firms’ average 
performance significantly increases after establishing or expanding employee stock 
ownership plans.
Consistent with findings in the interviews, both the univariate and logistic regression 
found that the Islamic view has a significant effect on the managers’ attitude towards 
the hedging decision. None of the previous corporate hedging studies considered the 
effect of the manager’s value and belief in the hedging decision. This study found that 
management culture affected the hedging decision. In Saudi Arabia religion plays a 
significant role in determining the managers’ attitude towards the available risk 
management tool. In the interviews, the respondents in non-hedging firms argued that 
there were no suitable financial products to hedge their firms’ exposure. The study 
pointed out that most of the managers in non-hedging firms argued that the financial 
instruments available in the markets for hedging purposes were unacceptable to be used 
in Islamic ‘Shariah’. Table 10.3, presents the effect of the manager’s nationality, the 
ownership structure of the firms, the manager’s age in relation with the Islamic 
‘Shariah’.
Saudi Arabia adoption of Islamic Shariah rules requires companies to work in line with 
Shariah law, and this requirement affected more the shareholder firms. Because of the 
nature of the Saudi Arabia religious society, any announcement that a shareholder finn 
has broken the Islamic Shariah law, may affect the firm’s equity price in the stock 
market. Table 10.3, shows that there are 74.3 per cent of the respondents in shareholder 
firms who agreed that using derivative contracts for hedging purposes is not accepted 
from Islamic Shariah point of view. Most of the respondents who did not accept this 
idea were with individual and family firms. While most of the young managers in the 
sample (75%) disagreed that derivative contracts were prohibited in Islamic
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Shariah, there were 72 per cent of the old managers who agreed. The Table also shows 
an important finding, in that Arabic managers were more likely to agree that derivative 
contract were prohibited in Islamic Shariah as the Table shows that 66.7 per cent of the 
American, European, and East Asian managers disagreed.
Table 10.3: The Islamic view and the firm's ownership structure, the
manager nationality and age.
The variable The measurement The level of agreement with the Islamic view
Disagree or 
rather disagree
Not sure Agree or 
rather agree
No. % No. % No. %
Shareholder firms 5 14.3 4 11.4 26 74.3
Ownership Structure Individual firms 15 50.0 6 20.0 9 30.0
Family firms 11 61.1 4 22.2 3 16.7
Manager’s Age Less than 40 15 75.0 2 10.0 3 15.0
Between 41 to 50 13 27.1 8 16.7 27 56.2
More than 51 years 3 12.0 4 16.0 18 72.0
Manager’s  Nationality Arabic 10 19.2 13 25.0 29 55.8
American and European 8 66.7 1 8.3 3 25.0
East Asian 12 66.7 0 00 6 33.3
10.3.3 The determinants of the firm’s need to hedge
The results in the univariate, logistic regression, and the interviews indicate that the 
competitive level, industry, markets, the volatility of a firm's foreign exchange rates, 
and the sensitivity of a firm’s costs to exchange rates movements appear to have the 
most effect on the hedging decision. The extent of the effect of the exchange rate 
exposure appears to vary with industry and its competitiveness. This study has found 
that firms in the food and drink, and car and equipments industries were more likely to 
hedge than firms in other industries. There is a tendency to believe that managers in 
different industries will have different interpretations and conceptualizations of risk 
(Pablo, 1999). Hitt and Tyler (1991) argued that the decision criteria used by managers 
and their influences on strategic decision making may vary by industry.
While there is generally a strong view among academics, practitioners and analysts that 
foreign exchange risk should be hedged, our findings indicate that having a foreign 
exchange exposure is not a sufficient condition for a financial manager to direct his 
hedging decision. Inconsistent with theoretical predictions, the study’s interviews and 
the survey results do not confirm any positive relationship between the hedging decision
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and the magnitude of foreign exchange exposure. It came as a surprise that all variables 
used to measure the level of foreign exchange exposure magnitude are generally not 
significant when comparing the difference between hedging and non-hedging firms. 
This result is inconsistent with theoretical and empirical findings of previous studies. 
For example, Joseph (2000) found that the degree of utilization of internal techniques is 
positively related with the measures of the amount of the currency exposure. Also, 
Geczy et al., (1997) found that firms with exposure to exchange rates through foreign 
sales or foreign trade are more likely to use currency derivatives. They also found that 
derivatives use is positively associated with a firm’s foreign-denominated debt, and the 
percentage of imports relative to total industry sales. The possible explanation for our 
unexpected result is that the findings reported in Chapter 9 (Table 9.7) do not tell us 
which kind of currencies (other than U. S. dollar) that these firms used in their exports 
or imports. Flood and Lessard (1986) argued that currency exposure of the firm that 
sells in foreign markets will be reduced if it sources its inputs in the same currencies 
that it receives for its sales. For example, firms with large exposure to exporting from 
the UK and a large exposure to importing from UK may result in an overall small 
exposure. It may be that failure to take account of this in the design of our questions 
affected our result.
This finding may reflect, at least partially, the limitations of the magnitude of foreign 
exchange exposure measures used in this study. It might be attributed to the fact that 
firms with well-developed international activities will be more likely to avoid hedging 
activity. For example, a firm which exports and imports using a basket of foreign 
currencies will be more likely not to hedge as this situation will provide the firm with an 
operational hedging strategy (Bennett, 1997). However, the survey in this study asked 
the respondents to indicate if they used any of the operational hedging strategies and all 
firms which did not use any of the operational hedging methods were classified as non­
hedging firms. In addition, this study also used direct measurement of the firm's 
exposure and ignored indirect measures of the exposure. For example, Bradley (1998) 
when she measured the foreign exchange economic exposure, used both the direct and 
indirect measures, and one of her indirect measures was competition, which was 
supposed to increase the firm’s exposure. However, using the competition level as one 
of the exposure level proxies may affect the overall result. Firms in a competitive 
market would be affected more by unexpected movements in foreign exchange rates
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than firms in less competitive markets. It could be that the sensitivity of the film's cash 
flow in its home currency to changes in the exchange rate is primarily a function of the 
level of competition in the market. In other words it is a function of the elasticity of 
demand for the firm's products, how the firm's products differ from those of its 
competitors and the market situation. Table 10.4 shows that there are no significant 
differences between firms in competitive markets and firms in oligopolistic markets 
regarding the magnitude of their currency exposure.
Table 10.4: The foreign exchange exposure magnitude and the market
The variables The measurement Firms in Firms in Total Chi-Square
Competition Oligopolistic Test' Markets Markets
No % No. % No. %
The magnitude
of the firm's
foreign Large exposure 6 42.9 8 57.1 14 100
denominated Medium exposure 7 77.8 2 22.2 9 100 0.150exports
Small exposure 9 37.5 15 62.5 24 100
No exposure 16 48.5 17 51.5 33 100
The magnitude
of the firm's
foreign Large exposure 21 47.7 23 52.3 44 100
denominated Medium exposure 16 51.6 15 48.4 31 100 0.338imports Small exposure 0 00 3 100 3 100
No exposure 1 50 1 50 2 100
As the competition level increases in industry, the sensitivity of the firm’s cash flow to 
changes in foreign exchange rates will increase and the firm's attitude to this change 
will be affected. Marston (1996) argued that the type of competition displayed in an 
industry affects the economic exposure of firms within the industry. Consistent with 
Marston (1996), the results for both the interviews and the survey confirmed that 
foreign exchange exposure was more problematic for the firms in a competitive market. 
The argument here is that the firm facing high demand elasticity with products close to 
the competitors' products will face high levels of competition. From the findings in 
chapter 9 and Table 10.4, it can be concluded that the existence of exchange rate 
exposure alone is not a sufficient incentive to encourage firms to hedge. It would be that 
hedging firms will be in more competitive markets than non-hedging firms and that will 
be a measure of the firm's exposure level. Williamson (2001) examined the effect of 
exchange rate changes in multinational firms using a sample of firms from the United 
State and Japan. He found that for all firms the estimated exposure was strongest during 
periods of relatively high foreign competition. However, because of the different
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contingent competition characteristics of the firms in different countries, the 
components of the firm's exchange exposure could vary across these countries, as well 
as the effect of the level of competition. This explains some of the differences in the 
findings in this study as compared to others. It would appear that hedging foreign 
exchange exposure depends on the extent to which firms are able to avoid a competitive 
disadvantage in their industry from hedging. To gain or maintain a competitive 
advantage in the markets appears to be one of the main factors affecting the decision to 
hedge. Most of the non-hedging companies in the sample benefited from having 
different products which gave them a competitive advantage, while most hedging firms 
traded in products similar to those of their competitors. Non-hedging firms enjoyed 
favourable access to the low competitive level available in their industry, while the 
hedging firms enjoyed no comparable benefit.
This study found that the relationship between the foreign exchange exposure 
magnitude and the hedging decision is contingent upon the competition level. The study 
demonstrated that the competition level affected the magnitude of the companies’ 
currency exposure, by providing some empirical support for the view that competition 
increases the firm's sensitivity to exchange rate movements. Table 9.3, in chapter 9, 
shows that the correlation between the magnitude of currency exposure and its effect on 
the firms' operations, and the level of competition faced by these firms, are significant 
and positive. These relationships strongly support the suggestion that, a high level of 
competition, associated with a high level of sensitivity of the firm's operations to 
changes in foreign exchange rates, the greater the company foreign exchange exposure 
and the more likely it will hedge.
The logistic regression analysis showed that the firm’s costs and cash flow were highly 
sensitive to changes in exchange rates. This result is inconsistent with some evidence 
from studies which examined the sensitivity of stock prices to changes in currency rates. 
Loderer and Pichler (2000) found that 24 out of 96 firms (25%) did not protect their 
long-term cash flows because they believed that positive and negative currency rate 
changes cancel each other out. We should understand that the exchange risk factor will 
not have the same effect in all firms, in that the exchange risk sensitivity of the firms 
will depend on their operating profiles, financial strategies, and other firm-specific 
variables (Choi and Prasad, 1995). The evidence in this study, regarding the relationship 
between the effect of the foreign exchange rate movements on the firm's
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costs, profit margin, purchase volumes, sale volumes, and cash flows and the foreign 
exchange exposure hedging decision, has several implications. From a methodological 
standpoint, this study provides an approach which directly, and from the firm's 
manager’s point of view, measures these relationships. This approach effectively filters 
out the influence of other factors than foreign exchange rate volatility on the firm's cost, 
profit, purchase volumes, sale volumes, and cash flow. It appears that non-hedging 
Saudi firms' cash flows are more sensitive to changes in exchange rates than corporate 
risk management theory would suggest. In that, Table 9.10, in chapter 9, shows that 75 
per cent of the Saudi non-hedging firms agreed that their cash flows are sensitive or 
highly sensitive to changes in foreign exchange rates, and that only 10.4 per cent of the 
Saudi non-hedging firms agreed that their cash flows are insensitive or highly 
insensitive to changes in foreign exchange rates. Table 9.3, in chapter 9, shows that 
there are significant positive relationships between firms which have sensitivity of sales 
volumes and profit margins and those that are demand sensitive to changes in price, and 
firms which have products similar to their competitors. This would indicate that these 
firms are facing strong competition and suffer from changes in exchange rates. The 
findings imply that the greater a competitive firm’s exposure to exchange rate changes, 
the more sensitive will its operations to changes in foreign exchange rates, and the more 
likely that the firm will hedge. It could be that these firms were not perfectly able to 
transfer all of the unfavourable effects of changes in foreign exchange rates on the 
firm’s sale volumes, purchase volumes, profit margin, costs, and cash flows to the other 
parties.
Both the interviews and survey have found that the level of currency diversification has 
little impact on the hedging decision. This is consistent with Fok et al., (1997) findings. 
Consequently, trading in many foreign markets may not necessarily be reflected in 
corresponding changes in the hedging behaviour. Currency diversification did not 
appear to be associated with the hedging decision. Eun and Resnick (2001) argued that 
the benefits of currency diversification would be greater if exchange rate volatility were 
absent. The lack of currency diversification within hedging firms may indicate that if 
the exchange rate volatility had been hedged away, the benefits of currency 
diversification would have decreased. This result is inconsistent with the common belief 
that financial hedging and corporate diversification are substitute means of risk 
management, implying that a firm which internationally traded using diversified
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currencies will be less likely to manage its foreign exchange exposure (Buckley, 1996). 
While most of the previous studies show diversification to be a substitute for hedging it 
has more benefit to shareholders, (Tufano, 1996). Evidence in Bartov et al, (1996) 
suggests an increase in systematic risk with currency diversification due to greater 
exchange rate risk. Similarly, Mathur and Hanagan (1983) posit that extending currency 
diversification may have increased risk from a variety of risk factors (such as exchange 
rate risk, political risk, lack of information, agency issues, asymmetric information, 
government policies etc.) that offsets the currency diversification benefit from 
imperfectly correlated returns. Another reason for less diversification in hedging firms 
is consistent with some of the past studies findings that focus on the firm’s performance 
and found that diversification has a negative effect on firm value (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 
1995). Also Comment and Jarrell (1995) found a positive relationship between 
companies which were less diversified internationally and shareholder returns.
10.3.4 The determinants o f the firm’s ability to hedge
Consistent with the interviews findings, the analysis for both univariate and logistic 
regression regarding the effect of the firm’s ability to hedge in the hedging decision 
shows that the management ability has a significant effect on the hedging decision. In 
that the qualification of the risk manager, the risk management experience, and the 
nationality are all found to significantly affect the hedging decision. The 
implementation of foreign exchange risk management needs sufficient management 
resources for training and employment of an expert person. Firms with qualified staffs 
are more likely to have enough human resources for hedging activity. The positive 
correlation between the decision to hedge and the manager’s quality is consistent with 
the notion that companies see risk management activity as an advanced strategy, 
particularly in setting up a hedging policy. It is more likely that managers with high 
qualifications are more willing to adopt new risk management strategy because they feel 
more confident with their expertise (Breeden and Viswanathan, 1990). The managers 
with more risk management experience are more likely to be flexible and have the 
ability and skills to use new and difficult risk management strategies. However, less 
experienced financial managers are often less averse to risk, so they might not want to 
hedge a large proportion of the firm’s risk. The findings in this study support Bonner’s 
(1990) suggestion that knowledge and experience is a good predictor of managerial
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Loderer and Pichler (2000) surveyed the currency risk management practices of Swiss 
industrial corporations. They found that 97% of their sample which quantified the 
currency risk profile of their operating cash flows were hedging their exposure. In our 
study we found that the majority of non-hedging firms did not know the currency risk 
exposure of their cash flows. This leads to the argument that risk managers in non­
hedging firms failed to manage their currency exposure because they did not understand 
its importance. We suggest that firms should be able to know their foreign exchange 
exposure, or at least the effect of the changes in the exchange rates on their operating 
cash flows.
As expected in the exploratory study, the univariate analysis result shows that firms 
employing foreign managers are more likely to engage in greater risk management 
activities. It seems that the foreign financial managers are more attracted to the use of 
hedging instruments, possibly in order to build their reputation and to put themselves in 
the interest of the shareholders. Breeden & Viswanathan (1990) in their hedging model 
posit that some managers hedge to communicate their higher ability and reputation to 
the market. They argued that by hedging using financial instruments, the managers 
reduce noise in the earning process, and thereby provide investors with a more 
informative measure of profits that depicts their ability. The training program in 
corporate risk management gave the managers a positive experience since most of the 
managers in the study who had training programs were hedging their foreign exchange 
risk. Ballantyne, Bruce and Packer (1995) stated that the principle of action learning 
explicitly aims to improve the performance and learning of both individual and 
organization.
Also the results of logistic regression reveal that nationality plays a significant role in 
determining the firm’s attitude towards currency exposure. The study argued that the 
firms whose risk managers come from western or East Asian countries are more likely 
to hedge. This result is an important finding in this research as risk management is a 
new activity in Saudi firms, and it seems that managers from Saudi Arabia or other 
Arabic countries have less experience to engage in foreign exchange exposure hedging 
activity. As most of the Saudi firms are still in the early stage of their development, so 
these firms may have less experience in risk management than the firms in developed
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countries. It seems that the strategy adopted in some of the Saudi firms to employ some 
foreign experts in the firms is worthwhile. It is important for the Saudi firms in their 
early stage to benefit from other countries experience as the management and business 
acknowledged in these countries is greater than in Saudi Arabia. One of the possible 
reasons that causes Saudi managers to pay little attention to foreign exchange risk as a 
strategic issue is their lack of risk management education and understanding of the 
subject. This result is consistent with work by George and Schroth (1991) who 
described the situation of U.S.A companies in 1980s and showed that corporate 
directors paid little attention to foreign exchange as a strategic issue due to their lack of 
education and understanding of the subject. We found that a manager’s qualification 
played a significant role in determining his attitude towards foreign exchange risk 
management. Leslie and Fleenor (1998) suggested that focusing on skill in employing 
managerial behaviour may lead to an improved understanding of effective management, 
While, Shipper and White (1999) speculated that it could improve the stability of 
results. Managerial knowledge in the firm is critical to competitive advantage and 
organizational success (Stewart, 1997). The management skill is an important strategic 
concept, and can provide a company with lasting competitive advantage in the market. 
Solomon, Shields and Whittington (1999) suggested that employee experience can 
improve the accuracy of employee's knowledge of business operations. The manager’s 
experience in risk management looks to be an important determinant of corporate 
hedging decision. Table 10.5, shows that, most of the foreign managers in Saudi firms 
work in large to medium size firms, since these firms have enough resources to benefit 
from the foreign managers’ experience. As can be seen from the Table, most of the 
foreign managers work in firms in electric and electronic, and car and equipment 
industries. The Table also shows that 90.3 percent (28 out of 31) of the foreign 
managers work in owner-controlled firms.
Table 10.5: The effect of the firm’s size, industry, and control in the
manager’s nationality.
The variables The measurement Arabic
Managers
No. %
Foreign Managers 
No. % No.
Total
%
Firm Size Large 23 54.8 19 45.2 42 100
(Total A ssets) Medium 12 54.5 10 45.5 22 100
Small 17 89.5 2 10.5 19 100
Industry Chemical & Oil 11 64.7 6 35.3 17 100
Food & Drink 9 100 . 00 9 100
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Arabic
Managers
No. %
Foreign Managers 
No. % No.
Total
%
Electric & Electronic 6 31.6 13 68.4 19 100
Cement and building tools & 
Furniture
15 100 - 00 15 100
Mining 4 66.7 2 33.3 6 100
Medical treatments & Tools 4 57.1 3 42.9 7 100
Cars & Equipment 3 30 7 70 10 100
Firm Control Manager-controlled firms 17 85 3 15 20 100
Owner-controlled firms 35 55.6 28 44.4 63 100
Regarding the effect of the firm’s size in the hedging decision the findings in the 
univariate analysis are consistent with theoretical predictions. The findings show that 
there are significant differences between hedging and non-hedging firms regarding their 
total sales and total assets. However, the empirical data in both the exploratory study 
and the logistic regression did not support a positive firm size hedging relationship. The 
logistic regression shows that the company size variable is not sufficient to discriminate 
between firms that hedge and those that do not hedge. The findings from the logistic 
regression seems to be interesting, from a theoretical point of view, since it appears 
inconsistent with many findings in the foreign exchange risk management literature. 
Nance et al, (1993), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Wysocki, (1996); Mian, (1996); 
Fok et al, (1997), Geczy et al, (1997), and Allayannis et al, (2001) found empirical 
evidence indicating a positive relationship between size and the hedging decision. This 
is a strongly held view in the literature and our apparently contradictory finding might 
be explained by the fact that the effect of a firm’s size is minimized by another variable, 
such as manager’s experience, nationality and qualification. These variables may be 
related positively with the size of firms.
There may be different problems associated with the findings in previous studies 
regarding the positive relationship between a firm’s size and the hedging decision. First, 
one of these problems is with research methodology. The proposition that size 
significantly influences both the hedging decision and the degree of involvement 
assumes that the causal direction is from company resources (size) to the actual hedging 
behaviour. The reverse, however, might also be true: international trading involvement 
might lead to hedging decision which may lead to an increase in size that would not be 
possible by only selling and buying in the domestic market. This is not acknowledged in
360
cnajner len  ____
the literature. In addition, each study examined the relationship between a firm’s size 
and the hedging decision using a mean to compare the size in hedging and non-hedging 
firms. This study used a category with three levels to measure the size (small, medium, 
and large size). Using three levels of size rather than the mean average of the firm’s size 
may affect the result in this study. We suggested that using three levels of size 
measurement would be more accurate than just using the average. The second possible 
reason is that those researchers who found associations between size and hedging 
activities have failed to provide any information which identifies the amount of variance 
explained by size. With the absence of consistent results it is difficult to discern whether 
size alone does in fact impact on hedging behaviour, and with the lack of information 
on the amount of variance explained, it is impossible to determine just how important 
size is.
The third possible reason which may explain the difference in this study and others lies 
with different sample frames. Many studies of size and hedging relationship focused 
only in MNCs sample frame (e.g., Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997, Allayannis and 
Ofelc, 2001), whereas this study has had a greater focus on export and import 
companies. The difference may also arise from regional or country factors. For 
example, virtually all of the other studies have been adopted in developed countries. If 
location factors impact international strategies (Frrunza and Senbet, 1984), it is possible 
that hedging behaviour may also be affected by local conditions. Thus,. hedging 
behaviour of U.S.A firms could differ from Saudi firms because of location factors. If 
size is related to hedging behaviour, it is probably that the broader the sample frame (in 
terms of firm size), the greater the likelihood of finding a significant relationship. 
However, as this study concentrated on the Saudi firms which are small in size in 
comparison to companies in countries like UK, U.S.A, France, Germany, or Japan, and 
a large company in Saudi Arabia could be classified as a medium or small company in 
these countries. If only small-and medium size firms in other studies were used a strong 
relationship may not have been identified. There are some constructs and variables that 
are incorporated into the models of the size-hedging strategy relationship. There is a 
wide range of literature according to which small exporting and importing companies 
face serious disadvantages in their foreign activities in comparison with large ones.
It seems that the inconclusiveness of research on the relationship between size and 
hedging strategy depends on the incompleteness of the existing theory. To
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discuss the shortcomings of the existing literature, we began by noting that researchers 
usually hypothesize that large companies hedge their currency risk because of company 
and managerial factors. Firstly, large companies have wide resources (i.e. managerial, 
financial, R & D, and marketing), which can help them in building their hedging 
strategy. Secondly, the economies of scale argument state that large companies become 
more flexible in hedging their foreign exchange risk because of their economic ability in 
the management of buying and sales operations in foreign markets. Fok, et al., (1997) 
found that large firms have a stronger tendency to hedge as a result of the economies of 
scale in the hedging argument. Booth, Smith, and Stulz (1984) argued that for 
informational scale economies, large firms are more likely to hedge, in that larger firms 
are more likely to provide managers with specialized information for the hedging 
decision. Nance et al., (1993) argued that using derivative contracts for hedging exhibits 
significant economies of scale in the structure of transaction costs, implying that large 
firms are more likely to hedge with these instruments. However, they argued that 
smaller firms are more likely to have taxable income in the progressive region of the tax 
schedule, implying that small firms are more likely to hedge. We should understand that 
small companies have more volatile cash flows, more restricted access to capital, and 
thus presumably more reasons to buy protection against foreign exchange risk (Dolde, 
1992). Small companies have a greater probability of default caused by not hedging 
foreign exchange risk and the greater concentration of equity ownership in small 
companies. A survey of Fortune 500 companies conducted by Walter Dolde in 1992, 
found that small companies reported hedging significantly greater percentages of their 
foreign exchange risk than the large companies. However, the search for causal 
explanations should always control the time dimension. Company size and hedging 
strategy may be the result of different processes with different time paths, so that 
statistical correlation at any point in time should not be assumed to be a proof of a 
causal linkage.
The results for the variables pertaining to the costs of hedging are consistent with the 
predictions of the hypotheses linking corporate hedging decision to the hedging costs. 
The effect of the corporate hedging costs in the hedging decision is consistent with that 
suggested in Geczy et al., (1997). The costs of implementing a hedging strategy play a 
role in a firm’s decision to hedge. In that, the study found that the firm is more likely to 
hedge, if the manager feels that the costs of hedging are at an acceptable level. While
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most of the importers and exporters used the internal hedging methods such as leading 
and lagging, matching and netting in different countries (Soenen and Aggarwal, 1989), 
these methods are generally not cost-free. As can be seen in section (3.3) forward 
contracts rank as the most frequently used instrument, which means that the transaction 
cost of the financial instruments plays an important role in the firm’s choice and in the 
decision to hedge or not. Forward contracts provide a relatively low-cost method for 
matching the payoffs of frequent and uncertain transactions (Geczy et al, 1997). Our 
findings confirm that, in most of Saudi’s firms in the sample, the extent of using 
financial instruments seems to be the result of their availability and cost.
10.3.5 The final model for the determinants of hedging decision
The objective of this research is to analyse and identify the corporate hedging decision 
determinants. Chapter 8 analysed the determinants of both the hedging incentives 
(group one) and the managerial risk aversion (group two). Chapter 9 examined the 
determinants of the firms’ need (group three) and ability (group four) to hedge. The 
logistic regression was used for further assessment on the hedging decision choice and 
in order to have the conditional relationship. In order to achieve the best model of 
determinants and using the logistic regression, the main corporate hedging determinants 
from each group were identified (see Chapters 8 and 9). Each of the models presented in 
these Chapters identifies the most significant factors which can be used to more 
effectively determine the decision to hedge or not to hedge currency exposure. The 
following equation [10.1], presents the main determinants from the four groups. This 
equation will be used to run the logistic regression and to identify the final model of the 
study which contains most of the factors that affect the currency exposure management 
decision in Saudi firms.
The logic model which will be used in this section is given by equation [10.1].
In ( ^  - )  = /?0 + /?, Sa +/?2 Tas +/?3 Cas +/?4Agency5 + /?5Agency3 I - P i
+ p 6 Distress4 + /?7 Opportunity 3 + /?8 Opportunity4 + /?9 Control + J3l0 Comoney
+ /?,, Comequity +/?I2 age +/?]3 Islamlaw + /?,4 Industry +/?]5 Costsens +/?)6 
Cpmpetition2 +/?17 Market +/?18 Qdegree +/?19 Nationality + /?20 Cost + fi2]
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Department + /?22 Training + /?23 Bank3 + /?24 riskexperience + s  [10.1]
Where:
o  Constant termPo
Sa = The ratio of Total sales / Total assets
Tas = The ratio of Tangible assets / Total assets
Cas = The ratio of cash flow / Total assets
Agency5 Our company has adopted a monitoring device system to control the relationship between
managers and owners
Agency3 Most of our company’s profits were paid as dividend to the firm’s owners
Distress4 We are dealing in business where the probability of gain and loss is equal
Opportunity3 The ability of our company to get over the financial problems increase our financial opportunities
Opportunity4 The investment opportunities in our market are good
Control Firm control
Comoney The monetary compensation system
Comequity The equity compensation system
Age The manager’s age
Islamlaw The Islamic view
Costsens The sensitivity of the costs to changes in foreign exchange rates
Industry The firm industry
Competition2 The difference between the firm’s products and those of their competitors.
Market The description of the markets that firms trade in
Qdegree The manager’s qualification degree
Nationality The manager’s nationality
Cost The cost of implementing hedging strategy
Department The participation of the operating department in risk management strategy
Training The risk management training program
Riskexperience The length of experience in risk management
Bank3 The relationship with banks
p  t0 p  Coefficients for each firm-specific variables
Residual term
Table C4 and Figure C5, in the Appendix C, show that no collinearity problem exists 
between the independent variable and the standardize residuals that lie between 3 
standard deviations from the mean. To analyse the final model of the currency exposure 
management determinants, the Forward Stepwise Method of Regression will be used, 
on the condition that all variables in the predicted model have a p  value of .10 or less (P 
< .10). When the forward method is employed the logistic regression begins with a 
model that includes only a constant and then adds single predictors into the model 
starting with the one with the most significant effect of the dependent variable through 
to the one with the less effect, excluding the ones with P > .10. Table 10.6, shows the
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results of the logistic regression analysis. The Table shows that the independent 
variables were added to the model step by step, starting with the variable with most 
significant score statistic. The logistic regression proceeds until none of the remaining 
currency exposure management predictors have a significant score statistic (the cut-off 
point for significance being 0.10).
Table 10.6: The Final logistic regression for the currency exposure 
_______________management determinants model_______________
The Model 
Step
Association/
Predictive
Efficiency
Variables The
Coefficient
S.E. Sig.
Step 1 s~<
M = 25.344
The Islamic view 
Constant
-1.365
2.425
.302
.643
.000
.000
The model 
improve our 
understanding 
of the hedging 
decision (to 
hedge or not 
to hedge) by
=87.674
p2
=0.224
2 P =0.429
%22.4
TP = 0.506
Step 2 r '
M =37.719
The Islamic view 
The Nationality
-1.464
1.208
.345
.377
.000
.001
The model 
improve our 
understanding 
of the hedging 
decision by
=75.299
d2
= 0.334
Constant .700 .786 .374
%33.4 =0.457  
r P = 0.531
Step 3 r ■>
M  =51.593
The Islamic view 
The Markets
-1.566
-1.226
.400
.372
.000
.001
The model 
improve our 
understanding 
of the hedging 
decision by
=61.425
n2
V. = 0.457
The Nationality 
Constant
1.550
2.720
.455
1.109
.001
.014
%45.7% ^P =0.60  
r P = 0.654
Step 4 r~>
M =64.643
The Management Equity 
Compensation System
2.765 .921 .003
The model 
improve our 
understanding 
of the hedging 
decision by
%57.2
D m  =48.375
p2
= 0.572
2 P =0.571 
r P = 0.630
The Islamic view 
The Markets 
The Nationality 
Constant
-2.073
-1.578
1.972
-.404
.555
.494
.583
1.444
.000
.001
.001
.779
Step 5 q  The Management Equity 3.515 1.182 .003
M =80.815 Compensation System
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Step
Association/
Predictive
Efficiency
Variables The
Coefficient
S.E. Sig.
The Islamic view -2.554 .768 .001
The Markets -1.668 .587 .004
The Participation of the 
Operating Department on the 
Currency Exposure 
Management Strategy
1.434 .560 .010
The Nationality 2.713 .844 .001
Constant -4.289 2.200 .051
Step 6
= 97.308
The Management Equity 
Compensation System
3.769 1.350 .005
The model 
improve our 
understanding 
of the hedging 
decision by
%86.1
= 15.710
n2
V. =0.861 
^P =0.857  
r P = 0.876
The Islamic view 
The Markets
The Cost of Implementing the 
Currency Exposure 
Management Strategy
The Participation of the 
Operating Department on the 
Currency Exposure 
Management Strategy
-2.653
-1.941
1.193
1.399
.854
.727
.536
.601
.002
.008
.026
.020
The Nationality 3.084 .974 .002
Constant -6.904 3.004 .022
Step 7 s~<
M = 106.244
The Management Equity 
Compensation System
3.802 1.509 .012
=6.774
The Islamic view 
The Markets
-3.078 
-2.311
1.081
.914
.004
.011
The model 
improve our 
understanding 
of the hedging 
decision(to 
hedge or not 
to hedge) by
%94
n2
1- =0.940  
^P =0.943  
TP = 0.951
The Risk Management 
Experience
The Cost of Implementing the 
Currency Exposure 
Management Strategy
The Participation of the 
Operating Department on the 
Currency Exposure 
Management Strategy
3.317
1.212
1.245
1.778
.589
.695
.062
.039
.073
The Nationality 3.543 1.214 .004
Constant -12.180 5.406 .024
The Table 10.6, shows that the last model in step 7 contains seven independent 
variables, which are; management equity compensation system, the Islamic view, 
markets (competition), risk management experience, the cost of implementing the 
currency exposure management strategy, participation of the operating department in 
the currency exposure management strategy, and nationality. We would argue that given 
a currency exposure management policy determinants, a firm’s ultimate decision to 
hedge also depends on the level o f its exposure to the risk. The Final model is as 
follows:
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PiIn ( ------- ) =  J30 + /?, Comequity + /?2 Islamlaw + P3 Market + fiA riskexperience+1 — Pi
p 5 Cost + p 6 Department + /?7 Nationality + s  [10.2]
Where:
A
Comequity
Islamlaw
Market
Riskexperience
Cost
Department
Nationality 
From P x to P 1
Constant term
The Management Equity Compensation System 
The Islamic view 
The Markets
The Risk Management Experience
The Cost of Implementing the Currency Exposure Management Strategy
The Participation of the Operating Department on the Currency Exposure 
Management Strategy
The Nationality
Coefficients for each firm-specific variables 
Residual term
This seven step model is the best model resulting from the study. The relationship 
between the hedging decision and hedging determinants presented in the final model is
statistically significant, = 106.244, with 7 degree of freedom, P = .000. Table 10.7, 
shows that the model can correctly classify 97.6 % of the firms in the sample as hedging 
and non-hedging firms. Table 10.6, indicates that inclusion of the seven determinants in
r 2the model reduces the variation by 94% ( L). This means that using the model we can
perfectly predict the hedging decision. Both measures of the predictive efficiency, p =
0.94, and Tp = 0.95, were very high indicating that the determinant variables allows us 
to classify the firms into hedging and non-hedging firms with a very high degree of 
accuracy, as reflected in the classification Table 10.7, step 7.
Table 10.7: The classification table of the firms in the sample after the
final model is adopted.
The Step Observed Predicted
Hedging or non-hedging 
company
Percentage Correct
Non-hedging
company
Hedging
company
Step 1 Non-hedging
company
40 8 83.3
Hedging company 12 23 65.7
Overall percentage 75.9
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The Step Observed
Hedging or non-hedging 
company
Non-hedging Hedging 
company company
Predicted
Percentage Correct
Step 2 Non-hedging
company
38 10 79.2
Hedging company 
Overall percentage
9 26 .._ _ _ _ _ ........... ....74.3
77.1
Step 3 Non-hedging
company
43 5 89.6
Hedging company 
Overall percentage
9 26 74.3
83.1
Step 4 Non-hedging
company
39 9 81.3
Hedging company 
Overall percentage
6 29 82.9
81.9
Step 5 Non-hedging
company
44 4 91.7
Hedging company 
Overall percentage
4 31 88.6
90.4
Step 6 Non-hedging
company
46 2 95.8
Hedging company 
Overall percentage
3 32 ........................... ... 91.4
94.0
Step 7 N on -h ed g in g
com p an y
97.9
H edg ing
com p an y
Overall
p ercen ta g e
1 97.1
97.6
10.4 Exploring the Major Findings
Findings in this chapter suggest that, hedging decisions were not always affected by the 
expected (favourable) impact on the firm’s value as there are other factors which play a 
role in the hedging decision. It is clear that using the finance theory factors alone as 
suggested by most of the previous studies to guide the risk management decision 
makers is not enough. The finance theory framework suggested by most of the previous 
studies is described by Froot et al, (1993) as an incomplete framework. FT has often 
been criticized for being too theoretical and narrow-minded (Peavy, 1984). Froot et al, 
(1993) argued that while financial theory provides managers with good instructions on 
the implementation of hedging unfortunately it has had much less clear cut guidance to 
offer an answer to the question as to hedge or not to hedge. The gap in the FT
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explanations in previous studies (in paradigm and methodology) are generally very 
broad as most of these studies analysed the corporate hedging decision from the same 
perspectives using only companies’ published data. Hence, any change in paradigm and 
methodology will provide another view regarding the explanations for why corporations 
hedge. The explanations of the FT for corporate hedging strategy also have some 
practical problems which were in mind when this study methodology and method were 
detennined (see section, 10.2).
Most of the previous studies found that hedging activity can be used to maximize 
shareholder value (Francis and Stephan, 1990; Froot et al, 1993; Berkman and 
Bradbury, 1996; Fok et al, 1997; Geczy et al, 1997; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Gay 
and Nam, 1998; Hardwick and Adams, 1999; Joseph, 1999; Haushalter, 2000). Most of 
these studies confirmed the FT indications that hedging increases firm value by 
reducing expected financial distress costs, expected agency costs, expected corporate 
finance costs, and increasing expected investment opportunities. However, Tufano 
(1996) found only a weak relationship between risk management and these factors. Also 
Mian (1996) found weak evidence that hedging activity increased the firm’s value. 
Consistent with the Tufano (1996) finding this study provides limited empirical support 
for the predictive power of these factors alone as hedging incentives. The findings in 
this study suggest that the explanation offered by most o f the previous studies regarding 
the implications o f  finance theory in the determinants o f  risk management offer much 
less clear cut guidance on the logically prior question as to hedge or not to hedge. The 
use of the predicted FT factors, by the previous studies, to explain the corporate hedging 
strategy may not provide a complete explanation and might prove to be of limited use to 
the active financial manager. It could be that there are other financial factors which are 
not established by previous studies and can be used to explain the effect of the FT 
implications in the hedging decision. It could be argued that what the previous studies 
presented as hedging incentive determinants might be classified as indicators for the 
success of hedging process FT argues that the decision makers aim at maximizing 
economic utility and this is what managers in hedging firms confirmed in this study. 
Our findings show that, the FT explanations suggested in previous studies achieve 
limited empirical support for the predictive power of finance theory that views risk 
management as a means to maximize shareholder value. There are many reasons for this 
finding such as microeconomic, and methodological differences between this study and
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previous studies.
However, our findings do not lead us to reject the FT implications on the hedging 
decision but alternatively direct us to explore the expected effect of the FT implications 
on the hedging decision in a way different from previous studies. Some of the empirical 
findings confirm theoretical rationales that view risk management as a means to 
maximize shareholder value. First, managers in hedging firms confirmed that their firms 
hedge the currency exposure since it affects their costs, cash flows, and to improve the 
firms’ competitive position. Second, the positive correlation between the decision to 
hedge and total sales, and the ability to hedge and to set up a hedging program is 
consistent with the notion that companies with a significant economic of scale were 
more likely to hedge. Third, the empirical evidence shows that hedging firms are more 
likely to be managed by one of their owners associated with less agency conflicts which 
provides support to the argument that by hedging these managers aim to maximize the 
shareholder wealth. Finally the positive correlation between the manager’s qualification 
and risk experience and hedging decision supports the theory that corporate risk 
management is used to accurately signal the manager quality and that these managers 
are attempting to maximize shareholder value. All these findings were confirmed using 
both univariate and multivariate analysis and give strong empirical support for the 
predictive power o f  theories that view risk management as a means to maximize 
shareholder value.
This study has found that FT alone does not contribute in a complete way to understand 
the determinants of the currency risk management decision in Saudi firms. FT provides 
only a managerial risk aversion and maximizing value framework to explain corporate 
hedging behaviour. We have argued that to explain corporate hedging behaviour, we 
need a much broader framework that can embody multiple descriptive goals and non­
maximizing behaviour of various forms. For these reasons, this study has attempted to 
fill the gap between risk management policy and FT by applying contingency theory. 
Contingency theory and FT offer more empirical scope to explain and understand the 
corporate hedging policy. It is fair to say that most of the risk management planners are 
guided by the factors identified by contingency theory. While most of the FT concepts 
are generally accepted by financial economists, the contingency theory concepts are 
helpful to explain the risk management strategy and are recognised as such by the
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practitioners.
Our findings also support the finance theory explanation that corporate hedging is 
affected by the managerial risk aversion hypothesis. According to the result in this 
research, we can argue that the risk management decision is more related to 
management risk aversion than agency conflicts. We have found that risk aversion plays 
an important and significant role as a determinant of the hedging decision. Managerial 
ownership can be seen as an important tool to affect the management risk aversion 
level. The findings show that the managerial characteristics appear to be more 
associated with corporate risk management than other organizational and 
environmental factors. Stulz (1984) argued that corporate hedging arises as a result of 
managerial risk aversion. Consistent with theories of managerial risk aversion (e.g., 
Stulz, 1984), this study found that a firm is likely to engage in hedging activity when 
the manager is also one of the firm’s owners.
This study suggests that the hedging decision is affected by the organizational, 
managerial and environmental context of the firm. This study found that contingency 
theory offers two explanations for why companies hedge. Using the contingency 
approach to understand the corporate hedging decision shows that the difference in 
corporate hedging strategy can be attributed to the firm’s ability to hedge. The 
contingency theory indicates that firms with qualified staff andfinancial managers, with 
more risk experience, with risk management training programmes, with strong 
relationships with banks, with more ability to bear the hedging costs, and with active 
involvement from the operating departments in risk management planning, are more 
likely to hedge. The contingency theory attributes the currency risk management 
decision to the firms’ need to hedge. In this regard, the contingency theory shoM>s that 
firms in specific industry, in competitive markets, with more sensitive operations to the 
changes in exchange rates and with more volatile exchange rates will be more likely to 
hedge.
10.5 Conclusion
While it is argued that currency exposure management is a good idea, the findings in 
this study imply that foreign exchange exposure management techniques are not widely 
used by Saudi firms. A high percentage of Saudi firms’ managers (57.8%) did not see
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foreign exchange management practice as important. While there are plenty of foreign 
exchange exposure management tools and techniques available, these managers were 
still reluctant to apply them in managing their firms’ exposure. It seems that risk 
management techniques have not yet become a standard practice in Saudi firms. It is 
clear regarding the criteria applied in this study that all of the firms in the sample were 
subject to the foreign exchange exposure. However, given that some Saudi firms 
adopted foreign exchange exposure management techniques and some did not, the 
question arises as to what are the factors that determine the hedging decision? In Saudi 
Arabia, it seems that managers were not confident with risk management practice and 
that there is still a long way to go. For these managers, more awareness, programme 
training, understanding of risk management techniques usage, and the usefulness of risk 
management practice are needed.
The chapter has pointed out that corporate hedging policies should not only consider the 
effect of the hedging activity on shareholders’ and managers’ wealth but also the firm’s 
ability and need to hedge. Using both the accounting ratios and indicators to measure 
the expected hedging incentives, the study found little evidence to support the 
hypothesis that hedging activity reduces the agency conflicts, increases the firm’s 
investment opportunities, reduces the distress costs and reduces the firms' finance costs. 
This result provides little support regarding the findings o f  previous studies o f the 
determinants o f  hedging incentives that view risk management as a means to maximize 
shareholder value. The chapter has presented the main factors which significantly affect 
the firm’s decision regarding foreign exchange exposure. The full logistic model 
consists of 24 independent variables used to predict the firms strategy regarding foreign 
exchange exposure. The final model was modified to include the management equity 
compensation system, the Islamic view, markets (competition), risk management 
experience, the cost of implementing the currency exposure management strategy, 
participation of the operating department in the currency exposure management 
strategy, and nationality. It can be argued that given these currency exposure 
management policy determinants, a firm’s ultimate decision to hedge also depends on 
the level o f its exposure to risk.
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Conclusions, Limitations and Future Work
11.1 Introduction
No single study can resolve the debate over the determinants of the hedging decision. 
Despite recent rigorous research efforts, the issue remains complex and in some respects 
contradictory. This study attempts to advance the debate by addressing important 
conceptual and methodological issues. This study employs a multiple stage, multi 
theory, and multi method to explore and examine the determinants of the currency risk 
management decision in Saudi firms. The findings in this study confirm some of the 
available theories of the determinants of corporate hedging that have been widely 
elucidated in the literature. The methods and methodology used in this study have 
helped to explain the discrepancies between corporate risk management theory and the 
results of previous empirical studies that only address the decision to use derivative to 
hedge, using publicly available data and a narrow hedging definition. We are able to 
explain the conflicts and differences between the results of this study and the previous 
studies.. Unlike other empirical studies, which mainly focus on historical data, this study 
extends the testable implication of existing theories of the hedging decision, by using a 
combination of contingency variables and financial variables, and interview and 
questionnaire methods.
The explanations of corporate hedging behaviour have some practical problems which 
were addressed when this study’s methodology and method were identified. For more 
accurate consideration of the corporate hedging strategy, this study tries to link the 
theoretical work (academics’ view) with practitioners (managers’ view) to identify areas 
of agreement, and to address the currency risk management problem from the 
perspective of both the financial manager and finance theory. For this reason, this study 
has attempted to fill the gap between risk management policy and finance theory by 
applying the contingency theory. The contingency theory offers a richer set of possible 
empirical explanations to understand the corporate hedging policy. We could argue that 
it is fair to say that most of the risk management decision makers are guided by factors 
identified by contingency theory. While most of the finance theory concepts are
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generally accepted by financial economists, however, the contingency theory concepts 
in full may more appropriate to explain the risk management strategy and are accepted 
by the practitioners. The study identified the limitation of using the finance theory alone 
as a framework for the determinants of corporate hedging. By using contingency theory, 
this study provides a further understanding of relationships among factors influencing 
the risk management decision at the micro level. An appropriate model of hedge or not 
to hedge decision will help to some extent in preventing problems caused by unsuitable 
hedging decisions. The contingency factors model helps managers to develop a more 
thorough understanding of complex situations facing hedging decisions and to take 
appropriate decision.
In order to carry out the survey with a questionnaire, two different sources of data were 
used. First, a review of the existing literature on risk management and corporate 
hedging determinants were undertaken and used to carry out the next step. The question 
arises as to whether similar hedging determinats can be constructed when working with 
the hedging decision in different countries? These factors are also key issues in the 
hedge or not to hedge model, examined in this study. However, are there any other 
determinants that may affect the firm decision to hedge? Our objective has been to 
identify different hedging determinants in which firms deal with corporate risk on a 
basis of the practices observed in Saudi firms. Second, all of the previous studies, 
presented in chapter 4, were mainly applied in developed countries and this study 
concentrates on one developing country, Saudi Arabia. The different environment and 
organizational structures in Saudi Arabia provide a new context for testing the 
generality of the findings of the previous studies. While these differences may affect the 
firm’s strategy and attitude, the method adopted to discover these effects and 
differences was to carry out an exploratory study with interviews before preparing the 
questionnaires used in the main study. The model and the tested relationships are based 
on a questionnaire survey. This research has been guided by the exploratory study, 
contingency theory, as well as by finance theory described in the corporate hedging 
literature discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
In order to achieve these objectives, the choice was made to conduct the main body of 
the exploratory study fieldwork using the semi-structured interview approach with 
financial managers. Interviews were used to explore and practically explain the 
determinants of the currency exposure management policy by collecting the
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relevant empirical data in order to test the competence and the structure of the 
theoretical framework to be used in the second stage (explanatory study; questionnaire). 
The interviews highlighted some of the contingency factors, and discussed in-depth 
some of the foreign exchange risk management behaviour in Saudi firms, and to gain 
further information about a firm’s hedging behaviour. The interviews succeeded in 
providing a rich background of information about hedging decision behaviour in Saudi 
firms and the factors that might affect the hedging decision. These exploratory 
interviews were used mainly to restructure the questionnaire design used in the final 
study. The exploratory study showed that it would be unacceptable to restrict the 
determinants of the hedging decision to the managerial differences and the possible 
benefits that firm might achieve from doing so. The exploratory study concluded that it 
is difficult for the decision makers in a firm to decide to hedge or not without also 
understanding a firm’s needs and its ability to do so.
11.2 The Contribution of the Study
This study has contributed to our understanding of corporate hedging behaviour by 
concentrating specially in Saudi export and import firms. At present there are no other 
empirical studies regarding the risk management practices and behaviour of Saudi firms. 
Most of the previous studies in the corporate hedging literature are based mainly on 
MNCs, whereas this study focuses on corporate hedging behaviour in smaller exporting 
and importing firms. While most of the previous empirical studies examine the 
predictive power of theories that view risk management as a means to maximize 
shareholder value, and the effects of managerial risk aversion, this study presents a 
contingency approach as an alternative framework for the determinants of a hedging 
decision. The general assumption is that the decision to hedge or not to hedge the 
foreign exchange exposure is contingent upon environmental, organizational, and 
managerial characteristics. Contingency theory adds a broader contingent dimension to 
understand the determinants of risk management, and the framework increases our 
understanding of corporate hedging behaviour. It is hoped that this framework will help 
to better understand the need for, and strategies available, to guide the firms’ currency 
exposure management and to choose from the different hedging policies available in a 
more effective way.
The study has found that FT and contingency theory offer four basic explanations for
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the coiporate hedging decision. From the FT point of view, and consistent with results 
reported in the literature, corporate hedging can be attributed to managerial risk 
aversion. According to the managerial risk aversion arguments, firms which are 
controlled by their owners, firms which have monetary and equity compensation 
systems, and those who have young directors, are more likely to hedge. In contrast with 
most of the previous study, this study provided only weak support for the finance theory 
argument that views hedging activity solely as a means to maximize shareholder value. 
On the other hand, the contingency theory offers another two explanations for why 
companies hedge. The first explanation is that the hedging decision depends on the 
firm’s need to hedge. According to this explanation, firms in specific industries, 
competitive markets, firms with operations highly sensitive to the changes in exchange 
rates, and with highly volatile exchange rates will be more likely to hedge. A second 
explanation is that the hedging decision depends on the firm’s ability to hedge. Firms 
with qualified staff and financial managers, with more risk experience, with risk 
management training programme, with strong relationships with their banks, with more 
ability to bear the hedging costs, and with active involvement from the operating 
departments in risk management planning, will be more likely to hedge.
Contingency theory improves our understanding of the theory of currency exposure 
management. In that the findings show that the external environment to the firm is a 
significant determinant of the currency exposure management policy. Significant 
associations between industry, markets, currency and market policy, banks and other 
external factors and currency exposure management decisions were found. While past 
studies view the determinants of corporate hedging in terms of the firm's internal 
characteristics, this study broadened this understanding to include both the external and 
the internal environment. By employing both inductive and deductive approach in 
gathering the study data, this study makes improvements to the way that the research 
should follow in order to examine and analyse the research problem. This research 
attempted to fill some gaps in the determinants of corporate hedging literature by 
considering both the financial analysis and the context of the corporate hedging policy.
The research findings in this study support the work of Tufano (1996) and Mian (1996). 
This study found a weak relationship between risk management and a firm’s 
characteristics that value-maximizing risk management theories would predict. The 
findings of this study are consistent with the argument put forward by Stulz (1984),
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Breeden and Viswanathan (1990), and Tufano (1996) that the theories of managerial 
risk aversion are more powerful in affecting the hedging decision than those of 
shareholder value maximization, (four variables from seven in the final model related to 
the management characteristics, see section 10.3.5).
This research predicts that risk management policy may be affected by four groups of 
factors; the hedging incentive factors, the managerial risk aversion factors, the firm’s 
hedging need factors, and the firm’s ability to hedge. Overall, using the logistic 
regression analysis we examined the possibility of using these groups to explain the 
hedging decision. The logistic regression results show that the determinants of the 
hedging ability model looks to be the best model to fit the hedging decision, in that the 
model can correctly classify 96.4% of the firms in the sample as hedging and non­
hedging firms (see section, 9.3.4). Also the study found a model which can correctly 
classify 97.6 % of the firms in the sample as hedging and non-hedging firms (see 
section, 10.3.5). This model consists of seven determinant factors: the management 
equity compensation system, the Islamic view, markets (competition), the risk 
management experience, the cost of implementing the currency exposure management 
strategy, the participation of the operating department on the currency exposure 
management strategy, and the nationality of the risk management decision makers. This 
study found that the Islamic view had a greater influence for the choice of the hedging 
decision. Most of the non-hedging firms described the financial instruments available in 
Saudi Arabia, (the derivative contracts) to be prohibited by Islamic ‘Shariah’ (see 
sections 6.3.3 and 7.3.2.2).
The research results have some implications for the banks. Most of the banks in Saudi 
Arabia have Islamic committees which help the banks to provide the customers with 
acceptable services from an Islamic point of view. These committees need to focus on' 
the foreign exchange risk problem and should seek to establish acceptable financial 
instruments to help companies. While the Islamic banks existed in Saudi Arabia1, none
1 There are five Islamic Banks established in Saudi Arabia; The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), The 
Islamic Investment Company (IIC), Al-Baraka Investment and Development Company, Two private 
groups which were formerly operating as money changing offices in Saudi Arabia, (Al-Rajhi Company 
for Currency and Exchange (Riyadh) and Al-Rajhi Islamic Investment Banking Company (Jeddah))
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of these banks, as confirmed by the interviewees, provide them with an acceptable 
Islamic solution for managing foreign exchange risk.
Because the currency exposure management policy is a function of factors such as 
foreign sales, agency costs, competition reactions, foreign costs, and managerial 
attitude, a firm's currency exposure hedging policy should differ from firm to firm, and 
should also change through time. As these determinants of a firm's exposure evolve 
over time, the hedging strategy should be reviewed and adjusted in line with the 
changing environment. The study showed that risk managers’ hedging decisions are 
affected by the limitation of the participation of the other departments in the firm in 
formulating a hedging strategy. The survey findings revealed low involvement from the 
operations department in foreign exchange exposure management, suggesting that most 
of the firms in the sample did not consider the effect of the exchange rates movements 
on their marketing and operating strategies. We would suggest that operating 
departments (e.g. marketing, purchasing and production) in a company should co­
operate more closely with the financial department (or treasury department) in 
establishing foreign exchange risk policy and the management practices. From the 
beginning when a company starts to plan its business it should consider foreign 
exchange risk management as a factor affecting the decision making process of the 
company. We would suggest that the corporate hedging policy should be discussed and 
implemented in connection with other departments in the firm. It seems that both 
identification of exposures and the decisions to hedge involve the operating units 
working together with the treasury department. Treasury provides the expertise in the 
foreign exchange markets and hedging tools, but the operating managers are the people 
with direct responsibility for foreign exchange since it hits their bottom line. Treasury 
departments should work with the operating units to identify currency exposures and, 
based on their input, the risk managers suggest hedging strategies. The contribution of 
the operating department in the risk management policy will effectively increase the 
possibility that the risk manager will choose the appropriate hedging decision. Saudi 
firms should develop a more formal approach to risk management, and should put 
together a team to develop and carry out their risk management policy and strategies.
applied to SAMA in order to be allowed to operate as Islamic Banks (Journal of economic corporation 
among Islamic Countries, 1998).
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The firm should establish a risk management team from people from several disciplines 
within the company, such as corporate risk manager, corporate accounting manager, 
corporate purchasing manager, and corporate operating managers. This risk 
management team meets regularly to discuss the markets, exposures, and hedging 
strategies.
The results presented in this study strongly suggest that, in general, boards of directors 
fail to consider the managers’ attitude towards corporate risk when preparing the 
company’s managerial performance compensation arrangements. To the extent that 
performance related monetary compensation payments to management fail to correlate 
with corporate hedging decisions, boards of director appear to be forsaking their 
obligations to shareholders and they may fail to use compensation as a mechanism of 
control. In summary, this study presented significant evidence that boards of directors 
do not generally consider the corporate risk management when deciding on 
remuneration payments. They possibly did so because they view minimizing the foreign 
exchange exposure as an inappropriate or insufficient criterion for judging 
management’s performance.
The link between the hedging decision and the firm's competition suggests the idea that 
firm's foreign exchange risk management policy should be made jointly with its 
competitive strategy. This means that studies which focus on the firm’s competitive 
strategy decision need to consider corporate hedging policies. For example, a firm in a 
highly competitive market that hedges its foreign exchange risk, may choose the same 
pricing strategy as a firm in a low competitive market that dose not hedge. Without 
controlling for foreign exchange risk, the relation between pricing strategy and the 
determinants of competitive advantages is ignored. It can be concluded that, it is 
important for the risk manager to understand the source of its company comparative 
advantages in order to plan the firm's risk management strategy.
Firms should measure exposure properly so that they do not underestimate the level of 
their exposure, including taking into account the nature of the foreign exchange risk 
they face. A company can adopt internal procedures that would permit it to measure 
foreign exchange exposure properly. For example, a company could develop a system 
that frequently updates its current and future global exposures as it executes new trades. 
This would provide the firm with much more accurate and timely information regarding
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its foreign exchange risk. The availability of a more accurate risk management 
information system will enable different operating departments to participate in 
developing the firm’s risk management strategy and help the risk manager to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the hedging activity. The findings in this study 
indicate that there are some Saudi firms that do not have a risk management policy let 
alone a risk management information system. It seems that these exporting and 
importing firms have a lack of understanding of the potential dangers of currency 
exposure. For these firms, it is important to develop new risk management policies.
Foreign exchange risk management practices in Saudi firms are limited and should be 
improved. Firms did not see the foreign exchange exposure management as an 
important strategic issue and firms need to be further educated regarding the effect of 
currency exposure. Firms should organize risk management training programs and 
employ qualified risk management staff. As most of the Saudi firms are in their early 
stages of development, the need for foreign experience in management and risk 
management is important. The foreign experience from Western countries is important 
to improve the quality of the management and business environment. Also the findings 
show that most of the firms did not have managerial performance evaluation and reward 
programs which aligned the manager’s interest to that of the shareholder’s interest. 
Firms need to pose the question of which type of compensation arrangements should be 
used to encourage managers to work in the interest of their shareholders. The study 
findings show that if appropriate management reward structures are in place, 
management performance improves, especially when firms use an equity reward 
system. This study found that changes in the managerial ownership structure may have 
important effects on the hedging decision. In addition, ownership structure does not 
only affect the risk attitude of the firm, but also a firm’s survival and market exit 
decisions. Firms should establish risk management objectives and their relationship with 
the firm’s overall objectives. Firms also need to improve the ability of forecasting the 
future exchange rate in order to better assess the effect of the currency exposure.
Findings of this study help to provide managers with valuable insights to the 
development of the firm's risk management strategy and to improve risk management 
decisions. The main effect of this study is to provide managers with a better ability to 
use the study’s theoretical framework for practical purposes, strengthen treasurer 
department developments, and increase the viability of the organization. This
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study focuses on exporters and importers in Saudi Arabia, who trade extensively in 
international markets, and the implications for the study are of particular relevance to 
such firms.
The findings in this study suggest that the discussion of the effects of an exchange rate 
shock on the value of a firm is based on the effect of the exposure magnitude and the 
exchange rates volatilities on the firm’s operations. Most of the previous studies, which 
examined the effect of exchange rate movements on the firm’s value, mainly 
concentrated on the idea that net foreign revenue is the primary source of exchange rate 
shocks on a firm’s value. However, as we found that the foreign exchange exposure is a 
function of some of the contingent environmental factors, such as foreign sales, agency 
costs, competitive reactions, and the management ability, a firm's exchange rate 
exposure on the firm’s value should change through time. The study of the effect of the 
exchange exposure on the firm’s value should not be separated from considering the 
effect of these exposure factors on the exchange exposure. Even for the researcher who 
examined the effects of an exchange rate shock on the value of a firm should take into 
consideration the effect of the contingent environmental, organizational, and managerial 
factors on the currency exposure magnitude.
11.3 Limitations of the Study
Several limitations have been faced while conducting this study. Some of these 
limitations relate to the methodological approach that underpins this research; others 
relate to problems encountered by the researcher in the research process itself. The total 
sample of the study was 171 firms and the idea during the period of the empirical work 
was to collect data from most of these firms. However, a response was only received 
from 94 firms. The reasons for this were: access was denied by a number of firms, the 
time available for doing this fieldwork was limited, and only the costs of three months 
data gathering in Saudi Arabia were covered by the sponsor. All these limitations 
affected the number of respondents. Finally, any conclusions that might be drawn on the 
data analysis in chapters 8, and 9 in this study should be taken into consideration with 
these limitations in mind. Also access to the firms’ financial and accounting ratios data 
was very limited as many firms regarded the data required as very sensitive data.
The main aim of this study has been to explore and examine the determinants of foreign
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exchange exposure management policy in one developing country. To achieve this aim 
the study focused on Saudi firms, this may affect the generality of some of the research 
findings as they may only be appropriate to explain the situation within the Saudi firms’ 
environment.
One of the main technical limitations in analysis of the study is that there are some 
statistical tools (e.g. factor analysis) which only accept variables with same unit of 
measurement. For example, all the variables should be scale variables or ordinal or 
nominal variables. While most of the groups (risk management aversion variables, 
firm’s ability to hedge variables and firm’s need to hedge variables) in this study consist 
of different variables; scale interval, ordinal, and nominal, makes it difficult to apply 
these statistical tools. There are also some limitations regarding the use of contingency 
theory as a framework. In that the variables’ ‘conceptualization’ and ‘measurements’ 
used in contingency theory need great theoretical and empirical consideration. The large 
number of variables generated by the use of the contingency approach, and the difficulty 
in finding appropriate measures for them, may have affected the research findings. 
While using a large number of independent variables with a small sized sample may 
affect the validity of the regression results.
11.4 Future Study
The aim of this section is to provide some suggestions for future research that might be 
considered in order to further improve our understanding of, and contribute to, the 
corporate hedging literature. One of the main original contributions of this study to the 
corporate hedging literature is the use of the contingency framework. While this 
framework is built on the situation in Saudi Arabia, this framework provides researchers 
with a tool that can be used for further investigation in other countries. There is a need 
to use the framework in studying the situation in other firms, in other countries. The 
variables examined in this study need to be examined in a larger sample to improve the 
regression results. Further, using the same variables as used in this study, but with 
unique measurements (scales only) for these variables, may allow researchers to use 
more complex statistical tests. This research adopted the contingency and finance theory 
and suggests for future study the use of other theories.
Islamic ‘Shariah’ imposes strong effects on foreign exchange risk management policy.
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These restrictions and effects can be explored further in order to focus more deeply on 
the reasons that led the Islamic view to prevent the use of derivative contracts. This 
indicates a new dimension to the problem and this should be investigated in depth to see 
if there are any alternative solutions for the foreign exchange risk from the Islamic point 
of view. As there are various risk management tools available, further research is 
needed to find out which of these tools and techniques are acceptable from an Islamic 
point of view. Research also needs to be undertaken to investigate the extent to which 
the risk management tools which are prohibited in Islamic Shariah law can be 
restructured in order to be acceptable. Further research is also needed to find out which 
of the risk management approaches and tools work best, and under what circumstances 
and environments.
This study raised essential points about the hedging method problems in Saudi firms. 
Further research can focus on risk management practice in Saudi Arabia and the 
different financial instruments used by hedging firms, and to what extent this practice is 
affected by the internal and external firm context. Further research needs to. be focused 
on an evaluation of the performance measurement methods in Saudi firms in order to 
improve firms’ managerial performance. This study found that although foreign 
exchange exposure management strategy was used by some Saudi firms to maximize 
shareholder value, the empirical evidence in this study shows that the risk management 
decision is more related to managerial risk aversion. The study also argues that the 
strongest motive for risk management behaviour is the managerial risk aversion 
argument. Further research should focus on this motive within larger and more open 
economies. It will be worthwhile, to examine the effect of the comparative advantage 
managerial risk aversion framework in both Saudi and non-Saudi firms. The question 
arises whether the findings in this study are especially for Saudi firms or can be used 
within the firms in different countries? This question can be answered by other 
researchers in other countries. This study also raises some questions such as, what is the 
information that treasury departments need to establish currency risk management 
policy and strategies, and who is to be on the risk management team?
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Appendix A.II: Letter from the Researcher.
Dear Sir,
I would like to inform you that I am a teaching assistant at Al-Imam University, 
Department of Business and Accounting. Currently, I am doing my Ph.D. at the 
Sheffield Business and Finance School, Sheffield Hallam University. As part of my 
Ph.D. programme, I am conducting a research project on the determinants of currency 
risk management decision, comparing the results with normative literature. In this 
respect, I would be greatly appreciated if the highest level official responsible for 
currency hedging would answer the enclosed questionnaire.
The questionnaire has been deliberately kept short so as to require approximately fifteen 
minutes for its completion. Please answer the questions to the best of your knowledge. 
All information given will be used in aggregate only and will be treated with the 
strictest confidentiality. The company’s name will never be placed on the research.
I would be extremely grateful if you would kindly spend few minutes of your time to 
complete the attached questionnaire. If you have any questions or comments please 
contact me at 056146765. Please return as promptly as possible in the enclosed business 
reply envelope.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely yours,
Fahad Al-Mohaimeed
Teaching assistant at Al-Imam University
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Appendix A: Letter about the Research Subject 
Foreign Exchange Risk Management
Dear Sir/
Foreign exchange exposure is a profit or expected future cash flow stream (whether 
certain or not) is said to be exposed to exchange risk when a currency movement would 
change for better or for worse, its parent or home currency value. The effect of 
exchange rate volatility on a company’s broad activities is one of the controversial 
issues in international economics. It is widely believed that the exchange rate volatility 
increases risk and uncertainty in exporting and importing firms. For example, if a Saudi 
firm imports goods from UK, and the payment is in pounds, and the value of the pound 
rises against Saudi Riyal (SR), an exchange loss will be incurred. Interest in defining 
and managing exposure to gains and losses caused by fluctuating exchange rates has 
increased dramatically in recent years.
For treasurers, in order to decide whether foreign exchange risks should be managed or 
not, they should know how significant the potential currency risk is considered to be, 
the company’s attitudes to currency risk and the benefit of their hedging decision. 
Hedging refers to all actions taken to protect a firm against the risks resulting from 
exposure to foreign currency exchange rate fluctuations. Hedging foreign exchange 
exposure (risk) is a practice of covering exposure designed to reduce the volatility of the 
firm’s profit and/or cash generation, and it presumably follows that this will reduce the 
volatility of the value of the firm. Companies can use a wide range of internal methods 
to hedge foreign exchange risk. These methods can be created internally as part of a 
company's regulatory, financial and operational management (e.g., matching, netting, 
leading and lagging). The use of external techniques is one means of managing and 
controlling foreign exchange risk. In this regard, many different financial instruments 
can be used for hedging purposes. A companies can use the external markets to hedge 
any residual exposure after cover from internal methods. Company can use financial 
instruments like forward, option, future and swap contracts to hedge currency risks.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Sincerely yours,
Fahad Al-Mohaimeed
Teaching assistant at Al-Imam University
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Appendix B: The Questionnaire and Interview Guide
B.l: A Copy of the English Version of the Questionnaire.
B.II: A Copy of the English Version of the Interview Guide.
B.III: A Copy of the Arabic Version of the Questionnaire.
B. IIII: A Copy of the Arabic Version of The Interview 
Guide.
Appendix B. The English Version o f the Questionnaire
Appendix B.l: A Copy of the English Version of the Questionnaire 
Confidential
P a r t  O n e '  A b o u t  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t
1.1) Name of Organisation (optional):.......................................  ............
1. 2) Name of person filling this questionnaire: ............................................................................
1 3) Job Title’ Director j j Financial manager j | Accountant manager | j Treasurer | |..Other...................
1.4) Classification of business Activity: Chemical & Oil Q  M ining & Steel Q  Food & Drink I I
Electric & Electronic I I Cars & equipments I j M edical I I Cement & I I Other....................
| I | | tools | I building tools | |
1. 5) How old are you? Less than 40 years j J Between 41 & 50 years | | more than 51 J j
1. 6) What is your qualification and area?
Diploma Q jj Bachelor □  Master □  PhD □
Management | | Accounting □  Finance □  Economic □
Other
Other.
1. 7) What is your nationality?
Saudi Arabia I Other Arabic
 | Countries □ West Asian □ European | | American j j
Other.
1. 8) Length of employment in your company and in your current job. 
years
W ork in a company Experience in your curren t job
Less than 1 year 
Between 1 and 3 years 
Between 3 and 5 years 
Between 5 and 10 years 
Over 10 years
1. 9) Which of the following kinds of ownership can describe your company?
Shareholders company Individual company Family company Others, Please specify
1.10) Does at least one of the firm’s owners or shareholders hold more than 10% of the firm’s 
equity or capital?
Yes “ No
1. 11) Does the manager own the company, or is he one of its main shareholders, or is he just 
employed by the owners of the company as a manager?
The manager is not one o f  the company Managers owns less than 10% o f  the firm's Managers ow ns m ore than 10% o f  the firm's
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owners equity equity
1. 12) In your company, how you can describe level of the performance related monetary 
compensation ?
No monetary compensation Low monetary compensation High monetary compensation
□  [ = □  □ _  _1.13) Does your company have an equity compensation system? Yes_|__ | No |___ |
1.14) Could you please define the annual salary for the manager?
The manager annual incom e is less than The manager annual incom e is between The manager annual incom e is more than 
50000 pounds 50000 and 150000 pounds 150000 pounds
1.15) Which kind of foreign trade does your company practice?
Export □  Import □  Export and Import □  No foreign trade □
1.16) Are you the one who is responsible for the Yes No
management of the foreign exchange risk?
P a r t  T w o . ’ T h e  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  Y o u r  C o m p a n y
2.1) The following table concerns some facts and figures about your company, could you please 
complete this table
/For part a to I, please tick the box which most accurately describes your company]
Items No 1-20% 21-50% 51-80% 81-100%
a The percentage of your company’s sales made in foreign (non KSA) markets
b The percentage of your company’s inputs purchased in foreign (non KSA) markets
c The percentage of your company’s key competitors based in foreign (non KSA) countries
d The percentage of your company’s debt denominated in foreign currencies
e The percentage of your company’s main competitors face cost denominated in the same currencies as your company
f The percentage of your company’s profit to the total sales
£ The percentage of your company’s debt to the total assets
h The percentage of the distributed dividend
i The percentage of the cash flows to the total assets
2.2) From your company’s annual report 2000/2001, could you please complete these 
items:
a) The total Sales.
□  Less than 5 million'Riyal □  From 5 m illion Riyal to less than 10 m illion Riyal
□  From 10 m illion Riyal to less than 50 m illion Riyal □  From 50 m illion Riyal to less than 100 m illion Riyal
□  From 100 m illion to less than 500 million Riyal □  From 500 m illion Riyal to less than billion Riyal
□  From billion Riyal to less than 2 billion Riyal □  M ore than 2  billion
8
Appendix B. The English Version o f the Questionnaire
b) Total Assets.
□  Less than 5 million Riyal
□  From 10 million Riyal to less than 50 million Riyal
□  From 100 million to less than 500 million Riyal
□  From billion Riyal to less than 2 billion Riyal
c) Capital Assets.
□  Less than 5 million Riyal
□  From 10 million Riyal to less than 50 million Riyal
□  From 100 million to less than 500 million Riyal
□  From billion Riyal to less than 2 billion Riyal
□  From 5 million Riyal to less than 10 million Riyal
□  From 50 million Riyal to less than 100 million Riyal
□  From 500 million Riyal to less than billion Riyal
□  More than 2 billion
□  From 5 million Riyal to less than 10 million Riyal
□  From 50 million Riyal to less than 100 million Riyal
□  From 500 million Riyal to less than billion Riyal
□  More than 2 billion
d) The company’s Research & Development expenditures.
□  Less than 100 thousand Riyal
□  From 500 thousand Riyal to less than million Riyal
□  From 5 million Riyal to less than 10 million Riyal
n  More than 100 million Riyal
e) The total Debt.
□  Less than million Riyal
□  From 5 million Riyal to less than 10 million Riyal
□  From 50 million Riyal to less than 100 million Riyal
□  From 500 million Riyal to less than billion Riyal
□  From 100 thousand Riyal to less than 500 thousand Riyal
□  From million Riyal to less than 5 million Riyal
□  From 10 million Riyal to less than 100 million
□  No expenditures
From million Riyal to less than 5 million Riyal 
From 10 million Riyal to less than 50 million Riyal
□□
□  From 100 million Riyal to less than 500 million Riyal□ More than billion Riyal
P a r t  T h r e e -  T h e  E f f e c t  o f  E x c h a n g e  R a t e  M o v e m e n t s  
o n  y o u r  C o m p a n y
3. 1) Without the use of hedging activity, how sensitive to changes in foreign exchange rates do 
you consider your company’s sales volumes, Purchase volume, profit margins, costs and cash 
flows to be? (Please choose the appropriate pox}
Highly Highly
Insensitive Insensitive Neutral Sensitive Sensitive
a) Sales Volumes □ □ □ □ □
b) Profit Margins □ □ □ □ □
c) Costs □ □ □ □ □
d) Cash Flows □ □ □ □ □
E) Purchase Volumes □ □ □ □ □
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3. 2) Please indicate the extent to which significant movements in each of the following 
currencies (against riyal) would affect the risk level in your investment portfolio.
T y p e s  o f  c u r r e n c y Extremelyaffect
Very
affect
Effect Not so 
affect
Not
affect
Japanese yen
Egyptian Pound
Indian rupee
British Pound
Korean won
Indonesian Rupiah
Malaysian ringgit
Pakistan Rupee
Philippine Peso
Taiwan Dollar
Turkish Lira
Moroccan Dirham
Brazilian Real
EUR
France Franc
Chinese yuan
Italy Lira
Netherlands Guilder
Spain Pesota
Deutsche Mark
American Dollar
Greece Drachma
Others, please specify:
3. 3) Please chose any of the following statements that describe your company’s 
international trade, and if that has a positive or negative effect on the riskeness of your
company’s foreign currency fluctuations.
Items Factor volume Kind of ef] ect
All Most Some No One Positive Negative No effect
1 Our exports are priced in US dollar which is 
fixed against Riyal
2 The appreciation of Saudi Riyal against other currencies is helpful for us.
3 Our export revenues are received in Saudi Riyal.
4 Our import costs are paid in Saudi Riyal.
5 All our imports are priced in US dollar.
6 We are always dealing with only one or two countries which their currencies are significantly 
. fixed in Saudi’s Riyal.
7 Our exports are priced in strong currencies rather than US dollar
8 Our import costs are paid in strong currencies
1 0
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rather than US dollar
Other please specified,...................................
3.4) Overall, how would you describe the volatility of the foreign exchange rates 
in your company.
a) Very volatile. □
b) Moderately volatile. □
c) Slightly volatile. n
d) Totally not volatile □
Other, please specify:..................................................................................................
P a r t  F o u r * .  T h e  I n t e r n a l  E n v i r o n m e n t  o f  y o u r  C o m p a n y
4.1) How sensitive is the demand for your company’s main products to changes in price? 
Inelastic demand Slightly inelastic Not sure Slightly elastic Elastic demand
demand demand□ □ □ □ □
4.2) To what extent are the product/s sold by your company differentiated from those of your 
competitors?
Highly differentiated differentiated Not sure□ □ □ Closed□ The same□
4.3) Which one of the following risks are relevant to your company?
Not Relevant Slightly Relevant Neutral
1 Financial Risk.
2 Interest Risk.
3 Economic Risk.
4 Political Risk.
5 Debt & Equity Markets Risk
6 Industry Risk
Slightly Relevant Very Relevant
4.4) Could you please define to what extent you agree with following statements relating to your
company:
The Statem ent Agree
The company's owners participate in the decision of the
Rather Nature Rather disagree 
agree Disagree
1 1
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strategy and plan to grow up the company
the company's total sales have been improved
Most of our company’s profits were paid as dividend to
the firm's owners
the owners of the company satisfied with improvement 
in a company 
our company has adopted a monitoring device system 
to control the relationship between managers and 
owners
In our company the management compensation system 
has been linked to the corporate performance 
our company's ability to service its debt is low
8 The percentage of our firm's debt is high
9 In our industry the probability o f going bankrupt is very 
high
0 we are dealing in business where the probability of gain 
and loss is equal
1 The risk management tools available in the markets to 
hedge the foreign exchange risk are very risky
2 Our ability in managing the financial risk protect our 
expected cash flow
3 We always have a plan to improve our investment 
opportunities
4 the ability of our company to get over the financial 
problems increase our financial opportunities
5 the investment opportunities in our markets are good
6 we finance our investment by increasing the company’s 
capital or asking the owners for help
7 we present our financial statements in a way which can 
increase our probability to receive more flexible external 
finance
8 We have more flexibility to get external funding under 
flexible conditions
9 in our company the cost of external finance is cheaper as 
our financial risk is low
20 Our cash flow has been improved
22 from our normal activities we can generate enough 
cash flow for future investments
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
4.5) Could you please define to what extent you agree with following statements relating to your 
company?
The Statem ent
The firm tends to use an accounting approach which minimize the
Agree Rather
agree
Nature Rather
Disagree
disagree
negative effect of the exchange rates movements on the data which 
was presented to shareholders and analysts 1 2 3 4 5
Implementing a risk management policy/ strategy is very costly 1 2 3 4 5
We feel the cost of hedging the financial risk is exceeding the benefits
from it 1 2 3 4 5
4 Using derivatives for hedging the currency risk is very costly
1 2
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1 2 3 4 5
5 In our company we have a qualified people to deal with financial risk
management 1 2  3  4  5
6 In or company we have qualified people on how to use risk 
management tools (the derivative contracts)
7 In our company we have financial a risk management strategy
8 In our company we have a policy in the use of financial derivatives
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
9 We are hedging our foreign exchange risk but not interest with the
results we got 1 - 2  3  4  5
10 Our company sometimes carries some training programs in hedging
foreign exchange risk 1 2 3  4  5
11 In our company the operating departments such as sales department
and purchasing department are participating in the preparation of the j ^ 3  4  5
financial risk management strategy
12 There is a high level of coordination between the different departments
in our company 1 2  3  4  5
13 Other departments usually provide me with relevant information about
the foreign exchange exposure in the company 1 2 3  4  5
14 We do not have any foreign exchange risk in our company. 1 2 3 4 5
15 We have difficulty in understanding the relevance and importance of \  2  3 4 5
our currency exposure
16 We are unable to measure our currency exposure with the necessary 1 2 3 4 5
accuracy
17 We always pay dividend to our shareholders 1 2 3 4 5
18 In the company there is a criteria and standard in evaluating the 1 2 3 4 5
manager’s performance
19 Our profit has been dramatically increased. 1 2 3 4 5
P a r t  F i v e -  F o r e i g n  E x c h a n g e  R i s k  M a n a g e m e n t  
P r a c t i c e s  O f  Y o u r  C o m p a n y
5.1) Does your company forecast its future foreign currency cash flow? 
No Yes
□  □  i
For what time horizons are these forecasts made?
[Please Tick one]
Up to one week □
Up to two weeks □
Up to one month □
Up to one year □
Greater than one year
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□
5.2) Please indicate the extent to which of the following internal hedging methods can be used in 
your company to hedge the foreign exchange risk._____________________________________
Methods
Used to hedge short-term 
currency risk
Used to hedge long-term 
currency risk
not
used
Occasionally
used
Frequently
used
not
used
Occasionally
used
Frequently
used
Netting
Matching
Leading and Lagging
Currency invoicing
Sales price adjustment
Reinvoicing Centre
Others please specify ..................
5. 3) Please indicate the extent to which of the following external hedging methods can be used in 
your company to hedge the foreign exchange risk
Methods
Used to hedge short-term 
currency risk
Used to hedge long-term 
currency risk
not
used
Occasionally
used
Frequently
used
not
used
Occasionally
used
Frequently
used
Forward exchange contract
Currency Future contract
Currency Option contract
Local Currency Borrowing
Foreign currency borrowing
Currency Swaps
Compensation of forward contract 
and option contract
Immediate buying of foreign 
currencies to cover future payment
Government exchange risk 
guarantees
Others please specified ............
5. 4) Please indicate the extent to which of the following O perational hedging methods can be used 
in your company to hedge the foreign exchange risk. ___________ ____________________________
Methods
Used to hedge short-term 
currency risk
Used to hedge long-term 
currency risk
not
used
Occasionally
used
Frequently
used
not
used
Occasionally
used
Frequently
used
Adjusting prices
Adjusting marketing strategies
Adjusting sources of inputs
Diversification
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Others please specify ..................
5.5) Which type of currency risk does your company incur?
Transaction Risk n
(The risk that the domestic currency value o f  a future payment or receipt denominated in a foreign 
currency may vary as a direct result o f  changes in exchange rates).
Pre-transaction Risk . . .
(This is exchange risk arising in the near future and before entering into a commercial contract 
(e.g. exposure from publication o f  a price list, submission o f  a tender, a decision to purchase 
a piece o f  capital equipment before an order is placed, etc).
Competitive Risk □
(The risk a corporation experiences when changes in the exchange rate affect the local or foreign 
denominated future cash flows, which depend on the competitive structure o f  the markets in which the 
corporation obtains its inputs and sell its outputs).
Supply & Demand Risk n
(The volatility on the exchange rate may affect the supply and demand position o f  the company’s volume 
o f  sales and purchases or its prices or costs).
5.6) How completely does your company hedge the following risks?
a) Transaction Risk
b) Pre-transaction Risk
c) Competitive Risk
d) Supply & Demand Risk
Hedge
Completely
Hedge
Partially
Do 
Not Hedge□ □ □□ □ □□ □ □□ □ □
5.7) Which one of the following best characterized your company’s attitude (your attitude) to 
foreign exchange risks?
Items Yes No
1 We are hedging our foreign exchange risk | | | |
2 We have no small amount of foreign exchange exposure and as a result we do not have 
any hedging activity
3 We are hedging our foreign exchange exposure but our purpose is to generate some | | | |
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gains
4 The movements in foreign exchange rate are affecting our company and while we know 
that there are some methods for hedging the foreign exchange exposure but we do not 
hedge
5 The movements in foreign exchange rate are affecting our company but we do not 
hedge our exposure as we feel hedging process is difficult and we have more important 
problems than foreign exchange risk
6 The movements in foreign exchange rate are affecting our company however we do not 
have enough experience on how to manage foreign exchange exposure
7 The movement in foreign exchange rate negatively affect our company and I am 
interested in hedging the risk but my company policy rejects hedging activity
8 The movements in foreign exchange rates are affecting our company and we are 
interested to hedge but the hedging instrument contracts which are available for 
hedging are prohibited from an Islamic point o f view.
□
Part Six* The Company External Environment
6 .1) Is it possible to say that your company’s markets are dominated by a small number o f companies?
| {No □  One company □  Two or three companies | | Four companies
□  More than four companies |
Is your company one o f these companies which control markets.
6.2) How can you describe your company’s markets?
Competition market Price regulated market Oligopolistic market
yes □  No □
j iCZI
6.3) How many banks your company is dealing with.
One bank Two banks Three banks Four banks More than four banks□ □
6.4) Does your company have a strong relationship with any bank who offer your company a 
special service.
yes □  Strong relationship with many banks □  No special relationship □
6.5) How many years have your company had in a special relationship with one o f these banks?
From one year to three years From 4 years to 7 years From 8 years to 12 years From 13 years to 15 years • M ore than 15 years
=  i = i  t =  =  c =
6.7) Could you please define to what extent you agree with the following statements relating to 
your company?
The Statem ent A gree R ath er  N atu re  R ath er  d isagree
agree D isagree
1 The market regulation reduces the impact of the foreign exchange rates 1 2 3  4 5
movements
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6  We usually receive some leaflets and recommendations on how to 
manage exchange risk from our bank
7 The derivative contracts (forward, future, option, and 
swap contracts) are prohibited from Islamic “Shariah”
2 The exchange rate regulation hinders foreign exchange risk 1 2 3 4 5
management
3 The market regulation hinders foreign exchange risk management 1 2  3  4 5
4 The exchange rate regulation reduce the impact of the foreign 1 2 3 4 5
exchange rate movements
5 The treasury department in our bank visit our company in order to
provide us with information on how to manage the foreign exchange j ^ 3  4  5
risk
1 2 3 4 5
1 2  3 4 5
8  As there are no acceptable financial contracts (from Islamic ‘Shariah’) 1 2  3
in the market to hedge currency exposure, does this affect your ability
to hedge
9 The absence of the local markets for the forward, future, and option 1 2  3
contracts affect our .understanding of these contracts as methods for
hedging purpose.
Thanks for filling this questionnaire and if you want to added any comment please use this space
Y ours Sincerely
M r. Fahad A l-m ohaim eed
P. O. B ox 5272
B uraidah
A l-Q assem
Saudi A rabia
M obile: 056146765
H om e: 063811933
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Appendix B.II: A Copy of the English Version of the Interview Guide
Section One- 
General Information about the Company
The purpose o f  this section is to explore the firm ’s  internal 
characteristics which m ay affect the hedging decision. The questions in 
this section se e k  to identify firm s’ characteristics for both the hedging 
and non -hedging firms.
Q l: What is the firm industry?
Q2: Can you describe the company ownership structure?
Q3: What kind of international trading does your company practice?
Q4: What is the percentage of your company’s foreign purchases from the total 
purchases? No l%-20% 21%-50% 51%-80% 81%-100%
Q5: What is the percentage of your company’s foreign sales from the total sales?
No l%-20% 21%-50% 51%-80% 81%-100%
Q6: What are the total sales, the total assets, and the capital of the company?
Q7: How possible it is to reduce the agency conflicts between managers and owners? 
Q8: How possible it is for the company to increase the investment opportunities?
Q9: What are the things that may increase the probability of going bankrupt?
Q10: How possible it is for the company to reduce the corporate finance costs?-
18
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Section Two- 
The Foreign Exchange Exposure M anagement. 
Characteristics
The aim o f  this section is to explore the firm ’s foreign exchange 
exposure management strategy. This part is to identify i f  the firm s in the 
interviews were hedging their currency exposure and to identify some 
factors that m ay interrupt a firm from hedging. A brief introduction for  
the different currency exposure management m ethods available is  
presented.
Q l: Does your company manage the currency exposure?
(Internal, Operational, Financial Hedging Techniques)*
Q2: Does your company have a risk management policy?
Q3: What do you think about the costs of implementing the hedging strategy?
(High or Low)
Q4: Does your company usually forecast the future exchange rates?
Q5: How many foreign currencies does your company use in its exports and imports 
activities?
Q6: Do you think there is any Islamic solution to the currency exposure?
19
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Section Three* 
The Manager’s Characteristics
The aim o f this section is  to explore the effect o f  the management and 
risk  m anagers’ characteristics in hedging decision. This section is to 
determine the attitude and ability o f  the financial manager against 
currency exposure in their firms and whether they  see hedging as 
important to their firms.
Q1: What is your position in the company?
Q2: What is the length of time working in the company?
Q3: What is the length of time working in the current job?
Q4: What is the level and the area of your qualification?
Q5: Does your company have any managerial compensation system?
I f  yes can you describe it?
Q6: Is the manager of the company one of the company’s owners? Yes No
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Section Four: 
The External Environments
The aim o f this section is to identify the firm ’s external factors which 
m ay influence the decision to hedge or not to hedge the currency 
exposure.
Ql: Can you describe your company’s markets? (the output and market sources)
Q2: Could you please describe the competitive position of your company in the 
markets? Why you describe your company’s competition level like this?
Q3: Can you describe the relationship between your company and banks?
Q4: Does your company use a specific accounting method in order to minimize the
effect of the exchange rate movements in the financial statement?
Q5: Does the market and exchange rate regulation affect the level of currency
exposure?__________________________________________________________
Section Five: 
The Determinants of Hedging Decision
The aim o f this section is  to address any missing or uncovered factors 
that m ay influence the currency exposure hedging decision. To ask  the 
interview ees about the determinants o f  the currency exposure hedging  
decision, it  was decided to ask the interviewees this question/
What are the determinants of the hedging or not to hedge decision in your company’? 
After that the interviewer was asked the question, ‘are there any further factors that 
influence his decision to hedge or not to hedge’? After that the interviewer asked 
another question, “When did you decide to hedge or not to hedge and on what basis 
did you build your decision?
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Appendix C: Testing the Collinearitv and the Standardized 
Residuals.
Figure C .l: Testing the Table C.l: Testing for collinearity
standardized residuals in the in the hedging incentive variables
hedging incentives model (Indicators).
__________ (Indicators).____________
The Model Independent Variable ToleranceD
The company's owners participate on the decision of the strategy and plan to grow up the company
.310
the company's total sales have been improved .264
Most of our company’s profits were paid as dividend to the firm's owners .638
the owners of the company satisfy with improvement in a company .348
our company has adopted a monitoring device system to control the relationship between managers and owners
.563
our company's ability to service its debt is low .633
The percentage of our firm's debt is high .604
In our industry the probability of going bankruptcy is very high .367
we are dealing in business where the probability of gain and loss is equal .394
Our ability in managing the financial risk protect expected cash flow .247
We always have a plan to improve our investment opportunities .262
the ability of our company to get over the financial problems increase our financial opportunities
.498
the investment opportunities in our market are good .412
we finance our investment by increasing the company's capital or asking the owners for help
.403
we present our financial statements in a way which can increase our probability to receive more flexible external finance
.466
We have more flexibility to get external fund under a flexible conditions .490
in our company the cost of external finance is cheaper as our financial risk is low
.453
from our normal activities we can generate enough cash flow for future investments
.397
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Figure C.2: Testing the standardized Table C.2: Testing for collinearity
residuals in the manager risk aversion in the managerial risk aversion
model. variables.
S ta n d a rd  r e s id u a l
The Model Independent 
Variable
ToleranceD
Company’s  ownership .601
Owner or Shareholders own 
10% of Firm’s Stock
.684
The managerial ownership on 
the firm
.474
The managers monetary 
compensation system
.877
The annual income for the 
manager
.764
The managers equity 
compensation system
.755
the age of the respondent .950
The effect of the Islamic 
commercial law on the hedging 
decisionD
.813D
Figure C.3: Testing the 
standardized residuals for the 
 hedging needs variables.
3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
N* B
Standard residual
Table C.3: Testing for collinearity in 
the hedging needs variables.
The Model Independent Tolerance □
Variable Model
with
collinearity
problem
Model
without
collinearity
problem
Classification of business 
activity
.530 .538
What is the description of your 
company's market (which 
markets)
.398 .400
The number of currencies 
internationally used for trade
.649 .651
The vulnerability of the firm’s 
foreign exchange rates
.699 .702
The magnitude of the firm 
exports
.434 .435
The magnitude of the firm 
imports
.589 .642
company’s sales in foreign 
markets
.301 .302
company's purchase from 
foreign markets
.575 .576
company's debt in foreign 
currencies
.631 .632
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The relevant of the foreign 
exchange risk
.696 .697
The sensitivity of the main 
products' demand to changes 
in price
.625 .627
The different between the 
company's products sold and 
those of their competitors
.683 .701
The competition level .315 .315
Number of competitors on the 
markets
.536 .542
The sensitivity of Sale 
Volumes to changes in foreign 
exchange rates
.365 .371 □
The sensitivity of Profit 
Margins to changes in foreign 
exchange rates
.135 Excluded
The sensitivity of purchase to 
changes in foreign exchange 
rates
.357 .343
The sensitivity of costs to 
changes in foreign exchange 
rates
.334 .731
The sensitivity of Cash Flow 
to changes in foreign 
exchange rates
.827 .647
The accounting method and 
the effect on the accounting 
information
.62513
9 Market Situation+Currency 
regulation hinders FXRM
.357 .343
The currency regulation 
reduce the impact of foreign 
exchange rates movements
.334 .731
8 Market Situation+Market 
regulations reduce the impact 
of exchange changesD
.827 .647
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Figure C.4: Testing the standardized residuals for the hedging ability variables.
-3«
83N =
Standard residual
Figure C.5: Testing the 
standardized residuals for the final 
model.
3
2
0
-2
-3 63N’
S tan d a rd  residua l
• Table C.4: Testing for collinearity 
in the final model variables.
The Model Independent Variable ToleranceD
The total sale to asset ratio .659
Tangible assets to total assets .734
cash flow to total assets .686
our company has adopted a 
monitoring device system to 
control the relationship between 
managers and owners
.715
Most of our company’s profits 
were paid as dividend to the 
firm's owners
.608
we are dealing in business where 
the probability of gain and loss is 
equal
.713
the ability of our company to get 
over the financial problems 
increase our financial 
opportunities
.627
the investment opportunities in 
our market are good
.650
Owner or Shareholders own 10% 
of Firm's Stock
.637
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The managers monetary 
compensation system
.731
The managers equity 
compensation system
.791
the age of the respondent .572
The effect of they Islamic law on 
the hedging decision
.534
Classification of business activity .759
What is the description of your 
company's market (which 
markets)
.681
The different between the 
company's products sold and 
those of their competitors
.614
The sensitivity of costs to 
changes in foreign exchange 
rates
.630
the respondent qualification .668
The length or period of 
experience in risk management
.664
practices
we run some training program in 
hedging FXR
.692
The relationship with bank .623
The cost of implementing the 
foreign exchange risk 
management
.553
The participation of the operating 
departments in currency risk 
management strategy
.684
The nationality of the one who 
responsible for risk 
managementD
.697D
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Figure C.6: Testing the standardized Table C.5: Testing for collinearity in
residuals for the hedging incentives the hedging incentive variables
_______ (accounting ratio).___________
The Model ToleranceD
Independent 
Variable
Leverage 0.822
Debt service 0.813
coverage
R&D expenses 0.910
ratio
The total sale to 0.807
total asset ratio
The expenses 0.891
to total sa les  
ratio
Tangible ratio 0.930
The cash flow 0.937
to total assets  
ratio
Operating profit 0.868D
margin ratio_______________________
model (accounting ratio).
3 t- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2
1-
0
-1
-2
-3 J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
N = 83
S tandard residual
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Appendix D. Tests of Normality
t  ests oj Aformality
Table D.1: Tests of normality for hedging incentives variables 
.__________  (Accounting ratios)__________________
Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig.
Leverage .075 83 .078
Debt Service Coverage .083 83 .061
Operating Profit Margin .062 83 .113
The Total Sale to Total 
Asset Ratio
.066 83 .091
The Expenses to Total Sales 
Ratio
.071 83 .084
R & D Ratio .077 83 .071
The Cash Flow to Total 
Assets Ratio
.081 83 .064
Tangible Assets .064 83 .102
Not: Field (2001) stated that “if the test is non-significant (p > 0.05) it tells us that the distribution of the 
sample is not significant different from a normal distribution (i.e. it is probably normal). If, however, the 
test is significant (p < 0.05) then the distribution in question is significantly different from a normal 
distribution (i.e. it is non-normal).
Table D.2: Tests of normality for the hedging incentive variable 
______________________(Indicators)______________________
Variables Indicator Indicator Kolmogorov-Smirnovnumber
Statistic df Sig.
Agency Costs 1 The company's owners participate on the 
decision of the strategy and plan to grow the 
company
.243 83 .000
2 The company's total sales have been 
improved
.260 83 .000
3 Most of our company’s profits are paid as 
dividend to the firm's owners
.290 83 .000
4 The owners of the company satisfied with 
improvement in the company
.218 83 ■ .000
5 Our company has adopted a monitoring 
device system to control the relationship 
between managers and owners
.281 83 .000
Financial 
Distress Costs
7
8
Our company's ability to service its debt is low 
The percentage of our firm’s debt is high
.180
.264
83
83
.000
.000
9 In our industry the probability of going 
bankrupt is very high
.227 83 .000
10 We are dealing in business where the 
probability of gain and loss is equal :
.219 83 .000D
Investment
Opportunities:
12 Our ability in managing the financial risk 
protects our expected cash flow
.268 83 .000
13 We always have a plan to improve our 
investment opportunities
.244 83 .000
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Variables Indicator Indicator Kolmogorov-Smirnovnumber
Statistic df Sig.
14 The ability of our company to get over the 
financial problems increase our financial 
opportunities
.225 83 .000
15 The investment opportunities in our market 
are good
.249 83 .000
Corporate 16 
Finance Cost
We finance our investment by increasing the 
company’s capital or asking the owners for 
- help ."'
.230 83 .000
17 We present our financial statements in a way 
which can increase our probability to receive 
more flexible external finance
.215 83 .000
18 We have more flexibility to get external fund 
under a flexible conditions
225 83 .000
19 In our company the cost of external finance is 
low as our financial risk is low
.222 83 .000
21 ■ From our normal activities we can generate 
enough cash flow for future investments
.271 83 •000D
Table D.3: Tests of normality for managerial risk aversion
variables
Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig.
Organisation Form .269 83 .000
Firm Control .471 83 .000
Managerial ownership .374 83 .000
Managerial performance 
monetary compensation 
system
.311 83 .000
The equity compensation 
system
.212 83 .000
The manager’s annual 
salary
.387 83 .000
Manager’s age .231 83 .000
Islamic commercial law .175 83 .0000
Table D.4: Tests of normality for hedging need variables
Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig.
Industries .145 82 .000
Markets .342 82 .000
Diversification .272 82 .000
The volatility of the foreign 
exchange rates that a firm 
uses in international trading
.257 82 .000
The magnitude of the firm's 
foreign denominated exports
.250 82 .000
The magnitude of the firm's 
foreign denominated imports
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Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig.
The company's debt in 
foreign currencies
.324 82 .000
The company's purchases in 
foreign currencies
.229 82 .000
The company's sales in 
foreign currencies
.214 82 .000
The relevance of the risks .336 82 .000
The sensitivity of the main 
products' demand to the 
changes in price
.179 82 .000
The difference between the 
company’s products and 
those of their competitors
.249 82 .000
Number of competitors on 
the markets
.228 82 .000
The sensitivity of purchase 
volumes to changes in 
foreign exchange rates
.212 82 .000
The sensitivity of sale 
volumes to changes in 
foreign exchange rates
.268 82 .000
The sensitivity of profit 
margins to changes in 
foreign exchange rates
.305 82 .000
The sensitivity of costs to 
changes in foreign exchange 
rates
.250 82 .000
The sensitivity of cash flows 
to changes in foreign 
exchange rates
.299 82 .000
Accounting approach .230 82 .000
The currency regulation 
hinders foreign exchange 
risk management
.190 82 .000
The currency regulation 
reduces the impact of the 
foreign exchange rate 
movements
.231 82 .000
The market regulation 
reduces the impact of the 
foreign exchange rate 
movements
.184 82 .OOOD
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Table D.5: Tests of normality for hedging ability variables
Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig.
the respondent qualification .353 83 .000
The respondent qualification 
area
.310 83 .000
Length of working in a 
company
.355 83 .000
The length of experience in 
your current job
.266 83 .000
The length or period of 
experience in risk 
management practice
.220 83 .000
in the company we have a 
qualified people to deal with 
risk management
.238 83 .000
In the company we have 
qualified people on how to 
use the risk management 
tools
.232 83 .000
We do not have any difficult 
in understanding the 
relevance and importance of 
our currency exposure
.241 83 .000
It is not that difficult to 
measure our currency 
exposure with the necessary 
accuracy
.229 83 .000
We always pay dividend to 
our shareholders
.262 83 .000
We have some criteria and 
standards to measure the 
managerial performance
.211 83 .000
Our profit has increased 
during the last yearsD
.199 83 .000
we run some training 
program in hedging FXR
.224 83 .000
banks visit us and tell us 
how to hedge FXR
.255 83 .000
receive some leaflets and 
recommendations on how to 
manage FXR
.245 83 .000
Banks dealingD .282 83 .000
The relationship with bank .351 83 .000
The total sales .223 83 .000
The total assets .318 83 .000
The capital .237 83 .000
In the company we have risk 
management strategies
.233 83 .000
In the company we have a 
policy of the use of financial 
derivatives
.247 83 .000
The absence of the forward, 
future, and option markets 
do not affect our ability to 
hedge the foreign exchange
.265 83 .000
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Variables Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic df Sig.
exposure
The risk management tools 
available in the markets to 
hedge the foreign exchange 
exposure are not that risky
.256 83 .000
Implementing the foreign 
exchange risk is not costlyD
.254 83 .000
We feel the benefit of 
hedging is exceeding the 
cost from it
.253 83 .000
Using derivatives for 
hedging is not costly
.258 83 .000
Forecasting the future 
foreign currency cash flow
.405 83 .OOO
In the company, the * 
operating departments such 
as sales department and ' 
purchase departments are 
participating in the 
preparation of the risk 
management strategy
.261 83 .000
There is a high level of 
coordination between the 
different departments in our 
company
.250 83 .000
Other department usually 
provides me with relevant 
information about the foreign 
exchange exposure in the 
company
.271 83 .000
The nationality of the one 
who is responsible for risk 
management
.276 83 .000D
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